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1. The Challenge of Governance 
in Remote Australia 
Professor Ian Marsh 
Public concern about remote Australia focuses on the wellbeing of Indigenous Australians 
- this is reflected both in the role that the federal government has adopted and in the 
responsibilities that it has assumed. The remoteFOCUS report 1argues that this is 
insufficient: the scope of policy needs to be extended to include all the residents of this 
area and the delivery of services radically decentralised. Extension of the scope of policy 
to all residents is essential for at least four reasons: 
The potential to develop regional economies, which is critical to Indigenous development, 
implicates all other residents and these decisions need to be taken jointly. 
The increasingly youthful Indigenous population will inevitably play a larger role in the 
unfolding of overall developmental strategies. 
Land Rights means the influence of Indigenous communities on access and use of remote 
places is vastly increased and they are often key stakeholders in any larger economic 
decisions affecting these regions. 
Fund flows to Indigenous communities and to repair backlogs in services are an important 
element in regional economies and thus potentially affect all residents. 
The delivery of services needs to be radically decentralised to honour sentiments and 
intentions that have been repeated frequently but that have proved impossible to translate 
into practice. Despite this, no official body has ever questioned the basic framework for 
programme delivery or asked whether governance might itself be a primary contributor 
to policy failings. By contrast, the adequacy of present governance arrangements is the 
focus of the remoteFOCUS project.  
It is instructive to recall how frequently and how repeatedly the need for collaboration 
with affected citizens and more contextualised solutions has been invoked as fundamental 
to policy success. For example, focusing only on Indigenous Australians, the most recent 
policy statement (Framework for Engaging with Indigenous Australians, November 
2011) states:  
Genuine engagement with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians is 
fundamental to our efforts to improve life outcomes and close the gap in the Indigenous 
disadvantage. 
                                                        
1 Walker BW, Porter DJ, and Marsh I. 2012  Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland: How 
Government needs to work in remote Australia, Desert Knowledge Australia, Alice Springs 
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A critical step in improving outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Australians is for government agencies, service providers and contractors is to engage 
them as valued stakeholders in the development, design, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of policies, programs, services and legislation that have an impact on 
them.  
Also in November 2011, the Commonwealth released its Indigenous Economic 
Development Strategy which states: 
Government cannot act alone. Success depends on working in partnership with 
Indigenous leaders communities and individuals and with business, industry peak 
bodies and non-government organizations 
Closing the gap requires a genuine partnership with Indigenous Australians at all levels 
and the Government is committed to a relationship based on trust and mutual respect 
Real sustainable change cannot be achieved by government alone. It relies on 
Indigenous Australians, the private sector, the not-for-profit sector and all levels of 
government 
Genuine engagement with indigenous Australians is fundamental to the Australian 
government’s efforts to increase personal and economic well-being and close the gap in 
Indigenous disadvantage. (Indigenous Economic Development Strategy 2011- 2018 
P18/19) 
Writing in 2005, Dr Peter Shergold, the former Secretary of DPMC and a primary author 
of the current framework, has observed: 
‘We need to drive governance programs in the direction of connectedness. Programs 
need to be made more flexible, responsive to community needs and priorities and 
delivered in a holistic manner….More importantly, there needs to be a delivery of 
programs in a seamless manner to local communities’ (2005) 
In a further speech in 2006, he voiced his personal frustration at the persistent failure to 
achieve significant change: 
‘I am aware that, for some fifteen years as a public administrator, too much of what I 
have done on behalf of government for the very best of motives has had the very worst of 
outcomes…..In my personal opinion three things need to be done….We need to tailor 
government programs to the particular circumstances of discrete communities…..We 
must ensure that discretionary government expenditures are negotiated to goals that 
address local needs….Community challenges are almost invariably holistic in their 
nature and require a variety of programs from all three tiers of government to be 
delivered in a coordinated whole of government manner….’ (2006). 
These particular sentiments are echoed in more general terms in recent reports on 
broader public sector reform. At the federal level, such ideas figure prominently in the 
Moran Review (Ahead of the Game, Blueprint for the Reform of Australian Government 
Administration, March 2010); and at a state level, in the Western Australian Economic 
Audit Committee Report (Putting the Public First, Partnering with the Community and 
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Business to Deliver Outcomes, October 2009).  This latter report is particularly relevant. 
For example, it asserts that ‘agencies operating in silos will be a thing of the past’. It also 
envisages a radical decentralisation of programmes via the introduction of self managed 
budgets and devolution of programme responsibilities to communities and community 
organisations (p. 47). Both these reports underline the profound challenge to centralised 
processes, cultures and organisational and budgetary arrangements that are involved in 
the next iteration of public sector reform.  
The most recent comprehensive overview of the Indigenous policy framework by a senior 
official team (Strategic Review of Indigenous Expenditure, Department of Finance, 
February 2010) identified the many obstacles that continue to confound achievement of 
espoused outcomes. This report repeatedly stresses the need for more contextualised 
approaches and more local engagement (e.g. p. 13, p. 27, p. 53, p. 73, p. 246, p. 247, p. 
248, p. 325). But the Finance review then also concluded that ‘the persistence of ... 
difficulties is more a reflection of the scale and complexity of the task than it is of 
inadequacies of governance’ (p. 298). 
Similar contradictory themes are to be found in the most recent assessment of 
persistently disappointing outcomes (Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage, Productivity 
Commission, August 2011, p. 9). In discussing what needs to be done, this report also 
emphasised the importance of local engagement and sensitivity to context: 
Analysis of the ‘things that work’, together with wide consultation with Indigenous 
people and governments, identified the following ‘success factors’: 
 cooperative approaches between Indigenous people and government - often with 
the non-profit and private sectors as well 
 community involvement in program design and decision making – a ‘bottom-up’ 
rather than ‘top-down’ approach 
 good governance – at organization community and government levels 
 ongoing government support – including human, financial and physical 
resources.  
The lack of any of these factors can result in program failure.” 
But the Productivity Commission did not then take the next logical step to suggest 
structural change and more place based approaches.  
Indeed resistance to taking anything but a nationally consistent approach is emphasised 
in the Treasury Red Book (2010), which warned the incoming Gillard government: ‘The 
extent to which regional policies can influence settlement patterns is likely to be 
limited….. Historical experience shows regional settlement policies are expensive and 
inefficient and result in an inefficient allocation of resources. This will be particularly the 
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case in a full employment economy where any short term employment and economic gains 
of one locality will inevitably come at the expense of another…’2   
This report reaches wholly contrary conclusions. Specifically: 
 First, it demonstrates that governance arrangements are a threshold cause 
of policy failure. As discussed later in detail, centralised protocols and siloed 
departments undercut local responsiveness. Reframed governance will not of 
course by itself ‘solve’ the many problems of local communities.  That can 
ultimately only be achieved with the active involvement of the affected citizens. 
This is the essence of so-called ‘wicked’ public policy problems. Solutions 
invariably require the active participation of affected citizens, their families and 
other relevant groups and representative organisations. No solution is possible 
without such engagements. But this essential mobilisation is negated by the 
present governance framework and cannot be remedied within it. 
 Second, policy for remote Australia needs to be separately conceived and framed. 
This zone constitutes 85% of Australia’s land mass, but is occupied by only 4.5% of 
the population. Of this number, 24% are Indigenous Australians, indeed their 1200 
communities scattered across the inland represent the only secure settlements in 
this vast, undefended, resource rich zone. In essence, the circumstances and 
challenges of remote Australia are wholly different from those that confront 
metropolitan or rural citizens. To cite only one critical factor: the role of 
government in the economy that may be appropriate for metropolitan and rural 
communities does not fit remote Australia. The prosperous mining precincts, 
the homeland settlement household and communal economies and the 
great pastoral estates all implicate government in a primary economic 
role quite unlike that which exists elsewhere in Australia.  
 Third, the challenge in designing new policies for remote Australia is a strategic 
one: a rethink from fundamentals is required. This covers the appropriate 
governance arrangements for this critical zone. A paradigm shift in policy – 
one that challenges structurally embedded habits, practices, and 
approaches – will always be hard to accomplish. This is trebly hard in 
Australia’s policy systems which has few if any platforms which can host such 
exchanges. Think of the recent Department of Finance Strategic review. This 
fundamental report was only published after a freedom of information request. The 
citations in the report are invariably to other government reports. The broader 
thinking, reflected in the bibliography associated with this present document, did 
not figure. The authors are distinguished public servants. Their competence and 
decency are beyond question. Their limited frame reflects a systemic problem. An 
appropriate discussion of possible new policy frameworks – one that is sufficiently 
open to new evidence and new concepts, that is serial and sufficiently protracted, 
                                                        
2 http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?ContentID=1875&NavID= 
 5 
and that is not immediately politicised - is (to say the least) very difficult in the 
present Australian policy system. 
At the heart of this report is a simple claim: there is an imperative need to reframe 
governance. This composite concept recognises the essential interdependence between the 
formal apparatus of the state and its publics. The parties are engaged in a dynamic 
exchange: the opposite of directed, deferential, passive or paternalistic linkage. In 
achieving positive and sustainable outcomes, engagement has a primary not a secondary 
role. In other terms, the capacity and right of citizens to participate in the 
choices that affect them is integral to any conception of governance. Meantime, 
one powerful reason for enhanced attention to governance arises from the seemingly 
intractable social issues which government’s now must tackle. These are generally 
systemic in character and the relevant system is place based – siloed approaches are 
ineffective and, as later evidence demonstrates, can compound the problems that they are 
intended to redress. This report explores the fresh challenges associated with the 
continued unfolding of these imperatives as they apply to remote Australia.  
Remote Australia is distinctive not only for its sparse population, desert and savannah 
environments and vast distances, but also for the dimensions and scope of the public 
policy challenge: on one side, Indigenous citizens who are the most marginalised of all 
Australians and on the other, an unprecedented resources boom that is intensively 
affecting several of its regions. A further factor is an overlapping sharing of policy 
responsibilities between federal and state government. Public policy has focused 
specifically on Indigenous Australians, but most recently via metrics and frameworks that 
focus on relative individual disadvantage. This framing not only sustains welfare 
dependency it also ignores the primary inter-dependence of Indigenous and non-
indigenous communities. Indigenous Australians constitute just under twenty-five 
percent of the remote population. Their futures are necessarily implicated in these wider 
settings. Further, whilst the present framing gestures to the systemic and contextual 
character of policy challenges, we will see that practice falls far short of this ideal. 
The present policy framework is parsed as ‘closing the gap’.3 This presumes the centre 
knows best what the outcomes should be. 4 In other words, if they enjoy the same broad 
material opportunities and material circumstances, all Australians will march to the same 
                                                        
3 According to the Prime Minister’s Report (2011): ‘The Australian government’s agenda to close 
the gap in Indigenous disadvantage is driven by three important imperatives: to overcome decades 
of underinvestment in services and infrastructure; to encourage and support personal 
responsibility as the foundation for healthy, functional families and communities; and respect 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.’ 
4 According to Mick Dodson: ‘What we’ve done consistently (in this country) is a top-down 
approach where policy is developed through party politics...the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people are rarely involved in that process....the answer is to work with Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people because we know what the problems are..we ought to be in charge of 
the answers.’ (www.onlineopinion.com.au/print article 12535, accessed 31 August. 
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drum beat. This strategy, honourable though its intent may be, ignores both the 
distinctive history of Australia’s Indigenous peoples and the diversity of the non-
Indigenous Australian community. It ignores the principle that is the heart of non-
indigenous citizenship. This acknowledges as primary a democratic right of choice.5 
Moreover, this right is seeded, cultivated and exercised through voice and through 
direct and practical engagements. Of course powerless and marginalised citizens can 
be uncomfortable conversationalists.6 
These considerations are critical in the development of policy both for remote Australia 
and for Indigenous Australians. If equal democratic citizenship, as both practice and 
orientation, is the objective, the development of agency amongst Indigenous Australians 
is a pre-eminent challenge. This is partly because capacities vary between communities, 
partly because communities must largely author their own solutions, and partly because 
the futures of Indigenous and non-indigenous Australians need to be linked. Participation 
is required not only as a fundamental right of citizenship, but also (as all official and 
independent studies attest) as the only sound basis for effective policy. Yet from a 
governance perspective, remote Australia has been increasingly subject to paternalistic 
and top-down direction and control. It is not presently recognised as a distinctive domain 
- one with its own specialised needs for framework policies and for a governance approach 
that acknowledges and nourishes agency. Reversing that perception is the primary 
objective of the remoteFOCUS project.  
Transforming present governance approaches presents formidable challenges – and from 
the outset their scale needs to be recognised. Contextualised approaches may be required. 
But there can be no contextualised solutions until governance is itself significantly 
reconfigured. The governance gap cannot be solved by ad hoc adaptations. To 
integrate legitimate national and state concerns with local interests, basic 
structural change is required. The alternative is more of the same. 
  
                                                        
5 For a sensitive discussion of the complexity of choice in an indigenous context, particularly the 
tensions between individualist and collectivist patterns, see for example Tim Rowse (2002); also 
Pearson, 
6 In a paper on ATSIC, Will Sanders describes its advocacy: in 1993 and again in 1997/98 against 
the Commonwealth and with the land councils in native title negotiations; in 1994/95 ATSIC 
attained accredited NGO status at the UN where it presented perspectives other than those of the 
government; in 1995 it presented a comprehensive reform program; from 2000 it was an active 
proponent for a treaty. Sanders comments: ‘As this increasing independence was emerging, one 
analyst and ATSIC-insider suggested that this was a strategic mistake; that ATSIC was 
unnecessarily distancing itself from the executive processes of government where it had an 
advantage in comparison to other Indigenous organisations...others saw independence as 
anomalous behaviour...I would argue that ATSIC was obliged to develop its independence from 
government in order to build credibility and legitimacy with its Indigenous constituency. This was 
an achievement and strength for ATSIC not a mistake or an anomaly.(Sanders, 2004).  
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2. The Current State of Remote 
Australia 
Dr Bruce Walker 
Since its inception in April 2008, the remoteFOCUS initiative has worked to establish a 
clear case for the need to approach the governance and administration of remote Australia 
in a different way.  A group of 28 people with extensive experience in dealing with Remote 
Australia, including senior industry figures, developed the prospectus remoteFOCUS: 
Revitalising Remote Australia, which was released publicly in September 20097.  The 
Prospectus argued that the situation in Remote Australia was reaching crisis point, that 
there was evidence of a ‘failed state’ in the heart of our nation and if this was not 
addressed there would be dire economic, social, cultural, environmental and security 
consequences for Australia as a whole.  
Remote Australia occupies approximately 85% of the Australian continent. 
However, because of the nature of the nation’s political system and demographic realities 
(95% of the nation’s population resides in the cities and their rural hinterlands), Remote 
Australian settlements and their residents are marginal within the Australian polity. 
Many Australians view Remote Australia in terms of extremes; as a last frontier, a vast 
unsettled terrain, a place of Indigenous crisis, or an economic wasteland. To them, it has 
legitimacy in Australian nationhood only because of the heritage status of the pastoral 
industry and the major resource development projects which are scattered throughout the 
remote regions. 
It is worth noting the dissonance between this view with that of many Indigenous 
Australians who see Remote Australia as Country, a place that nourishes and provides 
meaning and identity.  One world view wants to dominate and tame the space while the 
other lives in and adapts within it.  This difference or tension in perception is part of the 
complex of issues that needs to be addressed and reconciled. 
The distorted “extremes” view from closely settled Australia leads to a failure to 
appreciate the looming social, economic and ecological crisis in Remote Australia that has 
significant consequences for the nation as a whole. 
Remote Australia is inevitably distant – and remote - from the everyday attentions of 
government.  Despite best intentions Remote Australia will not consistently attract the 
attention of metropolitan-focused governments.  Successive and sincere efforts to ‘make a 
difference’ have generally failed. It is vital to have an effective and sustainable governance 
regime for Remote Australia which is not dependent on the intermittent attention of 
distant and distracted governments.  
                                                        
7 Desert Knowledge Australia 2008 remoteFOCUS: Revitalising Remote Australia. Prospectus. 
Version 1.9. Alice Springs. 
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RemoteFOCUS seeks a serious public discourse about the incapacity of the present 
structure of government to administer Remote Australia effectively.  This must transcend 
the notion that these problems belong solely to the realm of Indigenous public policy.  
Remote Australia is not solely an ‘Indigenous problem’. Much of the recent public policy 
debate on Indigenous issues has been focused on addressing the issue of dysfunction 
within Indigenous settlements. Unfortunately, this debate has ignored the failure of the 
‘governance of governments’ in Indigenous affairs and Remote Australia generally, and 
the fundamental role that dysfunction and failure has played in contributing to remote 
community socio-economic disadvantage and under-development.  
RemoteFOCUS seeks reform of public policy relating to Remote Australia because 
government has responsibility to provide an institutional framework that enables civil 
society and economic and social development. Without reform in this area other reforms 
and investment will continue to fail. 
The present circumstances in Remote Australia have been influenced by the frameworks 
within which industries such as mining and pastoralism have operated.  Conflicts between 
economic activities and Indigenous interests have helped shape attitudes and structures. 
In recent years an increasingly constructive engagement between industry and Indigenous 
interests point to a more collaborative future.8  RemoteFOCUS hopes to engage with these 
interests to assist in promoting reform in the governance, administration and public 
policy of Remote Australia.  
There is a range of views and differing analysis relating to the problems of remote 
Australia. These include: 
 that Government action and intervention is required in remote Australia on the 
basis of ‘market failure’  
 that the social crisis in this region of Australia is a consequence of structural issues 
of underdevelopment and legacies of colonialism that call for non-market based 
public investment solutions, and  
 that neo liberalism and the emphasis on the market economy has fundamentally 
eroded the sense of community in Australia and driven a growth in individualism 
and inequality which has exacerbated a neglect of Remote Australia.   
It is acknowledged that such views are often strongly contested in the wider community 
and within sectoral interests but remoteFOCUS believe that despite some ideological 
differences consensus can (and must) be achieved on the broad thrust of structural 
reforms required for the economic, social and cultural inclusion of this vast region of the 
continent within Australian nationhood. 
                                                        
8 Natasha Robinson  Indigenous rise from boom, The Australian, August 01, 201212:00A 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/>  
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The participants in the first forum held in Perth in April 2008 did not presume to be an 
expert group prescribing solutions to the evident problems.  The purpose of the 
Prospectus was to enlist the engagement of Indigenous, corporate, civil society, academic 
and broader community interests in a new and inclusive conversation about the future of 
Remote Australia; one that would influence governments and the private sector to embark 
on an agenda for fundamental reform and re-engagement.  
The ‘Failed State’ of Remote Australia 
In recent years the notion of the ‘failed state’ has figured powerfully in Australia’s foreign 
affairs and security strategies. Since the late 1990s Australia has demonstrated an 
increased preparedness to intervene in weak and failing states in our region, taking action 
under cooperative intervention arrangements involving military and police resources to 
address law and order and initiate developmental measures aimed at long-term nation 
building. 
It may appear provocatively alarmist to compare Remote Australia to weak states engulfed 
by poverty, the destabilisation of conflict, and weak political systems that barely function. 
However, the conclusions of remoteFOCUS support the detailed analysis of Neil Westbury 
and Michael Dillon in their recent book Beyond Humbug published in late 20079. There, 
the authors make a compelling case that Remote Australia exemplifies the conditions of a 
‘failed state’, using four criteria developed by the Brookings Institute in 2006. These 
criteria are World Bank data that measure poverty, security issues relating to violence and 
homicide, the capacity of governments to provide basic needs for human development 
(particularly health and education), and the legitimacy of government in the lives of 
people. 
The failed state of Remote Australia has been given credence by a succession of 
government reports and inquiries: these include the Northern Territory Little Children 
Are Sacred Report; successive reports on the parlous state of education in remote 
regions; and the Western Australian State Coroner’s report on the suicide of 22 
Indigenous people in the Kimberley region delivered in February 2008, in which Coroner 
Hope found an appalling lack of governance, little or no coordination between the Federal 
and Western Australian Governments, and a lack of a system of government 
accountability to measure outcomes from significant public investment aimed to alleviate 
Indigenous disadvantage.  
Further, a significant shift in demography will emerge over the next decade. While rural 
settlements in settled Australia are declining in population, many towns in remote regions 
are growing rapidly because of Indigenous population growth and mobility. Numerous 
towns throughout Remote Australia that were established to service the mining and 
pastoral industry are becoming predominantly Indigenous welfare-dependent 
settlements. This trend is likely to continue with predictable economic and social 
                                                        
9 Dillon, M and Westbury, N. 2007. Beyond humbug: transforming government engagement with 
indigenous Australia, Seaview Press, West Lakes.  
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consequences that will further entrench the ‘failed state’ status of Remote Australia.  This 
shift has been amplified more recently as the Commonwealth and the States and 
territories renegotiate bilateral agreements linked to Indigenous policies following the 
experience of the NT Emergency response. 
The impact of the failed state of Remote Australia reaches beyond its Indigenous 
settlements to affect all residents of remote regions.  In addition the consequences will 
increasingly be felt in the metropolitan towns and cities where the majority of Australians 
live.  Services for homeless people, gaols, state health services, metropolitan hospitals and 
emergency departments are increasingly impacted upon by the problems in Remote 
Australia, affecting the lives (and pockets) of metropolitan based Australians. 
The Consequences of the Failed State of Remote Australia 
The cost of Remote Australia languishing as a failed state is so grave that it potentially 
constitutes a sovereign risk to the entire Australian nation. 
Firstly, there is an escalating cost in public outlays particularly in the health, welfare and 
other social services, and justice areas. State and Territory government budgets are 
increasingly feeling the impact of poor health outcomes as greater numbers of Indigenous 
people occupy scarce (and getting scarcer) hospital beds in the public health system for 
serious illnesses such as renal failure. Continuing poor education outcomes make effective 
community governance and development hard to generate and sustain. The increasing 
focus on law and order intervention and substantial police recruitment to Remote 
Australia will inevitably lead to a need to expand the immensely costly prison system.  
Without a proactive and coherent strategy that addresses Indigenous impoverishment and 
community breakdown in Remote Australia the demographic trends point to an 
exponentially increasing cost in public expenditure.  
Secondly, as towns throughout Remote Australia feel the impact of the escalating social 
tension and public and private-sector disengagement, the phenomenon of ‘white flight’ 
takes hold (or is perceived to take hold) resulting in a rapid decline of services and social 
capital. In this situation the economic base in Remote Australia becomes starkly divided 
between the resource development sector that increasingly relies on fly-in fly-out labour, 
and the welfare sector that supports the rapidly expanding Indigenous population which 
is not engaged in the mainstream economy. The difficulties in recruiting and retaining 
professional staff in the areas of public health, education, justice, local government, 
management and community development are becoming increasingly apparent. This 
means that managing the welfare system, already under strain, becomes harder as the 
need expands proportionately and exponentially. Poor access to health services 
undermines attempts to attract and retain trained staff to Remote Areas.10   
                                                        
10 McKenzie H F 2007, Attracting and retaining skilled and professional staff in remote 
locations, DKCRC Research Report 21, Desert Knowledge Cooperative Research Centre, Alice 
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Thirdly, the increasing social crisis in (and drift of population from) Remote Australia has 
disturbing ramifications for Australia’s national security. A coherent societal structure 
throughout Remote Australia, with its networked infrastructure of settlements, roads, 
airstrips and communication systems, should be supported as an important plank of 
Australia’s defence system in the most vulnerable regions of the nation.  Australia’s 
defence against possible threats and breaches of security – including bio-security – 
emanating from south-east Asia and the south Pacific is made all the more difficult when 
Remote Australia itself is gripped by social and economic crisis.  (The network of 
settlements and population also provides important support for the ever-increasing 
number of outback travellers.) 
Fourthly, the failure to govern Remote Australia adequately has serious environmental 
implications. There is no integrated national strategy to manage the lands and fragile 
ecosystems of Remote Australia that are fundamentally made up of pastoral rangelands, 
savannahs, deserts, Indigenous titled land and lands dedicated to conservation. Problems 
such as changed fire management regimes, over-grazed pastoral lands, feral animals such 
as cane toads, cats, camels and pigs constitute a burgeoning environmental hazard to the 
Australian nation. The natural resource management regime in Remote Australia is made 
up of a disconnected patchwork of Federal and State agencies, local governments and 
some Indigenous organisations with no nationally agreed plan of action to underpin their 
efforts. The 2006 Australian State of the Environment report commented on the 
incapacity of local governments and Indigenous organisations to manage publicly-funded 
natural resource management programs. Of particular concern is the lack of public 
investment to assist Indigenous interests to sustainably manage the Indigenous land 
estate that occupies approximately one-fifth of the continent, practically all of it in 
Remote Australia. 
Fifthly, the social crisis in Remote Australia has serious implications for the nation to 
manage and sustain the prosperity from resource development. The Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade estimates that mining production amounted to $90 Billion in 
2006/07, which was the single biggest contributor to the Australian economy and 
approximately 65% of Australia’s total commodity trade11. Approximately 60% of mining 
platforms operate in remote Australia12. The mining industry’s capacity to recruit skilled 
labour to regions of social crisis and depleting services is a serious issue for the long-term 
sustainability of the mining industry in Remote Australia. In addition, the mining 
industry is a potential source of significant revenue for Indigenous interests from native 
title and other agreements. However, in the absence of a regulatory and regional 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Springs, available at www.desertknowledgecrc.com.au/publications/downloads/DKCRC-Report-
21-Staff-Attraction-and-Retention.pdf  
11 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, About Australia Resources Sector available at 
www.dfat.gov.au/facts/resources_sector.html 
12 Geoscience Australia, Australian Operating Mines Map, 1:10,000,000, January 2008, available 
at www.ga.gov.au/image_cache/GA11430.pdf 
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development framework, and in the context of fragile Indigenous community and regional 
governance structures, this new source of wealth may add to the crisis in Remote 
Australia through promoting community conflict and wastage of important community 
benefits.  The Prospectus acknowledges that since the remoteFOCUS forum in Perth, the 
Federal Minister for Indigenous Affairs has established a reference group with 
stakeholder expertise to investigate this matter. 
Finally, the crisis in Remote Australia has serious implications for Australia’s human 
rights reputation. Then Prime Minister Rudd’s announcement in the United Kingdom that 
there would be an annual report to the Australian Parliament on the national effort to 
address Indigenous disadvantage highlights the importance in which the Australian 
Government regards the international perception of the disparity between the economic 
and social position of Indigenous people and other Australians. With human rights issues 
becoming increasingly important in the international context, particularly involving 
China – our major trading partner – Australia is politically vulnerable whilst the living 
conditions of Indigenous people in Remote Australia remain deplorable. 
Characteristics of Remote Australia 
Remote Australia is distinct from the rest of the country.  The following factors create a 
very different social and economic environment. 
 Climate, distance and variability affect livelihood/economic opportunities 
 The age, language, cultural demographic is different 
 Physical and conceptual distance between people ‘on the ground’ and those in 
metropolitan-based offices leads to disengagement and misunderstanding 
 Remote Australian organisations are generally smaller and have less capacity  
 High cost of living, working and servicing in Remote Australia 
 Indigenous culture, society, land ownership and common law rights are a defining and 
positive characteristic of Remote Australia. 
Remote Australia is characterised by a number of interacting and mutually-reinforcing 
characteristics or drivers13 that very significantly affect how the issues confronting remote 
Australia should (and can) be tackled.  
  
                                                        
13 Simplified and taken from Stafford Smith, M and Cribb, J.  (2009). Dry Times: a Blueprint for 
a Red Land. CSIRO Publishing: Melbourne   
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Unless approaches take into account these interacting remote drivers then failure is 
almost inevitable.  These remote characteristics are: 
1. Unpredictability – includes climatic and primary production, investment, 
government attention, commodity prices and market 
2. Scarce resources, investment and livelihood opportunities – resources spread 
thinly across vast distances and higher cost structures.  Lack of critical mass and 
livelihood opportunities.   
3. Sparse population – small numbers, spread across vast land mass, often mobile.  
Little political and market clout. 
4. Remoteness – distance from markets and places where decisions are generally made.  
There exists physical as well as mind-set remoteness. 
5. Local knowledge – localised knowledge plays a greater role, particularly given 
regional and local differences.  One size does not fit all. 
6. Cultural difference – remote people and institutions are different. 
Understanding the interconnectedness of the elements of this system and working with it, 
rather than against it, is essential.  
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However, almost inevitably urban and metropolitan approaches are used.  For example, 
governments and the public service are geared up to satisfy the 95% of the population that 
lives in settled Australia.  Policy simplicity and politics work against treating parts of the 
country differently. 
Their locality and everyday experience cannot help but affect how people making 
decisions in capital cities respond to Remote Australia.  The mismatch between those 
operating in remote and metropolitan environments actually serves to reinforce the 
cultural differences and gaps in understanding between people and institutions working 
in remote Australia and those working in capital cities.  
remoteFOCUS argues that the underlying differences in Remote Australia must be taken 
into account so that new approaches are devised.  The alternative is the continuation of 
endless special measures designed from afar that fail to address the core issues despite 
well-intentioned policies and sincere convictions to improve conditions in Remote 
Australia. 
Governments as key change agents (and in need of change 
themselves) 
Remote Australia is too often perceived only in the context of the dysfunction of remote 
Indigenous settlements and seen therefore as purely an ‘Indigenous’ issue.  That is a 
mistake.  In fact, it can be argued that a major proportion of the remote Indigenous 
disadvantage is derived ‘more from their remoteness than from cultural or racial drivers, 
and need to be tackled primarily as part of a set of remote issues…’ 14 Predominantly non-
Aboriginal settlements in remote Australia suffer from the same or similar issues relating 
to the governance of government. 
In addition to the remote syndrome outlined above, there are many external drivers that 
contribute to the state of affairs in Remote Australia.  Some of these are ‘global’, such as 
the changing nature and structure of the global economy, or the changing modus 
operandi of extractive industries (eg fly-in fly-out).  Other contributors appear more 
local, but reflect global trends, such as changing settlement patterns in Remote Australia 
(reflecting ongoing global urbanisation) and changes in significant industries (eg 
pastoralism). 
While acknowledging these broader drivers and factors, remoteFOCUS argues that 
government policies, structures and administrative arrangements are critically significant 
drivers of many of the problems that are all too apparent in remote Australia.   Strategic 
and fundamental change to the way governments engage with remote Australia would 
have disproportionate positive effects if carefully directed to make the most of the unique 
features of remote Australia. 
Therefore, while acknowledging that there are many issues that need to be addressed in 
remote Australia, the remoteFOCUS initiative focuses on the critical contribution of 
                                                        
14 Op cit p143. 
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government and government arrangements.  Because of the characteristics of remote 
Australia and long-standing difficulties in governments effectively engaging with Remote 
Australia and its citizens – Indigenous and non-Indigenous – positive change in 
government arrangements will have disproportionate benefits.  This is the 
opportunity.  
remoteFOCUS argues that the ongoing economic, social and environmental issues which 
bedevil Remote Australia will not be resolved by merely applying the tools available under 
existing institutional and governance frameworks. Notwithstanding the good intentions of 
current government policies, funding mechanisms and programs are inadequate or 
demonstrably failing.  Trying harder has proven not to work.  There are structural issues 
and broader institutional factors that need to be brought into the policy and 
implementation equation. This will require nothing short of a national commitment to 
drive fundamental practical reform at a range of levels. 
Intermittent, on-going special government measures and interventions are proof that the 
normal processes of government are not working in Remote Australia.  COAG trials, 
Regional Partnership Agreements, Interventions, special redevelopment strategies, such 
as the Pilbara Revitalisation Plan, are examples of genuine government attempts to make 
good on failed ordinary government arrangements.  But they are inadequate, too often fail 
or achieve only marginal improvements and prove the point that the underlying 
arrangements need significant reform so that such interim or special measures are not 
needed. 
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3. Conversations with remote 
Australia 
Dr Bruce Walker 
The remoteFOCUS project has maintained a dialogue with people of remote Australia 
since the original gathering in April 2008.  Through multiple visits to the Pilbara, 
Longreach in Central Western Queensland and Central Australia;  workshops facilitated 
by Desert Knowledge Australia over their Regional Video Network, through the Outback 
Business Network and a special remoteFOCUS workshop at the Garma Festival in Arnhem 
Land; presentations and workshops to the McDonnell Shire Council; additional 
community consultation visits supported by BHPBilliton in the Pilbara; and through 
reference to speeches and writings of people with a long experience in dealing with 
remote Australians, the project has compiled aspirations and views that are relevant to an 
informed discussion on governance of governments in remote Australia. 
This chapter records the substance of the conversation. 
Hale Group Meeting, Perth April 2008 
On 1st and 2nd April 2008, a group of 28 people with extensive experience in dealing with 
Remote Australia, including senior industry figures, met in Perth to consider the looming 
crisis facing Remote Australia and the apparent failure of Australian governments to 
adequately govern and engage with the country’s vast arid and tropical regions. 
The Forum Participants concluded that the situation in Remote Australia had reached 
crisis point, with clear evidence that there was a ‘failed state’ at the heart of our nation 
and, if not addressed, there would be dire economic, social, cultural, environmental and 
security consequences for Australia as a whole. Many of these are already apparent. 
These problems are too often perceived only in the context of the dysfunction of remote 
Indigenous settlements and seen therefore as purely ‘Indigenous’ issues rather than issues 
of government capability.  That is a mistake.  
There are many drivers that contribute to the parlous state of affairs in Remote Australia.  
Some of these are ‘global’, such as the changing nature and structure of the global 
economy, or the changing modus operandi of extractive industries (eg fly-in fly-out).  
Other contributors appear more local, but reflect global trends, such as changing 
settlement patterns in Remote Australia (reflecting ongoing global urbanisation) and 
changes in significant industries (eg pastoralism). 
While acknowledging these broader drivers and factors, remoteFOCUS believes that 
government policies, structures and administrative arrangements are critically significant 
drivers of many of the problems that are all too apparent in remote Indigenous Australia.    
The issues in remote Indigenous settlements are, nevertheless, compelling and real.  They 
include: 
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 the social implosion and large scale movement of Indigenous people to towns and 
service centres 
 the consequences of demographic change in which the Indigenous population is 
growing at more than twice the rate of others  
 the disengagement of the rapidly enlarging Indigenous permanent population from 
the mainstream economy  and therefore the increased welfare dependency 
 the vulnerability of Indigenous governance structures required to cope with the 
resources boom and the phenomenal streams of new revenue from agreements with 
resource companies.  
All are exacerbated by government disengagement with Remote Australia.  
The Forum Participants also concluded that the ongoing economic, social and 
environmental issues which bedevil Remote Australia will not be resolved by merely 
applying the tools available under existing institutional and governance frameworks. 
Notwithstanding good intentions current government policies, funding mechanisms and 
programs are inadequate or demonstrably failing. There are structural issues and broader 
institutional factors which need to be brought into the policy equation. This will require 
nothing short of a national commitment to drive fundamental reform at a range of levels.  
Change is needed, to not only benefit Remote Australians but all Australians.  For 
example, there are significant security and environmental issues that affect every 
Australian.  The reality that much of the nation’s wealth will come from Remote Australia 
is only one aspect of this. The fact that the centre of global power is moving towards our 
region makes Remote Australia a matter of strategic national importance. The Indigenous 
settlements and pastoral leases of remote Australia are obviously integral to its human 
element, but it could be argued that apart from that our tenure of Remote Australia under 
the present regime is largely expeditionary (fly-in fly-out or relatively short term 
residence) in nature, which means that the vast resources zones could end up being 
contested, by virtue of the land being considered ‘unsettled’. The lack of management of 
the natural environment compounds the problem by failing to create or sustain a living 
environment attractive to Indigenous and non Indigenous inhabitants alike. This is why 
the governance of Remote Australia is a public policy matter that shouldn’t be left in the 
hands of the market and business, as it increasingly is. It requires a paradigm shift in the 
national strategic philosophy – one that recognises the rate of global strategic change.  
The Prospectus produced by this initial group of 28 people was be used to engage a range 
of interested parties and individuals in public discussion about Remote Australia and how 
it should be governed and how to include the remote regions into a modern integrated 
Australian nation.  RemoteFOCUS believe there is a compelling case for urgent change.  
There is a need for new approaches to remote area governance which must embrace 
genuine participation of those who inhabit Remote Australia in policy, administrative and 
financial decisions on matters which affect them.  This will only happen through the 
agency of a broad coalition of parties who see their shared interests as far more important 
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than the sectoral issues that may have divided them in the past; a coalition fully engaged 
with and connected to the peoples and communities of Remote Australia. 
There is a compelling case for urgent change.  But are there viable alternatives? 
remoteFOCUS believes so.  The value of structures that devolve responsibility and 
authority and are accountable has been demonstrated.  Policies and administrative 
arrangements that work in remote contexts and take into account the particular 
demographic can be developed.  This will take commitment, energy, goodwill and the 
coordinated support of many but offers the alternative of a strong, resilient Remote 
Australia and a place where its peoples can thrive.  
Desert Knowledge Australia Inter‐Regional Video Network 
meeting 41, 12 June 2008 
The meeting was held by teleconference linking sites in New South Wales, Northern 
Territory, South Australia, Queensland and Western Australia, to discuss the Governance 
and Administration of Remote Australia in response to the prospectus 
remoteFOCUS:revitalising Remote Australia. 
The meeting participants strongly endorsed the critical need for reform, and the 
timeliness of this initiative. 
Some examples which participants indicated highlight the need for reform are: 
• Removal of the regional partnerships program without having a strategy to respond to 
the pending applications 
• In the Kimberly there is no infrastructure so people don't want to stay and can't stay. 
Because the population is low, the government won't invest in infrastructure so the 
workers continue in the FIFO (fly in fly out) model. If there is no infrastructure, mining 
on its own won’t support people to live there. FIFO = no government investment. 
• Lack of response by government to the shortage of teachers in remote areas. 
• “Every time there is a change in government they want to make changes, but why are we 
expected to put our lives on hold whilst the new government gets organised. No one else 
has the right to step into a job and put everything on hold until they’ve learned the job.” 
• Inconsistency re: provision of essential services eg water, and other infrastructure in 
remote communities 
• Perception that regions get attention / reaction from government because of media 
pressure not for strategic reasons (eg APY lands rather than other remote Aboriginal 
communities). This response is therefore often reactive and under pressure, and based 
on limited information 
• Perception that remote Australians don’t have a voice – the Government only thinks of 
us when there is a crisis 
• Governments tend to view remote regions as a problem in themselves, and policy is 
made without consultation with local people and local govt, because of this. 
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• Cost shifting from Commonwealth and state governments to local government 
• Housing crisis in many remote regions – access to land for building, access to affordable 
housing (buyer or renter) 
• Housing crisis due to temporary housing needs of people coming in to regional centres 
like Alice Springs from remote communities. 
• Government staff in remote regions and remote areas need to be given resources and 
delegations to actually do things. 
• A huge percentage of people in remote Australia are disengaged from economic 
development. Regions need government support to build economic resilience not just 
band aid social issues, eg economists to work with people to decide what sustainable 
industries could be developed, then look at training for people to do this. 
• There needs to be a genuine acceptance of the greater cost of governing and 
administering remote Australia, and that it is a ‘given’. 
 The issues around governance and administration of remote Australia are systemic not 
about political parties / governments / states.  
 In building momentum around the issues we are faced with the ‘tyranny of democracy’ – 
only 3% of population lives in remote Australia. Government reacts to media and 
pressure points.  
 If a line is drawn from Perth to Brisbane – above line there are a maximum of 11 federal 
politicians. A key issue is how to build bridgeheads and partnerships into the south 
eastern corner of Australia – to get people’s attention. 
Participants were keen to be careful not to portray remote Australia as a ‘basket case’ 
noting the magnitude of the issues to be addressed required a proactive and positive 
engagement with governments.  
Remote Australia is part of the solution, not a set of intractable problems. Solutions need 
to be driven out of remote Australia. Engagement with regions is valuable to governments. 
It is not just about remote Australia but anywhere with a small population. 
Being part of remote Australia it is not a case of ‘one size fits all’ – each region has its own 
culture and particular issues. 
remoteFOCUS workshop at the Garma Festival,  
August 12 2008 
In partnership with the Yothu Yindi Foundation, Desert Knowledge Australia held a 
‘remoteFOCUS:revitalising remote Australia’ Research Workshop on the morning 
following conclusion of the Key Forum program of the Garma Festival. The Garma 
Festival is held annually in the Northern Territory at Gulkula near the township of 
Nhulunbuy in East Arnhem 
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One of Australia's foremost cultural exchange events since 1999 it includes a key 
educational forum to cover issues of relevance to Aboriginal communities.  
The remoteFOCUS workshop aimed to identify major research needs for driving 
institutional and social transformation in remote regions of Australia. 
The workshop attracted more than 100 committed and energised Aboriginal and 
non‐Aboriginal participants involved in research and/or who are residents of towns and 
communities in Remote Australia.  
Given the form of Garma and its participants, the workshop discussion and outcomes 
concentrated on Indigenous issues providing important input into the overall engagement 
and consultation processes of the remoteFOCUS initiative. Of significance was the 
considerable convergence of matters raised in the workshop to address and endorse issues 
identified in the Prospectus. 
Recurrent themes 
• to utilise local knowledge, authority and responsibility for local solutions 
• to utilise partnerships and adopt programs that work across government agencies 
• to recognise diversity in culture, leadership and development among communities and 
build specific programs appropriate to those conditions 
Big ideas for research  
1. how to reflect local governance in legal structures, 
2. the barriers and support mechanisms that maintain the existing mentality in federal, 
state and local government, 
3. data from pilot projects and how to engineer their implementation, 
4. decision making processes with emphasis on building the participation of youth, 
5. the many systems of Indigenous governance, 
6. a framework for citizenship rights, and 
7. the “Anthropology” of bureaucracies and how they respond to Remote Australia. 
Alternatives to Research Activities  
1. Build cross‐cultural competencies to enable Indigenous and non‐Indigenous people to 
understand how their respective programs, policies, philosophies and organisational 
cultures impact on one another. 
2. Build participatory research and strategic approaches for using on the ground 
knowledge. 
3. Instead of the conventional western linear–single endpoint approaches consider an 
Indigenous interactive model where outcomes are distributed throughout the project 
and opportunities can be examined as they emerge. 
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Governance Processes 
1. Involve Indigenous representatives in government decision making and engagement of 
remote communities in the broader national debates. 
2. Strengthen horizontal (inter‐sectoral) accountabilities of governments including 
polycentric networked governance across state/territory borders. 
3. Restructure government to establish a single, central body that enables an 
inter‐sectoral, single point of contact process for planning, support and funding for 
communities. 
4. Build greater risk‐taking with less bureaucracy and control in government management 
of grant programs. 
5. Instead of a conventional western hierarchical model (with knowledge only at the apex) 
consider an encapsulating model with pieces of knowledge from all organisational 
members leading to ideas and ownership to make the change work – ideas become the 
leaders. 
Partnerships 
1. Strengthen commitment to partnerships and locally‐based community‐driven planning 
with collaborative management and learning cycles to ensure communities are being 
heard and Government can respond in relation to: 
• local models to evaluate local outcomes and goals to inform funding 
• local level partnerships with Indigenous and non‐Indigenous Australians 
• local autonomy and authority 
2. Build private sector and philanthropic relationships with remote Australia while 
recognising governments as fundamental to the broad support structures. 
3. Recognise capacity development/building as a key role of governments and 
corporations to help people do things for themselves. 
Support Processes 
1. Build on successes and don’t focus on failures or on gaps. 
2. Provide infrastructure to support programs in communities in addition to salary 
funding. 
3. Recognise that the diversity in cultures, community leadership and autonomies 
demands diversity in approaches to meet individual community needs. 
Funding 
1. Build greater continuity of government involvement and explore processes to pass 
programs forward from year to year. 
2. Expand block funding of projects and simplify reporting structures. 
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Communication 
1. Simplify the language used by governments and bureaucracies and use interpreters 
where appropriate to enhance two way communication. 
2. Establish a website map linking remote Australia to share successes and experiences of 
what works. 
Desert Knowledge Symposium remoteFOCUS Workshop, 
November 2010 
Drawing on the Prospectus and the dialogue with remote Australians over the previous 
two years a workshop was convened in conjunction with the Desert Knowledge 
Symposium in 2010.  A large diverse group of community people and public servants from 
across remote Australia gathered to develop and refine a set of principles that they 
believed would improve the governance of government across remote Australia. 
In total eight principles were developed. 
Reform Principle 1:  Local Planning, Budget development and Control 
In remote Australia, people and institutions are often disempowered by what they see as 
institutional indifference.  People feel they are located at the end of a long process or 
supply chain for services provided by government.  Services delivered often do not meet 
local needs or reflect local circumstances.  Inevitably they are ‘siloed’ leading to a lack of 
coordination between services.  Critically, these arrangements work against people taking 
responsibility. 
The particular conditions and drivers in remote Australia reinforce this dynamic and have 
undermined genuine attempts to develop localised responses and institutions.  Because of 
the siloed nature of funding, small local populations have difficulty supporting the 
complex governance and consultation structures required to receive services from, or 
contract service to, government departments. Small communities almost inevitably 
experience governance and consultation fatigue.  Critical mass and governance stability is 
difficult to achieve15 and this further undermines confidence that local communities can 
and should have more input and control. 
Service delivery designed in remote capital cities and driven by national priorities and 
guidelines fails to deliver the outcomes needed in Remote Australia.  A new radical 
approach that takes into account the realities of remote community conditions and 
populations, and addresses the key drivers of past failures, is needed and which builds 
significantly higher levels of local participation in and control of services in Remote 
Australian communities.  International and Australian experience shows that small 
                                                        
15 Some communities have succeeded in achieving critical mass and coordinated, focussed and 
stable governance through creative governance structuring (Ngaanyatjarra Council is an example).  
But this is not the norm. 
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Indigenous community outcomes, for example, are significantly improved if there is local 
planning, control and governance of services. 
This reform aims to enable and empower local communities to consider their needs as a 
whole, develop plans and strategies that meet their local circumstances within agreed 
parameters, and negotiate overall funding levels and performance indicators with 
governments.  They would then purchase services and be held accountable for outcomes. 
In budget negotiations, agreement could be reached to switch funds within the agreed 
total between different functions to better match local priorities and improve overall 
effectiveness.  Communities/regions would then be expected to spend money within the 
agreed budget. 
Critically, this reform would reduce the governance and compliance overheads for 
communities so that they can concentrate on achieving outcomes, rather than being 
overwhelmed by the demands of multiple accountabilities from multiple government 
departments. 
The impact of this reform would be considerable, especially if coupled with the other 
reform principles in this package.  By localising responses services will better meet the 
needs and aspirations of citizens. By building local critical mass through aggregation of 
resources and concentration of governance, local ownership of issues and outcomes will 
grow, and local communities will build the capacity to engage more effectively with 
governments, inform government policy development and shape its approach to Remote 
Australia.  The level of variability and uncertainty at a local level would be reduced 
considerably, helping to create the stability necessary to attract investment, as well as 
high quality staff. 
Reform Principle 2:  Focused, Flexible and Sustainable Funding for Remote 
Australia 
At present total funding, funding criteria and rules relating to delivery and acquittal are 
centrally determined with little opportunity for local variation and for cross program 
coordination and integration. This one-size fits all approach inhibits capacity to shape 
and deliver policy that meets the diverse circumstances across Remote Australia, as well 
as limiting capacity for cross-agency integration. The rules and focus of programs and 
funding streams designed to meet the needs of the 95% of the Australian population that 
do not live in Remote Australia are too often not appropriate to the remote context.   
Further, funding cycles of typically only one year have very significant negative 
consequences, including inability to attract and retain appropriate staff to remote 
locations.16 
                                                        
16 Northern Territory Coordinator General for Remote Services Report, May to November 2009 
(p22) and recommendations 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. 
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Successful delivery of services in remote Australia which can significantly impact on local 
communities requires the combination of central and local knowledge, the funding 
flexibility to apply resources most effectively, and a responsive funding cycle.  Small 
populations and the general lack of local organisational critical mass means poor 
performance in the acquittal of multiple grants also undermines impact. 
There is an urgent need to: 
1. simplify and focus funding streams 
2. increase flexibility,  
3. reduce compliance overheads, and 
4. extend funding cycles to three to five years. 
To achieve maximum impact will require enabling legislative reform at a legal framework 
and government finance (fiscal) level.  Frameworks need to be established to make it clear 
that policy and delivery can be adjusted to reflect local circumstances, and that allows 
adjustment of the program criteria and rules relating to delivery in light of local 
knowledge, advice and circumstance.  
Centrally-devised policy would set out desired outcomes, the available budget and enable 
resources to be managed flexibly and in cooperation with local and regional 
communities/institutions to achieve objectives consistent with central policy. 
Accountability to the parliaments would be for the total amount spent and for the 
outcomes consistent with policy objectives rather than for process compliance.  
This is a radical departure from the present complex, centrally-driven and inflexible 
arrangements and would reduce the present variability and uncertainty in funding flows, 
and encourage long-term investment, improved capital flows, better outcomes and 
services that are tailored to local situations, development of local and government 
capacity and partnerships. 
Reform Principle 3:  Strategic Commonwealth Investment in Remote Australia 
Commonwealth funding streams to states and territories that are supposed to take into 
account the ‘disability factors’ of remote circumstances and demographic profiles do not 
fully take account the realities and costs and circumstances in Remote Australia. 
Most importantly, there is no guarantee that these funds are applied to Remote Australia.  
For example, although State and Territories receive additional funds because of 
remoteness and Indigenous factors, there is no current obligation to use those funds to 
reduce the service gaps in remote areas and in Indigenous communities. As a result these 
areas remain neglected. 
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This means that there is under-investment and under-resourcing of government-funded 
services in Remote Australia, with subsequent poor service delivery outcomes and 
inadequate infrastructure.  This contributes to a less-than-attractive investment and 
living environment in Remote Australian, perpetuation of some of its persistent problems 
and loss of significant social and economic opportunities. 
At present the Commonwealth Grants Commission and the Local Government Grants 
Commission use formula-based processes to calculate grants to that take into account 
demographic and other characteristics so that funding reflects the costs of delivering 
government services.  However actual expenditure by relevant States and Territories is 
often not consistent with either present disability factors used in the formulae or the real 
disability factors.  States and territories are not obliged to expend these additional funds 
in a way that relates to the disability factors. 
Not only must disability factors and cost differentials be reviewed so that the funding 
quantum is appropriate, but also new procedures must be introduced to ensure that actual 
expenditure by the States and Territories in Remote Australia is consistent with the actual 
disability factors and real cost differentials.  
If implemented this reform would lead to more transparent funding streams, improved 
investment and resourcing to Remote Australia.  It would reduce the need for irregular 
and reactive injections of government funding to address gaps that emerge or become 
politically apparent.  This would reduce variability and uncertainty, supporting more 
sustainable social and technical infrastructure in remote settlements and helping to 
attract much-needed private investment. 
Greater opportunities for innovation at the local level would emerge. Adequate funding to 
underpin other reforms would be available.   
Reform Principle 4:  Sustained Long Term Investment in Local Communities and 
Institutions (Civil Society) 
At present Remote Australia is characterised by inadequate institutional capacity and 
governance arrangements that significantly undermine efforts to improve outcomes, 
deliver meaningful services and improve underlying conditions. Local communities, 
regions and institutions too often struggle to effectively engage with governments and 
with the issues that government is trying to tackle.  Governments, likewise, too often do 
not have the capacity, capability, perspective or governance arrangements to effectively 
engage with the issues and with local communities and institutions.   
Recognition of the importance of effective institutions at local level and their critical role 
in social and economic development is too often missing.  Institutional incapacity and 
indifference to opportunities for change compounds the problem.  
The characteristics and drivers of remote Australia – lack of critical mass, under-
investment, high staff turnover, remoteness from decision-making and so on – 
significantly contribute to this profound shortcoming in remote communities, regions and 
institutions.  An over-reliance on imposed executive solutions made without regard to the 
essential need for civil and community engagement also undermines good governance and 
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institutional development. Overall, this leads to a misalignment between policy and 
practice in services, disconnection with local aspirations and needs, and fragmentation of 
effort.  
Improved capacity and governance of both remote institutions and governments is needed 
for meaningful and productive engagement improved outcomes. This calls for Federal, 
State and Territory Government and private sector commitment, including resources, to 
support specific programs and reforms designed to: 
 Approach policy development and implementation within realistic timeframes that 
ensures genuine community engagement and the necessary capacity-building to 
achieve it. 
 Promote improved engagement and trust between local communities, regions and 
government agencies (through, for example, neutral agreement brokers). 
 Recognise the importance of and support the development of individual, 
community and institutional capacity to effectively engage inter-culturally (bi-
culturally). 
 Effective expression of local voice and local choice in government decision-making 
and in the implementation of programs at the local level.  
This reform addresses the need to invest in (and coordinate) building the effective 
institutional capacity of governments and local communities and regions to effect 
sustainable governance arrangements in Remote Australia. 
This will enable communities in Remote Australia working in improved partnership with 
governments, where appropriate, to: 
 Build and sustain effective institutions of decision making and accountability 
 Better identify and seize opportunities for investment 
 Allocate and appropriate resources 
 Organise and deliver outcomes 
 Engage with business, non-profit organisations and governments 
 Access and develop required individual skills and abilities in a timely way 
 Enhance policy development, implementation and evaluation 
This will enable governments to: 
 More effectively and efficiently meet their obligations to their citizens 
 Deliver government services more effectively 
 Develop policy and program frameworks appropriate to remote Australia 
 More effectively work with local communities, regions and institutions to achieve 
policy goals. 
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The principle will contribute to long-term social and economic stability in Remote 
Australia based on continuity, capacity and reliability in governance and improved 
partnerships. 
Reform Principle 5:  Ensuring Continuity and Effectiveness of Public Servants 
Servicing Remote Australia 
Remote Australia suffers from a continual high rate of turnover of public servants with 
little accumulated knowledge being retained, low officer accountability for achieving 
tangible outcomes, limited incentives in remote Australia for ‘seeing through’ particular 
specific initiatives, and a related absence of defined and rewarding career paths.  
The result is a fragmented and inconsistent interface between governments and remote 
citizens and institutions, additional costs to both governments and remote institutions, 
significant opportunity costs because of ‘gear up’ and lost time, and high levels of 
frustration that erode the development of positive working relationships. 
The remoteness of Canberra and the State and Territory capitals from day-to-day realities 
on the ground significantly contributes to the disconnect between policy and 
implementation.  ‘Closing the implementation gap’ is needed but this will not be achieved 
without significant reform of the Public Service. 
Too many public servants are being required to undertake complex tasks when they do not 
have the knowledge or the technical skills and experience to be able to prosecute these 
tasks effectively or to assess the advice provided to them by experts.  On the other hand, 
capable, experienced and effective public servants are often classified as being ‘captured’ 
by local interests and their policy and program advice and experience trivialised. This 
reflects the dominant culture of the public sector that too often places process and 
compliance above the importance of effective service delivery.   
Public servants in Remote Australia in implementation or brokerage roles require a 
judicious mix of functional authority together with flexibility and accountability.  They 
need functional authority and flexibility to make decisions in responding to local needs 
and circumstances.  And they need to be held accountable in securing locally-required 
outcomes and National, State and Territory government policy requirements (i.e. both 
downward and upward accountability). 
This requires that: 
 Specific selection criteria, relevant training, mentoring support on the job, and 
career paths and rewards are established and maintained. 
 Technical best-practice and specialist knowledge in remote issues (legal, 
demographic, political, governance, cultural, anthropological, institutional, fiscal, 
communication and technological) are sourced and encouraged.  
 Professional recognition is provided for remote specialists, including field and 
community development expertise, to ensure that senior position(s) are created 
which serve to recognise remote experience that is directly related to a track record 
of achievement. 
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This reform would lead to the attraction and retention of high-quality professionals to 
work as public servants in and with Remote Australia.  It would help decrease the 
uncertainty and variability in the relationship between governments and their citizens 
and partner organisation in Remote Australia, which would offer a more stable foundation 
upon which to build effective working relationships and help reduce the ‘implementation 
gap’. 
Reform would assist in improving the conceptual understanding by public servants of the 
remoteness of Canberra and the other jurisdiction capital cities from day-to-day realities 
on the ground in Remote Australia and would therefore assist in the development of 
policies for Remote Australia that have a higher likelihood of success.  
In addition, specific reforms to provide enabling authority to public servants ‘on the 
ground’ in Remote Australia would significantly improve capacity of governments in 
working with local communities and institutions to develop local solutions and 
approaches to intransigent problems. 
Reform Proposal 6: Closing the Gap between Intentions and Outcomes 
Governments contract remote and other institutions to deliver services in remote 
Australia.  The transparency and accountability of the contracting process and the 
relationship between the service purchaser and the provider plays a significant role in the 
ongoing difficulties in achieving effective service delivery and development of realistic 
and effective programs that address local needs and conditions.  It also skews data and 
policy development. 
For example, there is too commonly a culture where individuals and agencies are 
encouraged by ‘the system’ to sign up for funding on the basis of commitments which they 
know cannot be met and they understand will not be expected to meet.  In addition, there 
are pressures placed on individuals within organisations to report actions as if they meet 
program objectives, when they often do not.   
The ever-changing policy environment and continuing change in language and 
nomenclature within program funding and contracting arrangements impedes the ability 
of all people involved in services to work in a concerted way towards long-term goals.   
At the same time there is insufficient obligation for program managers to take 
responsibility for the performance of programs beyond administrative and financial 
measures.  There is an urgent need to change the accountability arrangements so that 
reporting is reflective of real objectives and outcomes. This should include proper 
evaluation of the performance of programs against their objectives rather than mere 
financial and administrative audit. 
Contract management requires reform to ensure that scrutiny and auditing is tightened 
and these realistic and agreed to commitments are met.  This scrutiny should be 
embedded within the contracts, and also embedded within the public service 
accountability framework. 
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Reporting systems need to be improved and streamlined and be more transparent so that 
real data and critical analysis can help address local issues and capacity gaps, and support 
planning and policy development.  For this to be successful, greater encouragement and 
protection of providers of ‘bad news’ or empirical detail about real happenings is needed. 
This will steer processes towards increasing learning through evaluation.   
Government agency accountability frameworks also need reconsideration and 
mechanisms put in place to audit government performance, especially through monitoring 
and evaluation frameworks that are adaptable to local conditions and enable corrective 
action and learning for government agencies and service users. 
Reform would significantly reduce the disconnect between intention or stated targets and 
the reality of actual service delivery and program outcomes.  It would build a more 
realistic picture of needs and gaps, build higher levels of certainty, stabilise resourcing 
(because of more realistic and less reactive responses), which would help attract and 
retain good staff to remote Australia.  This would, in turn, support good decision-making 
capability locally and by remote governments because of better and more realistic data 
and reporting.   
This reform would see improved partnerships between governments and remote 
institutions, adding significant potential to address long-standing issues in a less reactive 
and more cooperative way. 
Reform Principle 7:  A National Social and Economic Strategy for Remote Australia 
There is no strategy, no considered development framework and despite many successive 
attempts, little coordination amongst the tiers of government, the various jurisdictions or 
the people and communities that make up Remote Australia.  Current approaches are 
universally ad hoc and non-systemic.  As a result: 
 There is no sense of the future that might guide and inspire Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Australians to have the confidence and certainty to make commitments to 
living and investing in Remote Australia (increased uncertainty, reduced investment 
and access to resources) 
 The positive potential of Remote Australia is unrealised (opportunity cost) 
 There are unrealised linkages and synergies, and too much duplication (reduced 
investment and resources due to waste). There is no framework to guide and inspire a 
cogent consideration and development of Indigenous futures and how these interact 
with the rest of the community, the nation and the global economy (increased 
uncertainty). 
 There are ongoing reactive and costly interventions to address crises, and a need for 
special measures to address long-term neglect (increased unpredictability). 
An integrated, careful and considered long-term settlement and population plan, 
implementation and investment strategy, and monitoring process is urgently required.  
The alternative is ‘adhocracy’, and continuing failure. 
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The strategy proposed here would recognise the unique nature of Remote Australia, its 
vital contribution to the national economy and identity and its strategic location.  Most 
importantly it could be joined up with the various jurisdictional planning frameworks so 
that it is properly integrated. The plan would bring governments, communities, and 
remote institutions together to craft a common future. 
The strategy would provide greater certainty to Remote Australia, and a mechanism to 
resolve key questions about its future.  For example, the pattern of settlement across such 
a vast region that is needed to provide safety, security and appropriate levels of services 
has yet to be clarified and planned for. The proposal would help meet the challenge of 
stewardship across Remote Australia, and help drive orderly and effective governance and 
administration. 
Not only would a strategy for Remote Australia provide vision, focus, and targets, it would 
also put in place a mechanism to connect and coordinate various government efforts with 
the aspirations of the people and settlements of Remote Australia. 
This will only be achieved by the development and implementation of a long-term strategy 
that guides governance and investment in the Remote Australian economy and people. 
Reform Principle 8:  A Commission for Outback/Remote Australia 
Both policy development and administration for Remote Australia is largely determined 
within State and Territory borders. As a result there is a fragmented approach. Major 
decisions affecting Outback Australia are almost entirely made in capital and regional 
centres on the coast, with little understanding of its key drivers and its unique setting. 
Instead, strategic and context-specific action is required to achieve positive outcomes. 
Historically this situation has been challenging for capital city-based decision-makers and 
investors, resulting in: 
 ad hoc, non-systemic and reactive approaches  
 unacceptable levels of service delivery and citizen outcomes 
 lack of consistency of approach (increased uncertainty, reduced investment and 
resources). 
 Unrealised linkages and synergies, and too much duplication (reduced investment 
and resources due to waste. Poor results). 
 No region-wide coordination and planning, and no region-wide (and often little 
local) sense of direction (increased uncertainty) 
 A disconnect and distrust between people and institutions in Remote Australia and 
their counterparts in the capital cities (increased uncertainty, reduced investment 
and resources)  
 On-going reactive and costly interventions imposed on Remote Australia to address 
crises, and the on-going need for special measures to address long-term neglect 
(increased unpredictability, reduced investment and resources, waste). 
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There is a critical need for an on-going institution that has the mandate and authority to 
create a sustainable focus on Remote Australia, change the dynamic of under-
development that afflicts the region, and achieve momentum for change and regional 
coordination that is specific to Remote Australia.  
The Commission for Outback Australia would be charged to develop and coordinate a 
focus on Remote Australia and communicate the narrative to create a national 
understanding of Remote Australia’s critical role in the national interest.  It would 
provide a pathway to create a strategic and less reactive approach to Remote Australia, 
and bring governments, communities, and business together for common purpose.   
The Commission for Outback Australia would analyse and advocate for change in and for 
Remote Australia. The Commission will play a central role of stewardship of resources to 
ensure security, safety, services and futures across Remote Australia in the national 
interest. The Commission could be charged with coordinating the development of a 
national strategy plan for Remote Australia, assisting in its implementation, and be 
charged with monitoring its progress. 
Its legitimacy with stakeholders and the wider policy-making community will enable the 
Commission to be a medium to bring together government agencies, business and 
community to invest wisely in the Remote Australia.  
Remote Australia is characterised by significant connections to the global economy, a 
business sector and associated enterprises that service both the global economy and 
disadvantaged communities.  The Outback Commission would promote opportunities 
arising from an intimate understanding of its fragile economic system in order to attract 
investment.  
A strong voice for Remote Australia and an effective means to coordinate development 
and government activity would provide a more stable investment and work environment 
that would generate livelihood opportunities.  Effective planning and coordination would 
reduce duplication and improve return on investment, and close the misalignment 
between capital-city-based and Remote institutions. 
Positive results would be hampered, however, if the Commission for Outback Australia is 
not correctly positioned and authorised within the national context.  Inadequate 
resourcing, an inappropriate governance structure, poor articulation into the national and 
government agenda, poor grounding into and representation of remote Australia, could all 
significantly undermine the impact of this reform. 
Recent Statements about Regional Australia  
Federal Minister for Regional Australia, Regional Development and Local 
Government, Simon Crean 
During the course of the remoteFOCUS project there were significant political 
developments Federally (the formation of a portfolio titled Regional Australia) and in 
Western Australia (Royalties for Regions) wherein the ‘regions’ assumed a greater priority 
in the eyes of government.  
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 In his address to the National Press Club in September 2010, the Federal Minister for 
Regional Australia, Regional Development and Local Government, Simon Crean, outlined 
a number of principles that apply also to remote Australia: 
Local empowerment is about recognising that in our federalist structure, the needs 
and aspiration of our people can best be met by allowing decision making about 
their economic, social and environmental wellbeing to be made closer and closer to 
the people most affected by those decisions... 
There are three considerations that guide my vision of a better future for regional 
Australia. 
 We need to ensure that economic growth and sustainable development is the 
driving influence in all regions of the nation. 
 We are required to operate within a Federal structure that gives expression 
to the hopes and aspirations of all Australians 
o noting of course that our Federal system only recognises two tiers of 
government, yet depends on three levels of government for service 
delivery. 
 And third, I hold firm to an inherent belief that the best way to balance the 
economics, the politics and the geography of diversity and sustainability is 
to understand the importance of local engagement – to more effectively 
empower local communities. Local communities deserve to have their voices 
heard at all levels of government...We want communities to be able to take 
responsibility for charting their economic, social, and environmental 
wellbeing and devise a way forward that stacks up against sound socio-
economic principles. 
We need to view regional development through the lens of economic, social, and 
environmental development. 
The Minister’s emphasis in his speech links the central principle of local engagement 
closely with diverse and sustainable social and environmental, not just economic, 
development. 
The Government, and myself as Regional Australia Minister, are committed to 
strengthening the network of 55 RDAs that cover the whole country…… I want the 
RDAs to join the dots…. to go beyond thinking about a single Government 
portfolio, it needs to be cross portfolio, cross governments but also through 
engaging with the private sector and NGOs.  
The role of RDAs should be seen as one that complements the work of Local 
Government. RDAs are there to perform a strategic role - one that is rooted in 
strong engagement with Local Government, Regional Organisations of Councils 
and other stakeholders. RDAs are there as facilitators, mentors and brokers on 
regional development. 
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RDAs are built around the connection of people with a vision for their region. As 
such, the RDAs have the ability to reflect the heartbeat of regional Australia as they 
include people who are passionate about their communities and have a vision to 
support development in their region. 
Insights from a former Australian Public Service Head of Transport and Regional 
issues. 
Dr Ken Matthews AO served the Australian Public Service across 5 portfolios over a 36 
year period working on issues in agriculture, mining, environment, natural resources 
management, water, regional services and regional infrastructure; regional Australia was 
a unifying theme for his career and he read the pulse of regional Australians for a 
considerable period of time. 
Upon his retirement from the APS in his valedictory address he outlined issues that had 
observed in his ongoing dialogue with people of regional and remote Australia. 
Regional Australia is a much bigger policy and delivery challenge for the Australian 
Public Service than most public servants so far realise. We joke that Sydney differs 
from Melbourne. But compared to metropolitan Australia, our regions have so 
much more variation and usually, so much less resilience. When a job is lost, or an 
industry folds in a regional community the options are much more limited than in 
the cities ‐ and the human and community consequences greater. 
The challenge for public administrators is therefore more than simply to introduce 
one parallel ‘regional’ policy to complement our traditional metropolitan‐oriented 
policies. Many of our policies and programs will have to be comprehensively 
regionalised and localised ‐ to multiple regions and localities. How well equipped is 
the APS to understand multiple regional perspectives when we have grown up with 
a much more homogeneous metropolitan world view? How will the public service 
gain an accurate understanding of the needs, aspirations and opportunities of the 
many different regions of Australia?  
Matthews raises his concern that the APS no longer have independent channels that 
enable them to ‘keep their ears to the ground’ in regional Australia and he questions 
whether the APS will be able to adjust their usual analytical tools to accommodate 
regional policy requirements. 
For example in most cases, a dollar spent on a metropolitan ring road carrying tens 
of thousands of cars a day will be found to be a dollar better spent than on a lonely 
country road. In the future, the APS will need more sophisticated project selection 
methodologies to capture the non‐monetary, community and externality values of 
the rural road. There is more to this than just political judgement by ministers. 
He goes on to consider the next set of challenges that will confront the APS given the ‘new 
paradigm’ of priority for regional Australia.  
Like metropolitan Australians, regional Australians over the next decade will be 
looking for more accessible agencies – on screen, on phone and in home. Like 
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metropolitan Australians they will increasingly expect more timely services and 
correspondence. Timeframes for email are so different from 2oo years of snail mail 
and the public service cannot afford to be the last national institution to be 
responding in snail mail timeframes. Like metropolitan Australians regional 
Australians will expect more personalised and tailored public services. They will 
want to know by name their contact officers in the APS and will be impatient with 
agencies’ constant re‐organisations and staff changes. They will also be impatient 
with apparently artificial functional separations between different agencies, and for 
that matter, different levels of government. Governments will have to organise 
themselves to be more unified externally and ‘keep the spaghetti behind the 
counter.’ 
However unlike metropolitan Australians, regional Australians will more than ever 
be expecting Government services to be localised and spatially delivered. They will 
want their services to be tuned to their particular communities and their regions. 
On the one hand they will expect to be able to participate in decisions about their 
regions. On the other they will sometimes startle the city‐based Australian Public 
Service by exhibiting consultation fatigue (because so often in smaller communities 
it is the same people who must front all the consultation processes). They will be 
looking for governance arrangements that maximise decision making and 
accountability in the local area ‐ where they are comfortable ‐ not back in Canberra 
where we are comfortable. The Public Service will also need to be ready for a 
certain amount of pent‐up frustration in regional communities. 
In a frank moment that is often only possible in a valedictory address he reflects on 
internal APS workings.   
First, is it inevitable that the APS must forever be in a state of structural and 
staffing change? Must there so often be a new face every time a client or 
stakeholder rings? We know it drives our stakeholders mad. We know it introduces 
management risk. We know it adds confusion, costs and time. We know it makes 
the Service look inexperienced and shallow. We know these things, but we seem to 
accept restructurings and personnel changes as unavoidable features of the public 
service. 
Matthews is very proud of the uniquely Australian model of public administration as a 
great, continuing national institution – but one which at the same time is responsive and 
ready to change – that is, a willingness to continue to adapt to Australian circumstances 
and national needs. However he notes that the Australian community wants a model that 
works for them in their current circumstances.  
The model will and should continue to change. The case for necessary further 
public administration reform can be built around the uniquely Australian policy 
challenges ahead as we continue to adapt to Australia’s own future. 
Australia may be a big continent but it is a small nation, governed from a small 
city. 
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Propositions about remote Australia 
In our consultations across remote Australia communities have consistently expressed 
five expectations about what they want in good governance. They want:  
1. a say in decisions that affect them;  
2. equitable and sustainable financial flows;  
3. better services and a locally responsive public service;  
4. local control and accountability where possible; and  
5. inclusion in the greater Australian narrative.  
In response to these claims and the research undertaken through commissioned studies, 
remoteFOCUS advances five propositions.  
First, remote Australia confronts extraordinarily diverse and complex local challenges. 
Nonetheless there are common issues, and these issues are globally familiar: they are 
common to regions where people reside remote from centres of economic and political 
power but are facing rapid social and economic change.  
Second, while it is important to recognise the limited influence that simply improving 
public policy can have on aspects of these issues, present governance arrangements make 
it more difficult to effectively and legitimately respond to  the circumstances that are 
emerging in remote Australia. 
Third, among the range of possible responses to these governance challenges,  the more 
promising prospects involve greater degrees—and varying patterns—of decentralised 
governance and community engagement.  
Fourth, while the present dispensation of national and state/territory politics has 
prompted a high degree of attention to remote Australia, normal representative politics 
are unlikely to result in the structural reforms needed to address these issues since the 
structures themselves are geared to the 95% of the population living in more settled areas. 
Special purpose initiatives will be required, and these will need cross-party political 
commitment and support from business, professional and community organisations.  
Fifth, in the absence of a narrative that confirms the national interest in remote Australia, 
nothing is going to change.  
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4. A Framework for 
understanding the conversation 
with remote Australia. 
Dr Bruce Walker 
We have claimed the problems are not specific to Aboriginal people and their settlements, 
however a significant part of the remoteFOCUS report examines Aboriginal matters.  
Apart from the recent Pilbara Cities initiative and the Royalties for Regions policy in WA 
and the emerging North Australia agenda (reactive rather than proactive responses) the 
only broad ranging remote Australia policy is targeted almost specifically towards 
Aboriginal matters.  
We have advanced several propositions that suggest that development of both Aboriginal 
affairs policy and remote Australia policy on this basis will not provide sustainable 
outcomes for people of remote Australia.  However in the absence of more comprehensive 
policy pertaining to remote Australia as a whole, (beyond the ephemeral debates around 
the resource sector, coal seam gas, FIFO and dying towns etc,) we have spent a 
considerable amount of the report examining the impact of our findings within the 
Aboriginal policy space. 
In order to understand the difficulty government faces in governing remote Australia we 
are forced to focus on governments track record in delivery of Aboriginal services and 
from there to derive general principles that impact the whole of remote Australia. 
Commissioned Research 
Professor Ian Marsh was commissioned to provide further investigate five areas pertinent 
to and arising from our community conversations. 
1. What have been the changes to how governments and public servants function as a 
result of Globalisation and Centralisation of governance?  
2. What have been the implications for better services and sustainable funding of 
those services that can be drawn from an examination of the mainstreaming of 
services to Aboriginal people in remote Australia? 
3. What have been the structural barriers confronted in attempting to respond to 
Aboriginal issues through strategic whole of government approaches?  
4. How have other countries with similar governance traditions attempted to give 
agency, voice, local control and accountability to people living in marginal or 
peripheral places and what trends or changes have occurred particularly the trend 
to Place centred governance and regional innovation systems?  
5. How might the strategic challenges for remote Australia be reframed? 
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The five inter-dependent but free-standing papers which follow provide evidence to 
stimulate innovative reappraisal of the issues raised throughout the national 
conversation. In summary the following chapters survey: 
 Chapter 5: The development of and rationale for governmental centralisation in 
Australia and its modification via joined-up designs to address ‘wicked’ problems 
and localised issues;  
 Chapter 6: The development of a succession of policy frameworks for Indigenous 
Australians – ‘self development’ followed by mainstreaming, ‘practical 
reconciliation’ and ‘whole-of-government’ 
 Chapter 7: The failure of ‘whole-of-government’ processes to realise promised 
outcomes and the structural obstacles which are the root cause of this outcome;  
 Chapter 8: Contemporary international experience with parallel and analogous 
governance challenges  
 Chapter 9: The gross inadequacies in the broader strategic framework within 
which policy is devised and implemented;  
In general, the changes in governance that have occurred since 1983 were enacted in the 
name of a more responsive and effective state. Power was centralised and top-down 
authority strengthened. To enhance local responsiveness, whole-of-government 
amendments were subsequently introduced. Moreover, government has devolved 
employment creation to markets - an approach which works where appropriate economic 
infrastructure exists, but not where it is absent. 
In the case of Indigenous policy, this has created a pattern of public administration that is 
structurally incompatible with local voice and representation. Underlying centralised 
practices are too embedded and they have thwarted joined-up efforts.  Moreover, the 
strategic framework has also demonstrably failed. In the face of a complex policy design 
and adaptation challenge, few of the relevant narratives have been adequately aired and 
contextual needs have been insufficiently recognised. Present strategic platforms have not 
mediated a conversation that is appropriately rich, wide ranging and appropriately 
responsive to emerging issues and developments.   
So what is to be done? 
The survey of emerging international practice in the fourth paper shows how thinking is 
developing in other states that are faced with analogous issues. The direction of change is 
clear – there is an increasing move to more place based arrangements. This is consonant 
with the espoused concerns of Australian governments at state and federal levels and of 
the representative organisations that provide voice for citizens in rural and remote 
locations. However as the joined-up efforts illustrate (Chapter 7), place based approaches 
are at odds with deeply embedded centralising processes and protocols covering policy 
development, organisational and managerial structures, fiscal and budgetary 
arrangements and political and prudential accountability. Yet comprehensive British 
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analysis of public spending on particular categories indicates the gains to be had from 
more systematic and contextualised approaches (Chapter 8,on page 99).  
The essence of a place based approach lies in the necessity of shaping administrative and 
other structures to the imperatives of local contextual imperatives. In addition, first place 
must be given to the creation of viable livelihoods. A place-based approach should 
start with a focus on economic opportunity at the relevant level. This will clearly 
vary by region – for example, there is potential for a wide ranging service and hybrid 
economy in the Pilbara; in central Australia carbon farming may present new 
opportunities along with a host of hybrid activities; in remote Queensland, the pastoral 
industry remains strong with coal seam gas a new and more problematic possibility. In a 
place based approach, local opportunities, contexts and circumstances are prioritised – 
naturally in conjunction with wider interests and concerns. The challenge is one of 
appropriate design. There is no one-size-fits-all solution.  
So is there an approach that would meet this design challenge?  
The OECD has developed a diagnostic framework, which systematically covers the 
relevant dimensions of governance and which is intended to identify the requirements for 
effective place based operations (Chairbit, 2011 a and b; see also Tables 1 and 2, Chapter 
8, on page 99). The seven dimensions that constitute all aspects of governance are: 
information; capacity; funding; policy; administration; objectives; accountability.  
This diagnostic is summarised in a ‘Mind the Gaps’ Table (Chapter 8, 99) along with 
illustrations of the approaches introduced by various government to bridge these gaps 
(Chapter 8, Table 2, 99). Nor is it necessary to look only internationally for relevant 
approaches. In a comprehensive report, Dollery and Johnson (2007) describe RAPAD, the 
coordinating structure at regional level that has been established by councils in western 
Queensland, and the imaginative array of solutions that have been developed to sustain 
services to local communities. They also describe a diversity of possible joined-up models, 
with particular arrangements dependent on local needs and circumstances. These 
instructive findings are also summarised in Chapter 8( on page 99).   
In considering sensible governance for remote Australia, a threshold issue concerns the 
appropriateness of present regional boundaries and existing institutions. A detailed 
analysis of the requirements in each region in the context of each governance dimension 
is needed.  
New arrangements for regional governance would also need to be supported by a suite of 
inter-governmental concordats, budgeting, accountability and HR policy approaches. 
These would need to: 
 Create a forum to link federal and state activity in an appropriate way (perhaps by 
contract or concordat). A pilot or experimental scheme might be one way to explore 
possibilities 
 Ensure Commonwealth and state funding allocations are consistent with disability 
factors and real cost differentials and that money reaches the intended purposes 
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 Establish a remote Australia public service - one that perhaps creates a cross 
governmental/cross-agency career framework and/ enhance training etc;  
 Square the circle of legitimate national and local interests – Sabel’s pragmatist or 
experimental governance suggests one approach (on page 99). 
In addition, as Chapter 9 argues, processes for developing overall strategies for remote 
Australia at national and state levels need to be considerably developed. 
In sum, four foundational activities would re-vitalise remote Australia, and the role of the 
community, including Indigenous peoples, within it: 
 A focus on enabling economic livelihoods across the region. 
 Declaration of an agreed policy on remote settlement that guarantees security, 
safety and services in the national interest, providing an investment strategy for 
the next 50 years. 
 New approaches to re-invigorating capital investment in remote Australia. 
 Effective governance of remote Australia as a common region or zone rather than a 
collection of state and territory backyards reflecting national neglect. 
Regional Contexts 
Early in the life of the remoteFOCUS project the Department of Families, Housing 
Community Service and Indigenous Affairs and the Pilbara Development Commission 
responded to the Prospectus and subsequent community conversations by sponsoring 
more detailed work in the Pilbara and Central Australia.   
As a result of this support the project has been able to practically test the principles and 
learning coming form the research. The ability to reflect on the generalised principles 
developed with a national focus and contextualise them in specific regions has provided a 
more robust framework for the remoteFOCUS project. 
remoteFOCUS observes the way government administers, engages and governs the 
heartland of theAustralian landmass- remote Australia. Remote Australia encompases 
places that are distant from services, in many parts distant from the points of global 
economic activity, a region that everywhere is on the periphery of the political dynamic 
that drives Australian democracy. 
And yet it also encompasses places, events and stories that have given national and 
international significance to Australia. 
The remoteFOCUS project has over the past two years conducted a national conversation 
with the people and communities of remote Australia and made a more detailed analysis 
of three significant regions that cut across the heartland of the Australian desert region of 
remote Australia. 
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Prior to the arrival of non Aboriginal people a series of tribal nations used country to 
fulfill their livelihoods, utilizing the land and resources and spirit of that country to 
provide sustenance and livelihood. 
Beginning on the east coast and pushing back into the regional and remote areas of the 
country, new land uses and resource allocations were forced on the original inhabitants 
and the history of contact and land settlement that is chronicled in Australian history 
books began to emerge. For our purposes the nature of the conquest is regrettable but 
importantly recognition that there was and there continues to be a contest ,largely 
emanating from the changes in use and governance of the land, is a principle driver in 
finding new governance systems. 
Early use of the land was driven by the nations need to sustain life with food and water 
and then through agricultural and pastoral development (initially through wheat, sheep 
and cattle) an economy.  Each of the remoteFOCUS regions to which we gave more 
detailed attention has at its centre an iconic town built to serve the national interest. 
Longreach in far western Queensland became a transition point where the pastoral 
industry connected with the cities of the coast at the railhead.  This region of the nation 
gave us the first big shearers strike, Waltzing Matilda was crafted as the iconic Australian 
‘anthem of the bush’, and Australia’s national airline Qantas was born and indeed our first 
aircraft were manufactured in Longreach.  Transport is still critical to this region and 
surprisingly it remains better serviced as a small town than some parts of say NSW where 
towns like Bathurst which were also at the cross over between the pastoral west and the 
urban coast have no equivalent air services. 
Adjacent to far west Queensland in central Australia, Aboriginal people have used what is 
now Alice Springs as a meeting place and a point of exchange.  Alice Springs has been a 
key communication link between Australia and the European world since the telegraph 
station was established in 1872.  In many respects there is no reason for Alice Springs to 
exist as a town other than its location at the mid point of any travel between the east and 
west or north and south of the nation and the role it continues to play as the 
communication hub not just within Australia but in a global context.  The town is at the 
heart of the Australian – American defence alliance providing strategic services in 
communications that shore up western democracies through the Joint Defence Scientific 
and Research Facility at Pine Gap. 
Incidentally it is most probably the existence of this facility and the constant flow of 
American and other visitors to the centre that ensures that Qantas continues to fly into 
Alice Springs. 
Central Australia continues to attract national interest as a result of a different 
communication issue.  The contest for Country  (land and resources) and the economic 
outcomes that flow from different uses of country underpin a constant dialogue between 
Aboriginal people living on country and those choosing more comfortable living in settled 
towns and increasingly dependent on services and incomes derived from those towns.  
There is now an interdependency between the towns and Aboriginal people that has been 
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less pronounced in the past.  A different form of communication barrier (contest of 
values) exists, one that challenges both Aboriginal and non Aboriginal people. 
To the west of central Australia begins the eastern part of the vast Pilbara region that 
stretches across to the coast of western Australia. Forgotten and ignored for much of the 
last two hundred years the Pilbara is now one of three resource rich zones that will 
dominate the future of remote Australia in the next century.  Already contributing 
considerably to the national wealth the Pilbara in many ways is becoming the symbol of 
the nations relationship with the emerging new world economy focussed on China and 
further into the future India.  It has provided a welcome domestic stimulus for the growth 
and expansion of Qantas services to the mining centres in the north of WA where there 
are now more aircraft movements in a day than in any other towns of similar size in 
Australia. A virtual population of fly in fly out workers that is almost equivalent in size to 
the resident population of the region dips in and out of the region leaving behind a 
significant array of side effects that have to be worked through by local communities. 
Conversations in each of the three regions acknowledge that the drivers that act on the 
focal towns and the regions are forces well beyond the control of the local and state 
governments that ostensibly are mandated to provide for the residents of the regions.  
Each of the towns is deemed to be suboptimal in size and resourcing in terms of the pace 
and scale of economic change that is confronting the residents and their ability to sustain 
the impacts of that change.  All are at distance from the centres of power and the next 
major governance level. Most people living at distance from the regions have a limited 
interest in or indifference to the impact of these changes on local communities. 
Importantly however each region in its own way has had a national and international role 
and in each case continues to have a significant contribution to make to the nation. 
Something has happened over the past 30 years to diminish the voice and the strength 
and potency of the messages and ideas coming from such remote places.  This report seeks 
to explore the shifts that have occurred through a closer examination of the more recent 
dynamics across the three regions. The report then identifies a series of common issues 
that present across remote Australia in the pastoral, indigenous, tourist and resource 
sectors. It concludes by suggesting a framework of questions to be worked through on a 
place by place basis to improve the governance of government across remote Australia. 
Aboriginal Engagement 
In early conversations with the Pilbara development Commission and the four Local 
Government bodies providing services across the Pilbara it was made clear that they all 
felt the pace of change was not in their view not able to take account of the interests and 
engagement of Aboriginal people of the region.  
Ironically, the Pilbara is a notable exception to remoteFOCUS’s identification of the 
governance problems of remote Australia being generally understood as belonging solely 
to the realm of Aboriginal public policy. In the recent flurry of planning for the region, 
including the WA Planning Commission’s Pilbara Planning and Infrastructure Framework 
(2011) and the establishment of Pilbara Cities, the focus has been on attracting more long-
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term residents from outside and building a more sustainable ‘community’. This may be an 
alternative vision splendid, but, in its elaboration, Pilbara Aboriginal people – already the 
main group of long-term residents – have been all but invisible. This is despite Aboriginal 
people making up some 14% of the region’s population, extensive Aboriginal reserves and 
lands held by the Aboriginal Lands Trust, and Aboriginal groups owning or claiming large 
tracts of native title land, including 136,000 square kilometres of the Western Desert. The 
latter is owned by the Martu people and, at the time of the determination in 2002, was the 
largest native title determination made to that date (see paper 4). Nor is there indication 
of where the multiple and, as the papers show, important Pilbara Aboriginal organisations 
mesh with the existing, planned, or proposed Pilbara governance or administrative 
structures.  
In view of these deficits, and with support from the PDC, remoteFOCUS commissioned Dr 
Mary Edmunds to prepare a series of papers with three main objectives: 
 to compile a socio-political overview of Aboriginal people in the Pilbara and report 
on the dynamics of engagement between Aboriginal people and the institutions of 
the Pilbara including State and Commonwealth, local government, industry and 
other Aboriginal organisations; 
 to undertake specific targeted studies in the Pilbara that will inform the 
remoteFOCUS project on ways of Aboriginal people being able to draw the greatest 
benefit from developments in the Pilbara and the establishment of the Pilbara 
Cities agenda; and 
 to distil from the overview and case studies evidence-based learnings and 
recommendations as a basis for strategic and positive ways for Aboriginal people to 
pursue their aspirations through engagement/involvement in governance reforms 
in the Pilbara and the associated investments occurring in that region. 
There are six papers that address these objectives.  
 Chapter 10 – remoteFOCUS and Pilbara Aboriginal People – a distillation of the 
following five chapters. 
 Chapter 11 – ‘Doing washing in a cyclone, or a storm in a teacup? Aboriginal people 
and organisations in the Pilbara’ – is an overview of Pilbara Aboriginal 
demographics and dynamics, both historically and in the context of the present 
hyper-development. 
 Chapter 12 – ‘A new story. Roebourne : a case study’ – looks at the history and 
current activities in a town that has a largely Aboriginal population and two 
recognised native title holding bodies. 
 Chapter 13 – ‘Harnessing the cyclone. Gumala Aboriginal Corporation: a case 
study’ – examines the workings of a particular Aboriginal organisation set up 
through the process of negotiations with a mining company. 
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 Chapter 14 – ‘Connections, continuities, and change. Martu and their country’ – 
looks at the ways in which a Western Desert group in one of the most remote areas 
of remote Australia has acted and responded to the impact of change. 
 Chapter 15 – ‘Imagining a region: prototypes and possibilities for Pilbara 
Aboriginal people’ – takes the broader view of how Aboriginal people and 
organisations are operating and might operate at a regional level, including ways in 
which they might engage with wider Pilbara regional planning and governance 
institutions.  
These papers, individually and collectively, illustrate the effects of the governance 
dysfunctions of current governance structures and practices affecting remote Australia 
and identified as part of the broader remoteFOCUS project. They also point to another 
critical and unresolved tension for governments: that is, how to achieve greater clarity of 
national purpose and realisation of appropriate living conditions and opportunities for 
Aboriginal citizens while at the same time accepting the right of Aboriginal people to 
cultural distinctiveness and identity.  
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5. Responding to Economic 
Globalisation: Strengthening 
and Centralising State Capacity 
Professor Ian Marsh 
Governance in Australia was transformed after 1983. In the face of a perceived economic 
crisis and weakened state capacity, major changes were progressively introduced which 
were designed to buttress governmental authority and rework the role of the state (e.g. 
Kelly, 1992; Pusey, 1991). The most fundamental change concerned the ends and means 
that framed conceptions of the state. A new narrative concerning the policy challenges 
presented by an open and globalised economic context was adopted by both major parties. 
In a decade, developmental and social policy frameworks that had been in place since 
Federation were overturned. Bipartisan endorsement was critical in the rapid 
implementation of this agenda.  
The first administrative/organisational step involved a reframing of governmental 
structures, which was intended both to enhance central control and to extend the role of 
unfettered markets or quasi-market disciplines. Their influence was expanded through 
private and public sectors (Keating, 2004; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; for a similar 
discussion in the British context, Gamble, 1988; for some of the unintended outcomes, 
Braithwaite, 2008).  
This approach was adopted by both major parties as a remedy to the stagflation of the 
1970s. Overly protected markets, overly rigid wage fixing, a sclerotic trade union 
movement, government services framed around the interests of producers not consumers 
and capture of programmes by rent seeking interests were held to be its principle cause 
(e.g. Australia at the Cross Roads). Change in public policy continues to unfold within 
this broad framework. This is evident in the ends adopted for - and the means used to 
achieve - outcomes in three key policy domains: the economy, the provision of public 
services and the welfare system. Whether these approaches are appropriate for managing 
the complex and distinctive issues that arise in remote Australia is the central concern of 
this report. 
These changes were introduced through three broad phases: the first covered economic 
activities that were directly under Commonwealth control; later change was extended to 
areas like public utilities where state cooperation was required; then, from the late 1990s 
until the present, attention switched to social policy and human services. Micro-economic 
reform has provided the narrative thread. Through newly enhanced top-down authority, 
market or quasi market arrangements have been extended across the whole public sector, 
including to the delivery of public services. One of the claimed benefits was cost 
efficiencies. By recasting citizens as consumers, another claimed benefit was client 
empowerment. We will see later that, in the case of remote Australia at least, outcomes 
have been almost wholly problematic.  
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The following paragraphs explore in turn these three dimensions of change: 
Strengthening the Central State: Centralised policy control was enhanced by 
budgetary, organisational and personnel changes that were designed to give the centre the 
language, technologies and administrative capacity to drive wider changes. As a first step, 
the control of ministers and key co-ordinating departments was strengthened. Within this 
framework, the focus has shifted progressively from economic structures and regulatory 
frameworks to, most recently, the delivery of human services. In addition, a strategic 
agency, the Productivity Commission, was repositioned and it has emerged as a principal 
steward of the forward agenda.  
The move to stronger controls by ministers and coordinating departments occurred 
progressively. In 1983, the incoming Labour government inherited a report on public 
administration (Reid, 1983), which echoed a recurrent theme: how to increase the 
responsiveness of the public service to the elected government. In implementing this 
report, the authority and accountability of ministers, particularly senior ministers, was 
extended and the influence of the central departments (Treasury, Finance, Prime Minister 
and Cabinet) widened and consolidated. A number of budgetary and organisational steps 
reinforced these organisational changes. 
The first development involved budgetary arrangements (Howard, 1986). Central agency 
control was reinforced through the Financial Management Improvement Program (FMIP).  
To better cost programs, forward estimates were introduced and to better focus on 
performance, budgets were recast in terms of programs and outcomes. Reporting against 
these indicators was also introduced. These changes all served to enhance the influence of 
the Finance and Treasury Departments. The influence of Treasury was further 
strengthened because, in the formation of the strategic agenda, the narrative of economic 
liberalisation caste this department in the critical role (e.g. Edwards, 1996).  
In 1983 the government published a White Paper on the machinery of government (this 
and the subsequent developments are reviewed in detail in Nethercote, 1986). This 
foreshadowed a strengthened role for central agencies, a Senior Executive Service, and 
augmented resource allocation processes. These changes were embodied in a Public 
Service Act in 1984. One key step involved a new accountability structure for top 
executives. Permanent Heads were re-caste as departmental secretaries, serving at the 
pleasure of their ministers and with the concurrence of the prime minister. In future, 
these officers were to be appointed by ministers with the approval of the prime minister 
and after consultation with the chair of the (then) Public Service Board. A Senior 
Executive Service was also established with officers appointed on fixed term contracts. 
Again the focus on ministers was reinforced as promotion was at the discretion of 
departmental secretaries without the involvement of the Public Service Board, a step 
which was reinforced by its later abolition and its replacement by an advisory agency, the 
Public Sector Management Commission. In other words, the notion of a unified career 
service was considerably qualified and the influence of ministerial views and desires given 
significantly more weight in personnel appointments and decisions. This had substantial 
longer term implications for the orientations and loyalties of public managers. Based on 
notional productivity gains, across-the-board efficiency dividends were also introduced.  
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Another key structural step was taken in 1987, when inter-related policy functions were 
brought together in mega departments (Social Security, Employment and Workplace 
Relations etc) with senior and junior ministers dividing responsibilities for overall 
strategy and priorities and specific programs. This step created powerful departmental 
‘silos’ at the peak of the national policy making system. 
In addition, the adoption of budgeting via Portfolio Budget Statements required 
departments to undertake strategic and business planning. Moreover, a number of 
specialised regulatory functions were progressively spun off into separate agencies (e.g. 
ACCC; ASIC; Centrelink, Air Services Australia etc). For example in 2002, Centrelink had 
partnerships with 25 federal and state agencies, serviced 6.4 million customers from over 
1000 service points and disbursed annually around $55 billion or roughly one third of the 
Commonwealth budget (Halligan, 2008). 
Finally, what is now the Productivity Commission increasingly assumed a much more 
prominent role in the development of the forward agenda. This agency became its primary 
source. The subsequent pattern of agenda change can be traced though it’s annual reports 
– from tariff reductions to privatisation, on to competition policy and contracting out, 
and turning progressively to more troubled areas at the heart of federal-state relations: 
health, transport, education as well as welfare and indigenous issues. The Commission 
also has important monitoring responsibilities. For example, the Commission prepares a 
biannual report on progress in indigenous development. Reflecting the implicit policy 
framework, this report focuses predominantly on individual circumstances and job-ready 
capacities. The most recent report fills some 750 pages (further discussed on page 99) 
A liberalised economy: From roughly 1907 until 1983, the central government played 
a critical role in the development of industry and employment. This occurred via two 
mechanisms. First, industry development was largely based on tariffs. This created a 
substantial manufacturing sector, but one largely oriented to the domestic market. 
Second, public enterprises were a major source of employment. These included a major 
bank, two airlines, a shipping service, railways, transport, electricity generators and 
distributors etc.  
From the late 1980s through to the mid 1990s, Commonwealth and State governments 
progressively withdrew from most of these activities. In the new neo-liberal narrative, 
public utilities were seen as cumbersome monopolies, retarded in their efficiency and 
responsiveness by the absence of bracing market pressures. Newly liberalised capital 
markets were assumed to be sufficiently mature and flexible to make the primary 
allocation decisions. We will see later that, in the case of remote Australia, this latter 
premise at least lacked realism.  
In its rhetoric and in practice, the state also progressively withdrew from employment 
creation. In general, such programs were deemed to be ineffective and counter-productive 
(Saunders, 2004). Interventions now focused on training and skills development and 
(explored further below) mutual obligation. We will see later how this has affected the 
CDEP scheme. Meantime, from the late 1980s, micro-economic reform was introduced to 
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strengthen the supply side of the economy (Keating, 2004). Its impacts on public sector 
services are reviewed below. 
Contracting out public services: The turn to contracts with NGOs or for-profit 
organisations for the delivery of public services was driven by both theoretical and 
practical considerations. At a theoretical level, the development of public choice, 
principal-agent and other approaches produced a new array of perspectives on the relative 
efficiency of public versus private provision. For example, this literature offered new 
perspectives on the likely capture of programmes by organised interests (such as business 
groups, public sector unions etc) and the aggrandising tendencies of public bureaucracies 
(Olson, 1965; Brittan, 1975; Downs, 1957; Niskanen, 1971). Principal-agent theory 
suggested more extensive use of contracts to avoid the shirking, opportunism and self-
serving practices that were asserted to be endemic in ordinary hierarchical or professional 
relationships (e.g. Miller, 2005; for a critique, see Sabel, 2004).  
These theoretical findings informed the development of public policy. Following a review 
of national competition policy in 1993 (Hilmer, 1993), the principle of competitive 
neutrality was extended to the provision of public services. In a first tentative application, 
the government white paper, Working Nation (1994) proposed the competitive delivery of 
case management into the then Commonwealth Employment Service. This experiment was 
deemed a success and in 1998, the whole service was privatised. The resulting Job 
Network represented one of the first comprehensive attempts internationally to apply 
market principles to the provision of assistance to disadvantaged job seekers (Considine, 
2001).  The relevant department (DEEWR) has now established contracts with around 109 
non-governmental organisations (including for-profit and not-for-profit suppliers) to 
provide employment related services from around 1000 sites (Productivity Commission, 
January, 2010).  
A Productivity Commission report in 2002 (The Job Network) noted the potential for 
more difficult clients to be sidelined. It also noted the very considerable savings which 
had accrued to the Commonwealth Budget, a point echoed more critically in the later 
Freud Report on employment services in the UK (2006). The use of contract 
arrangements has since extended to disability employment and a range of special services. 
As we will see in the next section, these are primary means for service delivery in remote 
Australia. In addition, to prevent error and to overcome inappropriate practices, 
accountability requirements have progressively become more elaborate. A 2007 report by 
the Catholic Social Services Australia (CSSA, 2007) found that under the pressure of 
accountability requirements, transaction costs had mushroomed disproportionately in the 
mainstream employment sector and that incentive arrangements had made creaming and 
parking endemic (also Productivity Commission, Contribution of the Not-for-Profit 
Sector, 2010 esp. 297-348). Contracting out to for-profit and NGO service providers is 
now the dominant approach. For example, in 2002 the Department of Family and 
Community Services (FaCSIA) spent $730 million on partnership arrangements of various 
kinds with 15 000 non government organisations. In a comprehensive survey of published 
evaluations, Hodge (2004) finds that, beyond very specific circumstances, the cost savings 
claimed for outsourcing have not been demonstrated. 
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Contracting out through NGOs can also affect their representational capacities (e.g. 
Sawer, 2002). Moreover, since there is typically no revokable purchase decision, the 
notion that quasi-market relationships enhance the power of citizens qua consumers 
seems mostly to be a fiction. This is particularly the case with outsourced programmes in 
remote Australia, where the non-existence of a network of potential service providers 
effectively undercuts the economic rationale for outsourced arrangements’ (Dillon and 
Westbury. p. 59- 60). 
An unpublished appendix to the Productivity Commission Review of the Not-for-profit 
Sector (Appendix J, 2010, available on line) lists NGO concerns about the working of the 
contractual system. The most fundamental involved the capacity of organisations to plan 
for local needs. The following comments are cited as representative of NGO concerns: 
Sector Connect Inc: ‘The major issue arising with respect to local knowledge and needs 
was a perceived limitation on organisations’ ability to plan for changing local 
needs…..They had little or no real input into shaping future funding programs to reflect 
what they were experiencing and learning locally’ (Appendix J, 2010 p. J2) 
Illawarra Forum Inc: ‘The purchase of service contracting…erodes the independence of 
NFPs in ways that make it difficult for them to remain responsive and flexible to 
community needs…A better model …..based on identification of local needs, the 
negotiation of funding levels and performance targets and measures is required’ 
(Appendix J, 2010 p. J4) 
Catholic Social Services Australia: ‘Over time there is a tendency for contracts and 
funding requirements to become more detailed and prescriptive…If this trend continues 
there is a risk of a shrinking gene pool of ideas and service techniques in Australian social 
services. The cost of tighter government control and more detailed, more uniform 
reporting mechanisms will be a reduction in local autonomy and a decreased ability to 
harness local knowledge’. 
Other matters that attracted criticism from agencies included: the short term nature of 
government contracts; the inappropriate transfer of risk; excessive compliance and 
reporting costs; the degree to which contracts are being used to micro-manage NFPs; and 
the sheer volume of contracts that community organisations need to manage. Examples of 
these individual concerns are explored in detail in the PC document. 
Mutual responsibility in the welfare system: Australia’s social policy system encompasses 
the provision of health, housing, education and community development as well as 
benefits to individuals. Whilst activity in all these areas has been affected by contracting 
out, the following discussion concentrates on changes to the income support system. This 
was originally conceived as a residual arrangement (Castles, 1985). Income support was 
based not on social insurance but rather transfers from general tax revenues. The system 
was designed to assist people in particular need, for example the indigent aged or 
disabled citizens or those, like the unemployed, with transient needs. The protected 
domestic economy meant that, at least in principle, jobs were readily available. Providing 
foreign exchange receipts from agriculture and minerals were sufficient, tariffs could be 
used to sustain employment in manufacturing. Moreover, the regulated wage fixing 
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system fulfilled a social justice function since the basic wage was based on need and not 
on capacity to pay. In practice of course, full employment was often not realised – for 
example, unemployment was particularly acute during the depression.  
In the immediate post war period the broad reach of income support and social security 
measures was significantly extended and deepened (e.g. health arrangements, 
pharmaceutical benefits, housing, educational access, pensions etc) and this general 
framework, which was progressively augmented,  prevailed broadly until 1983. Meantime, 
technical change, the movement of women into paid employment and changing 
occupational patterns created new imperatives – for example, for more flexible payment 
and work arrangements and for more part time jobs. Structural adjustment from the mid 
1980s also produced a surge in unemployment levels.  
The welfare system was the primary buffer against these accumulating pressures. 
However, by 2001, 28% of all Australian residents 15 and over were receiving income 
support (Keating, p. 137). Moreover, in 2007, of the 550 000 people on unemployment 
benefit (UB), 325 000 had been in receipt of benefits for more than 12 months – hardly 
the bridging assistance that Deakin had envisaged. In 2005-06, 700 000 were in receipt 
of disability pensions and 600 000 supporting parents benefits (Chenoweth, 2008). A 
system largely intended to deal with transitional events had become the principal source 
of support for a significant proportion of the population.  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, governments responded by much tighter targeting and cost 
cutting. Later mutual obligation came into increasing prominence. In 1988, then 
Opposition Leader Howard had foreshadowed a ‘Community Service Scheme’ for 
unemployment recipients. Work for the dole legislation was not however enacted until 
1997. From 1998 the principal of mutual obligation was introduced in conjunction with 
development of the contract-based Job Network. Those unemployed for twelve months or 
those assessed as having significant difficulties in qualifying for employment receive 
Intensive Support Customised Assistance. These clients are assigned a case manager who 
determines training and developmental needs. Failure to comply results in a ‘breach’ 
report and serial breaching results in disqualification from benefits. Assessment of needs 
for assistance and referrals to Job Network agencies are provided by Centrelink. From 
2006, these principles were progressively extended to citizens in receipt of disability 
benefits and to single parents.  
Commonwealth-State relations: The overlap in responsibilities between Australia’s 
federal and state governments had long been a feature of the Federation. But the broader 
economic agenda outlined above, progressively required new capacities for cooperation 
between levels of government. This intensified as microeconomic reform was extended to 
education, health, utilities and transport. An initial agenda was established through the 
Hilmer review. The organisational framework for its implementation was put in place 
with the establishment of COAG in 1992. The micro-economic reform agenda has since 
expanded to embrace the activities of state governments and the COAG apparatus has 
become progressively more elaborated. Currently, over 40 ministerial councils operate 
under its general auspices including one covering indigenous affairs, but not remote 
Australia. Specific developments in indigenous affairs are considered later. 
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‘Wicked problems’ and whole-of government approaches: The election of the Howard 
government in 1996 coincided with a turn in the agenda from more narrowly economic 
issues towards human services. As noted above, the first steps involved action in areas in 
which the Commonwealth government had direct responsibility, notably establishment of 
the Job Network. However the inadequacy of siloed approaches became increasingly 
apparent, particularly in contexts such as long term unemployment, burgeoning numbers 
of disability pensioners and single mothers, governmental concerns for alcohol and drug 
abuse etc. Hence, attention shifted to the systemic contexts in which such ‘wicked 
problems’ were embedded. Responding to similar pressures, the Blair government in the 
UK had, from its election in 1997, placed considerable emphasis on whole-of-government 
working (PMSU: Wiring it Up; Joining it Up, HMSO, both 1998).  
This approach began its migration to Australia with the establishment of the Management 
Advisory Committee (MAC) in 1999. This was a committee composed of the heads of each 
federal department with a brief to take the lead in cross-service issues. This process 
advanced in 2002 with the establishment of COAG trials (reviewed below, p. ). Indeed, the 
delivery of services to remote communities became the seed bed for testing the efficacy of 
whole-of-government arrangements. This was further advanced in 2003, when Peter 
Shergold was appointed head of the Prime Ministers department. In 2004, MAC published 
a comprehensive report Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to 
Australia’s Priority Challenges, which explored the requirements for joined-up 
government including culture, organisational arrangements, funding, reporting structures 
etc. This was follow by two other complementary documents: Tackling Wicked Problems 
(APSC, 2007) and Policy Implementation through Devolved Government (APSC, 2009). 
These explored the complexities of such arrangements, the requirements to make them 
work and the lessons from early experience, for which Indigenous affairs was a prime site. 
These are reviewed in more detail in a subsequent section. 
Conclusion: Looking back from the present vantage point, two outcomes are clear. First, 
government continued to play a leading part in a wide variety of economic and social 
policy areas. Government may have changed its role, but its influence was no less 
pervasive. The state determines what outcomes it wants to achieve and how they will be 
sought. Second, there is a clear template for action: in the first instance, strong central 
leadership with prime responsibility for determining desired outcomes located in the 
central authorities; thereafter, public services are best delivered through contracts or 
quasi-contractual arrangements with specialist for-profit agencies or NGOs.  
This framework was modified to accommodate two cases: those which involve chronic or 
intractable problems; and those which engage more than one department or level of 
government and/or local stakeholders. In these settings, management was shifted to a 
whole-of-government pattern. Before considering how effective this proved in practice, 
changes to the administration of Indigenous policy are traced. 
  
 51 
6. Mainstreaming Indigenous 
Service Delivery 
Professor Ian Marsh 
From 1988 until 2004, the policy framework for indigenous affairs in and beyond remote 
Australia marched to a different drumbeat.  In this period there was an effort, via the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), to build a separate structure 
which both redressed indigenous disadvantage and created a context for Indigenous voice 
and engagement. ATSIC had been established in 1987. By the time of the election of the 
Howard government (1996) ATSICs achievements had been increasingly overwhelmed in 
public and indigenous perceptions by its failings. Following an enquiry, which 
recommended a contrary course, and not without substantial controversy, ATSIC was 
abolished in 2004 (Hannaford, Huggins and Collins, 2003; also submissions from W. 
Gray and W. Sanders: the report and these submissions all recommended a re-structured 
organisation). Abolition received bipartisan support. Thereafter policy was 
‘mainstreamed’ with responsibility for ATSIC programmes distributed relevant line 
departments. 
The abolition of ATSIC was accompanied by a new governance structure. This involved at 
least three elements: the development of strategic capacity and focus within the 
Commonwealth government; the development of federal-state machinery; and the 
establishment of new on-the-ground delivery arrangements. These are briefly considered. 
Strategic leadership by the federal government:  
In March 2000, in an endeavour to impart a more positive orientation to indigenous 
policy, the Howard government espoused what it labelled ‘practical reconciliation’. This 
explicitly acknowledged the leadership role of the national government.17 It aimed to 
improve conditions on the ground in relation to health, housing, education and health.  
In 2001, the Howard government invited the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) 
to undertake a comprehensive review of gaps in indigenous access to services and of 
funding arrangements. A decade later, without significant gain in outcomes, it is salutary 
to recall the core points of this report: 
‘The social economic and cultural circumstances of Indigenous Australians differ 
greatly between urban, regional and remote locations. The services provided….how 
they are provided and the costs of providing them differ with location. 
Mainstream programs do not adequately meet the needs of Indigenous people 
because of barriers to access. These barriers include the way programmes are 
designed, how they are funded, how they are presented and their costs to users.   
                                                        
17 Grattan, M. ‘Howard practices a sorry argument’,Sydney Morning Herald, 30 March 2000, p. 8. 
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In all regions, across all functional areas examined in our enquiry Indigenous 
people experience entrenched levels of disadvantage compared to non-Indigenous 
people. 
It is clear from all available evidence that mainstream services do not meet the 
needs of Indigenous people.  
It should be expected that their use of mainstream services would be at greater 
levels than those of non-Indigenous Australians. This is not the case. Indigenous 
Australians access mainstream services at much lower rates than non-Indigenous 
people. 
Some essential features (of program development) include….Indigenous control of, 
or strong influence over, service delivery expenditure and regional and local service 
delivery arrangements that emphasise community development, inter-agency 
cooperation and’ general effectiveness.’ 
The CGC noted that mainstream services are mostly planned and delivered to meet the 
requirements of the most common users and do not allow for the extreme disadvantage 
and special needs of Indigenous people, a point echoed in other analyses. For example: 
Dillon and Westbury conclude: ‘Program design is invariably undertaken centrally and 
given the relatively small size of niche programs; “one-size-fits-all” approaches are 
inevitable’ (p. 69) 
In 2002, joined-up government was launched with trial at eight indigenous sites. In May 
2004, following the abolition of ATSIC, the government established a Ministerial 
Taskforce on Indigenous Issues. The idea was to create a Cabinet level committee to drive 
the ‘practical reconciliation’ process.18 This was supported by a Secretaries Group which 
was designed to coordinate implementation. To continue Indigenous representation, a 
new nominated National Indigenous Council was also established. At an administrative 
level, an Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination was also established, first in DIMIA 
and later in FaCSIA.  
Meantime, programs formerly administered by ATSIC were transferred to mainstream 
departments with the employment program (CDEP - $574 million in 2006-07 budget) 
transferred to DEWR and the housing program (CHIP - $292 million) transferred to 
FaCSIA. Program development was to be informed by three priority themes: early 
childhood intervention, safer communities, and building indigenous wealth, employment 
and an entrepreneurial culture.   
To effect change at the local level, Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) were to be 
signed covering particular measures. In addition, to build coordinated action these were 
to be backed by Regional Partnership Agreements (RPAs). By 2007, 180 SRAs and 3 
RPAs had been signed. These are detailed in an Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) 
                                                        
18 Ministerial Taskforce on Indigenous Affairs available at 
http://www.atns.net.au/agreement.asp?entityID=2330 
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evaluation (2009). Indicating the importance of mainstream programs, these 
arrangements represented a very small proportion of the overall budget which then stood 
at $3.5 billion. Likewise, in 2006-07 only $75 million over 4 years was committed by eight 
government departments for SRAs in a total indigenous budget of around $3 billion.  
(Hunt, 2007, p. 163). 
To implement these arrangements, thirty multi-agency Indigenous Coordinating Centres 
(ICCs) were established in urban, rural and remote Australia. By 2006, some 562 staff 
members were assigned to ICCs (approx 19 staff per centre). They assumed three main 
roles: program administration; solution brokering to provide a bridge between community 
needs and departmental programs; and developing SRAs with local communities. ICC 
mangers were the key. 
Meantime, in June 2006, a Summit on domestic violence and child abuse in indigenous 
communities was convened. This included representatives of state and federal 
governments. The participants agreed to examine a range of proposals, including ‘a 
greater role for a network of Aboriginal seniors’.19 These recommendations were discussed 
at a COAG meeting in July. In December, the federal minister released his blueprint for 
action. Its three key points were the same as those announced in May 2004: early 
childhood intervention, safer communities, and building an entrepreneurial culture. 
In June 2007, five months before an anticipated election, the report, Little Children are 
Sacred, was published. It documented distressing levels of child sexual abuse. Its release 
was accompanied by much media fanfare. Six days later the federal government 
announced its emergency intervention, the Northern Territory Emergency Response 
(NTER). It described the level of child sexual abuse as a national emergency.20 As noted 
earlier, this response effectively repudiated processes and approaches that had been 
unfolding over the previous seven years. 
In 2008, after defeat of the Howard government, the NTER was reviewed (2009) and the 
government subsequently modified its operation in a number of areas. Emphasis returned 
to community consultations and the ICC process.    
Federal-State Collaboration: Commonwealth-State collaboration in Indigenous affairs 
commenced in 1992 when the newly established Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) adopted a ‘National Commitment to Improved Outcomes for Indigenous People’. 
This was lifted to a new level in November 2000 when COAG adopted a Framework to 
Advance Aboriginal Reconciliation. In Aril 2002, COAG endorsed the whole-of-
government trials, which were discussed previously. This approach was continued by the 
Rudd government. Its election in 2007 was followed by a renewed commitment to 
Indigenous development with COAG as the primary platform for national policy 
development.   
                                                        
19 Larissa Behrendt, Indigenous Policy: law and order is only part of the solution, Australian 
Policy Online, 3 July 2006, accessed at www.apo.org.au  
20 See FaCSIA media release 21 June 2007 
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In 2008, COAG agreed to six ambitious targets to ‘close the gap’: 
 Close  the gap in life expectancy within a generation 
 Halve the gap in mortality rates for indigenous children under five within a decade 
 Ensure all indigenous four year olds in remote communities have access to early 
childhood education within five years 
 Halve the gap for Indigenous students in reading, writing and numeracy within a 
decade. 
 Halve the gap for Indigenous students in Year 12 attainment or equivalent 
attainment rates by 2020 
 Halve the gap in employment outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians within a decade. 
Government efforts were focused on seven building blocks or ‘strategic areas for action’: 
early childhood, schooling, health, economic participation, healthy homes, safe 
communities; governance and leadership – the latter involving Indigenous communities 
not the wider governance system that was to deliver on these goals. These building blocks 
have become the focus of the Productivity Commissions biannual assessment and also of 
the (briefer) annual report by the Prime Minister (e.g. Prime Minister, 2011). We will see 
later in the discussion of strategic policy making that the theory of development, implicit 
in this faming, is not uncontested (Chapter 9, on page 99). We will also see that this was 
introduced without any engagements with its nominal subjects. 
There is also an intergovernmental agreement covering indigenous development 
(National Indigenous Reform Agreement – Closing the Gap, 2009) In addition, there are 
National Partnership Agreements covering inter-governmental collaboration in the 
following indigenous areas: Remote Service Delivery, Economic Participation, Health 
Outcomes, Early Childhood Development, Remote Housing, Remote Public Internet 
Access. This elaborate framework, which constitutes the primary governmental strategic 
design for ‘closing the gap’, continues to evolve. 
In 2010, the Indigenous Expenditure Review Group published its first report on 
expenditure on indigenous services. This sought to establish a consolidated figure based 
on three components: the costs of targeted services; estimated expenditure based on the 
direct use of services (education, health etc); and indirect expenditure based on relative 
population shares. Whilst conceptually clear, in practice these last two calculations 
proved much harder to derive. The report estimates total indigenous expenditure at $21.9 
billion or 5.3% of total general government expenditure. Estimated expenditure per head 
was just over $40 000 for Indigenous Australians compared to just over $18 000 for non-
Indigenous citizens. The report notes the differences is due to three factors – more 
intensive use of mainstream services because of higher levels of disadvantage, the 
provision of indigenous specific services and the difference in the cost of providing 
mainstream services.  
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Note the aggregated nature of these calculations. The data is also reported by state. But 
no other levels of disaggregation are reported. For example, there is no distinction 
between regions. These assessments may be relevant to later discussion of a potential 
additional role for the Commonwealth Grants Commission.  
Outcomes: 
Evaluations of outcomes are now comprehensive and periodic. For example, already in 
2011, two comprehensive documents have been presented: the 750 page biannual 
Productivity Commission report and the Prime Ministers Annual Report to Parliament 
(Prime Minister 2011). Both documents use as fundamental points of reference the closing 
the gaps headings and targets. Their appropriateness is discussed in a later Paper 
(Chapter 9, on page 84). In the Productivity Commission report results are presented 
against 37 specific sub-targets. These are proxies for broader objectives adopted by 
COAG.  They also implicitly suggest a causal structure although the systemic links 
between the various principal outcomes are not explored. For example, employment 
outcomes are not prioritised. They are co-equal with health, educational, security and 
housing outcomes. This causal assumption might be questioned. 
The data is mostly also presented in aggregate or at least state-based terms. Despite 
repeated acknowledgement of the extent to which circumstances vary by location, it is not 
disaggregated by region. 
Outcomes have barely changed. From a seven year vantage point, it is equally hard to see 
how mainstreaming has improved the circumstances of people who live in remote 
communities. The array of indicators (now 12 prime and more than 37 secondary 
measures) shows marginal gains in an absolute sense in only three indicators and, when 
measured relatively against parallel changes in outcomes for the non indigenous 
population, backward movements in every single case. According to the 2011 review, 
outcomes have improved in relation to life expectancy and young child mortality; the gap 
has increased in relation to disability and chronic diseases and child abuse and neglect; 
and there is no change in relation to most of the rest including employment, post-
secondary education, household and individual income, family and community violence, 
reading etc.  
Conclusion: 
This section has reviewed the various elements involved in the ‘mainstreaming’ of 
Indigenous service delivery. In the process the governance system has been reconfigured. 
An overall strategic framework, focusing on closing the gaps between Indigenous and 
other Australians in average outcomes in seven socio-economic dimensions has been 
established. This strategic framework has been endorsed by COAG and hence has 
attracted the support of both federal and state governments. Implementation has been 
reworked. Thirty-four Indigenous Coordination Centres have been established with a brief 
to broker programs into local regions and to bundle programs at the local level. Joint 
Responsibility Agreements, Strategic Results Agreements and Local Investment Plans 
have all been introduced to support these organisational initiatives. Finally, an elaborate 
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reporting and evaluation structure has been put in place. How effective is this suite of 
governance measures on-the-ground?  
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7. Are there Structural Barriers 
to Whole-of-Government? 
Professor Ian Marsh 
Is it possible to design effective whole-of-government arrangements within present meta-
structural constraints? The latter has become the primary framework within which 
indigenous policy development and service delivery has been orchestrated. From the 
outset, the profound challenge that this would pose to governance was recognised. Two 
MAC reports (2004, 2007) described the changes in organisation and processes that were 
essential if whole-of-government was to work.  
This included five basic imperatives: 
 substantial initial cross-agency/stakeholder agreement about the broad purposes to 
be pursued;  
 use of the outcomes budget framework to pool resources and to create appropriate 
accountability frameworks;  
 lead-agency staff empowered with sufficient authority to manage whole-of-
government settings and to lead the engagement of local stakeholders,  
 empowering these same managers to engage with relevant individuals and 
interests;  
 And finally ensure the individuals engaged in these latter roles have the 
appropriate networking, collaboration and entrepreneurial skills. 
These are very demanding requirements. Can the development of localised authority and 
localised discretions be reconciled with central determination of outcomes and central 
budgeting and accountability arrangements? Or are devolved, whole-of-government 
outcomes not possible without much more radically decentralised designs?  
What programs are involved? To grasp the whole-of-government challenge, a first step 
involves assessment of the multitude and variety of programs that ICCs are supposed to 
broker into local communities. In practice, they can do this by one of two means: either by 
brokering linkages between communities and programs; or, more demanding, by joining 
individual programs into a funding block funding. By either means, ICCs are expected to 
achieve greater program impacts in a specific local context.  
The Strategic Evaluation of Indigenous Programs (Department of Finance, 2010) offers 
the most recent comprehensive overview. It identified no less than 232 individual 
programs which in one way or another support Indigenous Australians. This report 
reviews these programs in the context of the various broad outcomes that the government 
has established.   
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An earlier ANAO report (2007) focused on the four primary departments - DES, DEWR, 
FaHCSIA, and Health. This report identifies 94 programmes, either mainstream or niche, 
that are relevant to Indigenous affairs. DES operates 15 Indigenous specific programs and 
43 mainstream programs that have Indigenous applications; DEWR 11 indigenous specific 
programs and the Job Network;  FaHCSIA, 6 Indigenous specific  and 6 mainstream 
programs; Health and Aging, 5 Indigenous specific programs and 9 mainstream programs.  
To add to the complexity, many of these major programs have sub components.   
In a report on the indigenous trials, Gray (2006) noted the challenge of program 
management as perceived on-the-ground, in this particular case from Wadeye. The trial 
was intended to reduce the number of individual programs that local communities need to 
manage. In fact in the course of the trial the number of programs applied to the 
community increased to 90. In another example, Dillon and Westbury list the five 
Commonwealth programs that could be tapped to fund natural resource management on 
indigenous land: ‘An important and growing policy area where in recent years scores of 
Indigenous ranger programs have emerged across northern Australia focused on land and 
resource management. Program funding in this area comes from a diverse array of 
agencies: the National Heritage Trust, the Indigenous Protected Areas Program, CDEP, 
STEP and the ABA. …Programs vary in size from hundreds of millions (for example the 
CDEP or ARHP) to less than half a million (for example the Indigenous Children’s 
Program). (p 66) 
With 39% of the indigenous population under 15, education is another critical area. The 
same authors note the array of programs relevant here: ‘The national flagship programs 
include the Youth Allowance and Abstudy: the former is targeted at young people 
studying, undertaking training for Australian apprenticeship, looking for work, or sick; 
the latter at indigenous students. Over and above this FaHCSIA has four ‘niche’ programs 
which provide youth services of various kinds with a total national budget of $34.6 
million and a client base of approximately 340 000 nationally. DEST has at least ten 
youth related Indigenous specific niche programs….the data on numbers of service 
providers suggests that the availability of these programs in remote Australia is very 
patchy…It is clear that across the national government there are a couple of hundred 
different programs potentially allocable to the circumstances of remote citizens. Access is 
a different matter entirely’ ( p. 67/68) 
Finally, they note the bewildering array of programmes aimed at indigenous housing: ‘The 
existence of concurrent state and national responsibilities means that in some areas 
programs are duplicated by each jurisdiction. Housing is a classic example where states, 
territories and national governments deliver both mainstream and Indigenous housing 
and housing related programs, and even within the national government there are a 
number of separate Indigenous housing programs (CHIP/NAHS, CHIP/AACAP, FHBH) 
all delivering housing and essential services at the community level, along with ARHP 
which funds the states and territories to deliver housing at the community level’ (p. 65). 
The whole-of-government architecture was designed to ensure these programs are 
accessed by the citizens that they are intended to serve. How effective have these 
arrangements proven to be? 
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Whole-of-government administrative architecture: Since whole-of-government 
arrangements were introduced in 2002, there have been at least nine reviews. The first 
four covered the initial COAG trials and the rest subsequent developments. Seven were 
official or commissioned evaluations and the remainder independent academic 
assessments: Urbis, Keys, Young, 2006; Morgan Disney, 2006; Gray and Sanders, 2006; 
Gray, 2006; ANAO, 2007; KPMG 2007; Hunt, 2007; FaHCSIA, 2007; O’Flynn and 
Blackman, 2010). All these reviews repeat points stressed in the MAC documents, namely 
that whole-of-government will not work without devolution of authority, funding, 
accountability and coordinated organisation. They also all find continuing and unresolved 
administrative difficulties. It has not proved possible to reconcile centralised ‘siloed’ 
organisation and funding with devolved authority and flexible resource management.  
As an introduction to these unresolved problems, consider the case of Mutitjulu, 
ironically the first community named in the NTER. Before whole-of-government was 
conceived, this community tried, over more than a decade, to obtain for itself a new style 
of governance (Smith, 2009). Its efforts foundered on immovable central structures. This 
story starts in 1991 when the NPY Women’s Council prepared a report highlighting 
concerns about ‘controlling and caring for children’. A series of submissions and 
discussions followed. In 2000 the community council at Mutitjulu asked Centrelink, 
ATSIC and FaCS to work with it to develop a practical strategy to deal with welfare 
dependency and related family problems. Following a consultation, the Community 
Council itself proposed a Participation and Partnership Agreement. The departments did 
not respond. Why? ‘First, the key departments would not support an “All in” community 
model of welfare reform and would not support linking Youth Allowance with school 
attendance, even though these had been specifically requested by community 
members…Second, Centrelink and FACS would not countenance an indigenous 
community working with them to develop and implement locally-relevant breaching rules. 
Neither would they countenance a community organisation being provided with a 
delegation under the Social Security Act in order to do so…Third, entrenched inter-
departmental turf wars in Canberra meant that the departments concerned were unable to 
negotiate a common position…And finally the Australian government was unable or 
unwilling to reform the chaotic state of its departmental program funding in order to 
streamline the pooled funding and grant reporting arrangements that would have been 
required…In late June 2007, the Australian government announced that Mutitjulu would 
be the first community into which it activates national emergency measures. It will do so 
unilaterally’. So far as coordination is concerned, we will see little has changed. 
The findings of the various evaluations affirm that whole-of-government is confounded at 
the critical regional and ICC levels. The obstacles are structural not contingent. Consider 
the two most recent reports, one official (2008, conducted by KPMG) and the other 
independent (2010, conducted by academics from the ANU and the University of 
Canberra). The KPMG study involved a review of internal documents plus interviews with 
158 Australian and state government agency staff and 35 community organisations. The 
following selected observations define the magnitude of the structural barriers that 
continue to frustrate this arrangement despite six years experience and at least eight 
preceding reviews: 
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‘There is a definite trend of line agency staff presenting to communities/organisations as 
representative of their agency…..Communities/organisations reported this as confusing as 
they do not know who to talk to or if they have to talk to all the different agencies instead 
of accessing services through the ICC….ICC staff and line agency staff rarely visit 
communities together’ 
‘Many line agency staff were unable to provide governance and financial management 
assistance to organisations due to probity issues relating to assessment of funding 
applications…Communities advised that it was difficult for them to keep abreast of the 
changing policy and service delivery environment’ 
‘ICC managers reported frustration in undertaking (their intended leadership) role. As 
coordinators, Managers indicated that they do not have authority to gather agency staff 
support….Line agencies confirmed that their staff are directly responsible to their line 
agency and that the ICC manager has no authority to compel or direct staff to undertake 
ICC work. 
‘Line agency staff located in ICCs commented that they experienced a tension between 
their program management responsibilities (i.e. the expectations of their line agency) and 
their responsibility to engage in what they referred to as ICC work….Conversely ICC 
managers reported feeling powerless in some situations as they do not have the authority 
to direct change.’ (p. 9) 
‘The implementation of whole-of-government collaboration in ICCs is an area requiring 
significant improvements. Many of the issues that impede whole-of-government are 
structure and have little to do with ICC staff and management’s willingness to collaborate’ 
(p. 10) 
‘Overwhelmingly the consultation repeated the message that the current funding and 
reporting arrangements are a significant barrier to whole-of-government 
collaboration…Line agencies have different program guidelines, funding rounds and 
delegation which do not align…Complaints were raised about the different risk 
assessments each line agency applies..in some cases this can result in applications 
undergoing up to 8 different risk assessments’ 
‘One ICC took over 12 months to negotiate and approve an SRA which was worth under 
$50 000 in funding…To overcome the barrier of obtaining multiple line agency 
approvals…many ICCs have adopted the approach of developing smaller SRAs in terms of 
dollar value, number of signatures and issues to be addressed’ 
‘A perceived barrier to reducing red tape is line agencies different program and funding 
guidelines….For example one agency may apply more rigorous risk assessment for 
applications over $100 000, while another agency’s more rigorous assessment only 
applies to applications over $150 000.’ 
The findings of the University-based study (O’Flynn and Blackman, 2010) echo these 
conclusions albeit in more graphic terms. This study was based on 48 field interviews 
covering staff at ICCs, State and regional offices and in Canberra. It suggests that despite 
the top-down whole-of-government effort, Mutitjulu’s experience has not been 
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transcended. Their conclusion is unequivocal: ‘Due to entrenched barriers, which 
permeate the broader public service, ICCs have been a failed experiment.’  
Like KPMG, O’Flynn and Blackman identify structural failings in the basic organisational 
design:  
 No or limited assignment of authority to the Indigenous Coordination Centre 
Managers,  
 An ad hoc approach to the representation of departments (which meant staff were 
withdrawn as cost pressures emerged);  
 An underinvestment in skills;  
 Inconsistent operating systems.  
They cite the comments of ICC managers, first on their delegations of authority: 
I could not go out and direct another person to do something in this ICC … because 
they’re not from my agency.  I could (only) ask, influence, beg (Executive Level, ICC). 
Whole of government doesn’t work … when you’ve got all different agencies sitting in 
the one place, supposedly working together … they’re supposed to be all collaborating 
and telling each other what they’re doing … I’m telling you it doesn’t work and I work 
in an ICC and I’ve been there since the day it started (Executive Level, ICC).  
The fact that we’re co-located with [Department A] and [Department B] and a couple 
of [Department C’s] people is just window dressing.  So there’s no whole of 
government activity between them ... There’s no practical program [or] whole of 
government approach (APS Level, ICC). 
The NTER Review also picked up these criticisms but this time from the perspective of the 
clients: ‘There as extensive comment in communities about the lack of co-ordination 
across locally based professional staff. Between the GBMs, Community Employment 
Brokers and shire service managers, there is not a clear point of authority or coordination’  
A second set of unresolved governance issues arose from conflicting vertical and 
horizontal tensions which cut across in the administration of programs: According to 
O’Flynn and Blackman: ‘The pervasiveness of a program focus and the silos that it creates 
were seen as impossible to combat even in a setting where there was physical co-location 
and strong endorsement from Ministers and Secretaries.’ The comments of ICC staff 
provide graphic confirmation: 
There’s all these horrendous issues [in] the way we structure and design ... we’re all 
in-house, independent silos that are not meant to really do anything more than 
service that particular program (Executive Level, ICC).   
It seems to me the whole of government approach is about being entrepreneurial 
inside the public service … [For] program managers and project managers it’s not 
quite like that … [they] are constrained within the approaches and silos (Senior 
Executive Service, ICC). 
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When you go from the top down to the bottom [WG] disconnects at multiple levels.  It 
disconnects through the allocation of finances, it disconnects through the rewards for 
your accountabilities for your program … so all those things work against it (Senior 
Executive Service, National Office). 
A third problematic element involved centralised decision-making. This aspiration also 
fell foul of more embedded administrative practices and requirements:  
The idea [was] for ICCs to have a pool of money that they could make decisions about.  
Well, in the great thing about being risk averse that was all centralised back in 
Canberra: … useless basically.  It just went against the whole thing about whole of 
government which is about sharing, devolving, not controlling everything, but taking 
responsibility and it’s the same pattern.  And that was a bit of its undoing, in fact 
because it was to give people the power to do the deal on the ground (Senior 
Executive Service, ICC).  
There’s systematic and the structural problems that everyone faces … around the 
funding agreements ... really inhibiting for anyone …  and that certainly has happened 
[on] numerous occasions where … people have been able to say, “well I think we can 
do that” and … then going away and finding the actual delegate says, “no” … and yet 
you’ve said, “yes” … the people that are actually there [in ICCs] don’t have ... the 
ability to be able to make a call that can be carried through ... (Executive Level, 
National Office).  
[In the past] you’d have a cup of tea and even if you said “no” [community members] 
appreciated it. Whereas now, God, they’re too scared to pick up the phone.  They just 
feel the concept of the decisions and the power over their life is just so far removed … 
a lot of the funding has been removed back to [the capital] … [and] not only the 
position but the decision making [power] (Executive Level, ICC). 
You cannot make a decision … You can agree and say “we’ll take it up the line” but 
that doesn’t mean squat to me ... a lot of the poor old officers who go out there every 
two weeks, collect notes, build relationships, but in reality it’s a very long and 
tortuous process … (Executive Level, National Office). 
Most recently, under the 2009 National Partnership Agreements between the 
Commonwealth and the States, the same broad arrangements have been extended to 
coordinate the delivery of programs across jurisdictions. Six agreements have already 
been signed and others are foreshowed in relation to native title claims arrangements, 
remote infrastructure and healthy food. In general, the parties also commit to ‘developing 
a co-ordinated approach’ and ‘enabling initiatives to be delivered in a manner appropriate 
to needs in particular locations’. To oversee the arrangements, a Coordinator-General 
based in Canberra was appointed in 2009. This officer would ‘have the authority to work 
across agencies to cut through bureaucratic blockages and red tape…the Coordinator –
General will have direct relationship with Commonwealth Secretaries …and will work 
collaboratively with State and Territory officials and Ministers to achieve a unified 
approach’. This approach replicates on a national scale, the Commonwealth governments 
own whole-of-government arrangements. The ANAO report discussed earlier identified 
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some 95 relevant programs in four departments that were potentially relevant to ICC 
operations. Many sub-divided into a variety of further streams. How many more might be 
added when the diverse array of state programs are included? In the light of the 
experience with ICCs, it is hard to be sanguine about the likely success of this exercise in 
federal-state collaboration.  
Accountabilities as a structural barrier to local effectiveness: Central accountability 
requirements create another barrier to on-the-ground effectiveness. Take health services. 
In the interests of enhancing local choice and control, the Aboriginal Community 
Controlled Health Services (ACCHS) were established in the 1980s. Funding was later 
transferred to ATSIC and grants were on a yearly basis but with an expectation of 
continuance. The Commonwealth Department of Health assumed responsibility in 1995 
and thereafter funding increased. The pattern of funding has since further evolved with 
most services now drawing support from several sources: a core operating grant from the 
Office for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health (OATSIH); state government 
Health Department grants; and finally by proposal driven niche funding that could 
include broader social purposes.  
Each funding source adopts its own application process, accountability framework and 
priorities. In an assessment of these arrangements, Lavoie et al (2009) note: ‘Analyses 
conducted by the Victorian Department of Health suggests that the reporting and 
compliance burden is disproportionate compared to that imposed on other small and 
medium-size funded agencies’ (p. 6). For example, aboriginal agencies receiving on 
average $2 million were accountable for between 26-30 activities. NGOs typically received 
total funding of $10 million for the same array of activities. This study also found that 
agencies can be required to produce up to 59 separate reports for 13 programmes. This 
boosts transaction costs disproportionately.  Further, in a small service disentangling the 
daily time allocation of a single staff member between varieties of programmes can be 
wholly artificial. Finally, a 12 month funding cycle makes the recruitment of staff 
precarious.  
These multiple accountabilities and the associated burden of transaction costs have 
persisted despite having figured so strongly in other evaluations. This suggests that the 
requirements derive from wider structural imperatives and cannot be excised without 
systemic change. 
Consultation and the development of social capital. Every official report since 2001 has 
emphasised the imperative of working with and through local communities (e.g.  
Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2001; ATSIC, 2003; Whole-of-Government 2004; 
Morgan Disney 2006; wicked problems, 2007, NTER Review 2009; Devolved Government 
2009; Department of Finance, 2010; Productivity Commission, 2011). To illustrate the 
complexities that can arise, Edmunds (2010, p. 16) cites the negotiations over James Price 
Point, which involved Woodside and a proposed LNG development. Negotiations were 
conducted with the Kimberley Land Council, the organisation which had statutory 
responsibilities for consultation under the Native Title Act. The Council had secured a 
consensus amongst key traditional owners. But a dissident group challenged these 
processes. Edmunds comments: ‘This is a common situation and one that traditional law 
 64 
could once have dealt with. However, it fits uneasily into contemporary decision making, 
raising a crucial question about how much, and whose consent is needed for informed 
consent.  
If this is one dimension of the issue, another is the quixotic (from the perspective of local 
communities) behaviour of their governmental interlocutors. Take the NTER. This banned 
sales of alcohol on Aboriginal land. According to Maggie Brady, a specialist in alcohol use 
in Indigenous communities: ‘The (political grandstanding associated with the NTER) was 
a little strange considering that most Aboriginal land in the Territory was already dry. 
There were already 107 general restricted areas, all on Aboriginal land and all in non–
urban areas except for one town camp in Alice Springs…..the alcohol recommendations in 
the Little Children are Sacred report…are designed to work with and enhance the NTs 
existing legislative structure and that the Intervention measures unhelpfully cut across 
them’ (2007, cited Edmunds, p. 19).   
Another example involved the impact of the NTER at Wadeye, an early trial site. ‘When a 
crisis erupted at the Wadeye trial site……the Commonwealth government resorted to a 
more coercive approach characteristic of hierarchical or contract government…It has 
chosen not to develop housing through the legitimately elected Thamururr Regional 
Council, with whom it signed the COAG trial agreement thereby by-passing and 
potentially undermining the very indigenous governance structure it partnered with only 
four years ago, and to which it remains formally committed in the NT bilateral agreement 
(Gibbons evidence to Senate Estimates Committee Hearing, 2007, cited in Hunt 2007, p. 
167).  
Smith (2007) describes the proposed governance arrangements for the West Arnhem 
Shire that were developed slowly and after protracted negotiations that had begun in 
2004. Their purpose was to plan implementation of a new local government shire 
covering the entire region. Following protracted on-the-ground negotiations over three 
years which progressively built support amongst relevant groups and communities, a new 
governance structure had been settled. In 2007, the Intervention unceremoniously 
aborted these arrangements, leaving behind a frustrated and cynical local community.   
According to the ANAO, in 2007 75% of 257 managers surveyed in the ANAO Audit 
responded positively to the statement ‘The Indigenous Affairs Arrangements (IAAs) have 
encouraged consultation with indigenous communities at the local and regional levels’. 
How effective were these conversations from the perspective of their interlocutors. The 
on-the-ground evidence is not positive. For example, in May 2010, DEEWR and FaHCSIA 
issued a draft indigenous economic strategy. Submissions were invited and consultations 
held with indigenous communities throughout Australia. The following are the reporter’s 
notes on the consultations held in various remote centres in November 2010: 
In Alice Springs: ‘Approximately 22 (Indigenous) participants attended the 
workshop…People participated in both the questions and answer session and the table 
discussions but there was widespread criticism of the relevance of the Indigenous 
Economic Development Strategy to remote areas and the likelihood of anything changing 
on the ground…..There are no economic foundations in remote communities and this 
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needs to be acknowledged..There was widespread criticism that the strategy was 
homogenising and represented an urban western model…(it) needs to respond to the 
different circumstances, opportunities, economies and drivers in remote regional 
areas..There are so many economic strategies around that people are blasé about “just 
another plan”..The gap between the strategy and what is happening on the ground is very 
wide..There is a different sort of economy operating in remote areas. It’s not just a matter 
of transferring these into real jobs, they are real jobs but not recognised as such.’ 
In Broome: ‘ Indigenous people need to be heard..this has not happened in the past and 
this is being repeated in the current process: not enough time….and doubt as to whether 
the draft strategy will properly take account of the feedback..The current ranger program 
should be expanded. It has been successful in raising confidence and helping people 
become work ready.’ 
In Cairns: ‘Many participants said that over the decades they had participated in similar 
discussions with Government and had raised the same issues….There was obvious 
frustration with the focus of this consultation…the Mayor of Yarrabah led a symbolic 
walkout at 2pm underlying the level of frustration at the meeting…The strategy was seen 
as meaningless without a means of implementing it through planning at the community 
level and there was scepticism that anything would change on the ground..There is a need 
to open up communication between government departments.’ 
In Port Lincoln: ‘There was a high level of scepticism regarding the draft Strategy as 
participants note that consecutive governments had consulted on similar policies in the 
past without any noticeable achievements to date…Government (should) be held 
accountable for not following through its own recommendations in the area of indigenous 
economic development in the past ..The one-size-fits-all approach is inappropriate – 
there is a need for regional level planning including local employers and business. Local 
communities both indigenous and non-indigenous need to work together to achieve 
solution’ 
`In Karratha: ‘Real engagement means listening to indigenous people and not just telling 
them…it is difficult to engage with government…..previous feedback for policy 
development over the years has been ignored. There is no apparent correlation between 
what the Australian government proposes and what indigenous people want. A place-
based approach is needed. Different communities have different needs and opportunities’ 
The funding framework: At a material level, W H Stanner’s indictment of the ‘great 
Australian silence’ about Indigenous Australians is reflected in an accumulation of 
deficits which dog present programs: ‘The list would include in no particular order, the 
pre-existing failure of educational outcomes, which lead to a largely non-literate 
indigenous citizenry, extreme housing shortages for personnel required to deliver 
government funded programmes and service across remote Australia; poor law 
enforcement and less than optimal levels of intellectual capital within government 
agencies relevant to remote service delivery……The combined absence of social and 
physical infrastructure means that there is nothing for governments to graft mainstream 
services onto as happens elsewhere. Government appear to discount or underestimate the 
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importance of a pre-existing network of social, physical governance and business 
infrastructure…(Dillon and Westbury. p. 59). 
One important source of equality in services for Australians is the periodic 
determinations of the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC). Via complex metrics, 
the CGC attempts to equalise funding for service provision around Australia. But there are 
several problems. First, determinations are based on average or mainstream needs. There 
are no special provisions or allowances for remedying acute backlogs such as those that 
exist in remote Australia. These were comprehensively documented by the CGC in its 2001 
report (cited previously).  
Second, while the Commission grants money on the basis of an assessment of needs in 
particular areas like housing, transport etc, there is no requirement for governments to 
spend their allocations in these areas. On the contrary. The States and Territories are free 
to spend the sums as they choose. On the contrary, the Commonwealth has ‘defended the 
practice of making untied general purpose grants to (the states and local government) in 
recognition of their status as independent-elected democratic spheres of government. The 
fact that allocation of these grants was determined through an exercise which made 
reference to Aborigines in the measurement of disability factors in order to achieve some 
degree of fiscal equalisation….was clearly regarded as of secondary importance to the 
principle of general purpose funding’ (Sanders, quoted Rowse, 2002). In addition, the 
Commonwealth operates a substantial number of special or supplementary programs. The 
States and Territories may use the existence of special Commonwealth programs as a 
ground for reducing their own allocations to Indigenous services.  
There is now no aggregate assessment of the needs of remote Australia and no mechanism 
to check that total allocated funds match the rhetoric and proclaimed intentions of 
governments. 
Take the Northern Territory CGC allocation. According to a NT Council of Social Services 
analysis, in 2009 twenty-five per cent of the total $4 billion budget came in special 
purpose payments from Canberra, mostly for indigenous services. A further 55% 
represented a GST allocation by the CGC. The report demonstrates that in 2006-07 the 
Darwin government underspent its CGC allocation by $542 million across a range of key 
social welfare indicators. This represented no less than 42% of the total CGC allocation 
(NTCOSS, October 2008; see also The Australian, 24 October 2009).  The NTCOSS report 
commented: ‘The spending priorities of the NT government exacerbate the differences in 
measures and senses of equality for low-income and disadvantaged people thereby 
contributing to the reduced life expectancy, poor health, violence and other differences 
that they are intended to address’.   
Another issue concerns allocations to local government. These are determined on a per 
capita basis. ‘The bizarre result is that jurisdictions like the Northern Territory with one 
sixth of the Australian land mass receive less in local government assistance than is 
notionally allocated to the population of Geelong’ (Dillon and Westbury, p. 188). 
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A dedicated and periodic CGC review of remote Australia needs and circumstances would 
seem to be a prime requirement. The data collected for the Expenditure assessments 
(noted earlier) could provide a basis for such analyses. 
Whole-of-government policy development - a case study of CDEP: Whole-of-government 
is difficult to achieve not just in on-the-ground delivery, but also in processes of cross-
departmental policy development. Despite its popularity and considerable impact in 
remote Australia, at the same time as it is promulgating ambitious employment targets, 
the government is also curtailing CDEP. At its peak, CDEP engaged some 40 000 people. 
‘From 2005, CDEP has been systematically dismantled…..without much evidence, CDEP is 
being blamed for cost shifting by governments and for poor mainstream employment 
outcomes….as CDEP is dismantled people will be given the choice of mainstream work or 
welfare, on the proviso that work might require migration from home communities…This 
policy change fails to recognise Indigenous aspirations, cultures and life projects’ 
(Altman, 2009; also Sanders).  
Seized by budgetary concerns and a larger paradigm concerning the need to enhance 
pressures on unemployed people to seek work, the specific situation of citizens in remote 
Australia has seemingly received short shrift. What is to be done in remote communities 
where there is zero conventional economic infrastructure? For example, to illustrate the 
effectiveness of CDEP, Altman describes the experience of the Kuninjku community in 
west Arnhem Land: ‘For the majority of Aboriginal people in remote community’s 
migration away from ancestral lands. and from extended kin networks will be neither an 
aspiration nor a solution. This in turn suggests that key institutions like CDEP that are 
currently being dismantled will need to be retained’ (2009, p. 9). He notes the specific 
contributions of CDEP to the Kuninjku economy: harvesting game for local consumption; 
producing art for sale in the national and global arts markets; being employed in paid 
provision of environmental services.  
A review of CDEP by the Department of Finance in 2009 (Finance, 2009) found that the 
scheme had very limited success in fulfilling its work readiness charter and that it was 
almost impossible to assess its community development contribution. It also noted these 
goals are likely to conflict. By contrast, Jon Altman (2011) observes: ‘The Australian 
government (is committed) to radically reform the CDEP because it is erroneously and 
negatively perceived to hamper engagement with the mainstream labour market rather 
than positively as an enabler of remote livelihood possibilities in the hybrid economy. It is 
after all the highly variable interactions between customary, state and market sectors of 
hybrid economies from place to place that give them distinction and potential 
comparative advantage’. These perspectives played no role in the formal assessments. 
The changes to the CDEP scheme in the NT also indicate the difficulties government faces 
in managing policy development on a whole-of-government basis. The acute problems 
recently experienced in town camps may be in part a consequence of reductions in CDEP 
employment. This displaced population from outstations and other settlements. This was 
the intended result. The scheme was run down without town camp capacities being 
augmented. Moreover, there was no development of new town-based employment 
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opportunities and no or little opportunity for mainstream employment, despite the 
promise in the COAG charter to narrow substantially the job gap. 
Finally, the governance requirements for CDEP have been criticised for a want of cultural 
appropriateness: ‘A number of developments in the CDEP program may be viewed as 
quite deliberately coercive and, occasionally, quite unrealistic by the Aboriginal 
organisations involved. They may fundamentally change an Aboriginal organisation’s 
relationship to its community members. These include requirements that no more than 
50% of the Board should be CDEP participants, supervisors or managers. In some remote 
areas almost all of the able-bodied adult population is on CDEP, making this requirement 
impossible to meet without changing the very nature of the organisation. Programs also 
have to meet DEWR-determined targets for placement of CDEP participants in non-CDEP 
jobs…which in some contexts is almost impossible’ (Hunt, 2007, p. 159). 
The Indigenous Economic Development Strategy 2011-2018, released in November 2011 
seems to sideline the potential of hybrid economic activities as a likely source of 
employment in remote locations. It declares that the source of primary opportunity in 
remote locations lies in the existing labour market and in ‘removing barriers to genuine 
commercial ventures’ (p. 16). Later it gestures to green economy opportunities:  ’As 
investment in clean energy sources such as solar, gas and wind increases, the growth of 
the clean energy sector will  also provide many new opportunities. Through the 
Indigenous Carbon Farming Fund ..the Australian government will support Indigenous 
Australians to take up opportunities in carbon abatement activities. This may include 
savanna fire management, feral camel management and environmental 
planting…..Indigenous Protected Areas, while delivering significant environmental 
benefits, will also support economic endeavours such as ecotourism’ (p. 17).   
Conclusion: The Indigenous Clearing House in FaHCSIA maintains a register which 
records current, pending and past evaluation studies. There are currently 572 entries. 
Taking recent and pending years, 128 refer to studies due in 2010, 63 to studies due in 
2012 and 121 studies have no precise date attached to them. These seem an extraordinary 
number. The sector is being heavily researched. The ANAO has three pending program 
studies, all due in 2011. However, not one study involves the effectiveness of the 
government’s own governance. Indeed, as noted earlier, the major comprehensive 
overview of this policy area concluded that ‘on balance’ present uses were due more to the 
complexity of the area than to failures of governance (Department of Finance, 2010). The 
evidence reviewed here suggests this finding is at odds with the facts. 
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8. Beyond Whole-Of-
Government: Varieties of Place-
Centred Governance 
Professor Ian Marsh 
The prime focus of this report is governance. Whole-of-government is the currently 
favoured administrative design. The previous section discussed the fundamental 
difficulties that afflict present whole-of-government arrangements. In this respect, 
Australian experience matches that of other jurisdictions, which have tried whole-of-
government and found it wanting. In its place, a number of new or supplementary 
frameworks have been introduced to shift the locus of choice and decision away from 
highly centralised arrangements towards more localised contexts. This is reflected both in 
the Total Place initiatives in England and in the attention to place-based approaches in 
current OECD work, which in turn reflects developments in particular states. In both 
cases, the drastic cuts in public spending following the 2008 GFC have coloured 
implementation (e.g. Crowe, 2011). Also relevant are ‘learning-by-doing’ approaches 
which offer a new accountability framework to reconcile national concerns with local 
initiative and freedom of action. Finally, imaginative ‘place-based’ developments, 
covering the provision of otherwise threatened local services and the realisation of 
efficiencies through collaboration between authorities at the local level, are also evident 
in Australia. These are detailed in a comprehensive report on local government RAPAD, 
2007).  These varied governance design are reviewed in turn. A concluding section 
explores the consistency of these approaches with recent official reviews of the public 
sector in Australia.  
1 The Big Society in Britain. 
David Cameron’s Conservative Party won a majority of seats in the general election of 
May 2010 but not sufficient to form a government. His subsequent coalition with the 
Liberal-Democrat Nick Clegg was based on a formal agreement of which The Big Society 
was a key part. The agreement foreshadowed a series of decentralising actions including: 
a review of local government finance; reform of the planning system; the end of ring-
fenced grants and Comprehensive Area Assessments; the establishment of directly elected 
Mayors in 12 English cities; the creation of a ‘general power of competence’ for local 
authorities, and new powers for communities to takeover threatened local facilities and to 
bid to operate services that are now provided by public authorities; new powers to 
instigate local referendums; more scope for mutual’s, cooperatives and social enterprises 
in running public services; and the establishment of a Big Society Bank. 
In the first instance, these broad commitments have been implemented via changes in the 
remit of central departments and through several specific programs. Apart from the Prime 
Minister and his Deputy who (as party leaders) carry prime responsibility for what is the 
government’s principal domestic initiative, three ministers are leading implementation: 
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the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, who heads the eponymous 
department (DCLC); the Minister for Decentralisation who has a broad remit for 
decentralisation measures across government and is located in DCLC21; in addition a 
Minister in the Cabinet Office has overall responsibility for Big Society measures 
particularly as they affect the civil service, social enterprises, volunteering etc and a 
division with specific responsibilities in these areas has been established in that 
department.  
In so far as it concerns the effectiveness of public services, The Big Society draws on 
strong empirical grounds: as we will see, it is powerfully justified by political, social and 
fiscal evidence. However, as will be clear from earlier discussion of the miscarriage of our 
own whole-of-government efforts, it also presents profound challenges to existing highly 
centralised governance arrangements. This includes, not least: how to preserve central 
influence on overall economic and fiscal management; how to persuade central 
departments and ministers to let go authority; and how to defuse media driven crises and 
reframe political accountability. These may not be insuperable problems. But the designs 
that might reconcile more decentralised responsibilities with desired central capabilities 
have yet to be worked through. As will be discussed in a later section, there are putative 
solutions  – for example, ‘learning-by-doing’ designs offer one novel solution (on page 84) 
- but in moving to a new more decentralised governance configuration it would be self-
defeating to underestimate their scale.22  
Decentralised governance represents a deliberate shift away from the top-down pattern 
which was common to both the Thatcher-Major and Blair-Brown governments. In 
particular, the Blair-Brown years were marked by substantially increased investment in 
the public sector and the development of arrangements to enhance central control but in 
conjunction with whole-of-government delivery at the local level. Organisational 
arrangements to buttress central control and to drive service improvement included 
special units in the Cabinet Office to facilitate strategy development and to drive program 
change. In addition, the performance framework was extended with a plethora of targets 
                                                        
21 The now Minister, Greg Clark wrote a book in 2003 which he describes as making the case that 
‘if central government is everywhere, then local government is nowhere’ (Total Politics: Labour’s 
Command State, London: Conservative Policy Unit, 2003). 
22 For example, in their report on the Localism Bill the Communities and Local Government Select 
Committee pointed to the lack of a coherent framework which would indicate how the various 
measures might fit together: ‘It is surprising that we have not come across a coherent, 
comprehensive vision of how public services and local democracy will change in response to the 
Government’s agenda’ para 21, p. 13. Later they noted the somewhat paradoxical situation in 
which an agenda designed to promote decentralisation was introduced without any consultation 
with the interests who would implement it: ‘The views of those outside government about how the 
policy should be defined have not obviously been taken into account. We recommend that the 
government undertake a formal consultation to gather the views of local government and other 
stakeholders about what sort of localism they would like to see.’  Para 32. P.18 
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and measures. To facilitate joined-up working, Joint Funding Agreements were also 
introduced. There is an extensive literature on all these development (e.g. Barber, 2008; 
Marsh and Miller, 2012, esp. Chps. 3 and 4).  
The profound limitations of this experience fanned interest in more radically 
decentralised approaches. An early move occurred in 2006 when the Lyons review of local 
government proposed attention to place based approaches. In subsequent years, within 
and beyond government, attention to alternatives flourished. Think tanks have been 
important contributors to the emerging agenda (e.g. ResPublica, 2008, 2009; Demos 
(Wind-Cowie),  2010 ; IPPR 2010 a, b, c, 2008; NESTA, 2011; The Young Foundation, 
2010 ; the Institute for Government, 2011; new economics foundation, 2010). In addition, 
the House of Commons Public Administration Committee and the Communities and Local 
Government Committee have reviewed aspects of the new approach (HC 547, 2011). The 
number and variety of these sources indicates the vitality of this extra-mural policy 
discussion in the UK, a point which is relevant later when we consider the very limited 
extra-mural engagement in strategic policy development in Australia   
The government has since taken several steps to advance its decentralising agenda. These 
include commitments to create elective Police Commissioners for each police area with 
responsibilities for overall strategy and public liaison, but in conjunction with Chief 
Constables. In addition, following a program introduced by Tony Blair, incentives for the 
creation of citizen or community-controlled schools (school academies) have been further 
developed and there are proposals to decentralise health administration – although these 
are now stalled as a result of political reactions. The government also abolished a variety 
of regional administrative structures.  
But the most significant step so far involves the Localism Bill introduced in December 
2010. The details will be reviewed shortly. But the general case for this approach was 
powerfully developed in the report Total Place published jointly by the Treasury and the 
Communities and Local Government Department (March 2010). The following quotes 
from this report document the basic case for change: 
‘Resource mapping demonstrated the complexity of funding streams. A pilot 
conducted over 2009 in 13 areas, which focused on social development spending, 
covered $82 billion, approximately one-fifth of the total public spend in England. The 
per-capita spends ranged from L6000 in one area to just on L9000 in another. These 
differences reflect variations in relative deprivation. The pilots ‘exposed the 
complexity of the ‘internal wiring’ of public service delivery. The large number of 
individual grants and poorly aligned objectives of similar services across different 
policy areas can limit the ability of delivery organisations to join up services around 
users.’ 
A citizen viewpoint shows how public services are often impersonal, fragmented and 
unnecessarily complex. For example, the Leicester and Lancashire survey identified 
almost 450 face-to-face service points, 65 separate call centres plus 75 web sites 
providing customer services. In Lewisham’s the survey identified 120 projects or 
programs providing various forms of support to workless and unemployed people. The 
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Bradford review concluded: ‘By adopting the culture of people and place rather than 
organisation and/or department at a central or local level we can significantly change 
the way public services are accessed and delivered.’  
The system currently driving the delivery of public services is overly complex. Cross 
organisational working at the local level requires governance and accountability 
regimes which align the approaches of different auditors, inspectors, managers and 
national and local political leaders. Template protocols for pooled budgets and other 
joint working arrangements are being developed. Local authorities currently report 
performance against 188 indicators. For frontline services one authority reported 
against 706 measures and another against 930 measures! Reporting can also be on 
different metrics. For example the Police Department and a Youth Offending Team in 
Bradford measured the number of first time offenders differently – but both 
organisations need to work together to deliver outcomes. 
Individuals and families with complex needs impose significant costs in areas but in 
most cases they are currently not tackled through targeted or preventative activities. 
The pilots demonstrated that much current public spending was focused on 
consequences not the causes of complex problems. Other research demonstrated the 
very substantial costs (and the potential savings) in moving families from ‘chaotic’ 
(L49, 425 per child) to ‘barely coping’ (L6527 per child) and then to ‘coping categories 
(L643 per child). The pilots indicated that in order to target services, the involvement 
of a wide range of organisations was needed to ‘wrap’ services around the individual. 
Sharing data proved to be a particular problem. For example, one Family Intervention 
Project involved a single case worker who helped families with multiple problems to 
get the help they needed. The problems encountered included crime, anti-social 
behaviour, attendance/behaviour problems and evictions. Treated separately, costs 
were estimated to be ten-times larger’ (Total Place, various pages). 
The purpose of the Localism Bill was to ‘devolve greater powers to councils and 
neighbourhoods and give local communities control over housing and planning decisions’.  
The core elements of the Localism Bill were: 
 Regional Strategies: Hitherto a variety of top down and Whitehall based targets 
and procedures have framed local decision making. These are abolished.  
 General Power of Competence: Local authorities are empowered to do anything 
that is not specifically prohibited by law. 
 Communities’ right to buy: The Bill gives local communities the power to bid for 
local assets threatened with closure and to bid for the ownership and management 
of community assets. In addition, community organisations will have greater 
opportunities to bid for assets where these are essential or them to deliver existing 
or new services. Public services will also be encouraged to seek offers from staff 
who want to take over and run services constituted as employee-led mutuals. 
 Neighbourhood plans: The Bill reforms the planning system by extending the rights 
of communities in planning processes. 
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 Spending: Much of the spending provided directly by central government via 
general grants remained ring-fenced. Most of these restrictions are to be 
progressively abolished. The move to community budgets which enable local areas 
to pool funds from different programs is also foreshadowed to be completed by 
2013. 
 Community Right to Challenge: The Bill incorporates a right for communities to 
challenge to run local authority services  
 Participation: Opportunities for local referenda are extended. The Bill introduces 
elected Mayors for the ten largest English cities. 
Two Parliamentary Committees have since held extensive hearings on this Bill (Public Bill 
Committee, January to march 2011; Communities and Local Government Committee, 
HC547, 7 June 2011). Evidence to both committees covered issues which were seen to 
remain unresolved despite the government’s stated intentions. These included: 
 Bundled funds and Community Budgets: ‘Community Budgets’ covering services 
for at risk families are currently being trialed in 16 areas and being considered for 
a further 34. To work successfully significant funds that now flow via siloed 
departmentally based programs, would need to be bundled into single grant and 
devolved to an authority with appropriate governance capacities and public 
legitimacy. Total Place analyses indicated that approximately 70% of public 
founding for individual services came from three departments – Health, Works and 
Pensions and Education. The foreshadowed trials will only involve about 10% of the 
total funds. Further, since the change of government other new measures would 
seem to undercut the ability to bundle funds at the lowest appropriate spatial level. 
For example, the Department of Works and Pensions has reorganised welfare-to-
work into a single Work Program, which is being administered centrally on the 
basis of regional contracts. Local government has been excluded from direct 
participation in these arrangements, thus complicating the development of context 
specific employment and developmental programs at the local level (see later 
references to OECD reports on the desirability of creating at appropriate spatial 
levels whole-system employment and development capabilities). 
 The ‘right to challenge’. Charities, social enterprises and co-operatives (but not so 
far for-profit providers) are accorded the opportunity to challenge to operate 
services now channelled through local government. For example, this might cover 
offender and community services, social care etc. This builds on a consultation 
Green Paper issued in October 2010 (Building a stronger civil society) in which the 
Government foreshadowed a much expanded scope for non-government bodies to 
bid for the delivery of public services. A White Paper had been promised for 
February 2011 however it has been delayed - according to press reports as a result 
of differences within the coalition about the relative emphasis on community 
involvement versus for-profit providers. The tensions surrounding choices between 
local and for-profit provision were succinctly expressed in evidence to the 
Communities and Local Government Committee by Voice4Change England: ‘Whilst 
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localism and devolution of power to communities can support public service 
reform, it is not a given that public service reform supports localism. If proposals 
on opening up public services are not managed properly then it is not local 
businesses or charities that will take over services but large corporations’. The 
government is committed to ensuring ‘social value in the local area’ is taken into 
account in benefit-cost calculations but has yet to define how this will be valued. A 
metric for calculating ‘local social value’ will also be critical to facilitate evaluation.  
 Localism requires new analytic tools to determine appropriate spatial scales and to 
properly value ‘community development’ and on-going innovation. The government 
has yet to develop a methodology that would allow an analysis of the relative merits 
of different spatial levels of service provision or one to assess the value of 
‘community development’ or on-going innovation.  
 For example, there is no automatic coincidence between a scale that maximises 
economic efficiency, a scale that is most likely to encourage innovation and a scale 
that is most likely to encourage economic and community development and job 
creation. Spatial levels for employment, economic development, infrastructure, 
social development, and policing, schooling and primary health care do not 
automatically coincide (see later discussion of this point in relation to 
collaboration between local authorities in Australia, pp. 88-89) 
 Moreover, the government is committed to ensuring that ‘social value in the local 
area’ is taken into account but has yet to define how this will be accomplished. 
Similarly, it has not developed an approach that would allow potential for 
innovation, which is a key element of the case for change, to be incorporated in 
analyses.23 One approach may promise an immediate benefit but another may offer 
one that is unfolding and perhaps more uncertain. A fair metric or framework to 
evaluate such alternatives is required. This also spills into accountability processes 
since any measures would be pertinent both at the both initiation and evaluation 
ends of the exercise.  
 Freer Use of Grant Funds: The government has rolled more funds into Area-Based 
Grants for local authorities and proposes to add more as the program develops. The 
aim is to create more flexibility in how the money is spent by a community – but 
what if the local decision is to divert funds to other purposes? Take Supporting 
People’s Grants. These provide housing-related support for vulnerable adults. 
Different stakeholders reacted differently to the government’s proposal to return 
this money to general funds. Local government representatives welcomed it. NGOs 
representing the individuals involved were much more guarded. The government 
has not explained how it will ensure equity for the most marginalised or most 
                                                        
23 Schumpeter’s paradox of competition is pertinent: ‘A system that at every point of time fully 
utilises its possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long run be inferior to a system that 
does so at no given point in time, because the latter’s failure to do so many be a condition for the 
level or speed of long run performance’. 
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needy or least articulate. Minimum national standards and enhanced transparency 
and scrutiny capabilities may be a way – but they have yet to be enacted. 
 Political accountability: The Bill envisages devolving wider responsibility for 
public service provision to local levels but does not address issues of political 
accountability. Despite the government rhetoric, there are already gross examples 
of governmental reaction under media pressure to highly local issues. 
 Coordination at local levels: The relationship between the various components of 
localism remains ill-defined. For example, the government’s proposed reform for 
policing and schools devolve responsibility to other bodies with no incentives to 
link activities at the community level. Where does the expansion of school 
academies, GP commissioning and elected police commissioners leave the role of 
local government? A more diverse range of elected authorities and autonomous 
service provider complicates the task of ensuring approaches are strategic or joined 
up at the community level.  
In evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee, Professor George Jones 
underlined the depth of the challenge that decentralisation presents to the dominant 
centralised ethos:  
‘Centralism pervades the legislation on the localism proposals. …….The Local 
Government Association has calculated there are at least 142 order and regulation-
making provisions, in addition to the 405 pages in the Act, with its 208 clauses and 
25 schedules. One foresees the forthcoming Act being accompanied by panoply of 
regulations and orders, as well as by almost endless pages of guidance, as the 
centre seeks to determine what should be done locally, rather than the local 
authority which knows local conditions and is accountable locally. ……. 
14. It is as if central government knows no other way to act than through command 
and control enforcing detailed prescription. Yet localism will develop only if 
centralism in the culture and processes of central government is effectively 
challenged. ………. 
15. Centralism pervades central government in forming its attitudes and 
determining its procedures and practices. It draws strength from the culture of the 
various departments of central government, which do not trust local authorities to 
run their own affairs and know no other way to deal with them than through 
regulation and detailed guidance designed to ensure they act in ways determined 
by the centre. Departmental attitudes are reinforced by ministers who have their 
own views as to how local authorities should act and wish to require them to act in 
that way. ……………. 
17. Past experience suggests that ministerial words calling for localism do not 
translate into localism in practice because of the dominance of centralism in 
central government. Michael Heseltine, the Secretary of State in 1979, announced a 
bonfire of 300 controls, but the centralist culture remained unchallenged and over 
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time new controls were introduced, more than replacing those abolished. The 
Labour government often set out policies for decentralization to local authorities 
but the reality was detailed control in targets, inspection, prescriptions and 
guidance. There is no better illustration of this approach than the at least twelve 
regulations, five directions and nearly two hundred pages of guidance specifying 
exactly how local authorities should introduce new political structures, virtually all 
of which will remain in force after the Localism Bill becomes law. 
18. ………. Unless challenged the culture of centralism will prevent localism 
becoming more than words from a Minster or in a White Paper as has happened in 
the past. If the Government wants, as it asserts, to see localism developed in 
practice, it must recognise the need for changes in the attitudes and practice of the 
departments of central government. Words by themselves will not be sufficient. 
Measures are required to entrench localism 
Ideas advanced in the Bill hearings may have wider application. One involved the creation 
Public Service Boards, which could be established at an appropriate opportunity-focused 
spatial level. They could be composed of existing elected council members and nominated 
members representing both other community bodies and central government agencies and 
departments. Their role would be to allocate resources and commission services from 
other public bodies. These Boards could also be accorded the right to bid to manage 
resources that are now allocated by central or state departments on a regionalised or local 
basis. For example, unemployment, policing, welfare and educational programs might be 
opened to bids to bundle money and reassign resources according to local priorities and 
needs. This would require the creation of a separate authority both to adjudicate such 
bids and to ensure accountability.  
The British initiatives involve decentralising proposals in a familiar political culture and 
institutional setting. Another approach is explored in a number of current and recent 
OECD reports. These suggest that, in further developing effectiveness in the provision of 
public services, place based approaches are the primary candidate. These analyses are 
summarised in the next section. 
2. Place-based Approaches in Recent OECD Work.  
The extent and variety of place-based approaches in recent OECD studies indicate the 
emergent appeal of this framework. In the quest for sustainable economic development, 
jobs and the effective provision of public services, the establishment of context-specific 
capabilities are seen to be primary. They represent the next move in the development of 
public management. Place-based approaches are suggested for a variety of contexts 
including economic development and innovation, social development, city and rural 
development, unemployment, deprived areas and high needs contexts. This is indicated in 
the following list of recent studies (with additional studies listed in the footnote): 
 Managing Accountability and Flexibility in Labour Market Policy(2011) 
 Breaking out of Policy Silos: Doing more with less (2010) 
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 Strategies to Improve Rural Service Delivery (2010) 
 Regions Matter: Economic Recovery, Innovation and Sustainable Growth (2009) 
 How Regions Grow: Trends and Analysis (2009) 
 Linking Regions and Central Government: Contracts for Regional Development 
(2007) 
 Governing Regional Development Policy: The Use of Indicators (2009) 
 Flexible Policy for More and Better Jobs (2009) 
 Linking Regions and Central Government: Contracts for Regional Development 
(2007) 
 The New Rural paradigm: Policies and Governance (2006)24 
One proposition is common to these reports: whilst it is paramount to get institutions 
right at the local or regional level, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. According to one 
OECD analyst: ‘In many countries, the regional/central vertical governance gap is 
significant: the centre faces information gaps and the regions confront capacity gaps. 
Moreover, it makes little sense to speak of ‘centralisation’ or decentralisation in general – 
the details are always the key’ (William Coleman, Presentation to Australian MPs, 
October, 2010). Historic, institutional and local characteristics should shape governance 
designs. For example, in relation to development, the emphasis is on differentiated 
strategies and organisational designs which can detect and then exploit existing or 
potential niches or opportunities. Implicit in all of the foregoing is the key role of local 
engagement and empowerment.   
In designing place-based arrangements, the OECD has developed two frameworks. The 
first sets out systematically the seven core dimensions of a governance system: 
information; capacity; funding; policy; administration; objectives; accountability (Mind 
the Gaps – A Tool for Diagnosis, see Table 1 following). These individual elements are 
defined as follows (Chairbit, 2011 a and b): 
‘i. An information gap is characterised by information asymmetries between levels of 
government when designing, implementing and delivering public policies. Sometimes the 
information gap results from strategic behaviours of public actors who may prefer not to 
reveal too clearly their strengths and weaknesses, especially if allocation of responsibility 
is associated with conditional granting. However, it is often the case that the very 
                                                        
24 Delivering Local Development through a Comprehensive Approach to Strategy, System and 
Leadership – Highlighting the Case of Derry-Londonderry, Northern Ireland (2011); New 
Approaches to Rural Policy: lesson for Around the World (2005); The New Rural Paradigm, 
Policies and Governance (2006); OECD Territorial Reviews, France (2006); Job Rich Growth: 
Strategies for Local Employment, Skills Development and Social Protection (2011); OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Outlook (2010) 
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information about territorial specificities is not perceived by the central decision maker 
whilst sub national actors may be ignorant about capital objectives and strategies. 
ii. The capacity challenge arises when there is a lack of human, knowledge or 
infrastructural resources available to carry out tasks, regardless of the level of 
government (even if, in general sub national governments are considered to be suffering 
more from such difficulties than central government. 
iii. The fiscal gap is represented by the difference between territorial revenues and the 
required expenditures to meet local responsibilities and implement appropriate 
development strategies. In a more dynamic perspective, fiscal difficulties also include 
mismatch between budget practices and policy needs: in the absence of multi-annual 
budget practices for example, local authorities may face uncertainty in engaging in 
appropriate spending, and/or face a lack of flexibility in spending despite its 
appropriateness in uncertain contexts. Too strict earmarking of grants may also impede 
appropriate fungibility of resources and limit ability to deliver adapted policies. 
iv. The policy challenge results when line ministries take a purely vertical approach to be 
implemented at the territorial level. By contrast, local authorities are best to customise 
complementarities between policy fields and concretise cross-sectional approaches. 
Limited coordination among line ministries may provoke a heavy administrative burden, 
different timing and agenda in managing correlated actions etc. It can even lead to strong 
inconsistencies when objectives of sectoral policy-makers are contradictory. 
v. The administrative gap occurs when the administrative scale for policy making, in 
terms of spending as well as strategic planning, is not in line with relevant functional 
areas. A very common case concerns municipal fragmentation which can lead jurisdictions 
to initiate ineffective public action by not benefitting from economies of scale. Some 
specific policies also require very specific and often naturally fixed, boundaries. 
vi. The objective gap refers to different rationalities from national and sub-national 
policy-makers which create obstacles for adopting convergent strategies. Common 
examples arise from political and departmental purposes. Divergences across levels of 
government can be used for ‘cornering’ the debate instead of serving common purposes. A 
local mayor may prefer to serve constituents perceived aspirations instead of aligning 
decisions to national or state wide objectives which may be perceived as contradictory. 
vii. The accountability challenge results from the difficulty to ensure transparency of 
practices across different constituencies and levels of government. It also concern 
possible integrity challenges of policy makers involved in the management of public 
investment.’ 
These ‘gaps’ together constitute the architecture that is essential for effective place 
designs. In the absence of appropriate arrangements in any one building block, the entire 
design of place governance is put at risk. In turn, this emphasises the significance of a 
diagnostic phase in which local conditions, needs and circumstances need to be clearly 
identified. 
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The second framework, Bridging the Coordination and Capacity Gaps (Table 2), illustrates 
the approaches adopted in various states to overcome coordination and capacity gaps. A 
particular state might use various combinations of these instruments, depending on what 
it seeks to achieve through decentralisation and what coordination and capacity gaps are 
relevant. The key point again is the variety of approaches that are evident around OECD 
states and the specifically ‘local’ character of any particular design.  
Because of the importance of employment as the key to social development, particularly in 
deprived areas, economic development is a particular concern. This involves an initial 
strategic focus on economic opportunities. There is however no unambiguous empirical 
evidence concerning drivers of growth at regional levels or indeed about the propensity of 
different types of regions to grow. ‘A large number of urban regions grow faster than the 
average rural region, but many rural regions grow faster than the urban average. Hence 
opportunities for growth exist in all types of regions……. Human capital and innovation 
are positively correlated with growth and infrastructure influences growth only when 
human capital and innovation are present…… Agglomeration also influences growth.’  The 
presentation noted that these findings omit important interaction effects and that many 
policy interventions can have unintended effects if undertaken in isolation. ‘If this implies 
a constraint in terms of policy coherence, it also points to opportunities arising from 
policy complementarities’ (Seminar for Visiting Australian MPs. OECD, 8 October 2010)  
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Mind the Gaps : a Tool for a Diagnosis
Administrative gap  “Mismatch” between functional areas and administrative boundaries => Need for 
instruments for reaching “effective size”  
Information gap  Asymmetries of information (quantity, quality, type) between different 
stakeholders, either voluntary or not => Need for instruments for revealing & 
sharing information 
Policy gap Sectoral fragmentation across ministries and agencies => Need for mechanisms to 
create multidimensional/systemic approaches, and to exercise political 
leadership and commitment.  
Capacity gap Insufficient scientific, technical, infrastructural capacity of local actors => Need for 
instruments to build capacity  
Funding gap Unstable or insufficient revenues undermining effective implementation of 
responsibilities at subnational level or for crossing policies => Need for shared 
financing mechanisms  
Objective gap Different rationalities creating obstacles for adopting convergent targets  => Need 
for instruments to align objectives 
Accountability gap Difficulty to ensure the transparency of practices across the different 
constituencies => Need for institutional quality instruments 
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Bridge the coordination and capacity gaps
Contracts France, Italy, European Union,  Canada
Performance Measurement & Transparent 
evaluation 
Norway , United Kingdom, United States 
Grants, co‐funding agreements All countries: general purpose grants v. earmarked, equalisation 
mechanisms  
Strategic planning requirements, Multi‐annual 
budget  
Along with investment contracts
Inter‐municipal coordination  Mergers (Denmark, Japan) v. inter‐municipal cooperation 
(Spain, France, Brazil etc.)  
Inter‐sectoral collaboration  Finland, France …
One ministry v. interministerial mechanisms  
Agencies United Kingdom, Canada, Chile 
Experimentation policies Sweden,  United States, Finland 
Legal mechanisms and standard settings All countries, but more or less implemented
Citizens’ participation A question of degree
Private sector participation  From strategy design… to vested interest
Institutional capacity indicators Italy for sub‐national level
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In relation to rural and remote regions, the following are suggested as key messages 
from recent surveys and conferences:  
 Investment priorities for rural development – uniformity in service delivery 
is not an option. Differences in opportunities and characteristics between 
regions suggest investment requirements will differ. Provision should build 
back from strategies that are devised at regional levels.   
 Innovative rural regions: human capital development, financial support and 
ICT are all important – no less critical is how take-up is embedded and 
orchestrated (see later discussion of Regional Innovation Systems). 
 Innovative service delivery: meeting the challenges of rural regions – Service 
delivery is a key to rural development. National minimum standards may 
apply, but modes of delivery can vary widely between regions. 
The work on rural development has culminated in what the OECD describes as a 
paradigm shift in regional policy with a switch from compensatory and 
redistributive approaches to arrangements that can identify and capitalise on 
opportunities on a progressively unfolding basis: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This attention to economic opportunities is reinforced in literatures on regional 
innovation systems to which we now turn. 
3. Regional Innovation Systems 
Innovation shifts the focus of economic strategy from markets to capabilities. Fully 
assimilated, this represents another fundamental paradigm shift. The concept of 
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regional innovation is the heart of this new frame. This is because capabilities 
develop at regional not economy-wide levels. This approach has gained in currency 
in Australia as a response to at least three developments:  
 A slackening of productivity growth in Australia from the late 1990s which 
persisted into the early twenty-first century. 
 Increased intensity of international competitiveness in a globalising 
economy; 
 A switch in focus from the development of economy-wide market structures 
to the development of region-specific capabilities; 
A region is the key unit for research and action because capabilities develop only at 
this spatial level. Capabilities which are inherently ‘local’ in character create 
competitive advantages. This involves specialised resources, skills, institutions and 
locations which share in common social and cultural values, competencies and 
learning processes (surveyed in Asheim and Gertler, 2005; also Lipsey, Carlaw and 
Bekar, 2005). They also include institutional endowments, built structures, 
knowledge and skills (e.g. see West 2009, for an exposition of this approach in the 
context of regional Tasmania). There is an extensive literature on the contribution 
of cluster strategies to this outcome (Porter, 1998; Dunning, 1997). 
In contrast to a top-down ‘picking winners’ approach, regional development occurs 
as localised capabilities are mobilised. Regions gain competitive advantage by 
mobilising all their assets including institutional and governmental ones. For 
example, this might involve infrastructure (including education, communications, 
logistics etc) or commercial capabilities (such as finance). Where gaps are 
identified, appropriate infrastructure needs to be sought. Key platforms to develop 
these outcomes include: clustering and broader network collaborations, often 
involving leadership by industry or community associations. The Australian wine 
industry provides a classic example of this process (Smith and Marsh, 2009).  
The outcome is a Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS), which becomes a platform for 
building a provisional consensus around the steps that need to be taken to realise 
opportunities (e.g. high-potential sectors like culture, tourism, environmental 
management etc). For example, specific examples in the Tasmanian context include 
Coal River Valley development; the North West Regional Alliance; and the Dorset 
Pilot.25                          
Where capabilities depend on distributed knowledge (as distinct from that wholly 
developed internally by an individual commercial actor), RIS analysis is particularly 
                                                        
25 West Jonathan, 2009, An economic strategy for Tasmania, University of Tasmania: 
Australian Innovation Research Centre 
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concerned with the structures that are required to develop and disseminate 
appropriate or context-specific knowledge.  
Social conditions are another key element. Innovation and regional development 
require an assessment of the population and settlement patterns most likely to 
support development in a particular location and the social infrastructure required 
to support such populations.  
4. EU ‘learning-by-doing’, experimentalist or pragmatist governance: 
The EU is a complex multi-level governance design for which it is hard to find 
precedents. In areas where common action has been agreed the diversity of 
approaches and structures between member states ruled out top-down or one-size-
fits-all designs. So how could action be co-ordinated? In answering this latter 
question, the EU has introduced an approach which may have applications to co-
ordinated action between and within levels of government in Australia, specifically 
in the context of remote Australia.  
The EU approach replaces principal-agent designs with a ‘learning-by-doing’ or 
pragmatist one (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010). The former design continues to dominate 
public policy thinking in Australia (e.g. Marsh and Spies-Butcher, 2009). A central 
tenet of principal-agent theory is that the principal can determine desired outcomes 
in advance. Pre-determined performance metrics allow the principal to hold the 
agent accountable for outcomes, thus obviating shirking, opportunism or other 
deceptive behaviour on the part of the agent. This has been widely applied in public 
sector settings in Australia, for example in a variety of human services contracts. 
But the diversity of conditions across the country has required adaptation. Hence in 
equalising comparisons the centre adds in a variety of qualifying factors that it 
considers appropriate. Influenced by this thinking, elaborate contractual, co-
production, outsourcing and reporting structures have developed in a variety of 
fields (e.g. surveyed in Productivity Commission, 2010) 
At least three basic features of human service (and other) contexts undercut advance 
determination of outcomes by a centrally located principal: 
• First, the knowledge guiding the decisions of both principals and agents is 
provisional. 
Both are operating with corrigible information and judgements. Unintended 
consequences, ambiguity and difference abound. It is impossible to devise programs 
from first principles that survive the effort to realise them. In the case of the 
principal, this involves judgements about attainable outcomes and, in the case of 
agents this involves judgements about the practices most likely to enhance 
performance in the pursuit of these outcomes. 
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• Second, providers have information that is essential to adapting performance 
outcomes 
for the overall system that recognise best practice. The principal is setting outcomes 
that need to reconcile efficiency and quality in a way that minimises incentives for 
provider gamesmanship, creates incentives for efficiency and that does so in a way 
that also promotes quality services for clients. Any one of the outcomes is complex. 
Their achievement in combination is a daunting challenge. Only the providers have 
information that is relevant to making this latter judgement. The principal needs 
routine access to provider information in order to refine and develop her 
understanding of desired outcomes in the light of provider and client experience. 
• Third, providers’ own knowledge of how to attain quality services for clients is 
varied and developing. Providers own knowledge of how best to serve clients – and 
how best to establish organisational and governance routines that reinforce these 
outcomes, is itself corrigible and experimental. Different organisations will attain 
different outcomes and it will not be immediately apparent which represents the 
best achievement of not necessarily consistent purposes. Dynamic efficiency 
through the whole system thus requires the routine collection, assessment and 
dissemination of performance information amongst providers.  
An ‘experimentalist’ or pragmatist approach represents an alternative to these 
architectures – but one that promises to shift exchanges from a primarily punitive 
to a primarily learning basis (Sabel 2006, 2007). This builds on earlier work on 
continuous performance improvement and ‘learning by doing’ – an approach to 
dynamic efficiency that was developed by the Toyota Motor Company in its 
management of buyer-supplier relationships (Sabel 1992). Here is how this might be 
translated to public policy settings: ‘General goals or designs are set provisionally 
by the highest level – parliament, a regulatory authority, or the relevant corporate 
executives . . . then the provisional goals are revised in the light of proposals by 
lower level units responsible for executing key aspects of the overall task  (Sabel, 
2006:11). 
Sabel proposes to recast fundamentally the terms of the accountability relationship 
between principals and agents: 
‘Compliance or accountability in the principal agent sense of rule following is 
impossible. There are in effect no fixed rules, or, what comes to the same 
thing, a key rule is to continuously evaluate possible changes in the rules. 
Accountability thus requires not comparison of performance to a goal or 
rule, but reason giving: actors in the new institutions are called upon to 
explain their use of the autonomy they are accorded in pursuing the 
corrigible goals (our italics). These accounts enable evaluation of their 
choices in the light of explanations provided by actors in similar 
circumstances making different ones and vice versa.’ 
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Sabel’s approach also alters the frequency and the substance of the exchange 
between principals and agents: 
‘To encourage this kind of ongoing mutual reflection monitoring is 
continuous, or nearly so, rather than occasional or episodic: and it is less 
concerned with outcome measures than with diagnostic information – 
information that can redirect the course of ‘treatment’.  
Finally and critically, it also alters the patterning of carrots and sticks. Sabel 
envisages that agents who fail to perform to best-practice levels will be first given 
the chance to improve via an exchange of knowledge about their potential to 
improve. ‘When failure to follow the rule in principal-agent systems is, in theory, 
immediately penalised, in pragmatist systems non-compliance in the sense of 
inability or unwillingness to improve or otherwise respond to change at an 
acceptable rate triggers . . . increased capacity enhancing assistance from the 
oversight authority. Repeated failure to respond, even with assistance, is, however, 
likely to bring about the dissolution of the offending unit’ (Sabel 2006:14). 
This broad approach has been widely tested in a variety of human services and other 
public policy settings in the United States including teaching disadvantaged 
students (Liebman and Sabel 2003); defence contracting (Dorf and Sabel 1998:332), 
environmental regulation (Dorf and Sabel 1998:373), nuclear regulatory safety (Dorf 
and Sabel 1998:370), policing in deprived neighbourhoods (Dorf and Sabel 
1998:327), occupational health and safety (Dorf and Sabel 1998:358) etc.  
Pragmatist or experimental principles define an approach to the management of 
inter-governmental and purchaser-provider relations wholly different from the 
structure that is now dominant in federal and state jurisdictions. Earlier sections 
explored the fit between the present whole-of-government architecture and 
outcomes in remote Australia. Empirical evidence concerning the structural 
impedimenta to these arrangements was also reviewed. The alternative 
‘experimentalist’ or pragmatist approach to system design avoids these difficulties. 
It builds on a broad structure of inter-governmental and purchaser-provider 
relationship, but places exchange in a context that emphasises learning by both 
parties. This approach merits consideration not only because it would encourage 
continuous performance improvement but also because it promises to transcend 
difficulties that have consistently worked against reform. 
5. Australian Local Government Practice. 
The foregoing discussion focused on regions as the relevant spatial unit and 
involved governance models drawn from international practice. Parallel 
experiments and possibilities are also evident in Australian local government 
practice. The models that have been developed here have clear implications for 
imagining various possible forms of regional governance. These local government 
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arrangements are comprehensively explored in a report of the collaborative 
practices of shires in remote Queensland (Dollery and Johnson, 2007).  
The report documents the many imaginative responses of individual Councils to 
preserve community amenities and to reconcile local responsiveness with efficient 
resource management and relationships with other levels of government. The focus 
of the report is the Remote Area Planning and Development Board (RAPAD) which 
is a not-for-profit ASIC listed company involving a collaboration of 11 councils in 
Western Queensland. According to the report: ‘The RAPAD mission is to “plan, 
facilitate and encourage sustainable growth for the future of Outback 
Queensland….It intends achieving this by: 
 Being future oriented 
 Being a consultative advocate and lobbyist 
 Proactively working and networking with all shires as well as private and 
public sector organisations 
 Adding value to individual shires and other regional organisations in a non-
duplicative manner 
 Coordinating and facilitating the provision of relevant research to their 
region 
 Supporting all miners and their respective communities”’ 
Its core concerns are transport, regional planning, capacity building, natural 
resource management, service development, technology and communications, 
development of sustainable industries and investment attraction. 
The report documents the many imaginative roles that are being undertaken by the 
individual councils to ensure community amenities are maintained at desired 
standards: ‘In the absence of any other feasible service providers, local councils 
must provide a large range of essentials services. For instance, there are not many 
councils in Australia that provide the postal services (as in Barcoo and Ilfracombe); 
offer banking facilities (Blackall, Boulia, Tambo and Winton); a café (as in Boulia, 
Isisford and Winton); undertaker services (Barcoo, Blackall, Boulia, Ilfracombe and 
Tambo); real estate agency activities (Diamentina); operate general stores 
(Ilfracombe and Isisford); provide freight services (Isisford); or operate the local 
newspaper (Blackall)…In addition, each council provides extensive support to the 
numorous community and sporting organisations in their boundaries’(p. 104) 
Other services include: 
‘ ..Aramac Shire either directly or indirectly provides…a bakery, Home and 
Community Care programs, and a rural transaction centre. Similarly, 
Barcaldine Shire delivers a number of state government programs including 
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rural family support, 60 and Better, Home Assist Secure and a HACC 
program……BARCO Shire Council provides the Jundah Post Office….the 
Council provides a bus service and a 4WD vehicle for  the three schools in the 
Shire; the Council provided land for the Windorah Medical Clinic; it provided 
land for state community housing; it has undertaker services and provides 
burial services…..Barcoo Shire has set up a bursary system for residents 
undertaking tertiary, diploma or trade qualifications…….Blackall Shire assist 
its residents by providing an ‘in-store’ Westpac Bank facility in the Council 
office and it acts as a ‘developer’ baby providing an industrial estate as well 
as residential land for sale…..(it) runs an extensive local economic 
development program….an airport (with 3 commercial flights a week); SBS 
radio transmission; youth development services, including employment 
initiatives’ (p 105-106). 
Earlier, the report discussed at least seven ways common services might be provided 
by collaboration between local communities: 
i.. Ad hoc resource sharing: ‘The most limited and flexible alternative to municipal 
amalgamation resides in voluntary arrangements between geographically adjacent 
councils to share resources on an ad hoc basis’ (p. 23). The examples cited include 
skilled staff (environmental experts), capital equipment, IT systems, domestic 
garbage removal and disposal. 
ii. Regional organisations of councils: These are ‘voluntary groupings of spatially 
adjacent councils….ROCs are usually governed by a Board consisting of two 
members from constituent municipalities’ (p. 24). The authors comment that 
continuing engagement can provide wider opportunities to build understanding and 
identify new and emergent opportunities for collaboration that might have occurred 
to no individual council acting alone. 
iii. Area integration or joint board models: This would involve ‘a shared 
administration and operations overseen by a joint board of elected councillor’s 
forme ach of the member municipalities. Member councils retina their political 
independence, thus preserving local democracy, whilst simultaneously merging 
administrative staff and resources into a single enlarged bureau (p. 24-25). 
 
iv. Virtual local government: This model of local government ‘would consist of two 
main elements. Firstly relatively small councils would encompass ejected 
councillors and a small permanent secretariat. They would decide on questions of 
policy formulation and monitor serviced delivery to determine its 
effectiveness…Several small adjacent councils would share a common administrative 
structure or “shared services centre” that would provide the necessary 
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administrative capacity to undertake the policies decided upon by individual 
councils. Service delivery could be contracted out’ (p.25-26). 
v. Agency models: In this model councils would occupy a ‘principal-agent’ 
relationship to state governments. ‘Municipalities would surrender completely 
operational control of these services they direct, but at the same time still enjoy 
political autonomy as elected bodies for a spatially defined jurisdiction. Thus all 
service functions would be run by state government employees with state 
government funds….Elected councils would act as advisory bodies to these state 
agencies charged with determining the specific mix of services over their particular 
geographical jurisdictions. 
vi. Amalgamations: This is noted as the most extreme form of centralisation.  
6. Implications 
The foregoing suggests the timeliness of a shift of governance towards place based 
or regional spatial levels. This is the next logical step in the development of public 
sector designs to strengthen economic and social development. As noted earlier, this 
is wholly consistent with the vision for public sector reform advanced in a number 
of recent official reports, for example at the federal level, in the Moran Review 
(Ahead of the Game, Blueprint for the Reform of Australian Government 
Administration, March 2010); and at a state level, in the Western Australian 
Economic Audit Committee Report (Putting the Public First, Partnering with the 
Community and Business to Deliver Outcomes, October 2009).  This latter report 
specifically foreshadows the replacement of ‘agencies operating in silos’ with more 
decentralised even individualised arrangements. Both these reports underline the 
profound challenge to centralised processes, cultures and organisational and 
budgetary protocols that are involved in the next iteration of public sector reform. 
But, as British experience attests, the difficulties in translating aspirations into 
practice remain formidable. Many hurdles remain to be surmounted if governance 
in remote Australia is to shift to a place based pattern. 
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9. Framing the Remote 
Australia Challenge: What 
Narratives and Contexts are 
Pertinent? 
Centralised and top-down approaches currently dominate Australian policy 
thinking, despite the many gestures to more joined-up approaches and to the 
engagement of local communities. Moreover, most policy discussion about remote 
Australia focuses only on the circumstances of Indigenous Australians. Both these 
propositions are questionable. Also questionable is a key finding of the Department 
of Finance Strategy Review (February 2010) which represents the most recent 
comprehensive assessment of government programs. According to this review, the 
basic challenge in Indigenous Affairs is one of delivery (p. 298). This present report 
reaches a wholly contrary conclusion. It suggests the basic challenge is strategic and 
conceptual. The basic challenge concerns the basic paradigm through police design 
is conceived.  This is fundamentally a question of strategy. How well equipped is the 
policy system for such a conversation?  
This issue is explored in the following sections. The first section discusses the 
framework and approach currently adopted to develop overall strategies. A second 
section looks at the NTER not as it was politically constructed (as an appropriate 
response to a ‘crisis’), but rather as symptomatic of failed governance capabilities at 
the strategic or agenda entry or paradigm end of the policy cycle.  The third section 
asks if the governance pathologies evident in remote Australia are like those that 
have caused failed states. A final section explores the platforms that might mediate 
a richer strategic conversation. 
The present strategic framework 
The most recent comprehensive statement of strategy was embodied in the 2008 
COAG agreement on closing the gap in outcomes for Indigenous Australians. It is 
worth restating the six ambitious targets that were endorsed: 
 Closing the gap in life expectancy within a generation 
 Halving the gap in mortality rates for indigenous children under five within a 
decade 
 Ensuring all indigenous four year olds in remote communities have access to 
early childhood education within five years 
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 Halving the gap for Indigenous students in reading, writing and numeracy 
within a decade. 
 Halving the gap for Indigenous students in Year 12 attainment or equivalent 
attainment rates by 2020 
 Halving the gap in employment outcomes between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Australians within a decade. 
The supporting notes underline the magnitude of the challenge. For example the gap 
in life expectancy is to be closed within 25 years. ‘This equates to an annual 
improvement in life expectancy of 0.5 years for males and 0.4 years for 
females…Gains of this magnitude have taken around 60 years to achieve in the 
Australian population as a whole’ (Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal 
Financial relations, p. G-84). On employment too, Altman shows that the espoused 
goals are deeply problematic. ‘Research shows that between 1996 and 2006 less that 
50 000 new jobs were created for Indigenous Australians. To halve the employment 
gap by 2016 will require between 71 000 and 106 000 new jobs, an extremely 
ambitious target given that only about 140 000 indigenous people are currently 
employed. There are enormous variations in projected indigenous jobs required 
depending on the region of residence…The chance of finding mainstream 
employment in remote Australia is limited owing to geographic isolation’ (p.8). In 
the absence of employment, ‘closing gaps and ending disadvantage’ is a mischievous 
fiction. Altman notes dryly: ‘Goals expressed in such statistical terms become 
somewhat rhetorical and hollow if they are not matched by effective policy action or 
analysis of the causes of socio-economic difference, and if such goals do not reflect 
indigenous aspirations’ (p. 6).  
Further detailed discussion of the problematic nature of these goals is to be found in 
the Strategic Review of Indigenous Expenditure (Department of Finance, February, 
2011). This is particularly relevant to schooling where ‘even by year 3 at school 
(average age 8), a very large gap has been established between the learning 
outcomes achieved by indigenous and non-Indigenous students…The size of the gap 
varies widely by jurisdiction and location..it is widest in the Northern Territory in 
some remote schools no indigenous students meet national minimum standards’ (p. 
98). In relation to health, this report comments: ‘Clearly achieving the COAG targets 
for indigenous life expectancy will be a major challenge with some commentators 
already labelling the target “aspirational”’ (p. 132). A report Aspirations versus 
reality: closing the gap by 2030, W Hoy, Medical Journal of Australia, May 2009, 
is cited.26  In relation to economic participation, the whole burden is referred to the 
                                                        
26 A paper issued by the Closing the gap clearinghouse indicated the gaps in basic 
knowledge that constrain program design in early childhood and pre-school educational 
services: ‘What we don’t know –1.  How to significantly increase the early childhood 
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Indigenous Economic Development Strategy which will be discussed later. However 
the Finance paper notes that to meet the stated target an extraordinary 100 000 
jobs would need to be created over a single decade. 
The Discussion Paper issued in conjunction with the government’s Indigenous 
Economic Strategy, gives no indication that government is contemplating an active 
role. Yet short of that, change in employment outcomes seems unlikely. Similarly, in 
relation to housing and home ownership, the report documents the daunting 
obstacles both legal and administrative to the realisation of targets. Finally, the 
Department of Finance review implies that the seven nominated major gap areas 
omit some important policy areas: for example, it suggests the development of an 
additional policy segment covering Youth at Risk  
Nor are these the first attempt to spell out ambitious goals. In 1983, the Hawke 
government declared a new beginning as did Prime Minister Keating (1992) and the 
Howard government in 1996. For example, in 1987 the Hawke government 
committed itself to achieving equality between Indigenous and other Australians in 
employment, education and income by 2000. Needless to say, this was not achieved. 
In 1998 Prime Minister Howard declared ‘practical reconciliation’ would reduce 
disadvantage in health, housing, education and employment and outcomes were 
subsequently endorsed by COAG. The PC was subsequently commissioned to report 
on a biennial basis with comprehensive reports from 2003. The Howard government 
did not commit to specific targets until 2007 when it declared the gaps for the 
Indigenous community in the Northern Territory would be closed in five years 
(surveyed in Altman, 2009).  
Others have questioned the conceptual foundations of the ‘closing the gaps’ (CTG) 
strategy. Altman (2010) notes that CTG was tried and failed in New Zealand, where 
it was finally abandoned in the mid 1990s. More deeply, this ‘modernisation’ frame 
presumes that this is what Indigenous Australians would themselves want. But they 
were never asked or consulted. It also overlooks other frames that might surround 
the enterprise of Indigenous development with a much more complex narrative, and 
which might better communicate the challenge to a broader public. The possibilities 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Indigenous work force; to train and support Indigenous workers who will remain in their 
communities; and to build structures to enable Indigenous workers to develop a career 
path. 2. How to develop unique Indigenous services for Indigenous families rather than rely 
on models developed for and tested with non-Indigenous groups 3. How to increase trust of 
Indigenous families in mainstream services and non-Indigenous staff 4. How to best deliver 
programs to Indigenous organisations and their children in the various Australian contexts, 
including across geography and sub-cultueres 5. How to create the funding and 
management structures to operate truly integrated services’ Margaret Sims, Resource Sheet 
No. 7, May 2011). 
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are naturally contested. But if not widely debated there is little possibility of 
generating appropriate support in the relevant policy community, much less in the 
wider society. 
Take economic development and employment. The government released a draft 
Indigenous Economic Development Strategy in 2010. There was a subsequent call 
for written submissions and some 95 were received. A final policy statement was 
released in November 2011. Divergences in approach are striking. For example, 
the draft itself and the submissions by Helen Hughes and Gary Johns all march in a 
‘modernising’ direction, with the latter two more committed to 
uncompromising assimilationist conceptions and measures. Other submissions 
suggest approaches that are more accommodating of cultural difference and the 
opportunities that might be imminent within Indigenous communities themselves. 
Several refer to the 1984 Miller report as still the most comprehensive and relevant 
treatment of the issue, yet it is not cited in the present draft. Others argue 
Indigenous cultural practices and norms, which undercut the impact of 
developmental programmes, need to be confronted (Sullivan, 2007; Sutton, 2001). 
Some submissions support an approach based around mutual responsibility but 
administered in conjunction with relevant communities. For example, Janet Hunt 
(2010) questions the implicit individualism of the draft strategy. She observes: 
‘Those communities that are making progress with economic development across 
Australia have developed strong, culturally legitimate and effective governance. 
They have collectively developed a vision about what they want to achieve and then 
have developed locally-relevant strategies and programs to achieve it’ She cites ten 
specific examples of successful action which reflect these principles. 
The final statement of government policy, released in November 2011, (Indigenous 
Economic Development Strategy 2011-2018) sidelines the potential of hybrid 
economic activities. On the contrary, it declares that the primary opportunity in 
remote locations lies in the existing labour market and in ‘removing barriers to 
genuine commercial ventures’ (p. 16). Later it gestures to green economy 
opportunities:  ’As investment in clean energy sources such as solar, gas and wind 
increases, the growth of the clean energy sector will  also provide many new 
opportunities. Through the Indigenous Carbon Farming Fund ..the Australian 
government will support Indigenous Australians to take up opportunities in carbon 
abatement activities. This may include savanna fire management, feral camel 
management and environmental planting…..Indigenous Protected Areas, while 
delivering significant environmental benefits, will also support economic 
endeavours such as ecotourism’ (p. 17).   
This document underlines the primary theme of this study, namely that wholly top-
down government is itself a threshold contributor to policy failure. Dillon and 
Westbury have succinctly summarised this failing:  ‘Because it looks to mainstream 
solutions to deeply entrenched non-mainstream problems…(centralised governance 
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fails to) recognise the sheer diversity of contemporary indigenous 
circumstance…Unless we get beyond ‘closing the gap’ the next phase in indigenous 
policy making and program investments is as “destined to fail” as previous 
approaches’ (2007, p.1).  
Returning to more general processes of strategic policy development, Altman asks 
why the Australian State is not engaging more deeply with these strategic 
alternatives. Perhaps one answer lies in the approach adopted for development of 
the Indigenous Economic Strategy, which reflects the standard assumptions about 
strategic policy development in Australian public administration. In May 2010, the 
responsible departments, FaHCSIA and DEWR, issued a discussion paper. They 
called for written submissions and attracted some 95 responses. In the Australian 
Policy Handbook (2007), Bridgman and Davis discuss the varied forms of 
consultation. Their consultation ladder consists of eight steps - in ascending order 
of depth of participation, exchange and transparency. The present approach – 
release of a discussion paper and a call for written responses - stands at the second 
lowest level, only one up from sharing information. This is hardly a process 
designed to illumine strategic options and choices, to uncover implicit premises and 
frameworks and to promote dialogue and, if possible, consensus. Altman himself 
suggests a parliamentary committee enquiry.  
A variety of other issues that create strategic needs and circumstances in remote 
Australia quite different from those that operates in urban and regional Australia. 
For example, whereas aging is the primary issue for non-Indigenous Australia, the 
opposite is the case in remote Australia. ‘In remote Australia the population is both 
extremely youthful and highly mobile. The high numbers of young indigenous 
citizens place new pressures on government service delivery but (also) place 
extraordinary pressures on social cohesion within societies whose traditional 
structures are under attack from without and whose legitimacy is under constant 
pressure….In this environment government programs need themselves to be 
specifically designed for delivery to a mobile client base. Very few programmes meet 
this benchmark’ (Dillon and Westbury, p. 58). 
Another is the connection between indigenous and non-indigenous communities. 
‘The geographic and demographic inter-penetration of Indigenous and non-
indigenous populations (means that) it will be more and more difficult for 
governments to separately focus on indigenous or non-indigenous citizenry’ (Dillon 
and Westbury, p. 58). 
A third issue concerns the varied bases of economic opportunity in each of the 
fifteen regions of remote Australia. To take only the Pilbara, already around $90 
billion of new private investment has been committed. The resources boom will 
touch all Australians. Yet there is now no official governmental paper which pulls 
together relevant economic and social considerations or discusses the implications 
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for remote Australia, much less the community more generally. So far as the 
pastoral industry is concerned, recent reports suggest not only that its future is 
clouded but also that a new economic activity, carbon farming, may constitute the 
base for a widespread economic renaissance (Rothwell, 2011; Henbury Conservation 
project, 2011). In other regions (such as Central Australia) government is itself the 
principal generator of the local economy, an issue which deserves more detailed 
consideration. 
Settlement and Housing Patterns. 
Take two basic strategic issues, housing provision and settlement patterns. These 
have been identified as contributors to the current malaise.27  The early settlements 
were originally ration points and mission posts established as convenient staging 
points away from major centres or in support of the pastoral industry. 
Over the past 30 years culture and land attachment have driven development of 
more than 1000 new settlements including some established as a retreat from the 
dysfunction of larger settlements where forced co-location of different groups was 
unwieldy.  Under today’s conditions this re-engagement with significant country 
through the outstation and homeland movement has been questioned on grounds of 
viability. 
This settlement pattern driven by cultural attachment is now problematic because 
Indigenous culture is seen to not support increased engagement in the mainstream 
and in the view of some has helped create the social dysfunction evident in many 
communities. 28  Further the nature of the land holding is seen as problematic by 
those seeking to use conventional models of Indigenous economic development. 
The present approach assumes most settlements are unviable but that resources are 
best focused in a series of 26 hub towns (e.g. Department of Finance, 2010, p. 72). A 
                                                        
27 Walker, B W, Porter , D J, Stafford Smith, M. 2008 Investing in the Outback: 
A Framework of Indigenous Development within Australia. Submission to the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response Review Board, Centre for Appropriate Technology Inc, 
August 2008 
28 Sutton,P., ‘The Politics of Suffering: Indigenous Policy in Australia Since the Seventies’, 
Inaugural Berndt Foundation Biennial Lecture given at the annual conference of the 
Australian Anthropological Society, University of Western Australia, on 23 September 
2000. 
Kunoth-Monks, R., ‘Land and Culture: Necessary but not Sufficient for the Future’. 
Identity in the 21
st 
Century, presentation to Desert Knowledge Symposium, November 2006, 
Alice Springs 
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combination of policies that aims to move Indigenous people up the settlement 
hierarchy from outstations to townships and now from townships to mainstream 
urban employment could see urban migration at an unprecedented level. Take the 
Northern Territory. Even before the emergency measures were announced, it was 
estimated that if the Alice Springs hinterland was emptied of Indigenous people 
living on their traditional lands, the Indigenous share of the Alice Springs 
population could increase from 20 per cent to about 50 per cent. This is obviously a 
statistical extreme, but if the full suite of commonwealth policy is taken at face 
value, and is effective, then this could be the outcome. Negative social cohesion 
impacts from relocation would make Alice springs a very different sort of town. 29 
A reflection on settlement practice suggests that they survive and thrive when they 
are associated with a significant economic resource or have a market adjacent to 
them. Moreover, issues of water, energy, resources, skills, markets, transport and 
services, etc are relevant factors in resilience of settlements. 
If culture and land are seen as necessary but not sufficient factors in settlement 
viability into the future then more time needs to be spent examining what might 
form the economic base for the dispersed network of settlements across Australia.   
Meantime, it is difficult to see how employment opportunities will be found should 
people abandon their communities and move to town.  The social trauma and 
dysfunction currently faced by people is unlikely to be relieved by creating a series 
of fringe settlements or new suburbs around Darwin, Alice Springs, Cairns, 
Kalgoorlie, Mt Isa, Broome and Kununurra. In sum, sustainability will be greatly 
enhanced if there is a clearer agenda for investment and development of the 
settlements across remote Australia. 
Moreover, until it is possible to understand and define a settlement pattern that is 
in the national interest it is difficult to invest in housing with confidence. There has 
been much discussion around Indigenous housing and the cost of construction and 
the short lifecycles of these investments in existing settlements.  The NT 
Government estimates required expenditure of $1.6 billion on some 4000 houses in 
the NT.  In the absence of a strategic rationale for the investment beyond providing 
accommodation for Indigenous people this could further contribute to misalignment 
between location and opportunity.  Housing rather needs to be positioned in a wider 
regional development context with investment decisions made around the capacity 
of the industry to deliver and the capacity of the users to manage and sustain the 
service they obtain through the house.  This requires a shift from a primary focus on 
normalising services and minimising disadvantage to a process that is principally 
driven by investment potential in a regional economy. 
                                                        
29 Taylor and Altman – The Australian 11th July 2007 
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Home ownership and individual land holding only make sense if there is a 
reasonable prospect of the owner having an income source that is commensurate 
with the nature of the investment made.  According to Stafford-Smith: “The truth is 
that people can choose to make almost any scale of settlement and remoteness work 
if they are prepared to adjust their aspirations and take on an appropriate service 
delivery model (probably involving a great deal of self-reliance)”.30   For example, 
most pastoralists provide their own power and water and rubbish management 
services, and accept greatly increased health risks in exchange for their lifestyles.  
Likewise, some older Aboriginal people even today would rather live in subserviced 
humpies on their country than in (admittedly crowded and dilapidated) housing 
with water and power in town (e.g. Amnesty International, 2011). 
Such a position requires Government to rethink how it applies some basic equity 
principles that don’t necessarily result in the statistical equality that comes with 
policies of practical reconciliation and mainstreaming31.  It also challenges local 
communities to fully understand the reality of their expectations or the 
politicisation of their inequality by external interests. 
The NTER as evidence of governance failure:  
In a governance perspective, the NTER represented systemic failure. Why? Starting 
from 1991, at least seven reports had explicitly noted the presence and degree of sex 
abuse - but nothing happening. To take only the more recent past. In June 2004, 
COAG adopted two documents one covering the delivery of indigenous services and 
the other a ‘national framework for preventing family violence and child abuse in 
indigenous communities’.32 In June 2006, a Summit on domestic violence and child 
abuse in indigenous communities was convened. This included representatives of 
state and federal governments. The participants agreed to examine a range of 
proposals, including ‘a greater role for a network of Aboriginal seniors’.33 These 
recommendations were discussed at a COAG meeting in July. In December, the 
federal minister released his blueprint for action whose three key points were the 
                                                        
30 Stafford Smith, M and Moran,M., ‘The Community – Settlement nexus – drivers of 
viability and resilience in remote areas of desert Australia.’ (in develoment),p18 
 
31 Peterson, op cit,p13 
32 COAG Communiqué 25June 2004, available at 
http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/250604/index.htm#attatchments. 
33 Larissa Behrendt, Indigenous Policy: law and order is only part of the solution, Australian 
Policy Online, 3 July 2006, accessed at www.apo.org.au  
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same as those announced in May 2004: early childhood intervention, safer 
communities, and building an entrepreneurial culture. 
In June 2007, five months before an anticipated election, the report, Little Children 
are Sacred, was published. It documented distressing levels of child sexual abuse. 
Its release was accompanied by much media fanfare. Six days later the federal 
government announced its emergency intervention.34 The intervention itself 
extended well beyond the recommendations of the enquiry (Anderson, 29 June 
2007).35 As noted earlier, this response effectively repudiated processes and 
approaches that had been unfolding over the previous seven years. 
Should the policy system have registered the scale of the challenge earlier? Why did 
it take seven years after the promulgation of ‘practical reconciliation’ to identify the 
scale of a problem that was acknowledged to be long standing? Did the national 
government policy system have earlier intelligence? The answer is a resounding yes. 
As far back as 1999 a report entitled Violence in Indigenous Communities had been 
prepared for the Department of Aboriginal Affairs by Dr Paul Memmott.36 This was 
released publicly in 2001, a delay of two years after its completion. The report 
offered a no-holds-barred assessment of the scale of the problem. It emphasised the 
prevalence of sexual abuse and the inadequacy of existing responses. It had no 
impact on policy. The government did not seek to seed a wider discussion about 
options.  
In November 2001, the Queensland government released a report on problems in 
indigenous communities in the Cape York area.37 This effectively repeated the 
Memmot findings, and in equally unequivocal terms. In 2002, the Western 
Australian government also released a report on sexual abuse in Western Australian 
communities (The Gordon Report, 31 July 2002). The COAG process cited above 
unfolded with these reports available. In 2003, the indigenous leader Mick Dodson 
spoke forcefully at the National Press Club about violence, alcoholism and sexual 
abuse.38 Nothing happened. The Ministerial Task Force established in 2004 had all 
these findings available to inform its deliberations, but they had no apparent 
impact. Finally, as noted above, an inter-governmental summit on violence and 
                                                        
34 See FaCSIA media release 21 June 2007 
35 Accessed at www.apo.org.au/webboard/print-version.chtml.filename_num=161613 
36 Memmott, P. et al. Violence in Indigenous communities (2001), Attorney-General’s 
Department, Canberra.  
37 Fitzgerald, J., Cape York Justice Study (2001), p. 60. available at 
http://www.communities.qld.gov.au/community/publications/capeyork.html 
38 Sydney Morning Herald, 30 June 2007, p. 35. 
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child abuse was held in 2006. This pointed to the cost and blame shifting that 
characterised federal-territory and state relations. Again, nothing substantive 
happened. Despite its declared leadership role, the national government failed to 
treat sexual abuse as a priority issue. 
Another example of a governance problem that the policy system has not properly 
highlighted is turnover. Peter Sutton (2001) notes the profound dilemmas 
associated with short term assignments of public servants to indigenous 
communities. Writing in 2008, Prout provides a specific example in education, 
which suggests that the problem persists: ‘Despite the clear finding that one of the 
most significant facilitators of academic achievement for Aboriginal students is 
their relationship with teachers…..At Meekatharra District High School..there have 
been 15 principals in the last nine years. Almost the entire school staff turns over 
every one or two years. Most of the nursing staff turnover regularly every few 
months’ Prout, 2008, p. 23, 24) 
Why was the political system unable to register compelling evidence of a policy 
need? Executive preoccupations are surely part of the answer. For at least half of 
this period executive preoccupations with symbolic and representational issues 
trumped attention to policy needs. Further, despite its declared aims, the severity of 
the problem was never acknowledged in the practical reconciliation process. But this 
was not because intelligence was unavailable. It was, presumably, an inconvenient 
truth. Ultimately, the problem is structural. There was no capacity to seed public 
discussion of a highly sensitive issue.  There were no access points where concerns 
could register authoritatively.  
Is remote Australia a failed state?  
Through his articles over many years, Nicholas Rothwell has offered witness to the 
daily circumstances of many of Australia’s Indigenous peoples. Far from the taken-
for-granted urban experience of most, Rothwell records conditions of life that are, 
in another rendering, ‘mean, nasty, brutish and short’. Recalling Hobbes vision of 
the state of nature is a reminder of the curse that created this malady: corrupted 
governance. And of a further consideration - Hobbes’ remedy begins with an act of 
consent. The Australian state is far from Leviathan – but in his record of conditions 
in Alice Springs, the Kimberley’s, Kununurra and Halls Creek, Rothwell’s 
unsentimental eyes register circumstances and situations that are bleak, heart-
rending and unchanging - despite repeated governmental promises over many 
decades (e.g. The Australian, 24 October 2009, 30th April 2010). Noel Pearson has 
written eloquently of similar developments in his own community (2007). These 
destructive outcomes are not of course the whole story. But they are disturbingly 
pervasive.  
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The NTER exactly parallels the response used by the Federal Government to address 
the failed states of the South Pacific where police have been used to stabilise acute 
social disturbance.  
These responses have three main aspects:39 
i) security/policing, in order to re-create the primary public good of peace, order 
and stability. 
ii) executive solutions, that is, effective ceding by the state of executive authority to 
foreign control/influence (over typically, budget making and spending, audit and 
interdiction) in return for concessions (aid, trade and other benefits), Elected 
representational political processes play a second fiddle to executive solutions. 
iii) ‘community solutions’- the usual raft of AusAID-type community based water, 
health, and education projects. Problems are seen as ‘community/local’ issues (not 
as the product of the society’s geopolitical or trade position on the periphery of the 
global economy, history of violence and poverty, etc), for which there are few 
‘community solutions’.  
The political and administrative elements of this approach include:  
 Creating direct relations between the highest level of authoritative 
governance and local recipients regarded as ‘risky’ or ‘at risk’ (in the NT case 
directly linking the federal government and the children in risky places). 
 Sidelining intermediating agencies (e.g. introduce tent clinics to usurp the 
community controlled health services next door) 
 Creating systems of surveillance and contractualised accountability in which 
recipients respond to the policy priorities of central authorities (e.g. through 
income management) 
 Using hard-edged ‘command’ and ‘control’ systems to intervene, to cut away 
all the other messy arrangements, and make it easy to access land (e.g. use 
the army to resolve logistic matters and directly lease parcels of land). 
 Expressing high level policies as directly measurable outputs (e.g. number of 
children checked, decrease in outbreaks of violence, or number of sexually 
transmitted diseases). 
                                                        
39 Walker, B W, Porter , D J, Stafford Smith, M. 2008 Investing in the Outback: 
A Framework of Indigenous Development within Australia. Submission to the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response Review Board, Centre for Appropriate Technology Inc, 
August 2008 
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In various ways these arrangements require failed state or local authorities to cede 
executive sovereignty – for policing, economic governance, fiduciary oversight – to 
external agencies. The situation is normalised so that services and aid targeted at 
poverty reduction can be delivered. 
This mode of response improves direct security and can quickly channel large 
volumes of resources for popular services into peripheral places. It is highly desired 
by community members who want relief and it places executive staff in control of 
local institutions with direct lines of accountability to the central government.  It 
puts kids in school, delivers additional primary health care, gets infrastructure built 
and sets off a round of small and relatively inconsequential income generating 
projects. 
Yet these conditions have little to do with the personalised welfare dependency that 
is the root cause of the current malaise. 
Conclusion: 
This section has ranged across the strategic context of policy. Several conclusions 
are clear.  
First, imposed crisis responses breach every rule of governance that Australian 
governments have themselves promulgated. They also reflect a policy development 
system that lacks adequate structural capability. Yet in no area of public policy is 
the need for a rich and diverse and sometimes confronting conversation more 
essential. At a conceptual level, the NTER signified policy failure accumulated over 
many years. It parsed the problem of sexual abuse in wholly individual and local 
terms. It legitimised action through the metaphor of ‘emergency’. Whilst this may 
have been helpful as a galvanising device, this obscured systemic governance 
failings – indeed deflected attention from this fact. And the recent 10 year extension 
of this form of intervention now titled Stronger Futures – has normalised this 
approach as the response to governance failure. 
A second conclusion concerns the inter-dependence between indigenous and non-
indigenous communities in any particular location. No where is this better 
illustrated than in the case of the Pilbara. It is impossible to separate in any 
substantial way the interests of the major stakeholders. Their interdependence is 
clear. But the complexity of the challenge of framing workable governance 
arrangements is no less clear. In the face of the massive economic and social 
pressures that are emerging and converging, this presents a considerable 
imaginative challenge. There are few precedents. The emergent pressures need to be 
absorbed and assimilated over a short decade. If there is to be a reasonable prospect 
of adaptive change that works for all the stakeholders now is the time to act. 
Moreover, given the scale of the challenge, nothing short of radical action is 
required.  
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Are the processes for framing strategic governance reviewed here appropriate for 
the complex issues associated with remote Australia? The answer seems clear. This 
is no way to advance or resolve such fundamental debates. The underlying strategy 
questions remain unresolved and largely unaired outside specialist circles, which 
are largely isolated from each other. If the object is prudent public policy, there 
could be no area with greater need for wide deliberative engagement. In other 
words, there is not only a delivery and local engagement gap - but also 
a profound systemic gap covering the development of strategies for remote 
Australia.  
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10. remoteFOCUS and Pilbara 
Aboriginal People  
Dr Mary Edmunds 
1. Context  
In his address to the National Press Club in September 2010, the Federal Minister 
for Regional Australia, Regional Development and Local Government, Simon Crean, 
outlined a number of principles that apply also to remote Australia: 
Local empowerment is about recognising that in our federalist structure, the 
needs and aspiration of our people can best be met by allowing decision making 
about their economic, social and environmental wellbeing to be made closer and 
closer to the people most affected by those decisions... 
There are three considerations that guide my vision of a better future for regional 
Australia. 
 We need to ensure that economic growth and sustainable development is the 
driving influence in all regions of the nation. 
 We are required to operate within a Federal structure that gives expression to 
the hopes and aspirations of all Australians 
 noting of course that our Federal system only recognises two tiers of 
government, yet depends on three levels of government for service delivery. 
 And third, I hold firm to an inherent belief that the best way to balance the 
economics, the politics and the geography of diversity and sustainability is to 
understand the importance of local engagement – to more effectively 
empower local communities. Local communities deserve to have their voices 
heard at all levels of government...We want communities to be able to take 
responsibility for charting their economic, social, and environmental 
wellbeing and devise a way forward that stacks up against sound socio-
economic principles. 
We need to view regional development through the lens of economic, social, and 
environmental development. 
The Minister’s emphasis in his speech links the central principle of local 
engagement closely with diverse and sustainable social and environmental, not just 
economic, development. 
Maintaining a balance amongst all three is a particular challenge in the 
economically over-heated Pilbara. Here, in a classic demonstration of the effects of 
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the ‘resource curse’, the scale and pace of recent cycles of resource boom have 
threatened to overwhelm the capacity, not just of local people and institutions, but 
also of governments, to manage either their social or economic environments. Only 
in the past few years has government attempted to take back some control over this 
key region in remote Australia in order to fulfil its ‘responsibility to provide an 
institutional framework that enables civil society and economic and social 
development’ (Desert Knowledge Australia 2008: 6). 
RemoteFOCUS was initiated in 2008 with the recognition of the apparent failure of 
current structures to deliver effective government to remote Australia. Its aim is to 
effect reform of public policy and improve significantly the way that governments 
engage with remote citizens and undertake the administration and governance of 
remote Australia. As the remoteFOCUS project has developed, it has identified a 
number of governance dysfunctions that are structural and that underlie the 
incapacity of the present structure of government to administer remote Australia 
effectively. These are dealt with at length in the main report so they are summarised 
here only briefly as a point of reference for the discussion in the following papers: 
 lopsided governance and responsibility, where a shift to greater 
centralisation of decision-making has been matched by an outsourcing of 
service delivery to the private sector and an assignment of responsibility for 
implementation and problem-solving to local communities, households, and 
individuals;  
 organisational deficits and misalignments, where organisational 
arrangements are not ‘fit for purpose’, with a resulting misalignment of needs 
and responses in remote Australia; 
 policy over-reach and administrative under-reach, where commitments ‘over-
reach’ beyond what is simply feasible from an administrative and fiscal point 
of view; 
 inability to reconcile parochial and general interests, underlining the lack of 
any coherent mechanism for balancing distinctive local needs and aspirations 
from the needs and aspirations of the urban majority; 
 policy turbulence and instability, where constant policy ‘churn’ results in 
practice in policy nonsense, together with a continual shuffling of functions, 
powers, and resourcing of different levels of territorial authority; 
 mis-matches between responsibilities and resources, where the principle of 
‘resourcing following function’ is rarely, if ever, achieved. 
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2. The remoteFOCUS Pilbara Project 
The Pilbara Project sits within this broader remoteFOCUS mandate. The Pilbara 
Project is to consider how governments need to change how they govern, 
administer, and interact with the Pilbara region, and to develop recommended 
measures and reforms. In a briefing note prepared in November 2010 (Walker 2010: 
4-5), the project phrased this purpose as positioning the Pilbara ‘as a leader in the 
reform of government governance, administration, and engagement, with the aim of 
significantly advancing regional development through a more strategic, systemic, 
and sustainable process’ and referred to ‘a scaled regional reform program’. 
Maintaining a balance amongst all three is a particular challenge in the 
economically over-heated Pilbara. Here, in a classic demonstration of the effects of 
the ‘resource curse’, the scale and pace of recent cycles of resource boom have 
threatened to overwhelm the capacity, not just of local people and institutions, but 
also of governments, to manage either their social or economic environments. Only 
in the past few years has government attempted to take back some control over this 
key region in remote Australia in order to fulfil its ‘responsibility to provide an 
institutional framework that enables civil society and economic and social 
development’ (Desert Knowledge Australia 2008: 6). 
In view of these deficits, remoteFOCUS commissioned this series of papers with 
three main objectives: 
 to compile a socio-political overview of Aboriginal people in the Pilbara and 
report on the dynamics of engagement between Aboriginal people and the 
institutions of the Pilbara including State and Commonwealth, local 
government, industry and other Aboriginal organisations; 
 to undertake specific targeted studies in the Pilbara that will inform the 
remoteFOCUS project on ways of Aboriginal people being able to draw the 
greatest benefit from developments in the Pilbara and the establishment of 
the Pilbara Cities agenda; and 
 to distil from the overview and case studies evidence-based learnings and 
recommendations as a basis for strategic and positive ways for Aboriginal 
people to pursue their aspirations through engagement/involvement in 
governance reforms in the Pilbara and the associated investments occurring 
in that region. 
There are five papers, in addition to this introduction, that address these objectives.  
 Paper 1 – ‘Doing washing in a cyclone, or a storm in a teacup? Aboriginal 
people and organisations in the Pilbara’ – is an overview of Pilbara 
Aboriginal demographics and dynamics, both historically and in the context 
of the present hyper-development. 
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 Paper 2 – ‘A new story. Roebourne : a case study’ – looks at the history and 
current activities in a town that has a largely Aboriginal population and two 
recognised native title holding bodies. 
 Paper 3 – ‘Harnessing the cyclone. Gumala Aboriginal Corporation: a case 
study’ – examines the workings of a particular Aboriginal organisation set up 
through the process of negotiations with a mining company. 
 Paper 4 – ‘Connections, continuities, and change. Martu and their country’ – 
looks at the ways in which a Western Desert group in one of the most remote 
areas of remote Australia has acted and responded to the impact of change. 
 Paper 5 – ‘Imagining a region: prototypes and possibilities for Pilbara 
Aboriginal people’ – takes the broader view of how Aboriginal people and 
organisations are operating and might operate at a regional level, including 
ways in which they might engage with wider Pilbara regional planning and 
governance institutions.  
These papers, individually and collectively, illustrate the effects of the governance 
dysfunctions of current governance structures and practices affecting remote 
Australia and identified as part of the broader remoteFOCUS project. They also 
point to another critical and unresolved tension for governments: that is, how to 
achieve greater clarity of national purpose and realisation of appropriate living 
conditions and opportunities for Aboriginal citizens while at the same time 
accepting the right of Aboriginal people to cultural distinctiveness and identity.  
In his book, Belonging together, Sullivan (2011) sketches the history of more than 
fifty years of government policies that have tried and failed to reach these twin 
objectives. The latest in this long line is the policy of mainstreaming or 
normalisation, now often glossed as ‘closing the gap’. The Pilbara studies make clear 
that this policy, too, is far from succeeding. Nevertheless, Sullivan offers a way out, 
that is (2011: vii): 
a greater integration of white Australia with Aboriginal Australia, a reordering 
of our subjective understanding more than our structural relationship. I call 
this a consolidated approach to Aboriginal affairs. It recognises the 
improvements achieved in Aboriginal circumstances during the period of 
rights-based land and development programs, recognises also the distance still 
to travel, and accepts the fact that the future of Aboriginal Australia is 
inextricably bound up with the future of the descendants of our settlers and 
immigrants. 
Recognition of this inter-relationship requires understanding about how 
consolidation differs from integration or assimilation...: it is a two-way 
process. 
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This ‘two-way process’ emerges strongly from the Pilbara studies as ‘partnership’. 
Sullivan goes on to argue that such a two-way process is a logical extension of the 
kind of engagement often referred to as the intercultural domain, where ‘culture is 
found in relationships formed by experience rather than being a structured thing 
that people “have” or “belong to” ’ and ‘intercultural exchanges and negotiations are 
taking place all the time everywhere there are people, whether they are Aboriginal 
or non-Aboriginal’ (2011: 18). Looking at the example of one group, the 
Ngaanyatjarra people – whose experiences since colonisation are not very different 
from those of the Martu (paper 4) – he discusses four important ways in which  
Ngaanyatjarra are enmeshed in wider Australian processes: their corporate 
expression as a group, their land tenure arrangements, their interdependence 
with non-Aboriginal people on their lands, and through sharing the 
environment within which they live...Ngaanyatjarra people, whether they care 
about it or not, are ineluctably bound into the Australian state (2011: 27, 28). 
His point is that ‘boundaries are not inherent to a culture but contextual, mutable 
and negotiable, and cultures are nested, imbricated, layered, with their own 
subcultures as much as “other” cultures’ (2011: 26). His view is supported, as these 
studies make clear, by the experience of Pilbara Aboriginal people since the first 
pastoralists arrived in 1864.  
This is not to suggest that the forms of interdependence, or of their effects, have 
been or are uncontested. On the contrary, as again made clear in these studies, there 
is a pernicious imbalance in the relationships between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people in the Pilbara, resulting in the present marginalisation of 
Aboriginal people from the intensified decision-making processes in the region, 
whether being undertaken by government or by resource companies.  The 
remoteFOCUS Prospectus pays attention to the implications of this for Aboriginal 
organisations in its Attachment 1, on the accelerating crisis in remote Australia 
(2008:19): 
The evidence...points to the vulnerability of Indigenous governance structures 
trying to deal with the growing demands of resources boom, land negotiations, 
and very significant streams of new revenue from agreements with resource 
companies. 
Attachment 1 of the Prospectus also relates to the impact on Indigenous 
organisations of the governance dysfunctions of governance (2008: 18-19): 
The Indigenous Community Governance Project has documented the effect of 
crippling stresses on the Indigenous organisations who are trying to cope with 
labyrinthine government funding arrangements, duplication and red tape, 
cross-jurisdictional inefficiencies, and the confusing array of overlapping 
short-term niche programs. 
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Achieving a meaningful place for Pilbara Aboriginal people within the stated goal 
for the remoteFOCUS Pilbara Project of a scaled regional reform program is clearly 
highly complex and therefore daunting. Nevertheless, a number of themes emerge 
from the Pilbara studies that suggest that the challenges are not insuperable. Two of 
these themes in particular offer the basis of a way forward. One relates to Aboriginal 
principles of regionalism. The other is the critical place of Aboriginal organisations 
as providing ‘the institutional framework of Aboriginal civil society and, at the same 
time, the principal means of Aboriginal civic engagement with the wider world’ 
(Sullivan 2011: 50). 
3. Aboriginal principles of regionalism 
In their February 2011 final report, the Indigenous Implementation Board suggested 
that it was ‘considered premature to seek to define a regional governance model at 
this time for the Pilbara’ (2011: 38). Their view was based not on incapacity but on 
an assessment of the high levels of pressure affecting Pilbara Aboriginal groups 
(2011: 37): 
The relatively limited amount of determined Pilbara region native title and the 
negotiation pressures on claimants and representative bodies means that the 
Pilbara is several years behind the Kimberley in reaching the level of stability 
to be considering aggregated Aboriginal representative structures. 
The Board’s interim recommendation was for the re-establishment of a council of 
elders – previously convened by the Department of Indigenous Affairs – to act as a 
reference group for the Pilbara Futures Forum as it develops regional governance 
options. The findings of this series of remoteFOCUS papers make clear that this 
recommendation, while it may be appropriate, does not go far enough. The 
conversation has already begun and there is an appetite among Pilbara Aboriginal 
people for it to continue. But there is already a sense of disappointment that the 
momentum arising from the first meetings has dissipated.40 For this to be effective, 
a momentum needs to be built up and maintained. This will require a dedicated and 
intensive effort as discussed further below.  
The remoteFOCUS studies also make clear that the experience of regional groupings 
is not new to Pilbara Aboriginal people, either historically or more recently. They 
share this kind of experience with other parts of Australia. Building on previous 
anthropological analysis, including Sutton’s description (2003) of the tension in 
Aboriginal groups between atomism and collectivism, Smith (2005) identifies a 
number of principles that underlie classical forms of Aboriginal regionalism. One 
she terms ‘relational autonomy’ (2005: 3): 
                                                        
40 This point was made at a meeting between remoteFOCUS and Aboriginal people at the 
Port Hedland hospital, 21 July 2011. 
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Within Indigenous social and political domains there is a preference, on the 
one hand, for autonomy, that is marked by a tendency towards localism and 
high value accorded to local control at the level of small, kin-based congeries 
of people attached to particular geographic locales. 
But this momentum towards atomism, fission and small-scaled autonomy is 
systemically balanced, on the other hand, by an equally compelling strain 
towards relatedness. This emphasises the desire for connectedness and 
interdependence, and the reproduction of enduring Indigenous webs of 
relationship, alliance and exchange, and brings small groups together into 
confederacies; this is, alliances for some common purpose, which are 
sometimes lasting, sometimes short-term and situational. 
The second principle she discusses is subsidiarity (2005: 4): 
Instead of assuming that governance must be centred, bounded and unitary, 
the Indigenous principle of subsidiarity, when meshed with the principle of 
relational autonomy, poses the possibility that federal systems of Indigenous 
governance can be decentred and accommodate inter-dependent layers...An 
important characteristic of traditional subsidiarity is its negotiated division 
and allocation of roles, rights and responsibilities across different groups and 
classes of people... 
The [Indigenous Community Governance] Project case studies are highlighting 
a ‘two-way’ trajectory for Indigenous governance: namely, a desire for 
residential decentralisation and localism on the one hand, alongside political 
centralisation and service regionalism on the other.  
Sullivan (2011) takes a somewhat different view of subsidiarity, that retains its 
importance as a principle but links it more broadly to the relationship between 
cultural rights and universal rights. It also places the discussion of subsidiarity in 
Aboriginal governance firmly within the wider remoteFOCUS agenda for remote 
Australia generally (2011: 13): 
Autonomy and recognition of culturally derived authority can be reconciled 
with respect for civil and human rights by developing the concept of 
subsidiarity to include culture as well as governance...It seeks to allocate to 
central authorities decisions that transcend local particularities, yet at the 
same time guarantees to regions the right to set policies that reflect regional 
priorities. It is also often stated as being the principle of decision making as 
close to the level of the individual citizen as is appropriate for the 
circumstances. 
The Pilbara studies make clear that achieving this is not straightforward, as the 
failed example of Marnda Mia (paper 5) and the uncertain future of the Roebourne 
Aboriginal Congress (papers 2 and 5) demonstrate. But the studies also provide 
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examples of regional movements that have existed in the past, and also current 
arrangements that offer working models for evolving regional structures, with ‘the 
creation of connected autonomy where there are tiers of authority, responsibility 
and entitlement, together with tiers of accountability – down to local constituents, 
and up to higher organisational levels’ (Smith 2005: 5). 
4. Aboriginal organisations as the institutional framework 
of Aboriginal civil society 
In 1958, Edward Banfield published a study of a region in southern Italy where he 
observed what he called ‘amoral familism’, that is, a family-centric society unable to 
transcend immediate family interests in order to work together to solve common 
social problems or to act for the common good. One of the reasons for this, he 
suggested, was the absence of community building institutions or, in terms of the 
present discussion, of any kind of civil society.41 Banfield’s analysis describes 
atomism without the balancing tendency towards collectivism or, in Smith’s term, 
relational autonomy.  
Banfield’s conclusion is relevant to providing a context for the relationship between 
the strong family-centred interests in Australian Aboriginal societies and the 
development of Indigenous sector organisations – Banfield’s community building 
institutions – since the early 1970s. Sullivan (Belonging together (2011) sees the 
development of these Indigenous sector organisations as instrumental in providing 
Aboriginal cultures with a contemporary institutional framework for building wider 
networks and taking control of their own modernisation. He sees them as both 
drivers of positive social change and manifestations of such change, as the 
foundation of Aboriginal modernisation, and as the principal means of Aboriginal 
civic engagement with the wider world (2011: 56, 57, 50). He draws on Rowse to say 
that (Sullivan 2011: 56): 
the importance of Indigenous sector organisations goes beyond their service 
function to the core of social rights in a liberal democracy...Indigenous not-
for-profit organisations are the primary means for most Indigenous people to 
                                                        
41 The term ‘civil society’ has come to be seen as a third sector, distinct from government or 
the public sector and the market or private sector. Sullivan (2011: 56) describes this third 
sector as embracing ‘enduring and formal associations of people who aim to provide a social 
benefit to their members and/or clients’. The World Bank, drawing on a range of research 
institutions, defines the term civil society ‘to refer to the wide array of non-governmental 
and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing 
the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, 
scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations’ (http://web.worldbank.org). 
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make themselves visible as citizens within a polity of which they form a small 
minority. 
The findings of the Pilbara studies support Sullivan’s analysis and make clear that 
Aboriginal organisations play a key role in the region, even in the absence of a 
formal regional body and in spite of the relentless pressure being exerted on them. 
While other Pilbara residents may privilege their status as citizens in their relations 
with the state, for Pilbara Aboriginal people this relationship, even as citizens, is 
largely mediated through organisations. Sullivan also points out (2011: 50) that 
Aboriginal people, particularly in regional and remote areas, do not achieve their 
understanding of civic engagement with the wider society from schools or through 
the media, but through engagement with their local organisations. This is true in the 
Pilbara, whether the organisations are focused on dealing with the state or, as in the 
case of Gumala (paper 3), with resource companies and an absence of government. 
All are what Rowley (1972: 255) termed ‘their own legal-economic carapaces’, a 
concept that is elaborated in paper 3, and what Levitus (2000: 75) refers to as 
transactional boundaries or spaces (paper 2).  
Through their organisations, Pilbara Aboriginal people, like Indigenous people 
elsewhere in the country, have gained practical experience of participatory 
engagement, in the challenges of acceptable representation, and in the critical need 
for cultural legitimacy (paper 1). As paper 5 suggests, the Pilbara has effective 
organisations that demonstrate cultural legitimacy even in the face of the 
governance dysfunctions of government and the distracting pace of development. 
Others have failed to achieve such cultural legitimacy and have withered as a result.  
Before going on to discuss the implications of all this for the development of a 
Pilbara regional Aboriginal body, there are three other points to be made about 
organisations. One is the pervasive presence of ‘Indigenous extended families of 
polity forming the backbone of governance and especially organisational modes of 
governance’ (Hunt and Smith 2006: 10). The second is that cultural legitimacy 
sometimes comes from a wider coalition of organisations. The third is another 
instance of the essential interconnectedness of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
Australians in the presence in Aboriginal organisations of ‘trusted outsiders’. 
4.1 Families of polity 
This concept is very different from the ‘amoral familism’ described by Banfield 
(1958). Sutton (2003: 206) in discussing the constitution of native title claims, 
points out that ‘these wider groups...have internal structure, typically comprising a 
set of units usually referred to by the applicants as ‘families’ identified by surnames 
in documents or oral evidence’. The Indigenous Community Governance Project also 
identified this feature as having much wider application than just in native title 
claims (Hunt and Smith 2006: 10). Sutton goes on to elaborate (2003: 208): 
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Regardless of how it is locally defined, a human family is always a jural 
construct and never merely a biological or demographic datum. This is because 
it belongs to the realm of kinship, or recognised genealogical relationships, 
rather than merely to the reproductive history of some randomly selected set of 
individuals...A further reason why the family is always a jural construct is 
because within any one culture its examples belong to a set, or a set of 
genealogically nested subsets, of like or parallel entities. That is, families are 
units of social organisation, and thus in any one society they are both 
structures of comparable or parallel internal makeup and at the same time they 
are units that together form a wider mesh or structure. In a kinship-based 
society relations between individuals almost always both entail and affect, 
sometimes quite comprehensively, relations between different families. 
The conclusion to be derived is that the development of good governance models in 
Aboriginal organisations must accommodate the principle that ‘the familial and 
genealogical parameters of Indigenous community and regional governance are 
critical to the success of any policy implementation and capacity development 
initiatives around governance’ (Hunt and Smith 2006: 10). The principle manifests 
itself in diverse ways, and is often itself a site of conflict and bureaucratic 
frustration, but Indigenous organisations do not constitute just another 
corporation, which is another reason why Indigenous groups themselves must have 
the main voice in organisational design, and why the Martu organisations, to take 
just one example, are able to operate so effectively (paper 4). 
4.2 Cultural legitimacy within a region 
There are a number of instances of this from across the country. Here I refer to only 
one, from outside the Pilbara, but demonstrating the way in which cultural 
legitimacy can operate to contain conflict arising from the stresses of modernity. 
The example is from the Kimberley and relates to the bitter dispute over the 
Goolarabooloo Jabbir Jabbir people’s decision to agree to the development by 
Woodside of a gas hub at James Price Point off the coast of Broome. The decision 
was brokered by the Native Title Representative Body, the Kimberley Land Council, 
over a period of several years and multiple consultations. Both the decision and the 
Kimberley Land Council have been attacked and opposed by dissident 
Goolarabooloo members, as well as by environmental and other lobby groups. As a 
result, the Kimberley Land Council, despite its formal representative status, has 
been under great pressure, including from among Kimberley Aboriginal people. 
At the end of September this year, the three major Kimberley Aboriginal 
organisations – the Kimberley Land Council, the Kimberley Law and Cultural 
Centre, and the Kimberley Language and Resource Centre – held their annual 
meeting at the Nyumpan community. Collectively, the three organisations represent 
twenty-nine language groups from across the whole region. The five hundred 
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community leaders at the meeting gave public support to the decision of the Jabirr 
Jabirr traditional owners to back the project (The Weekend Australian October 1-2, 
2011). 
The support is unlikely to mean the end of the dispute. Nor does it indicate that the 
conflict is a sign of the institutional failure of the Land Council. What it does 
demonstrate is the way in which Aboriginal organisations can develop capable, 
legitimate, and accountable institutions that can manage the evolving nature of 
social contestation, which is an inherent part of any changing society (Dinnen et al. 
2011: 16), and that sometimes this process requires a network of organisations 
rather than any single one. The Kimberley annual meetings exemplify the regional 
principle of relational autonomy. 
4.3 The role of ‘trusted outsiders’ 
In a 2007 paper, Moran discussed the role of ‘trusted outsiders’ in Aboriginal 
organisations. As he noted, this has been an underdeveloped area of analysis but 
one that is beginning to draw more attention, with a shift to the intercultural ‘away 
from an emphasis on an “interface” between separately conceived domains, towards 
an approach that considers Indigenous and non-Indigenous social forms to be 
necessarily relational, and to occupy a single social-cultural field’ (2007:3, quoting 
Hinkson and Smith 2005). Moran identifies two categories of trusted outsiders: 
permanent resident outside employees and resident departmental officers (2007: 8). 
Those who were employees of the Aboriginal organisations – in this case, in 
Kowanyama in Cape York – were recruited principally on the basis of their technical 
expertise in a particular area such as financial accounting, environmental 
management, native title negotiations, and mediating justice systems (2007: 9), 
thus supplementing the human capital available in the community. Sullivan (2011: 
31-32) queries the need to limit the description to residents, and indeed to the 
notion of ‘outsider’, but recognises the importance of the presence and the roles. 
Again, the Pilbara studies support this analysis: the most successful Aboriginal 
organisations operate with a combination of local Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
employees, working to and with an effective Aboriginal board. In these instances, 
the key elements for the non-Aboriginal staff are trust – we are back to the 
relational model – and competence. As the studies indicate, there are also Pilbara 
examples of failure where one or both of these elements are lacking. 
There is another category of trusted outsider which has proved effective in other 
situations, that of independent community mentors or brokers – the funded broker 
– to enable effective community-government interactions (Desert Knowledge 
Australia 2011: 3). The Desert Knowledge submission refers to the work done by Bill 
Gray and Neil Westbury with governments and communities in Groote Eylandt as 
just one good example and makes the point that the establishment of funded brokers 
is similar to mining companies funding land councils – or Native Title 
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Representative Bodies – so that they have the capacity to negotiate agreements 
effectively. This happened with the Ord Stage 2 agreement in the Kimberley and is 
common in the Pilbara, where it has facilitated a number of native title agreements. 
5. The place of Pilbara Aboriginal people in decision-
making for the region 
The Pilbara studies make clear that the current government intervention in planning 
for the future of the Pilbara has failed to include Pilbara Aboriginal people in any 
comprehensive way. There is positive and important engagement through the 
Royalties for Regions and collaboration between the Department of Indigenous 
Affairs and Pilbara Cities; but the principal focus is not on integrating or 
consolidating Aboriginal residents with a broader population. Rather, it is on 
encouraging long-term migration to the Pilbara of outsiders, who will not just live 
but die there, with a key performance indicator for the success of sustainability 
being ‘when the cemeteries are full’.42  
What the Pilbara studies also make clear is that, despite this marginalisation from 
the broader planning, there is vigorous and sustained Aboriginal activity happening 
across the region, mainly through organisations, and that Aboriginal people want to 
be included as equal partners in making decisions about the future of their country, 
at both local and regional levels. Ironically, the major resource companies like Rio 
Tinto, BHP Billiton, and Woodside understand this, even if they struggle to 
implement it adequately. Government has been slower to catch up. Yet a priority for 
government must be to find better ways of including Aboriginal people in decision-
making for the future. The Pilbara studies, drawing on a wealth of other research in 
this area as well as on the analysis of the evidence produced by this project, allow 
for a number of recommendations as to how this might, and indeed must, be 
achieved.  
Crucial to this process is that those involved in developing any Pilbara regional 
Aboriginal body take careful note of the experiences and lessons of other processes 
of Indigenous regionalisation and of the design principles that have been developed. 
This now has some history in Australia, as paper 5 discusses, with earlier ATSIC 
consideration of the redefining of Regional Councils as Regional Authorities; the 
establishment of the Torres Strait Island Authority; the thwarted attempts in the 
Northern Territory, after the abolition of ATSIC, to replace the ATSIC regional 
council structure with regional local governments; the Groote Eylandt Regional 
Partnership Agreement.  
                                                        
42 Pilbara Cities CEO, Chris Evans, ABC Radio National, Saturday Extra, 6 August 2011. As 
paper 5 comments, Pilbara Aboriginal people already, and often tragically, more than meet 
this criterion. 
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Smith (2008a) poses two alternative approaches that are in evidence in this 
regionalisation history: collaboration and coercion. Collaboration allows for, indeed 
actively supports, Aboriginal leaders and organisations in developing their own 
delineation of region and its constituent or overlapping sub-regions and the 
appropriate forms of representation and decision-making arising from this. 
Coercion is what it says: an interventionary imposition with decision-making 
claimed, or reclaimed, by government. This may be direct, as for example in the 
abolition of ATSIC and its regional councils and potentially regional authorities. Or 
it may be indirect, in the form of what Sullivan (2011: 80, 81) terms ‘audit 
fetishism’: 
Because accountability has so permeated public practice, producing the ‘audit 
society’, its effects as an instrument of control and acculturation in Aboriginal 
development are masked by its apparently unimpeachable rationality. 
As Sullivan goes on to suggest, accountability too needs to be reciprocal, with 
financial accountability only one aspect of a framework that includes assessments 
about, for example, whether people’s lives are getting better. Pilbara Aboriginal 
people also demand accountability, not control or coercion, from government. What 
is required from government is the development of an enabling, collaborative 
environment that, in working towards the establishment of a regional Pilbara 
Aboriginal voice, provides appropriate support but also ensures the creation of 
structured and effective pathways between this voice – in whatever form it takes – 
and the established Pilbara bodies: the shires, the Pilbara Development 
Corporation, Pilbara Cities, and any other regional organisation, such as a possible 
Pilbara Regional Authority or equivalent, that might eventuate. 
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
As discussed above and in paper 5, a process for developing a united Pilbara 
Aboriginal voice has begun. But also as discussed, the early momentum has 
dissipated. It is essential that there is adequate time for the development of a 
longer-term and sustainable model for partnership to be developed. But there is also 
a moment of opportunity in the now. DIA is working with Yamatji Marlpa for this to 
happen and that collaboration will provide a framework. Given the multiple 
responsibilities of both organisations, however, it will not be sufficient to achieve a 
satisfactory outcome in time for Aboriginal inclusion in current processes of 
planning by Pilbara Cities, the Pilbara Development Commission, or the shires. A 
more urgent process is needed in order to take account of the rapid pace of resource 
development, its impact on Aboriginal people in the region, and the absence in the 
WA Planning Commission’s 2011 Pilbara Planning and Infrastructure Framework 
of any detail at all about where Aboriginal people fit within the overall Pilbara Cities 
agenda, whether as Aboriginal communities or in the planning for the hierarchy of 
‘cities’, ‘major towns’, ‘towns’, or villages. Given that Aboriginal people form a 
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significant part of those settlements even outside ‘Aboriginal communities’, this 
remains a glaring oversight (see paper 1 for Onslow as just one example). 
There is need, therefore, for additional dedicated resources and people to undertake 
this task: a role for ‘trusted outsiders’ or ‘funded brokers’. The Aboriginal Affairs 
Coordinating Committee took a step in this direction in appointing a Chief 
Operating Officer to undertake specified roles. In Roebourne, this resulted in the 
Roebourne Aboriginal Congress (paper 2). The problem is that the Chief Operating 
Officer, like DIA, was given a multiplicity of roles and sites that did not allow for 
ongoing intensive work towards consolidating the Congress. If government is 
serious about assisting in the development of a united Pilbara Aboriginal voice, the 
lessons identify a number of prerequisites.  
One is to recruit at least two people, a man and a woman, wholly dedicated to the 
task. Their role would be to work with government and Yamatji Marlpa, but also, 
and most rigorously, with Aboriginal people on the ground: ‘on the ground’ in the 
literal as well as metaphorical sense. Payment could be jointly provided by the State 
and Commonwealth governments from FaHCSIA and Pilbara Cities, to be managed 
through DIA or the ICC. A second prerequisite is that the pair (or small team) would 
be independent of any specific government program and work to a senior reference 
group made up of members from responsible State and Commonwealth government 
agencies and relevant Pilbara bodies. This should include representatives from at 
least FaHCSIA/ICC, DIA, the Pilbara Development Commission, Yamatji Marlpa, 
Pilbara Cities, and probably Pilbara Regional Development Australia.  
The project brief developed by this senior reference group would need to specify 
that a key objective of the project team would be to identify what a possible regional 
Pilbara Aboriginal entity would not do, in addition to working through what it 
would do: that is, it would not be in competition with functions already being 
undertaken by other Aboriginal organisations such as the Native Title 
Representative Body, management of CDEP while it continues or other employment-
related projects, or the responsibilities of individual native title groups or their 
organisations and trusts. What such a body might do, depending on the result of 
input from Aboriginal people and its consequent authority, is have representation 
on each of the relevant regional structures, and identify mechanisms for the 
appointment of Aboriginal presence on any possible new Pilbara regional 
governance body. 
A third prerequisite is that the funding for this project be adequate to cover full-
time involvement in the Pilbara, intensive engagement, meeting costs where 
required, and regular travel.  
Keeping in mind also that ‘new governance institutions must be initiated by 
Indigenous people themselves on the basis of their informed consent’ – the 
collaboration model – and that ‘external coercion and the imposition of governance 
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institutions have little traction in changing behaviour or building commitment and 
responsibility’ (Smith 2008b: 107), the senior reference group’s recruited project 
team would need to ensure that a Council of Elders, the Aboriginal working group, 
and organisations are provided with clear information about the principles already 
identified for regional governance from other Australian Indigenous regionalisation 
examples. This would include the options of federation, aggregation, and 
representation, ensuring practical understanding and implementation of the key 
principles of relational autonomy, networked relationships, and subsidiarity (paper 
5). 
In the meantime, State and Commonwealth governments need to restrain their 
impatient impulse to introduce yet more new policies or interventions while the 
partnership with Pilbara Aboriginal people is being developed and implemented. 
Finally, the overwhelming weight of evidence cited above and throughout this series 
of papers has significant implications for framing recommendations that provide for 
‘strategic and positive ways for Aboriginal people to pursue their aspirations 
through engagement/involvement in governance reforms in the Pilbara’ and ‘being 
able to draw the greatest benefit from...the establishment of the Pilbara Cities 
agenda’.43 
6.1 Approaches to enhancing Aboriginal participation in Pilbara governance 
1. That the State and Commonwealth governments provide extra and substantial 
resources through DIA or the ICC for the establishment of a senior reference group 
with representation from relevant Commonwealth, State, regional bodies, and 
Yamatji Marlpa, to engage with the process of developing a model or models for a 
regional Pilbara Aboriginal voice, including: 
 engagement by selective tender of two dedicated consultants, a man and a 
woman, highly experienced in Indigenous governance issues to work to the 
combined agency/regional bodies senior reference group. In accordance with 
current practice, these consultants would be auspiced outside government by 
Yamajti Marlpa. 
 Planned consultations would include consideration of how Pilbara Aboriginal 
people see their relationship with the shires, Pilbara Cities, other Pilbara 
bodies, and a possible Pilbara Regional Authority, and the ways in which they 
wish to enter into effective partnership/s on a statutory or contractual status. 
 Consultations would also explore alternative networked and layered models 
such as those set out in paper 5 (Imagining a region). 
                                                        
43 The third objective in the remoteFOCUS brief for this series of papers. 
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 The Indigenous Implementation Board’s recommendation (2011: 38, 52) for 
building governance capacity and investing in future leadership skills would 
be implemented parallel to this process. 
2. From the beginning, that the State government commit to providing funding to 
such a regional Pilbara Aboriginal voice on at least the same basis as it funds the 
shires. 
3. That Pilbara planning processes and bodies, including Pilbara Cities and the 
shires, expand their acknowledgement of the central importance to the region of 
contemporary Aboriginal people, not just of Aboriginal culture and history.  
4. That the State government continue to provide ongoing support for current 
programs to improve relations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in the 
region, such as the Town-based Reserves Transformation Project being undertaken 
by DIA with funding support from Pilbara Cities.  
5. At the local level of Roebourne (see paper 3), that the Aboriginal Affairs 
Coordinating Committee support moves by the Chief Operating Officer to 
reconstitute the Roebourne Aboriginal Congress from its current dysfunctional 
organisation through a process of engagement with and representation from the 
town’s principal organisations. 
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11. Doing Washing in a 
Cyclone, or a Storm in a 
Teacup? Aboriginal People 
and Organisations in the 
Pilbara: An Overview44 
Dr Mary Edmunds 
1. Introduction 
In 2005, Taylor and Scambary published their research, Indigenous people and the 
Pilbara mining boom. Their statistical profile demonstrated all too clearly that, 
despite the boom economic conditions in the region, Pilbara Aboriginal people 
remained marginalised and poor.  
For a complex set of reasons, Indigenous economic status has changed little 
in recent decades – dependence on government remains high and the relative 
economic status of Indigenous people residing adjacent to major long-life 
mines is similar to that of Indigenous people elsewhere in regional and 
remote Australia (2005: 1). 
Just a year later – and without fundamentally challenging the situation as 
demonstrated by Taylor and Scambary – a number of Pilbara Aboriginal families 
were given notice by HomesWest that they were no longer eligible to keep the 
HomesWest houses that had been their home for a number of years. This was on the 
basis that the household income was above the income limits set as one of the 
criteria for public housing rental. The situation was not a widespread one, but it was 
significant: directly for the families involved, and more broadly for what it indicated 
in terms of changes that are taking place, albeit unevenly and erratically, in the 
economic conditions of Aboriginal people in the Pilbara. 
Current statistics on the rate of Indigenous employment in the region remain 
partial, but in 2001, the employment rate was only 42.5%, with the Community 
Development Employment Program (CDEP) representing 12.3% of that figure 
(2005: 29). Numbers available from the major resource companies suggest that 
                                                        
44 The analogy about washing in a cyclone is not original; it was a description offered by one 
non-Aboriginal Pilbara woman commenting on how the current boom feels to those who live 
there. 
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there has been some improvement over the past decade in the number of those in 
full-time jobs but figures from the Australian Bureau of Statistics put the figure for 
Indigenous employment nationally at 46% in 2010 (www.abs.gov.au/ausstats). The 
Pilbara figures may vary from this but probably not hugely. Sources of income in 
addition to welfare payments come from a variety of other activities. High on the list 
is the constant requirement by resource companies for heritage surveys. Other 
income is generated from some consultancy and contracting payments; sitting fees – 
often around $500 a day – for native title Working Groups, negotiation and 
committee meetings; some payment for art works; distribution from trusts; and 
occasional gratuities. Although this range of partial income generation may be seen 
as a classic welfare trap (Holcombe 2009: 162), many Pilbara Aboriginal people 
prefer it to full-time employment. In some cases, as in the HomesWest situation, it 
raises unexpected problems.  
On this occasion, one of the resource companies supported the families’ case to the 
Department of Housing to be allowed to remain in their houses. More generally, DIA 
successfully lobbied for a two-year moratorium allowing tenants with income above 
the Homeswest threshold to remain in public housing (Department of Indigenous 
Affairs 2008). Nevertheless, the incident suggests that many of the practices taken 
for granted in the past, including the low income of Aboriginal people and their 
general access to public housing, may be changing. It is important to examine both 
the issues, the durability, and the potential impact, of such a substantial shift. 
2. Who are Pilbara Aboriginal people? 
Pilbara Aboriginal people are the people who belong to the Pilbara.  
The Hamersley Ranges (Gambulanha) run from Gurrama, through 
Yindjibarndi to Banyjima country following the valley of the great Fortescue 
River which we call Yarndanyirra – ‘sun mirror’. Long ago Yarndanyirra was 
dry, until Barrimirndi – the great water snake – came from the sea chasing 
after two boys who broke the Law. He travelled under the ground and at each 
place where he busted out of the dry river to smell where those two Law 
breakers were, Barrimirndi made yindangali (deep permanent pools). He 
finally got up at Nhanggangunha (Deep Reach) and lifted the Law breakers 
into the sky in a wananggaa (willy willy)...Today Barrimirndi rests deep down 
in the pool he made at Nhanggangunha. He is the protector of water places all 
along Yarndanyirra right up to Nhanggangunha. We don’t think Barrimirndi is 
bad, we respect him because he’s a giver of water, of life. He only gets wild if 
the laws for water places are broken (Juluwarlu 2004: 1). 
This is the Black Range, we call it Black Range in white man’s name. Our name 
is Warttarra...This place got a story. It’s a man’s story. Bloke’s been travellin’, 
comin’ along and seen this smoke comin’ – smokin’ all that hill. It’s a 
Manguny story, Dreaming story. This one comes from Hillside station right 
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through past Marble Bar, right up to Shay Gap and Nimingarra. It’s been burnt 
on the top, that’s why it’s black. There’s a Nyamal men’s Law story about 
something which we can’t say (Read and Coppin 1999: 20). 
The Two Men [Western Desert Wadi Gudjara] travelled on until they reached a 
spot where they put down all their gear and camped. They named it Djilbiriri. 
Then they went on to a place where they pierced each other’s nasal septum; 
they named it Mulajidibura, a big rock with a hole through it. They went on, 
and saw a small kangaroo lying down; they backtracked, then crept up on it 
and speared it. They cooked and ate the meat and called the place Wirgudja 
(Tonkinson 1974: 73). 
These are just some of the creation stories from the many different language groups 
whose country covers what is now known as the Pilbara, stories that map the 
relationships between people, and between people and their country; invest that 
country, and particular named sites within it, with meaning; and set down the law to 
regulate people’s social and religious life. Many of these stories of ancestral travel 
also establish the relationships between the different groups through whose country 
they journeyed, creating networks of ownership, responsibility, and reciprocity.  
But country is not just sacred: it is economic, providing livelihoods for the groups 
over the millennia of their occupation; and it is home. For a hundred years after 
colonisation – which came late to this part of Australia – the pastoral industry 
added another level of meaning, and the stations redefined home for many people. 
So too did the emerging settlements, on Aboriginal reserves and a few missions. All 
these levels of identification remain significant for Pilbara Aboriginal people today, 
although some ties have proved more binding than others. There are also 
generational differences, with the sheep and cattle stations having lost much of their 
resonance for younger generations, whose main experiences have been shaped in the 
newer towns and settlements.  
2.1 Population and residence 
In the Pilbara today, there are Aboriginal people living in the larger towns: Port 
Hedland/South Hedland and Karratha. More live in or near the smaller towns, 
including previously closed mining towns: Newman, Tom Price, Paraburdoo, 
Roebourne, Wickham, Pannawonica, Onslow, Marble Bar, Nullagine. Jigalong is a 
former ration depot and mission that is now an Aboriginal community.45 In 
                                                        
45 As discussed in paper 5, the term ‘community’ is a contentious one, implying a unity of 
identity and purpose, and associated expectations that are often not appropriate (Peters-
Little 2000: 3). The term has come to be used in Australia, however, to identify Indigenous 
settlements or towns, often on Indigenous land. The Australian Bureau of Statistics now 
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addition, there are some twenty other small Aboriginal communities of between fifty 
and one hundred people scattered across the region. A few of these are on 
Aboriginal-owned stations like Yandeyarra and Strelley/Warralong. Many fall 
clearly into even the most stringent definition of ‘remote’. 
In the 2006 census, the resident population of the Pilbara was around 41,000. The 
Indigenous population – that also includes some Torres Strait Islanders – was 5,632 
or 13.7% of the total Pilbara population. With the rapid expansion in the resources 
industry since 2006, even with the hiatus generated by the global financial crisis in 
2008-2009, the next census (9 August 2011) is likely to show a significant variation 
in these figures, and in the ratio of Indigenous to non-Indigenous people. Estimates 
of the total resident population for 2008 already show a rise in the two years after 
the 2006 census of around 5,000 to nearly 46,000 and another 5,000 for 2010 to 
51,000. The projection for 2020 is an increase to 62,500 (Waller 2010: 3). These 
figures do not take into account the presence of operational and construction fly-in 
fly-out (FIFO) workers; they take the projections from 66,530 in 2010 to 96,200 in 
2020 (Western Australian Planning Commission 2011: 10). 
If these projections are realised – and the Waller figures for 2010 indicate that they 
may well be – then the proportion of Aboriginal to non-Aboriginal people may well 
decrease. This is despite the fact that the Indigenous population itself has grown 
steadily over the past couple of decades and continues to do so (Taylor and 
Scambary 2005: 13); and that, in 2006, the Pilbara Aboriginal population 
represented the third highest proportion of Aboriginal people in Western Australia 
(Western Australian Government, Department of Aboriginal Affairs 2011). In 
addition, the spread of Aboriginal people is varied, with towns like Roebourne, 
Marble Bar, South Hedland, Onslow with much higher Aboriginal populations than 
in, for example, Karratha or Dampier; and other areas such as parts of the East 
Pilbara where the proportion of Aboriginal people is much higher than the regional 
average. As Taylor and Scambary observe (2005: 13): 
The simple point is that, over vast tracts of the Pilbara region, the 16 per cent 
global Indigenous share statistic46 can be misleading as large parts of the 
country away from the demographic influence of urban centres and mine sites 
remain essentially Indigenous domains where Indigenous people and their 
institutions predominate. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
uses the term ‘Indigenous location’ but ‘community’ continues to be more generally used as 
an indicator of such settlements and will be used in that way in this paper.  
46 The slight discrepancy between this 16% figure and the 13.7% of the 2006 census reflects 
the 2005 publication date of the Taylor and Scambary study. Their research was based on 
the 2001 census figures and consequent projections. 
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A large variation occurs even within towns. In South Hedland, for example, the 
2006 census figures show a spread of Aboriginal residents across the town from 
eight to nine per cent in some areas to twenty-eight to thirty-three per cent in 
others.  
2.2 People, language, country 
Statistics are an important tool for regional understanding and planning. But they 
do not define the ways in which people, including Aboriginal people, see themselves. 
Pilbara Aboriginal people identify themselves across a range of other dimensions. 
One of these is by language group. According to the Wangka Maya Pilbara 
Aboriginal Language Centre, there are twenty-four languages still in use to a greater 
or lesser extent, although a number of these fall into the linguistic category of 
‘endangered’ and a further seven have already become extinct in that they no longer 
have any speakers (Wangka Maya web site). Traditional owner groups align closely, 
though not rigidly, with the named language groups and their associated country, 
with the same or related languages being spoken in some instances by a number of 
different groups. Extensive intermarriage across groups provided individuals with a 
range of potential group and country affiliations, each of which could be invoked in 
different situations, around a central identity. Lola Young’s mother, for example, 
was Kurrama, her father Panyjima [Bunjima], ‘and I follow the Yinawangka 
[Innawonga] way. I never followed the two parents; I followed the grandfather, 
Yinawangka’ (2007: 26). 
Affiliation with particular stations is also important for many people who grew up, 
lived, and worked there. Often this allowed families to stay on their own country. 
Lola Young remembered (2007: 25, 26): 
My name, my Aborigine name, is Ngamingu; I was born at Rocklea Station...on 
12 February 1942...Some of my growing up was on Rocklea Station and some 
on Juna Downs Station. We was up and down to Juna Downs, because my 
father was a horse breaker and he used to break in horses on every station. 
Juna Downs was the place he used to stay most of the time; just come back to 
Rocklea to visit all the family, my grandmothers and everyone...Good life, 
growing up in the bush – free, nice and wild...We used to go riding all the time 
when there was two of us. Brother Nick would ride with Dad and I used to ride 
behind Mum on her horse. We used to go everywhere. Take a packhorse, go 
dogging in the back country, catch a fish, whatever you want. A good free life. 
This sense of connection with particular stations is changing for younger 
generations who were born after the move by Aboriginal workers and families from 
the stations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Some of this experience remains for 
those who still live in communities on Aboriginal-owned stations like Yandeyarra or 
Strelley/Warralong  
125 
 
A further level of identification came with the introduction of the Commonwealth 
Native Title Act 1993 (NTA). On the basis of the requirements of the NTA, 
traditional owner and language groups have been recast as native title groups, with 
a stronger legal basis for looking after traditional country. The process has 
demanded a much more stringent and inflexible group identification than the 
broader language and traditional owner groupings. By the same token, it has offered 
tangible benefits to Pilbara Aboriginal people through the native title claims and 
determinations procedures. To date, there have been seven native title 
determinations. One was litigated in the courts; this was for the Ngarla and 
Yindjibarndi people, many of whom live in Roebourne. The other six, including the 
Martu determination in the east Pilbara, have all in the end been decided by the 
consent of all the parties. Twenty-eight claims are still to be finalised.  
Native title does not give groups absolute rights over their country, but it does give 
them legal status and some negotiation rights over developments, including 
exploration and mining developments, on their country. Both government and 
resource companies, whether large or small, now have to engage with the native title 
groups on a regular and active basis as part of development and project planning. It 
has also become the basis of resource companies going beyond the legal 
requirements of the NTA and other statutes as part of confirming their social licence 
to operate. This makes Pilbara Aboriginal people integral to Pilbara economic 
development.  
In addition, and despite the benefits, including substantial financial benefits, 
flowing from agreements between resource companies and native title groups, 
Pilbara Aboriginal people – though not their country – remain economically 
marginal to the dizzying levels of development activity and wealth generation 
currently sweeping across the region. Langton (2010) suggests that, while Australia 
is unlikely at the national level to experience the full impact of what Richard Auty 
identified as the ‘resource curse’ (1993), both Aboriginal people and long-term 
settlers in the Pilbara share the disadvantages of the effects of the resource curse in 
important ways: ‘their income is much lower, yet they must pay the same exorbitant 
housing, food and services costs, thanks to the localised inflation brought about by 
the boom’. 
Langton goes on to suggest that ‘the effects of the resource curse in regional 
Australia should be a greater policy concern for all governments’. With the massive 
ramping up of resource development in the Pilbara, and its economic importance 
nationally as well as for the State, governments have responded. The result has been 
an explosion of bodies, policies, planning frameworks and strategies focusing on the 
region and on long-term regional planning for sustainability that attempts to 
manage the current urgent pressures and to expand the social and economic base 
beyond resource dependency.   
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3. The broader Pilbara context 
3.1 The current boom 
The astonishing scale of the current boom can and has been measured in figures, 
with everyone speaking in superlatives: the amount of iron ore being dug up and 
exported; the levels of planned project expansion and associated infrastructure of 
port and rail; the number of new workers flocking into the region, whether 
temporarily resident or fly-in fly-out; the inflated, seductive wages for those who 
have resource sector jobs; the impossible cost of accommodation, where it is 
available. But it is perhaps symbolised by the grandiose names given to some of the 
newer projects, in contrast to the more modest or descriptive names of older ones: 
from Tom Price and Newman to Pluto, king of the underworld, who raped 
Persephone and abducted her to Hades; and Gorgon, the snake-headed sisters 
whose look could turn people to stone. 
The regional implications of these developments were set out in a letter from 
Collene Longmore from the Pilbara Area Consultative Committee47 to the then Prime 
Minister, John Howard, in October 2007. She described a situation that has only got 
worse: 
Accommodation and land is so out of control in the region that rents are 
consistently $1500-$3500 per week for an average 4 bedroom 
property...Industry is constrained as they can’t house their workforce for 
continuing operations, planned maintenance periods and expansion...The not-
for-profit sector is steadily declining...In this market, unless you can provide 
housing you have little chance of securing employees...Agencies (at all three 
tiers) appear paralysed with the enormity of the situation therefore do nothing 
or provide small investment funds in an adhoc manner which achieves little. 
She also refers to the urgency for response: 
PICC [Pilbara Industry’s Community Council] states that the issues it seeks to 
address are long-term challenges for the Pilbara community and need a 
dedicated and coordinated response. I agree, but proffer that although the 
challenges may be long-term they are also immediate and require firstly a 
thoughtful and coordinated immediate financial response that may best be met 
through Federal, State, Local Government and Industry agreement. Secondly a 
commitment from parties to coordinate and collaborate to remove the 
bureaucratic barriers that stall addressing the issues. 
                                                        
47 Now Regional Development Australia. Pilbara. 
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3.2 Government response and the State Royalties for Regions program 
Since this 2007 letter, there has been a proliferation of Federal and State bodies 
tasked with addressing Pilbara issues, although the achievement of an effectively 
coordinated response and the removal of bureaucratic barriers appears to be 
elusive. This was hinted at in the 2010 report to the Minister of the Indigenous 
Implementation Board (Department of Indigenous Affairs web site, Boards and 
Committees). The Board was established for a three-year term by the Western 
Australian Government  in 2009 to advise it on how to address the underlying 
causes of Indigenous disadvantage.48 It was chaired by Lieutenant General John 
Sanderson. In his Introduction to the 2010 Report, he comments (p3, 4): 
The Board has attempted to keep itself fully informed of the progress on the 
initiatives emerging from Council of Australian Governments’ Indigenous 
agenda and to align its strategy for engagement with Aboriginal people with 
that agenda where it is possible to do so... 
The Board continues to seek engagement with the Aboriginal Affairs 
Coordinating Committee (AACC – the Directors General group) and the newly 
appointed Western Australian Aboriginal Advisory Council (WA AAC). 
Unfortunately, the building of these alliances continues to be hampered by a 
lack of clear definition of an agreed strategy for addressing the needs of 
Aboriginal people and the ongoing problem of explaining exactly how 
commitment and expenditure of resources are determined in Western 
Australia and at the federal level. This work needs to be advanced with some 
urgency... 
This assessment with respect to Aboriginal matters sits within, and is symptomatic 
of, the broader effects of the entropic features of governance in the Pilbara, and 
regional Australia, generally. Nevertheless, notable changes for the Pilbara in the 
WA Royalties for Regions program are indicative of a shift in government priorities 
even over the past two years. In 2008, for example, the initial funding under the 
Country Local Government Fund – only one of three funds available under the 
Royalties for Regions scheme – was $100 million. In 2008-2009, the Pilbara had 
received only $6.7 million, or 7% of the total (CME 2009). Criticism by the Chamber 
of Minerals and Energy focused on what they identified as two disparities. The first 
was ‘the strong bias to the more populated rural areas’ of the Wheatbelt and south-
east and southern regions which, taken together, received a total of 61% of the 
funding. The second disparity was the ‘dramatic’ contrast between the Country 
Grants Fund allocations and royalty revenues (2009:2, 3). 
                                                        
48 The Board held its final meeting and presented its third and final report to the Minister 
in February 2011, just two years after its establishment.  
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The Pilbara region dominated royalty payments providing about 78% of the 
total followed by the Goldfields-Esperance region with 9.3%. With the 
Kimberley region, the three most isolated regions from Perth provided 91% of 
the State royalty revenue. 
The input from the Country Grants Fund fluctuated over the next two years – $0.14 
million in 2009-10 and back to $6.5 million in 2010-11 – but the total for the 
Pilbara from the three Royalties for Regions funds in 2010-11 reached $334.7 
million. A major part of this funding – $253.2 million – is allocated for the Pilbara 
Cities initiative (Government of Western Australia. Department of Regional 
Development and Lands 2011).  
The Pilbara Cities initiative was announced by the Premier and the Minister for 
Regional Development in November 2009 as a central component of a broader plan 
to normalise living conditions: to use some of the vast wealth produced in the region 
for the social benefit of the people who live there, rather than for those in 
metropolitan centres, and to make newcomers want to stay. The objective is to have 
two cities, Karratha (Karratha and Dampier) and Port Hedland (Port Hedland and 
South Hedland), each with a population of 50,000. Newman would become a sub-
regional centre; Tom Price, Onslow, and Wickham ‘major towns’; Paraburdoo, 
Roebourne, and Pannawonica ‘towns’; Point Samson, Marble Bar, Nullagine, 
Cossack, and Shellborough ‘villages’. Aboriginal ‘communities’ – unnamed – sit 
outside this particular planning hierarchy, in a discreetly acknowledged too hard – 
‘challenging’ – basket (Western Australian Planning Commission 2011: 33). 
3.3 From village to ‘major town’: Onslow 
The proposed promotion of Onslow to a ‘major town’ is a vivid demonstration of the 
potential impact of the Pilbara Cities plan and of its ongoing integral relation with 
resource development, despite efforts to unlink the two for the longer term. While 
Chevron has been producing oil on islands off the coast from Onslow – Barrow 
Island and Thevenard Island – for more than 45 years, the development of the 
Gorgon and Wheatstone liquefied natural gas (LNG) and domestic gas projects is 
about to transform the town.  
Like the town of Roebourne, Onslow used to be the administrative centre of the 
shire – in this instance, the Shire of Ashburton – but this was moved to Tom Price 
in 1990, taking the associated jobs and residents with it. Census figures for 1996 and 
2006 suggest that the removal of the shire’s administrative centre had little effect 
on resident numbers. The 1996 population was 588; that of 2006, 573. Of this 573, 
192, or 33.5% of the town population, were Aboriginal people. Many of these live in 
the Bindi Bindi Aboriginal community on the outskirts of the town. 
Old Onslow was established in 1883, some twenty years later than Roebourne, to 
serve as a port at the mouth of the Ashburton River for the export of wool from the 
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surrounding stations. In 1925, after a number of destructive cyclones, the town was 
relocated to its current site. Although much of the surrounding country is still 
covered by pastoral leases, the pastoral industry is now only one of a number of 
other activities, mainly fishing and tourism which, despite being off the North-West 
Highway route, attracts visitors in particular to the Mackeral and Thevenard 
Islands. Solar salt is produced and shipped by Onslow Salt.  
Onslow is in Thalanyji country. In 2008, the Federal Court found that native title 
continues to exist over much of the area claimed, including pastoral leases and some 
land in and around the town. There are five Indigenous Land Use Agreements 
dealing with the practical matters of co-existence between the Thalanyji native title 
holders and five of the station owners. Eight industry bodies with interests in the 
area were parties to the determination but, even a few years ago, their interests were 
relatively low profile, apart from Onslow Salt and Chevron’s projects off the coast. 
Buffered from its nearest regional centre, Karratha, by some 200 km of indifferent 
roads, Onslow remained a bucolic coastal village, with a primary school, a small 
public hospital dealing mainly with emergencies and acute care 
(www.myhospitals.gov.au/hospital/onslow-hospital/), a police station and lockup; 
one supermarket in the old Elders Smith building,49 a pub, a small motel with donga 
accommodation fronting the beach, and Nikki’s deservedly much-praised (and 
enjoyed) beach-side restaurant.  There are periods of increased activity, mainly 
during the tourist season, and an irregular influx of people for meetings with or for 
resource companies, for native title negotiations, or for other matters of regional 
concern.  
This will all change with the development of Onslow into a ‘major town’.  The 
Western Australian Planning Commission’s draft plan does not suggest a likely or 
projected figure for Onslow’s growth, although it places it below the ‘sub-regional 
centre’ of Newman with its target population of 15,000. Instead, its ‘population and 
footprint...will be largely determined by mining and oil and gas related industry in 
the locality’ (2011: 11, 27): 
The town is on the threshold of a significant expansion as the locality is 
considered a favourable area to establish gas processing industries to monetise 
gas resources from the North West Shelf by production of LNG for exportation 
to overseas markets and domestic gas for the local market. 
In 2008, Chevron selected a preferred site at Ashburton North, 12 kilometres west 
of Onslow, as the location for its Wheatstone LNG and domestic gas plant. The 
company expects that the project will create about 6,500 direct and indirect jobs at 
                                                        
49 The original Elders Smith building burnt down in December 1978 and was rebuilt and 
reopened in July 1979.  
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the construction peak (Chevron Australia web site). At present, there is no major 
fly-in fly-out program, but there is already ‘a significant number of transient 
workers’ who occupy ‘rooms and units in the town’s [limited] commercial visitor 
accommodation and private dwellings’ (Western Australian Planning Commission 
2011: 27). The scenario – taking into account the scale of the comparable Pluto 
development on the Burrup – will bring in large numbers of construction workers 
and require further transport and other infrastructure. It is beginning to be 
uncomfortably reminiscent of the impact on Pilbara Aboriginal people, especially in 
Roebourne, of the lifting of the iron ore embargo and the mining development of the 
1960s. 
There are, however, significant differences. All levels of government – 
Commonwealth, State, and local – as well as industry bodies are taking an active 
role in planning for the Pilbara and the management of current, proposed, and 
expansion projects. This has resulted in activity levels of some complexity. In 
addition to normal departmental responsibilities for their various portfolios – 
health, housing, education, land management, and so on – the State government has 
established or redefined a number of specialist bodies to oversee Pilbara matters.  
3.4 WA State Government and industry arrangements 
3.4.1 The Pilbara Regional Council is a statutory body established under the 
Western Australian Local Government Act 1995. It was formed in 2000 and is made 
up of representatives from the four Pilbara shires: Ashburton, East Pilbara, 
Roebourne, and the Town of Port Hedland. Its aims are to take a regional approach 
to service delivery and to act as a collective voice to government and industry. In 
2010, it received funding to three projects to be carried out in the following twelve 
months: improvement of local government services to Indigenous communities 
($180,000); the preparation of a Regional Business Plan to investigate shared 
service delivery between the four local governments ($170,000); and the promotion 
of larger strategic infrastructure development and asset preservation and renewal 
($2,275,067 from the Country Local Government Fund) (Pilbara Regional Council 
Newsletter 2010: 1). 
3.4.2 The Pilbara Development Commission is one of nine Regional Development 
Commissions established under the Regional Commissions Act 1993 and supported 
by the Department of Regional Development and Lands. The role of the 
Commissions is to facilitate and coordinate the development of the region in which 
each one is based (Duncan 2010: 10). The Review commented that ‘if regional 
governance in Western Australia were to be measured against jurisdictions 
elsewhere in Australia, then the RDC model, with its local staff, CEO and board, 
would stand out against all other systems, which are broadly centralist in nature’ 
(2010: 58). 
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3.4.3 The Regional Development Council consists of the chairpersons of the nine 
Regional Development Commissions, two local government representatives, and the 
Director General of the Department of Regional Development and Lands. It is the 
peak advisory body to the Western Australian Government on regional development 
issues (Department of Regional Development and Lands web site). 
3.4.4 The Pilbara Regional Planning Committee is one of six regional planning 
committees set up to advise the WA Planning Commission, the statutory authority 
with statewide responsibilities for urban, rural, and regional land use planning and 
land development matters. The Commission is supported by the Department of 
Planning (Department of Planning web site). 
3.4.5 The Pilbara Industry’s Community Council (PICC) was set up in 2006 with 
member companies BHP Billiton Iron Ore, Chevron Australia, North West shelf 
venture, Rio Tinto Iron Ore, Woodside. Fortescue Metals Groups (FMG) is also a 
member. Although PICC has become less active as other programs have been put in 
place, its key commitments were twofold: to increase Indigenous participation in 
employment in the Pilbara and the sustainability of Pilbara towns. PICC saw 
collaboration with government as vital to ensure that both sectors worked together 
(Parker 2008: 6). 
3.5 Commonwealth government arrangements 
3.5.1 The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) National Partnership 
Agreement on Remote Service Delivery came into effect in January 2009 as part of 
the Closing the Gap commitments. None of the priority locations in Western 
Australia is in the Pilbara. The 2009 Report by the Coordinator General for Remote 
Indigenous Services therefore deals only with the priority locations, which are all in 
the Kimberley. 
3.5.2 Regional Development Australia (RDA) was established in 2008 to bring 
together all levels of government to support the growth and development of regional 
Australia (Regional Development Australia web site). It is supported by the 
Department of Regional Australia, Regional Development and Local Government 
and is made up of a network of 55 non-profit, community-based committees, 
derived from the previous Area Consultative Committees (ACCs). 
3.5.3 Regional Development Australia Pilbara Committee (Pilbara RDA) was 
previously the Pilbara Area Consultative Committee, now part of the RDA network.  
3.5.4 The Office of Northern Australia was also established in 2008 to provide 
policy advice to the Australian Government on sustainable development issues in, or 
affecting, northern Australia. One of its immediate priorities was the establishment 
of the Northern Australia Ministerial Forum, which held its inaugural meeting in 
December 2010. One of its five key themes is Indigenous employment and skills 
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shortages (Northern Australia Ministerial Forum joint communiqué, 13 December 
2010). 
3.5.5 Indigenous Coordination Centres (ICCs) were established in 2004 as part of 
the Commonwealth government’s turbulent changes to the structure and 
administration of Indigenous Affairs. This was part of the ‘whole-of-government’ 
approach being undertaken and was related to the abolition of ATSIC (see paper, 
Introduction) and the transfer of ATSIC staff and programs – the mainstreaming of 
Indigenous programs – to other Australian Government Departments. They are 
designed to be a service delivery hub for the new arrangements and to take the place 
of ATSIC State and regional offices.50 Since December 2005, the ICCs report to 
FaHCSIA State Managers (Gray and Sanders 2006; KPMG 2007). The Pilbara ICC 
office is located in South Hedland and, unlike the previous ATSIC Regional Councils 
which combined the East Pilbara with other Western Desert groups, covers the 
whole of the Pilbara.  
3.6 Regional planning 
The WA Planning Commission’s (Pilbara Regional Planning Committee) 2011 draft 
Pilbara planning and infrastructure framework is the latest, and only one but 
perhaps the most ambitious, of a number of regional plans that have emerged in 
recent years. Many of the latter focus on funding for selected local or regional 
projects. 
In 2008, the Pilbara Area Consultative Committee – now Pilbara RDA– produced 
The Pilbara Plan, identifying 43 ‘essential projects’ in conjunction with the Pilbara 
Development Commission and the Pilbara Regional Council.  This formed the basis 
of RDA Pilbara’s August 2010 Preliminary Pilbara Regional Plan. 
In 2008 and 2010, the Pilbara Industry’s Community Council commissioned 
reports, Planning for resources growth in the Pilbara, focusing on employment and 
population projections to 2020 (Heuris Partners 2008; Waller 2010). 
In 2009, the Pilbara Development Commission published its Strategic Plan 2010-
2013. Also in 2009, the State Government announced the Pilbara Cities blueprint; 
the Pilbara Regional Council finalised its Plan for the future 2010-2014; and the 
Minister for Regional Development, Brendan Grylls, set out the Royalties for 
Regions Pilbara Revitalisation Plan (Ministerial media statement 11/5/09).  
Much of this intense planning activity was given a major boost by the 2008 
establishment of the Royalties for Regions program, that commits the government 
to return the equivalent of 25 per cent of the State’s mining and onshore petroleum 
royalties revenue to regional Western Australia. The development is a welcome one, 
                                                        
50 There was no replacement of the elected ATSIC Regional Councils. 
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and it is clear that the Pilbara is served by range of State, Commonwealth, and 
industry bodies. What is less clear is the extent to which the proliferation of bodies, 
policies, plans, amounts to a coherent and effective approach to regional issues, or 
whether it has created the policy turbulence of multiple lines of authority, ever 
changing policy and funding guidelines (deadly no.3), and the churning of different 
levels of territorial authority (deadly no.6 or 5). 
For Aboriginal people, there are even more levels of complexity to be dealt with. 
But, in some ways, that has become business as usual. 
3.7 Aboriginal engagement 
In September 2009, the WA Indigenous Implementation Board held an Indigenous 
Pilbara Dialogue. Barry Taylor from Ngarda Ngarli Yarndu Foundation chaired the 
meeting. In his introductory comments, he made the point that Indigenous leaders 
‘could choose to engage with government and seek to change the current 
unsatisfactory state of affairs, or believe that government was not serious about 
change, and focus their energies elsewhere’. He stated that, by coming to this 
Dialogue, ‘all present had recognised the need to do Indigenous business differently’ 
(Indigenous Implementation Board 2010). 
One of the suggestions made during the Dialogue discussions was that ‘We need a 
governance hub for the Pilbara, based on our four Aboriginal cultural blocs, a 
regional governance body’.  At the end of the second day, those present passed a 
unanimous motion as follows: 
That a Pilbara Indigenous one stop shop (the governance hub referred to 
earlier in the workshop) be created to speak to all levels of government: 
 Federal; 
 State; and 
 Local government. 
This organisation would do business with: 
 miners; 
 explorers; 
 tourist operators; and 
 other relevant agencies. 
This organisation would include Indigenous: 
 Elders; 
 Community leaders (who may or may not be elders); and 
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 CEOs of Indigenous organisations. 
Only Indigenous people would have voting rights. 
There is Aboriginal representation, including from the Pilbara, on a number, though 
not all, of the State bodies discussed above. The then Indigenous Affairs Minister, 
Kim Hames, also re-established the Western Australian Aboriginal Advisory Council 
in 2009. The Council is a requirement of the Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority 
Act 1972 but had not sat for several years. Its State-wide membership is exclusively 
Aboriginal, and its role is to provide independent advice to the State Government on 
Indigenous matters (Department of Indigenous Affairs web site). The twelve 
members are drawn from the State’s different regions and include one person from 
the Pilbara. The Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act 1972 also requires that 
Board members of the Aboriginal Lands Trust are all persons of Aboriginal descent. 
The situation is similar for the membership of the Aboriginal Cultural Material 
Committee, which makes decisions about cultural heritage and sites, and advises the 
Minister in relation to section 18 applications under the Aboriginal Heritage Act 
1972. These are applications for disturbance or destruction of Aboriginal sites for 
the purposes of land development, including resource development, and are a 
regular and fraught issue for Pilbara Aboriginal people. A Pilbara representative was 
a recent Chair of the committee. 
The idea of a specifically Pilbara regional Aboriginal voice has, nevertheless, been 
suggested from time to time. There have also been a number of proto-types, with a 
more limited regional focus. In 1971, for example, the first bush meeting to bring 
together Aboriginal groups from across the region in a process based on long-
established traditional gatherings of related groups was held at the Yule River. Bush 
meetings proved an important part of wider Aboriginal decision-making for some 
years, and people at the 2010 Indigenous Pilbara Dialogue called for its return. In 
2006, the native title groups negotiating with Rio Tinto Iron Ore formed themselves 
into a Central Negotiating Committee (CNC) and successfully pushed Rio Tinto to 
raise its offer of financial benefits to all the groups. After a hiatus in which the CNC 
was incorporated and failed as Marnda Mia (see paper 5), this process has resulted 
in the establishment of a new Regional Aboriginal Corporation that will operate 
under the auspices of the Native Title Representative Body, Yamatji Marlpa 
Aboriginal Corporation (Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation 2010).  
Other moves to operate at a more regional level have been through Regional 
Partnership Agreements (RPAs). These were part of the new arrangements for 
Indigenous Affairs put in train in 2004 that also established the ICCs. One of the 
roles of the ICCs was to negotiate RPAs based on the principle of shared 
responsibility and mutual obligation or reciprocity for service delivery (Australian 
135 
 
Human Rights Commission 2004).51 There are two RPAs in the Pilbara, both on 
Indigenous employment: the Hedland RPA in 2006 and the Ashburton/Roebourne 
RPA in 2007 (Department of Indigenous Affairs 2008). Both were signed by the 
Commonwealth, the WA State Government, and a range of industry and regional 
bodies and Indigenous organisations. Neither has had particularly notable results. 
On the other hand, the Pilbara Aboriginal Contractors Association, incorporated in 
2009 with the assistance of BHP Billiton Iron Ore, the Pilbara Development 
Commission, the State Government, and Royalties for Regions, is experiencing some 
success as an emerging peak industry association. 
To date, however, all these loose associations of Pilbara groups tend to be focused 
on the central and west Pilbara. East Pilbara groups such as the Martu are, for 
example, notable by their absence, though they form part of the Pilbara 
administrative region and, from the point of view of Aboriginal people, have 
important cultural links with groups in the central and west Pilbara as well as with 
other Western Desert groups (see paper 4). At the same time, Martu, like many 
other Pilbara groups, have been engaged in the processes of agreement-making that 
have come to play a major role for Aboriginal groups, particularly in relation to 
resource development. The development of a culture of negotiation and agreement-
making has been one of the crucial changes arising from the recognition of native 
title. 
Prior to the Native Title Act 1993, the only statutory protection in Western Australia 
for Aboriginal rights in traditional country was the fairly weak protection of the 
Aboriginal Heritage Act. There were few constraints on mining companies. Where 
there was resistance, as there was at Noonkanbah in the West Kimberley in 1980, it 
proved to be spectacular (Kolig 1987). Although the early iron ore mining 
companies, Hamersley Iron (now Rio Tinto) and BHP, put in place various 
assistance programs for local Aboriginal people, there was no statutory requirement 
for them to seek approvals from traditional owners. The Native Title Act changed 
that. In addition to providing certain rights to native title holders or registered 
native title claimants, the mediation requirements of the native title process has led 
gradually to a culture of agreement-making as the preferred way of doing business.  
Although this approach was slower to take off in Western Australia than in some 
other parts of the country, Western Australia did see the first big mining agreement 
between a mining company and native title groups. This was the 1997 Yandicoogina 
Land Use Agreement – the Yandi agreement – between Hamersley Iron and the 
combined Nyiyaparli, Bunjima, and Innawonga native title claimants. Gumala 
Aboriginal Corporation was established in 1996 as the groups’ collective negotiating 
                                                        
51 The successful Groote Eylandt RPA, first signed in 2008, is dealt with in some detail in 
paper 5. 
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body, providing an initial model for the development of an effective combined voice 
(see paper 3). 
The Yandi agreement was also the first WA mining agreement to deliver substantial 
and ongoing financial benefits to Pilbara Aboriginal people.52 This has now become 
the norm. Most of the money is, however, held in charitable trusts, with few and 
limited direct payments to individuals, leading one of the group to observe that, 
‘we’ve got the richest trusts, and the poorest people’ (Scambary 2007: 165). On the 
other hand, the need for resource companies to reach agreement with native title 
groups has led to a practice of sitting fee payments for meetings, as well as travel 
and accommodation costs. Different companies have offered different sitting fee 
rates, but $500 a day has become common. For people involved in a range of 
negotiations and committees, this can become regular part-time income (Holcombe 
2009: 162). 
Aboriginal people, like everyone else in the Pilbara, are affected by the development 
and planning busyness infecting government and industry. But there is a sense that, 
in some ways, they’ve seen it all before, including its cyclical fickleness.53 Their 
involvement, and their stake, in the process is now more intense than in the past. 
But resource development is just one dimension of their concerns and does not 
encompass the whole.  
4. Issues as expressed by Pilbara Aboriginal people 
On a cloudless May day in 1997, around 300 people attended a mediation 
conference on country for the Martu native title claim. There was some tension and 
some nervousness about how the meeting would go. There had been a deep rift in 
the wake of the 1946 Pilbara Aboriginal workers’ pastoral strike. The strike had been 
led by Clancy McKenna, Dooley Bin Bin, and Don McLeod but, a decade later, 
‘leadership and internal conflicts came to a head with different families aligning 
themselves with two factions’ (Read and Coppin 1999: 123). One group, including 
Bin Bin, chose to continue with McLeod, establishing themselves as Nomads Pty 
                                                        
52 This has now drawn the attention of the Australian Taxation Office and the ATO and 
Commonwealth governments are examining the potential tax implications. 
53 As just the most recent example, over the period up to 2008, the mood of the iron ore 
mining companies was that the demand from China in particular would sustain the boom 
and the good times for many years to come. Then came the global financial crisis. Although 
Australia escaped its worst effects, the GFC hit expansion plans, stymied the BHP Billiton 
proposed takeover of Rio Tinto, and precipitated many redundancies in its wake before the 
situation changed once again. 
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Ltd. They later acquired Strelley and a string of neighbouring stations.54 ‘The Split’ 
led to ongoing bitterness amongst the groups and the Nomads had filed a competing 
claim that overlapped part of the Martu native title claim. The meeting at Duck Pool 
was the first time in forty years that many in the groups had come together again.  
As had become usual in the early native title plenary mediation conferences, the 
meeting was attended by all the parties over several days, as well as many members 
of the claimant group. The first day was attended only by the Aboriginal parties. 
Within the mediation process, each party was given the opportunity to speak about 
their position and their concerns and whether any progress had been made or was 
likely to be made in resolving the overlaps. Don McLeod was there, but when it came 
to the Nomads’ turn to speak, old man Snowy Judamaia stood and came forward. 
Despite his frailty, his presence was powerful. His words were compelling. He spoke 
in language – later translated for those of us unable to understand – of the need to 
end the forty years of fighting and mend the pain, for the families to come together 
once again, for the next generations to know that they could work together to look 
after their country and their kids, and make a good place for all the families, and for 
blackfellas and whitefellas to be friends. 
On the night before the meeting, the Martu and Nomads had set up separate camps. 
At the end of the first day, the Nomads moved to join the Martu. That evening, 
people saw a bright shooting star. And that night, Snowy Judamaia passed away. 
It was another five years before the Martu had their native title recognised by the 
Federal Court (paper 4) and Aboriginal people have articulated many broader 
concerns. These include better houses, better education, jobs, especially for young 
people; opportunities for business development and contracting; more control over 
what happens on their traditional country, particularly the protection of cultural 
heritage; better services, including better access to health services and aged care; 
more of the good things enjoyed by many non-Aboriginal people. A more 
comfortable present, and a future. 
But the matters touched on by Snowy Judamaia remain central to the issues that 
continue to be expressed by Aboriginal people: the priority of family; strong ways of 
dealing with relations within and between groups, even when there are disputes; the 
importance of working together; the necessity of holding on to traditional law and of 
looking after country and protecting cultural heritage; and the need to live with 
white Australians, but on equal terms and keeping strong Aboriginal ways. 
One of the ways that some of the older Aboriginal people have worked to achieve 
these aims is by moving back onto country, or at least away from the towns. 
                                                        
54 One of the other groups, lead mainly by Njamal men including Peter Coppin, later 
acquired Yandeyarra station (Read and Coppin 1999; McLeod (1984). 
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Cheeditha settlement near Roebourne, for example, was chosen as a refuge by some 
families when Roebourne Aboriginal people were moved from the old Reserve into 
town – to the Village – in 1975 and alcohol had become a problem (Olive 2007: 31): 
‘We were with people [on the reserve] in the fifties and sixties, but people were 
drinking and a whole lot of things...I came to the village when the people had moved 
from the reserve...But we moved back this way [Cheeditha Community] and then 
stayed in the woolshed [a station building nearby] to get away from the village, and 
from village life. Yeah, just get away from the drink.’ 
These issues have not gone away. A more recent settlement, chosen out of 
Roebourne for the same reasons, is the 5 Mile, home for a group of Bunjima families 
(Mingulltharndo Aboriginal Corporation). Small communities or outstations 
attempt to serve the same purpose: Youngaleena, Parrnngurr (Cotton Creek), 
Punmu, Kiwirrkurra, to name but a few. Not all manage to keep their young people; 
not all are functional. Some of the remote communities and Aboriginal-held leases 
for stations or reserves55 have been more successful in preserving some continuity 
between the generations. Yandeyarra and Strelley/Warralong have enough resident 
children to support remote primary schools, as does the community at Punmu, made 
up of families who separated from Strelley in the early 1980s, and now services an 
outstation at Kunawarritji (Well 33), 180 kilometres to the east on the Canning 
Stock Route. Strelley Community School, begun in 1976, was the first of fourteen 
Aboriginal Independent Community Schools operating in Western Australia 
(Aboriginal Independent Community Schools web site). 
Other stations, often those closer to towns, have been less successful in attracting or 
keeping young people. Even in the 1980s, a program for young people from 
Roebourne to work on Chirritha, one of the Mt Welcome stations along with 
Woodbrook, held little attraction. A 2005 review of WA Rangelands found that the 
stations run only a small number of cattle and during the past few years have barely 
been profitable’ (Rangelands NRM Co-ordinating Group 2005, Appendix VII). More 
generally, the theme of the need to get young people out bush and teach them 
traditional law has been reiterated by older Aboriginal people since people moved 
off the stations. It came up again in the Pilbara Indigenous Dialogue: ‘Some families 
                                                        
55 There are eight Aboriginal-held pastoral leases in the Pilbara, although some of these 
include more than one named station, for example, Strelley and Mt Welcome both cover 
several. Yandeyarra is a lease granted to the Mugarinya Aboriginal Corporation by the 
Aboriginal Lands Trust. Woodstock/Abydos is a Protected Area under section 19 of the 
Aboriginal Heritage Act because of its wealth of rock engravings. All WA pastoral leases 
expire and are due for renewal in mid-2015. It appears that the Aboriginal-held leases are 
all likely to be renewed (Pastoral Lease Renewals Project, Project Leader, pers. comm., 22 
March 2011). 
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do the right thing, but their children get dragged down by other kids running wild. 
Spending time on outstations can help in this area, by reducing the bad influences 
of towns. We need to take our children out bush again’.  
But there is also the constant theme of the need for young people to get jobs, both in 
the mining industry and elsewhere. Most of the agreements negotiated between 
native title groups and resource companies include commitments to training and 
employment, bolstered by support for school and work readiness programs. In 2007 
for example, BHP Billiton Iron Ore set itself the target of 14 per cent Indigenous 
employment across its Pilbara operations by 2012, and to working with its 
contractors to achieve 14 per cent indirect Indigenous employment (2008 
Sustainable Indigenous Relationships Program). In 2011, its direct and indirect 
number of employees is just under 800. In 2009, Rio Tinto had 650 Aboriginal 
employees in its iron ore business, making it the largest non-government employer 
of Indigenous workers in the State. In the same year, the company awarded a $200 
million four-year contract at its Western Turner Syncline deposit to a joint venture 
between Eastern Guruma native title holders and contractor NRW. Part of the 
contract is to raise Aboriginal employment levels to 27 per cent over the four years 
(Rio Tinto media release 18 December 2009). As we have seen, one of the principal 
objectives of the Pilbara Industry’s Community Council (PICC) is ‘the development 
of a shared vision and strategy to increase Indigenous participation in employment 
in the Pilbara, including strategies to reduce gaps in education and training, health, 
and housing’. The two Pilbara Regional Partnership Agreements focus on Aboriginal 
employment. In 2006, FMG established VTEC, a Vocational training and 
Employment Centre based at Pundulmurra in South Hedland. 
Taylor and Scambary identified two of the major impediments to achieving these 
goals: education and health (2005: 148-149): 
While the historic reality is that many older indigenous adults in the region 
have never attended school, it is equally true that many of those presently of 
compulsory school age do not attend school on a regular basis...Against the 
estimated requirements for Pilbara Iron [Rio Tinto Iron Ore] and BHP Billiton 
alone for an additional 665 Indigenous workers by 2012 to meet Indigenous 
employment targets, this suggests that the local flow of individuals with 
capacity to compete in the mainstream labour market is barely sufficient to 
match labour demand. Somewhat similar calculations can be made in regard to 
VET [Vocational Education and Training] sector output, although here the 
indications are more promising... 
At least part of the project to enhance Indigenous participation in the economy 
of the Pilbara is a need to address the effects of low socioeconomic status on 
ill-health...Estimates generated here of the numbers likely to be excluded from 
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regular (or even any) employment due to poor health point to a figure that 
could be approaching the size of the mainstream Indigenous workforce. 
A related issue for the mining companies relates to the limited numbers of potential 
Aboriginal employees: the companies are all competing for the same pool of people. 
In addition, not all of those wanting jobs and with the necessary skills want to work 
in the mining industry. Nor do communities want all their young people working 
there; many have expressed the desire to see them get jobs that will assist people in 
the communities and contribute to community life, giving rise to a tension between 
‘the imperative to maintain cultural identity and the potential cultural assimilation 
implied by their increasing integration into a market economy’ (Scambary 2007: iv).  
This tension can sometimes erupt into a very public dispute as has occurred in 
Roebourne with different responses by different Yindjibarndi people to a proposed 
agreement with FMG in relation to the development of the Solomon hub. One group 
is wholly opposed to FMG’s offer and the damage that will be done to Yindjibarndi 
country (Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation Newsletter, nd: 4): 
FMG’s open-cut mining at Gambulaynha, right through Ganyjingarringunha 
Ngurra will destroy the sacred resources we need in Birdarra Law, especially 
for the Garliwinyji Ngurrarangarli, and it will destroy the Maliya Thalu (honey 
site). 
The other group wants to accept the offer on the basis of the opportunities it will 
create, especially for the young people: ‘FMG is offering to train our people and to 
bring them to their level, to learn to read and write and get them out into the mines 
and work’ (ABC News 2 Feb. 2011; SBS Living Black 27 March 2011). This was 
echoed by the participants in the Pilbara Indigenous Dialogue: ‘There is a 
passionate belief in the importance of employment for Aboriginal people, especially 
young people, and of creating a strong Aboriginal community’. 
These are very difficult issues, with no easy solutions. Nevertheless, there are 
indications of some of the ways in which Aboriginal people themselves want to do 
business. Central to this, in the Pilbara as elsewhere in Indigenous Australia, is the 
concept of partnership, Snowy Judamaia’s vision for blackfellas and whitefellas to 
be friends, but a partnership of equals. To quote the Pilbara Indigenous Dialogue 
again: ‘We need to form partnerships with white people, while remaining united and 
staying in control of our own affairs’. 
A practical manifestation of this is the growth of Pilbara Aboriginal contractors and 
businesses. Many of these are now members of the Pilbara Aboriginal Contractors 
Association, a not-for-profit organisation incorporated in February 2009 to 
advocate for and support Aboriginal businesses. The highest profile of these is 
Ngarda Civil and Mining, which has won contracts with BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, 
Newcrest, and Woodside among others, working in partnership with Leighton 
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Contractors. Other companies, like Civil Road & Rail SX5, are partnerships between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal entrepreneurs. Another regular theme emerging 
from discussions with those involved in contracting is one identified some years ago 
in relation to the then developing Northern Territory Aboriginal businesses: the 
preference of people to work for themselves, or for their own group (Robert 
Lawrence, pers. comm.). In the Pilbara, the preference is also to work, or invest in 
projects, on people’s own country. The Rio Tinto Western Turner Syncline contract 
with the Eastern Guruma is just one example of this. 
Partnership is also central to the Graham (Polly) Farmer Foundation’s education 
enrichment projects. In the Pilbara, they have projects in Karratha/Roebourne, Port 
Hedland, Newman, and Tom Price. All involve the Commonwealth and State 
education departments and either Rio Tinto or BHP Billiton. Crucially, local 
Aboriginal community members are partners and, in Tom Price, Gumala. The model 
is one that is achieving substantial, success. Figures showing where students were in 
2010 included Pilbara sites. Since the Karratha/Roebourne (Gumala Miruwarni) 
started in 1997, 27 students have gone to university, 29 to 
TAFE/apprenticeship/traineeships, and 11 direct to employment. From the Tom 
Price program that started in 2002, 5 have gone to university, 12 to 
TAFE/apprenticeship/traineeships, and 6 direct to employment. The Port Hedland 
program began in 2003 and has 18 students that have gone to university, 18 to 
TAFE/apprenticeship/traineeships, and 3 direct to employment (Graham (Polly) 
Farmer Foundation 2010).  
The impact of resource development in the Pilbara has been to change life, and 
landscape, irrevocably for its traditional owners. Modernity is an uncompromising 
task master. But the recognition of native title, too, has brought about fundamental 
change; and the two trajectories are intertwined, for better and for worse. Native 
title does not yet make Aboriginal people full partners in the frenzy of development 
and planning; but it does give them a formal stake, and status, in the process, 
reflected in the growth of Pilbara Aboriginal organisations. 
5. Aboriginal organisations and governance structures 
The importance of Aboriginal organisations was discussed in the introductory 
paper, making clear that the Pilbara is no exception. The circumstances that are 
particular to the Pilbara are the high pressured demands on organisations and 
groups resulting from the rapid developments taking place both in industry and in 
government. Paper 2 will sketch the differential impact of these pressures on two of 
the native title holding corporations based in Roebourne: Ngarluma and 
Yindjibarndi. Ngarluma people are constantly asked to respond to matters arising 
from the massive infrastructure developments on their country: a major expansion 
of Rio Tinto’s Cape Lambert port; a new port at Anketell Point directly west of Cape 
Lambert to service Aquila Resources, Fortescue Metals (FMG), and China 
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Metallurgical Group (MCC); a Chinese proposal to build a huge magnetite mine of 
over 140 square kilometres and 300 metres deep near the new port; new rail and gas 
piplines; the list goes on and on. And on. Yet the group’s governance structures have 
proved to be sufficiently robust to date to deal with these demands. The pressure on 
Yindjibarndi people comes from inland, particularly in relation to FMG’s Solomon 
hub. This has led to a split in the group that has also divided the Roebourne 
community, underlining the extent to which the rate of development and change 
creates specific difficulties for different organisations, with each of them responding 
from within their own specific contexts. 
5.1 Organisations and trusts 
The Pilbara Development Commission’s 2007 Directory of Pilbara Indigenous 
communities and organisations lists nine regional organisations and 32 local 
organisations across the four shires. Some of these, like the Wangka Maya Pilbara 
Aboriginal Language Centre, are focused on specifically Aboriginal matters. Many 
are single-purpose, such as the Irrungadji Group Association. This was established 
to own and run Mt Divide cattle station, some 150 kilometres from Nullagine, after 
the station was bought by ATSIC and transferred to the Irrungadji Group 
Association in 1999 (Department of Agriculture and Food 2009). An organisation 
like Gumala, and now the Roebourne Aboriginal Congress, include several different 
traditional owner or native title groups, as do some of the foundations that receive 
and administer financial benefits received through resource company agreements, 
like the Ngarluma Yindjibarndi Foundation or the IBN Foundation.    
Other organisations provide an interface between native title groups and the 
broader community. One of the most active of these is the Yamatji Marlpa 
Aboriginal Corporation (YMAC) and its Pilbara regional component, the Pilbara 
Native Title Service (PNTS). Yamatji Marlpa is a land council as well as a Native 
Title Representative Body. The organisation’s charter gives it a role in economic and 
business development. Its main function, however, is as a Native Title 
Representative Body. In this capacity, PNTS represents fourteen of the twenty-one 
Pilbara native title groups (or twenty-three of the twenty-eight claims, since some of 
the groups have more than one outstanding claim).   
Like most Native Title Representative Bodies, YMAC has had a somewhat chequered 
history but has developed valuable experience to allow it to play an increasingly 
effective role. It performs a critical function in providing both representation and 
also an important level of coordination for native title groups. Crucially, in terms of 
developing effective governance capacity, it has developed a system of native title 
Working Groups through which ongoing business is carried out. The Working 
Groups are nominated by claim groups and have limited authority to do business, 
engage in negotiations, and make limited decisions on behalf of their community, 
although important decisions are always taken back to the community to be 
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authorised and ratified. Issues of representation remain vexed, but most groups 
have come to accept the role of the Working Groups in the process of native title. 
The Working Groups have become the vehicle for the main negotiations with 
industry. PNTS also works with the groups in heritage protection and organising 
heritage clearances; with the level of intense resource and other development 
activity, this is a constant and demanding role. 
 In addition to these organisations, there is now a largely uncoordinated 
multiplication of trusts, foundations, and other structures for the management of 
financial benefits. Many of the native title groups have a number of different trusts 
and/or foundations. Few are equipped to manage sums of money in the millions of 
dollars. Some trusts, such as Gumala, involve more than one group. Some resource 
companies, mainly the major ones, retain some oversight of these management 
processes. Others are satisfied with handing over the money and getting on with 
business. With this burgeoning of trusts and other structures to manage financial 
benefits, governance is an urgent issue, demanding capacity building across a range 
of areas. 
5.2 Issues of representation and governance  
The Productivity Commission’s Steering Committee for the Review of Government 
Service Provision defines governance in its report, Overcoming Indigenous 
Disadvantage. Key Indicators (2009: 11.1): 
Governance generally refers to the way the members of a group or community 
organise themselves to make decisions that affect them as a group. Governance 
therefore includes the structures and institutions that guide individual and 
group behaviour, and describes who has the authority to make decisions in a 
community, how those decisions are to be carried out and how different 
members of the community are included in the making, implementation and 
communication of those decisions. 
Drawing widely on the material produced by the five-year (2004-08) Indigenous 
Community Governance Project,56 the Steering Committee’s Report identifies key 
determinants (2009: 11.3) and some common characteristics of successful 
Indigenous governing institutions (2009: 11.7). They include the characteristics of 
‘cultural match’, a concept used but then basically abandoned by the Indigenous 
Community Governance Project. 
The Indigenous Community Governance Project initially examined the notion of 
‘cultural match’ that is used in the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic 
                                                        
56 This was a joint project between Reconciliation Australia and the Centre for Aboriginal 
Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) at the Australian National University. 
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Development. The Australian research, however, revealed that ‘the conditions for 
“cultural match” are extremely complex in Australia’ and do not really fit the North 
American experience. Instead, the Project identified cultural legitimacy as one of 
the six major governance issues that came to the fore on the basis of their research 
(Hunt and Smith 2006: 13ff; 2007):  
Legitimate Indigenous governance arrangements win the support of members 
and external stakeholders, and produce outcomes. Achieving legitimacy 
appears to be especially reliant on having genuine decision-making authority 
and powers, and on the quality of leadership. 
Hunt and Smith go on to discuss the two connected elements that are required for 
governance arrangements to be accepted by Indigenous people as legitimate (2007: 
xiv-xv): 
(a) having representative structures and decision-making processes 
that reflect contemporary Indigenous views of what are the ‘proper’ 
relationships, forms of authority and cultural geographies; and 
(b) ensuring those are combined with a practical management and 
service capacity to deliver outcomes. 
The research suggests that the concepts of ‘culturally appropriate’ and ‘cultural 
match’ would usefully be replaced by that of cultural legitimacy. 
The Working Groups developed by PNTS go some way to meet these criteria and 
provide some useful pointers for establishing and operating effective and 
sustainable organisations that do not fracture on impact with the vicissitudes of 
internal or inter-group politics. Gumala has, on a number of occasions, been in 
danger of this fate but its governance and operational arrangements have allowed it 
to survive to date.57 
The second Report from the Indigenous Implementation Board ( March 2010) gave 
considerable attention to the question of regional governance. Central to its 
discussion and recommendations were two key observations: firstly, that 
involvement of Aboriginal people from the beginning in decision-making and 
implementation planning is essential to sustainable regional development; and 
secondly, that government itself needs reorganising ‘so that its silos are broken 
down and it can provide a more holistic approach to collaborating with Aboriginal 
people’ (2010: 10). A corollary comment related to the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) reforms in Indigenous affairs (2010: 19): 
                                                        
57 This will be the subject of a more detailed case study in paper 3. 
145 
 
The Board was critical of the COAG process as it was initiated without 
consultation with Aboriginal communities affected by the reforms and had not 
engaged effectively with local governments...Major reforms such as the COAG 
agenda cannot be orchestrated from Canberra or Perth and be effective.   
It is also of note that, amongst the examples given in the Report of initiatives ‘that 
show the emergence of processes that recognise the advantages of involving 
Aboriginal people from the beginning of the process to establish outcomes’, none is 
from the Pilbara.58 This is not to suggest that Aboriginal people are absent from the 
various regional planning documents produced for the Pilbara. On the other hand, 
they tend to figure as a separate and subordinate rather than integral consideration 
in the broader regional vision for the future: as contributors to rather than 
participants in the region, with much of that contribution designated as playing a 
role in the protection of cultural heritage (cf Department of Planning 2011: x, 113-
14). This is a fundamental disconnect from the way that Aboriginal people see 
themselves and their place in the region, and the equality that they seek in 
partnership with both industry and government. 
5.3 Engagement with government 
The Indigenous Implementation Board’s 2010 and 2011 Reports provide a serious 
discussion of the need for regional governance, the result of regional conversations 
across the State (2010: 25): 
It has been the Board’s experience that with each new conversation the need 
for unity has been increasingly affirmed by participants and that plans to 
develop workable regional processes are becoming the main determination of 
conversation outcomes.  
This conclusion reflects the need articulated in the Indigenous Pilbara dialogue for a 
governance hub for the Pilbara based on representation of cultural groupings as the 
way to engage with government. The potential effectiveness of such a hub has been 
recognised at a much more local level by the Aboriginal Affairs Coordinating 
Committee’s Chief Operating Officer, but together with changes that need to be 
made within government. In his 2009-2010 Annual Report, he recognises in 
principle that joint decisions and responsibility ‘is where the greatest change occurs 
in the way government delivers services to the Aboriginal community’ (2010: 19-
20). One result of this approach was the formation of the Roebourne Aboriginal 
Congress as an attempt to bring together the various Roebourne groups into a single 
point of contact. This seemed to offer the potential to add to the building up of a 
more collective Aboriginal voice for at least this area and possibly a model for other 
                                                        
58 Although one, the Wiluna Regional Partnership Agreement involves Martu people living 
in that shire. 
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areas. However, while it may still be too early to make a serious evaluation, recent 
indications are that it has not received the necessary support from the community. 
Some of the reasons for this will be examined in paper 2.  
And there remains little evidence that government, whether Commonwealth or 
State, is delivering a more coordinated and sustained approach to engagement with 
Aboriginal people or to service delivery. If anything, the bewildering array of 
programs has increased, while longer-term programs like CDEP – pooled 
unemployment benefits supplemented with amounts for capital and administration 
(Levitus 2009: 80) – have been extensively revised or withdrawn altogether. This 
has been despite the fact that individuals and organisations had come to rely on 
CDEP for essential funding and income. Nevertheless, organisations have shown 
remarkable resilience in dealing with these changes (paper 2 and 5). 
If some important things have changed for Pilbara Aboriginal people, others 
haven’t, including the apparent capriciousness of government policy and funding, 
especially when this is determined from distant centres. What has become 
increasingly important, however, is their capacity to engage with local issues, 
concerns, and needs. 
6. What has changed, what hasn’t changed, what 
may/could change and its potential impact on a reform of 
governance in the Pilbara 
6.1 What has changed 
In the first iron ore mining boom of the 1960s, Aboriginal people were simply swept 
aside, with well-documented devastating consequences. This is no longer possible. 
Relationships, including power relationships, have shifted; not completely, but 
significantly. Governments – Commonwealth, State, and local – are required to take 
account of the rights of Aboriginal people. Importantly, and despite the strident 
politics that marred the passing of the Native Title Act, the emphasis in the NTA on 
mediation and the subsequent establishment of a statutory process for Indigenous 
Land Use Agreements based on Indigenous rights has developed into a culture of 
agreement-making that goes beyond statutory requirements. The attitude and 
approach of resource companies too has changed; negotiating agreements with 
traditional owners is now taken as a normal, if sometimes frustrating, part of 
business and as a prerequisite for maintaining their social licence to operate. 
Resource development in the region now offers access to economic and other 
benefits for Aboriginal people. This includes serious training and jobs, as well as 
business and contracting opportunities, the latter often in the kind of partnership 
desired by Aboriginal people. There is a greater engagement of Aboriginal people 
and a growth of more representative organisations. There are prospective benefits of 
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the current Pilbara planning, including Pilbara cities, with access to better services 
and opportunities.  
But there is, of course, a down side. Much more country is being damaged or 
destroyed. The growth of towns like Onslow is likely to marginalise the Aboriginal 
people who live there or use it as a meeting place. Many Aboriginal people, 
especially young people, are being left outside, and alcohol and drug use remain a 
serious issue.  
Stress is increasingly a health issue. Given the number of companies and scale of 
projects, an unacknowledged dimension of the desire of companies to engage with 
traditional owners is the requirement for native title groups to spend inordinate 
amounts of time and energy in meetings and negotiations. The Nyiyaparli group, for 
example, were involved in forty-two formal meetings in the 2008-2009 financial 
year, nearly one a week, some of which went for several days, and became back to 
back meetings with more than one company.59 Many Nyiyaparli claimants have to 
travel long distances to attend meetings. Individuals as well as groups also suffer 
the consequences for their cultural values and practices of agreement to resource 
development. In addition, the pressure to reach agreements is a cause of 
divisiveness within and between groups, as the Yindjibarndi dispute over the 
proposed FMG agreement makes clear. Research has demonstrated the damaging 
impact of stress on Aboriginal health. The good intentions of resource company 
personnel are not a panacea for good health. 
6.2 What hasn’t changed 
For Aboriginal people, the Pilbara is their traditional country, and that remains 
central to their sense of who they are. There is a strong commitment that any 
accommodation to modernity has to keep that as its central tenet. Given the 
pressure for and rapidity of change, this of itself is a cause of stress, often with 
serious consequences. It was not lost on people that three of the key representatives 
for the negotiations over the Burrup Peninsula all passed away shortly after the 
agreement was concluded.  
The forces for economic development have limited patience with concerns that delay 
projects. Despite the protected status of the Woodstock/Abydos reserve, for 
example, the Minister approved an excision in 2006 to allow the building of a 
railway by FMG.  
Much housing remains sub-standard, if not downright appalling. Service delivery is 
patchy at best, a situation acknowledged by the 2008 Local Government Advisory 
Board Report. The Report also noted that ‘the majority of Indigenous community 
                                                        
59 Yamatji Marlpa 2009 Annual Report. 
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residents...are sceptical about whether services will improve under the proposed 
arrangements. There is a view that this is another change being imposed by 
Government without community consultation or involvement’. 
6.3 What may or could change 
That is indeed the question. It is clear that there is an appetite for change, from 
both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. It is the terms of the change, and the 
resulting relationships that evolve, that remain to be determined. The planning 
rhetoric ticks many of the right boxes but is coy about implementation; and, as we 
have seen, falls far short of envisioning the kind of partnership with Aboriginal 
people that is at the forefront for Aboriginal people themselves. 
In contrast, the practical range of on-the-ground projects approved under the 
various Royalties for Regions funding streams include many projects developed 
locally and in partnership. Pilbara Cities is providing funding, for example, to the 
educational and cultural amphitheatre in Karijini National Park in partnership with 
Gumala Aboriginal Corporation; to the Martu Knowledge program with Kanyarinpa 
Jukurrpa in Newman; to the Ngarluma Aboriginal Sustainable Housing (NASH) 
project in Roebourne. Taking even these few examples suggests a much greater 
involvement of Aboriginal people and organisations in planning and decision-
making at the local level. It also suggests a greater continuity in some of the key 
local bodies, even in the face of name and format changes, like the Pilbara Area 
Consultative Committee to Pilbara RDA. The relationships built over time, 
personally and organisationally, matter; and this can only happen at the local level. 
Pilbara economic interests may be national, but they will only result in long-term 
sustainable social development by taking account of the local. And Aboriginal 
people are integral to that social, as well as economic, development. 
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12. A new story - Roebourne: a 
case study 
Dr Mary Edmunds 
When I saw ‘Nothing Rhymes with Ngapartji’,60I thought to myself this would 
be a great opportunity to the people of Roebourne to tell their stories – of 
how we stayed strong together and survived through thick and thin. There’s a 
lot to be told about Roebourne.  
Josie Samson, senior Ngarluma woman and Roebourne community member.61  
1. Introduction 
In many ways, Roebourne has been the touchstone of the devastation caused to 
Pilbara Aboriginal communities by resource development and long-term 
government deficits62 in the region. Conversely, it can also be seen as the touchstone 
of new possibilities for Aboriginal people. These include the relationships between 
Aboriginal people on the one hand and resource companies and government on the 
other; and a reimagining, as part of a broader regional community, of the 
relationships between the oldest Pilbara residents and those who arrived in the 
wake of, and since, the initial mining boom in the 1960s.   
Since the 1960s mining boom, and now more than ever, the Pilbara story has been 
dominated by the variable fortunes of resource development in the region, and of 
the Pilbara as an economy, rather than as a society. The stories of the people of 
Roebourne long predate that narrative and provide a challenging counterpoint that 
remembers that the region is not just one big deposit of mineral wealth to be dug or 
drilled up but a place where people, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, live and 
have history; a place that is imbued with multiple layers of social and emotional 
meaning. 
Ironically, and driven by the formal recognition of native title, it has been the older 
established resource companies who have accepted the imperative to shift the focus 
of the Pilbara story and to acknowledge the place of Pilbara Aboriginal people, not 
                                                        
60 A Big hART documentary film about the return of Pitjantjatjara actor Trevor Jamieson to 
his traditional country for a performance of Ngapartji Ngapartji in 2009 at Ernabella in 
South Australia.  
61 Quoted on Big hART web site, Pilbara Project, www.bighart.org/public  
62 Entropic feature 2: government organisational deficits and misalignments (remoteFOCUS 
report; Introduction paper.) 
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just as another interest group to be dealt with but as integral to the long-term 
development and social identity of the region. Government, and other people who 
have chosen to make the Pilbara their home, are finally scrambling to catch up. In 
the consequent maelstrom of digging, drilling, and planning, Roebourne people 
continue to tell the stories that link them to their country and Law, but that also, in 
the telling, redefine their relationships both with outsiders, as part of modern 
society, and with each other. At the same time, they continue to experience the 
impacts of living in a town that remains peripheral and subordinated to the 
bewildering pace of development and to the priorities set by decision-makers remote 
from the mundane but urgent concerns of everyday life.  
2. Roebourne as a site of contradiction 
At the beginning of March 2011, the Western Australian Coroner, Alistair Hope, 
handed down his findings into the 2009 death of a two-year-old Roebourne toddler. 
The child had crawled through a hole in the wall of a house in the Village and been 
electrocuted. The Coroner’s report described the condition of the Department of 
Housing dwelling, where ‘numerous holes had been kicked or punched in various 
walls, and cockroaches infested the premises. Almost all the electrical accessories 
were either damaged, brimming with cockroach nests or not working’ (Tony Barrass, 
Weekend Australian, 19-20 March 2011). This was despite the requirement for the 
Department of Housing to carry out annual inspections of its tenanted houses and 
their 2006 contract with a Karratha-based electrical firm to install safety switches 
in 95 Roebourne houses. The Coroner found that the death was accidental but noted 
the failure of both the electrical company and of the Department of Housing to 
ensure that the safety switch had been installed. It hadn’t, despite completion 
signoff from the company (ibid.): 
The Department of Housing was supposed to be overseeing the project, as it 
was spending $7.6 million for the retrofit program allocated in its 2005-2006 
budget. But that’s where the governmental care stopped. There was no proper 
reporting of how the installation program was going to evolve, no formal 
management framework put in place, no system of review, or any structure to 
oversee or strategically implement the installation of the [residual current] 
devices throughout WA. 
The Coroner’s report not only identifies one of the symptomatic failures of a 
government agency to carry out adequately its responsibilities in Roebourne. Its 
description of the grim state of the house in which the little boy died is just one 
further instance in a series of depressingly similar reports cataloguing the social and 
environmental ills that plague the town and the nearby settlement at Cheeditha: 
sub-standard and over-crowded housing, alcohol and drug abuse, family and other 
violence, child abuse, poor school attendance and low educational outcomes, poor 
health, unemployment, welfare dependence, gambling, very high rates of 
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incarceration (Johnston 1991; Uniting Church Frontier Services 1996; Trees 2004; 
Shanks 2009). 
The problems have not always been internal to the town. The Uniting Church 
Frontier Services report (1996: 46ff) noted a lack of coordination at government 
level as a key problem in the delivery of services, and cited four main factors: lack of 
a coordinating culture; differing departmental cycles; high turnover of government 
department staff; and lack of planning and coordinating mandate and resources. 
Edmunds had earlier made similar observations (1989: 79) about ‘the sheer number 
of agencies and services already involved [with Roebourne] with so little apparent 
result’. There were ‘approximately 45 groups or organisations within the Karratha 
region who are involved in some form in the dispensation of services to local 
Aboriginal communities’; and this, in a town of then population of around 1700 
people, of whom around 800, or just under half, were Aboriginal. 
Before examining the extent to which these latter factors may, or may not, have 
changed in recent years, it is important to give a brief overview of the context in 
which Roebourne developed from a prosperous administrative centre and service 
provider for the surrounding region for over a century into the marginalised and 
largely Aboriginal town that it is today. The change is intimately connected to the 
development of the iron ore mining industry. 
2.1 Historical background and context 
The town is built in Ngarluma country. The historical events in terms of non-
Aboriginal presence in the area can be outlined quite simply. The first pastoralists 
arrived in the region in 1864 and the town was founded in 1866. The site was chosen 
for its secure fresh water supply – the Harding River or Ngurin – and because it was 
reasonably close to the harbour at Cossack. Till the end of the nineteenth century, it 
was the major centre of the northwest, closely tied to the expansion of the pastoral 
and pearling industries, becoming a service centre for the surrounding pastoralists, 
the administrative centre of the region and, in later years, a thoroughfare and drop-
off point for the trucks carrying asbestos from the Wittenoom area to the port at 
Point Samson. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Roebourne was firmly established as a 
non-Aboriginal town, with solidly built church, bank, courthouse, post office, 
hospital, three hotels. Cossack too, linked by tramline to Roebourne in 1888, was a 
non-Aboriginal town, as was the new settlement of Point Samson where a jetty was 
built in 1903-04 to supplement the port facilities at Cossack where the harbour was 
beginning to silt up (Gibson 1971: 55; de la Rue 1979: 60, 130).  An early presence of 
Malays, Filipinos, Chinese, Timorese, and later Japanese, brought to Roebourne and 
Cossack by the pearling industry, had all but disappeared by the early 1900s. Apart 
from a few families who had been granted a certificate of exemption, the only 
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Aboriginal presence in Roebourne itself was in domestic service; on the annual race 
day; or in the court or gaol.  
In the 1930s, an area outside Roebourne was designated for Aboriginal people to 
live. Over the years, people camped in a number of different sites which, 
collectively, came to be known as the Old Reserve. It was separated from the main 
town by the Harding River. The separation was social as well as spatial; a curfew, in 
force well into the 1960s, formally excluded Aboriginal people from the town 
between 6.00pm to 6.00am. Regulations, announced in a notice at the entrance to 
the Reserve, required anyone living outside the Reserve to get a permit from the 
Department of Native Welfare before they could go there.  
Initially used mainly by Ngarluma people, the population of the Reserve was swelled 
by Yindjibarndi and others from the 1940s till it became for a time the largest 
Native Reserve in Western Australia with around 300 people (Johnston 1991: 285). 
There was no school on the Reserve until 1954 and children from the Reserve were 
not allowed to attend the school in the town until 1961. Four years later a hostel, 
Weeriana, was built to offer accommodation to those Aboriginal children whose 
families lived away from the town. 
1961 was also the year that the Federal government lifted its ban on the export of 
iron ore. By the end of the decade, there were three new towns – Dampier, 
Wickham, and Karratha – close to Roebourne, as well as six more mining towns in 
other parts of the Pilbara and a new satellite town, South Hedland, near Port 
Hedland. The developing mines also required the building of new ports and of a 
network of roads and railways that slashed through the land. The massive and rapid 
scale of construction and of the soaring numbers of construction workers 
overwhelmed the settled routines of the people in and around Roebourne: 
townspeople, Aboriginal people, pastoralists. Ongoing mayhem developed around 
the Victoria Hotel, the only pub within a hundred-mile radius. Roger Solomon 
summarised the impact in his narration for the documentary, Exile and the 
Kingdom: ‘Our community just fell apart. Everything fell apart’. 
For Aboriginal people, the rupture was compounded by a number of further events: 
the move off the stations in the late 1960s, access to drinking rights around the 
same time; and the closing of the Reserve and relocation of people into the town in 
1975, where Homeswest provided housing in the Village, bringing into much less 
traditionally structured proximity the four main language groups: Ngarluma, 
Yindjibarndi, Bunjima, and  Kurruma. 
Four years previously, in 1971, the administrative centre for the shire had moved to 
Karratha. Over the next few years, so too did services and many of the non-
Aboriginal people. Roebourne was relegated to the status of backwater, with a 
largely Aboriginal population and a major alcohol problem. There were ongoing 
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related deaths. Trees pointed out in 2004 (2004: 216) that, ‘as a result, there are a 
markedly small number of people in the 45 to 60 year old age group’.  
Even over this infamous period, however, there was another story. Yindjibarndi 
people continued to carry out Law ceremonies at Millstream. For others, there was a 
break of probably only two years, from 1969 to 1971. Ceremonies were performed, 
sometimes on the Old Reserve, often at bush meetings over the hot season, later at 
Woodbrook station after it had been purchased for local groups, though never in the 
Village. Law ceremonies included initiation for boys. In 1969, a group of senior men, 
both Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi, worked with Pastor Dave Stevens to establish the 
Pilbara Aboriginal Church. It was a mainly Christian group who rejected the move to 
the Village and the easy availability of alcohol. They moved instead to the old 
shearers’ quarters, the Woolshed, on Mt Welcome station, about three kilometres 
out of Roebourne. The first to use the old Woolshed buildings were Jacob Scroggins, 
a Ngarluma man, and his family. Renamed Cheeditha, it was begun as a dry 
community – no alcohol permitted – and continued under the leadership of Yilbie 
Warrie, Kenny Jerrold, and Allan Jacobs. All three were leaders in the Church. They 
were also senior Yindjibarndi Law men. And they, with others like Ngarluma senior 
man Coppin Dale, were active in the establishment in 1973 of the Mt Welcome 
Pastoral Company when the Mt Welcome and Cherratha stations were purchased – 
Woodbrook was added later – and, in 1974, of Ieramugadu. Also active in this 
process was Kurrama woman Carol Lockyer. Ieramugadu Group Inc. was the first 
legally incorporated Aboriginal organisation in Roebourne and the sole shareholder 
in the Mt Welcome Pastoral Company. Ieramugadu was also the partner in 
Hamersley Iron’s (now Rio Tinto) first attempts to set up a program to provide 
employment for Roebourne Aboriginal people. 
All this was a long time ago and is not part of the experience of the next generations. 
But it remains integral to the Roebourne story and ‘of how we stayed strong together 
and survived through thick and thin’. 
3. Negotiated engagement and self-determination 
The formation of the Ieramugadu Group as an organisation signalled the beginnings 
of a recovery by Roebourne Aboriginal people from the depredations wrought on the 
community by the first mining boom and of a taking back by them of some control, 
on their own terms, over the new social and economic conditions. That control could 
never be total. ‘Historically, colonialism forged relations of articulation that now 
make Aboriginal society everywhere a part-society’ (Levitus 2000: 75): 
Responsibility for the social reproduction of Aboriginal society is therefore 
nowhere located entirely within an Aboriginal universe. It always draws to 
some extent on external sources of supply that are under non-Aboriginal 
control. 
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People in Roebourne are long past the ‘first contact’ stages of colonialism, although 
it is arguable that the beginning of iron ore mining in the 1960s marked the most 
serious disruption to their processes of social reproduction as embedded in kinship 
relations (Kirsch 2001: 9) and introduced modernity in its most destructive forms.  
In his book, Radical Hope (2008), Jonathan Lear looks at a similar historical 
moment for a different tribal group, the Crow Nation of the western United States, 
and takes the story of Plenty Coups, the early twentieth century great chief, who 
confronted the impact of change for his people from the hunting culture of the Great 
Plains to life on reservations. In a review of the book, J.M. Coetzee wrote 
(www.hup.harvard.edu/): 
How does a nation come to life-and-death decisions at a time of crisis when it 
can no longer live according to its founding values?...[In this book, Lear] 
shows us that besides the glamorous alternatives of freedom or death there is a 
third way, less grand yet demanding just as much courage: the way of creative 
adaptation. 
This courage – to reimagine culture confined to the mundane rather than the heroic 
– he calls radical hope, describing it as ‘imaginative excellence’ by which Plenty 
Coups tried to imagine what ethical values would be needed to overcome despair 
and lead a meaningful life in a new world. Aboriginal people in Roebourne, as 
elsewhere, have had to face comparable challenges and, as in the case of the Crow, 
there have been different, all too often dysfunctional, ways of responding. But the 
group of local leaders who founded the Ieramugadu Group less than a decade after 
mining was initiated were beginning to restructure their own space within a 
changing cultural order (Sahlins 2005: 48). It is relevant to the present discussion 
that the form this restructuring took was to set up an organisation. 
The Ieramugadu Group as an Aboriginal organisation, together with the gradual 
establishment over the following years of a number of other Aboriginal 
organisations in the town, created a new mode of negotiated engagement – what 
Levitus (2000: 75) refers to as a transactional boundary and others as an 
intercultural space – between Roebourne Aboriginal people and the new social 
universe in which they found themselves. Roebourne Aboriginal people were 
beginning to forge new ways of asserting their own terms. 
In other parts of Australia over the same period, those ‘own terms’ were being 
promoted, both by Indigenous people and by government, as self-determination. 
This concept and policy has been subjected to recent trenchant criticism as setting 
Aboriginal people up to fail (cf Abbott 2009: 168). Perhaps the most savage attack 
comes from development economist Helen Hughes (2007), who widens her critique 
to condemn the range of government Indigenous policies that she terms 
‘exceptionalism’, and that she sees as a version of self-destructive apartheid, with 
‘communist economies’ having been established on Aboriginal lands (Hughes et al. 
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2010). Former politician Gary Johns (2011) is equally, though perhaps less 
exaggeratedly, dismissive: ‘Self-determination interrupted integration by preventing 
Aborigines from adapting to opportunities. The consequences have been tragic.’ 
There is no doubt that these judgements are an angry response to the bleak living 
conditions in many Aboriginal communities, including Roebourne; nor that they 
have found evidence to support their criticism in the family factionalism, nepotism, 
self-interest, and governance incompetence in many Aboriginal organisations. What 
they fail to take into account is the extent to which the policy of self-determination 
has been what Smith refers to as a Claytons’ self-determination (Smith 2002: 6, 5): 
The principle of self-determination holds that culturally distinct groups should 
have a degree of control over those economic, political, and social institutions 
that impact on their way of life. Ironically, some commentators complain it is 
actually Australia’s self-determination policy that is the current problem in 
Indigenous affairs; that it is holding Indigenous people back from 
socioeconomic engagement with the mainstream economy. But it is premature 
to declare self-determination as being past its ‘use-by’ date when, at no stage 
over the last three decades, has any Indigenous community or region been 
handed genuine self-determination. Rather, the implementation of self-
determination by Australian governments over the last two decades has 
consisted more of a ‘dump and run’ exercise. Certain assets, resources and 
responsibilities have been handed over to community organisations. But at the 
same time, many government departments and non-government agencies have 
‘vacated the field’, withdrawing staff and practical support. 
Government agencies were not absent from Roebourne in the wake of the first 
mining boom, though their effectiveness was questionable as we have seen. In some 
cases, as in the establishment of Mawarnkarra Aboriginal Health Service in 1985, 
government involvement was necessary but also acted to limit rather than enhance 
Aboriginal control. The initiative to establish Mawarnkarra came from Roebourne 
Aboriginal people as part of a concerted effort to deal with the alcohol problem in 
the town. What they wanted was not a medical service, since the town already had a 
hospital and Community Health Centre, but an alcohol counselling service that 
would work in conjunction with Ngurawaana, the small community set up on 
Yindjibarndi land away from town that also acted as an alcohol rehabilitation camp. 
Instead, they got a medical service, to which an alcohol program was to be attached. 
The then Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs was instructed to assist 
in setting up the service (cf Edmunds 1989: 82ff). Bolger observed in relation to 
similar outcomes in the East Kimberley (1987: 53): 
Although communities may seem to be offered a choice, this is limited by the 
function of the particular agency...What happens in each community is 
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dictated more by the fashion of the time in any particular government 
department than by any genuine choice being made by Aboriginal people. 
Nevertheless, these organisations provided more instances in which ‘Aboriginal and 
“mainstream” aspects of governance are now deeply interwoven in a single – albeit 
complex – field’ (B.Smith 2008: 154). Government has played a key role in that 
complex field; but so, too, and often more immediately, have the resource 
companies. Within the muddle and frustrations that operate at the ‘point of 
articulation’ (Levitus 2009: 75), compounded by the internal rivalries and disputes 
within and between the Roebourne Aboriginal organisations, it is possible to discern 
the conditions of the possibilities of real partnership.  
One of these conditions is the stubborn insistence of Roebourne people on 
maintaining their Aboriginal identity, an understanding that maintains the vision of 
self-determination and of a viable future for the next generations. Another is an 
inchoate realpolitik of how self-determination can and cannot be shaped within the 
hard demands of an overwhelming Pilbara development trajectory. Inevitably, both 
government and resource companies are essential players in determining what the 
extent, and the limits, of self-determination might be. 
3.1 Employment 
Raising levels of Aboriginal employment has been one point of common concern in 
this interaction. Its history has been subject to a great deal of goodwill and limited 
effectiveness. A few examples will indicate some of the reasons. The Ieramugadu 
Group was the first Roebourne Aboriginal organisation to enter into employment 
contracts with both government and industry. The most long-lasting of these were 
gardening contracts with Hamersley Iron and Robe River (both now part of Rio 
Tinto). These minimalist early contracts evolved over time into the establishment by 
Hamersley Iron of an Aboriginal Training and Liaison (ATAL) unit in Dampier in 
1992 and, in a collaboration between ATAL and Ngarliyarndu Bindirri (Corporate 
CDEP) Aboriginal Corporation, the setting up of Brida Contracting in 2000. Brida is 
wholly owned by Ngarliyarndi Bindirri.  
By 2005, Brida was employing 27 people on earthworks and camp landscaping, 23 of 
whom were Indigenous (Taylor and Scambary 2005: 45, 48). Initial contracts were 
the successors of the first Hamersley Iron contracts with the Ieramugadu Group and 
related to gardening and landscaping. This remains a core activity of the 
organisation, but Brida – after a few hiccups described below – has now expanded 
the scope of its work, although its primary client remains Rio Tinto Iron Ore. In 
2006, the Cape Lambert Production Partnership was initiated between the Cape 
Lambert operations team and Brida. It provided tiered training over a twelve month 
period, with the opportunity for employment at the end. In 2007, eleven Brida 
contractors were involved in production operations (Rio Tinto Iron Ore 2007 Milli 
Milli edition 27, July). In 2009, Brida was contracted to undertake earthworks on 
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the Rio Tinto power station. In the same year, it undertook the installation of a new 
security perimeter fence at the Roebourne Regional Prison for the Department of 
Corrective Services. In 2011, it held the contract for all gardening for the town sites 
at Dampier and the Cape Lambert camp, with fourteen gardeners employed and 
other work in Roebourne, Cheeditha, and Mingulltharndo (the 5 mile). 
Ngarliyarndu Bindirri itself was incorporated in 2000 as the local organisation 
receiving the Community Development and Employment (CDEP) funds. The 
corporation is a community organisation, with directors and membership drawn 
from the broader Roebourne groups, rather than exclusively from Ngarluma and 
Yindjibarndi people.  
In 2010, however, the Roebourne CDEP ceased as part of wider government nation-
wide changes to the program.63 The Ngarliyarndu Bindirri Directors’ Report for the 
year ended 30 June 2010 noted that ‘after the end of the financial year, the entity 
will not be in receipt of CDEP funding which has been there (sic.) major source of 
the entity’s funding for several years’. The same Directors’ Report also stated 
(www.oric.gov.au): 
A subsidiary of Ngarliyarndu Bindirri being Brida Pty Ltd went into Voluntary 
Administration of 1st October 2010. The activities for Brida Pty Ltd transferred 
the NBAC of (sic.) continue to operate the contracts. 
Whether Brida’s fate was the result of the withdrawal of CDEP funding or of other 
causes is perhaps open to question; but Brida was on the way to being fully 
operational again in 2011, though with its own Board of Directors separate from 
Ngarliyarndi Bindirri still to be re-established. What has been the result of the 
changes to CDEP is that there is now no direct government employment funding 
channel in Roebourne itself. What the Federal Government announced through the 
National Partnership Agreement on Indigenous Economic Participation as a ‘new 
integrated approach to employment services for Indigenous Australians’ has meant 
the removal of yet another government service from Roebourne to Karratha; Job 
Services Australia operates through the Karratha office of ITEC Employment. It is 
too early yet to assess whether the outcomes from the change will match the rhetoric 
of the Closing the Gap targets agreed in the National Indigenous Reform Agreement, 
but the removal of CDEP and even of its replacement from Roebourne has left a 
different kind of gap, one that has been left largely to the resource companies 
working with the community to fill. 
Despite these problems, and the lack of government assistance for the CDEP 
transition, Ngarliyarndu Bindirri – like Ashburton Aboriginal Corporation that will 
be discussed in paper 5 – continues to operate and expand. In 2011 it runs the Red 
                                                        
63 Yet another instance of entropic feature 5. 
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Dirt Driving Academy, an activity meeting high local demand with some 40-60% of 
Aboriginal people in the Regional Prison there for driving offences. In its first year 
it has had around seventy local participants. It owns a number of properties in 
Roebourne itself, including the building that houses the thriving Roebourne Art 
Group. It also owns the building at the prison’s Decca training facility on the 
Harding Dam road, which it leases to the Department of Corrective Services.  
The Decca training facility for minimum security prisoners, in collaboration with 
TAFE, has established a water and horticultural project. Side by side with this, and 
working with Ashburton Aboriginal Corporation in Tom Price, Ngarliyarndu 
Bindirri and the Decca station have also now become one of the biofuel pilot 
projects being run by Asburton Corporation (paper 5), with the regional 
implications for a network of local organisations discussed in the Introduction 
paper. When the prison’s education program is taken back to a new building in the 
prison grounds in 2012, Ngarliyarndu Bindirri will become directly responsible for 
the biofuel project. 
3.2 Native title developments 
The recognition of native title has led to the formation of other Roebourne-based 
organisations. The joint Ngarluma Yindjibarndi native title claim was lodged in 
1995, the first native title claim to be lodged in the Pilbara. On the basis of that 
earlier collective action, some of the first agreements were between the resource 
companies and the two groups together. One of the projects established in 1998 
between the North West Shelf Venture partners – Woodside Energy and others 
including BHP Billiton Petroleum and Chevron – and the Ngarluma and 
Yindjibarndi groups was Pathways to Employment. In 2000, the two groups entered 
into an agreement with the North West Shelf venture partners that provides for 
compensation for land use of the Burrup Peninsula and areas of the Shire of 
Roebourne.  
3.2.1 Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi Foundation (NYFL) 
The Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi Foundation was set up to receive the compensation 
and for long term management of the funds. The money is used for community 
programs that support the social, cultural, economic, educational, health, and 
wellbeing of the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi people. The Foundation now owns the 
local shop, the Roebourne General Food Store, and the Roebourne Tyre Service. It is 
in the process of finalising plans for a Roebourne cultural centre. $190,000 towards 
the planning for the centre came from Royalties for Regions. The first stage is an 
amphitheatre near the banks of the Harding River. This is at the final stages of 
completion and is part of a wave of new developments in Roebourne (see paper 2). 
However, one of the anomalies of Roebourne as a town is that it has now been 
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removed from the Commonwealth’s definition of ‘remote’,64 one consequence of 
which is that there will be no subsidy for the cultural centre for the installation, for 
example, of solar energy.  
In other ventures, in 2006 NYFL applied to the Indigenous Stock Exchange (ISX) 
for investment and support for the Cultural Centre (www.isx.org.au/). It has 
purchased a dialysis machine for Mawarnkarra Medical Service to help deal with the 
high incidence of diabetes in the community and supports other local social and 
health programs. In 2011, Rio Tinto awarded NYFL a $120 million car dumper and 
bulk earthworks joint venture contract with NRW Holdings for the Cape Lambert 
port expansion. Another joint venture with NRW and the Eastern Gurruma for 
drilling and blasting at Fortescue Metal Group’s (FMG’s) Solomon hub will be 
looked at in paper 5. 
Other intensely busy organisations resulted from the 2005 Ngarluma Yindjibarndi 
native title determination. The Ngarluma Aboriginal Corporation (NAC) and 
Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation (YAC) hold the native and are the registered 
native title prescribed bodies corporate under the Native Title Act 1993. Both are 
emerging as formidable actors in reasserting local Aboriginal identity and values 
and in constituting Levitus’s ‘transactional boundary’ between the Roebourne 
Aboriginal domain and external stakeholders. They have also given rise to disputes 
and separation between the two groups, an issue that will be addressed in the next 
section. 
Since the establishment of the separate native title prescribed bodies corporate, 
each organisation has tended to operate and pursue their interests separately. This 
has been so, even when the issues, such as housing, affect the whole community; 
and Juluwarlu, set up with the benefit of the Woodside agreement to document and 
record Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi culture and history, has become in practice an 
Yindjibarndi organisation. NAC is developing its own resource and media arm. 
3.2.2 Ngarluma Aboriginal Corporation (NAC) 
Other NAC projects, however, with the collaboration of government and the private 
sector, have the potential for transforming the social conditions of Roebourne. The 
most ambitious of these is the Ngarluma Aboriginal Sustainable Housing (NASH) 
project. Initiated by NAC and in the planning over several years, the project has 
involved the Ngarluma native title holders surrendering their native title rights over 
part of their country and the land has been acquired under an option agreement 
with the State Government for a 400 house lot development, with commercial and 
group housing areas. One hundred blocks are being developed as the first stage, 99 
single residential lots and one group housing site for ten dwellings. The 
                                                        
64 www.fahcsia.gov.au. Social Security Act 1991 s.14. 
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development is being funded from a combination of the Department of Housing; 
Royalties for Regions which, like all Pilbara Royalties for Regions, comes through 
Pilbara Cities; the Department of Regional Development and Lands; the sale of lots; 
and from NAC itself. NAC is developing the infrastructure for the lots but is not 
building the houses. At the insistence of the State, this will be done by a Class A 
contractor from Perth rather than being designed to provide employment 
opportunities for Roebourne people, though some may become available through the 
process. 
The development will have a mix of social housing, with rental accommodation to be 
managed by Foundation Housing instead of the Department of Housing. The 
Department of Housing has bought 50 lots with a view to providing accommodation 
for government employees. Some lots will be available for shared equity home 
purchase for Roebourne Aboriginal people (Ngarluma Monthly, December 2009). 
NAC commissioned Burgess Design Group to produce a development plan, which 
they completed in December 2009. The plan will be revisited when stage 1 is 
completed. Stage 2 is to be funded from profits from stage 1.  
Under the Planning Commission’s draft Pilbara planning and infrastructure 
framework (2011), Roebourne is listed in the proposed settlement hierarchy as a 
‘town’, without a specified target population. It suggests instead that ‘the population 
and footprint of these settlements will be largely determined by mining and oil and 
gas related industry in the locality’ (2011: 11). With the focus for Pilbara Cities on 
developing Karratha as a city and Rio Tinto planning for an extra 750 houses in 
Wickham, the place of Roebourne in the shiny Pilbara future remains unclear. 
Pilbara Cities sees the Roebourne Shire as responsible for further planning and has 
provided $250,000 to the Shire for this purpose.65  
In 2010, the Shire set up a Roebourne Advisory Committee, to be made up of six 
Roebourne residents and three Council members. Of the first membership, four of 
the six Roebourne members were Aboriginal.66 The Council also plans to reopen the 
old Shire building in Roebourne in order to have people on the ground there. In the 
meantime, they continue with normal Shire service delivery. 67 
Other NAC projects are more modest but also significant in redeveloping Roebourne 
Aboriginal people’s interests. One of these is the revival of Mt Welcome station as a 
working cattle station. The original purchase of the station in 1973 had been by a 
                                                        
65 Interview with Pilbara Cities CEO, Chris Evans, 23 May 2011. 
66 Interview with Chair of the Committee and long-term Roebourne resident, Councillor 
Gary Bailey, 19 July 2011. 
67 Interview with Shire President, Nicole Lockwood, 26 May 2011. 
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group of community leaders and the Ieramugadu Group, in the name of the Mt 
Welcome Pastoral Company, had later taken over the lease-holding and 
management. In 2006, the State Government had proposed forfeiture of the Mt 
Welcome lease for failure to meet the terms of the lease, including non-payment of 
rent. The Minister discontinued the proposal in 2007 and acknowledged the role of 
NAC adviser, Peter Dowding, and others in helping to improve performance (WA 
Government Ministerial Media Statement, 4 July 2007). As part of that process, the 
NAC replaced the Ieramugadu Group as the owner and daily operator of the pastoral 
lease. In 2008, they appointed a new manager, previously from the Department of 
Agriculture in Karratha. In the same year, Rio Tinto Iron Ore, in partnership with 
Pilbara TAFE, began a Work Start program in the Roebourne Regional Prison and 
its nearby work site on Mt Welcome (Rio Tinto Iron Ore media release, 24 August 
2008). A renewed station-hand training program began in 2009. Mt Welcome has 
been offered renewal of its lease after the State-wide pastoral leases expiry in 2015, 
subject to meeting the standard conditions. 
There are no mines on Ngarluma country though there is a huge proposed magnetite 
mine near the new port at Anketell Point, but the Ngarluma bore the brunt of the 
1960s mining boom and of the building of towns and of road, rail, and port 
infrastructure.  Their country continues to be affected by the massive expansion 
being undertaken in the present boom. Their time and energy is consumed by the 
associated intense negotiations and legalities. In 2008, NAC signed a letter 
agreement with Rio Tinto Iron Ore that provides for ongoing financial benefits to 
the group from Rio’s operations. They signed a final agreement in December 2010. 
In the intervening two years, a three-page letter agreement had become an 
inaccessibly complex document of over 700 pages in two volumes. 
As with other native title groups with whom they have negotiated, Rio Tinto also 
funded advisers for the Corporation to assist them in the management of financial 
inflows. The model developed in consultation with NAC, but based on principles on 
which Rio Tinto insists, is set out in diagram 1 (Thayalgu Ngurna Wanggayi 
(Capturing our words), NAC newsletter Edition 5, November 2008). The Newsletter 
made clear that money received through the Direct Benefits Trust would be subject 
to tax.  
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Diagram 1.  
 
3.2.3 Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation (YAC) 
Like the Ngarluma, Yindjibarndi have no mines or prospective mines in their native 
title determination area, and their country suffered much less of the impact of 
earlier mining. This is different in the area covered by a further claim that has not 
yet been determined and where a number of companies, including Rio Tinto and 
Fortescue Metals Group (FMG), have exploration and development interests. FMG 
in particular urgently wants access to Yindjibarndi country for the expansion of its 
Solomon iron ore project and related infrastructure, an interest that has become the 
subject of an acrimonious and very public dispute between FMG and part of the 
Yindjibarndi community.68 Even prior to this conflict, the Yindjibarndi Aboriginal 
Corporation (YAC) had chosen not to enter into any long-term binding agreements 
with any of the resource companies, although its members are part of the Ngarluma 
                                                        
68 The comment of one senior Roebourne Aboriginal man after seeing the ABC’s Four 
Corners Program screened on 18 July 2011 was that he thought it was all ‘a bit silly’. 
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and Yindjibarndi Foundation agreement with Woodside and the North West Shelf 
partners and, like Ngarluma and other Pilbara native title groups, are constantly 
responding to requirements for heritage surveys.  
Through the period of conflict with FMG, but also in numerous other ways, YAC has 
made very clear that its priority is on preserving and maintaining traditional 
culture, and doing so with the use of contemporary media. The jewel in YAC’s crown 
is Juluwarlu, set up in the wake of the Woodside agreement and registered in 2000, 
the same year as the Woodside agreement, as a not-for-profit Indigenous 
community organisation to preserve, record, and broadcast culture and language, 
and document the lives of contemporary Yindjibarndi people. Under the supervision 
and with the active involvement of their co-founders, Michael Woodley and his wife 
Lorraine Coppin, their output in DVDs, books, films, and art work has been 
impressive and their archive contains over 6000 photos that they have digitised 
(www.oric.gov.au). The collection includes the extensive photo collection from long-
term Roebourne residents, Pastor Dave Stevens of the Pilbara Aboriginal Church 
and his wife Margaret. In 2004, Juluwarlu reissued the seminal Roebourne 
documentary, Exile and the Kingdom, together with updated biographies and an 
associated booklet, Know the song, as well as a range of other books, videos, and 
DVDs on Yindjibarndi history and culture (www.yindjibarndi.org.au/juluwarlu). In 
2005, Juluwarlu was granted a television and radio licence, Ngarda Community 
Television and Radio Station, to broadcast into Roebourne and its surrounding 
areas. Its programs include employment and training in multi-media for Roebourne 
Aboriginal people. 
Juluwarlu continues to receive support from Woodside and the Ngarluma and 
Yindjibarndi Foundation, and has had grants from Royalties for Regions through 
the Pilbara Development Commission, a range of government agencies, and other 
funding bodies.  
Juluwarlu is not alone in this harnessing of Western technologies and the embracing 
of contemporary forms of communication in reaffirming identity in the context of 
modernity. One of the projects supported with the funding available under the 
Conservation Agreement, signed between Woodside and the Commonwealth 
Government in 2007 to cover the Dampier Archipelago (www.woodside.com.au), 
was an innovative interactive media project by a Ngarluma man and emerging film 
maker, Tyson Mowarin. These are just a sample of the range of ongoing activities in 
Roebourne being carried out by local Aboriginal people, in partnership with or with 
the support of industry and government. There are others not confined to native 
title but involved across the whole community. 
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3.2.4 Organisations and local working partnerships 
Big hART 
Also through the Conservation Agreement funding, Woodside has supported the 
involvement of arts and social change company, Big hART, with Roebourne people 
(www.pilbara.bighart.org), in order to use the arts and media as a way of telling 
Roebourne stories. Initial funding was also provided by the Federal government 
through the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services, and Indigenous 
Affairs (FaHCSIA) and subsequently by some other partner bodies. Taking an 
approach based on their experience with developing Ngapartji Ngapartji, this has 
resulted in the Yijala Yala (‘now’ in both Yindjibarndi and Ngarluma languages) 
project. The project started very quietly in 2009 with meetings between Woodside’s 
senior Indigenous adviser, Ben Garwood, and Scott Rankin, director and creative 
director of Big hART. In due course, Scott and Trevor Jamieson, actor and central 
performer in Ngapartji Ngapartji, came to Roebourne to meet with people in the 
community to talk about what might be possible. Some time later, the group with 
whom they had met invited Big hART back to Roebourne. Part of the commitment 
was that they would stay for five years. In July 2010, the project’s producer and 
creative director, Deb Myers, arrived.  
Over the following year, a team that included Trevor Jamieson and his co-performer 
from another Big hART play, Namatjira, worked with an advisory group made up of 
community members, ‘to highlight cultural heritage as something alive and 
continually evolving in the here and now, rather than only of the past’ (Big hART 
2011: 1). They did this using film, text, translation, recordings, songs, music, iPad 
apps, NBN focused material, photography, and performance. Over 300 workshops 
were held in the first year, with over 25 adults and 250 young people, including 
workshops at the prison and school. A women’s choir produced a Christmas DVD for 
2010. In 2011, four Roebourne people went as part of the Big hArt contingent to the 
International Community Arts Festival in Rotterdam. And in July 2011, Yijala Yala, 
involving performance, film by and with young people, and music was presented at 
the Woodside Plaza auditorium in Perth. It was just one part of an ongoing process 
in what the participants refer to as the Cultural Resources Boom. 
Big hART is just one part of this Cultural Resources Boom, which also involves 
training and employment for local people. Juluwarlu is a major contributor and the 
town now has a number of flourishing arts centres, with artists exhibiting on a 
regular basis in Perth and taking part in the Cossack art awards. Rio Tinto, 
Woodside, and BHP Billiton are all major sponsors. Rio Tinto was the founding 
partner in the company set up by Aboriginal professional dancer and choreographer, 
Michael Leslie, in 2006 to work with young people in a number of Pilbara towns, 
including Roebourne.   
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Graham (Polly) Farmer Foundation and the Gumala Mirnuwarni Education project 
One of the most successful stories from across the Roebourne Shire is the Gumala 
Mirnuwarni Education Project. Begun in Karratha and Roebourne in 1997, the 
project involves a sustained partnership between the Aboriginal community, the 
Graham (Polly) Farmer Foundation, the WA Department of Education and Training, 
the Commonwealth Department of Education, Employment and Workplace 
Relations, Woodside (North West Shelf Venture partners), Rio Tinto Iron Ore, Rio 
Tinto (WA) Future Fund, and Dampier Salt. A steering committee oversees the 
project and provides strategic level management. The steering committee has 
representatives from all the partners. The program has education enrichment 
centres in Karratha and Roebourne. Students attend for a minimum of two and 
maximum of four afternoons per week. Enrichment and extension activities occur 
during some weekends and holiday periods. All students have an Individual 
Learning Plan and associated personal tutors (www.woodside.com; www.pff.com). 
 As mentioned in paper 1, the current 41 students come from two public and one 
private secondary school. Since its inception in 1997 the Partnership has graduated 
66 students, 27 of whom have achieved tertiary entrance, 29 of whom have gained 
traineeships/apprenticeships or entry to TAFE and 11 to direct employment.  
Some of the criteria that have contributed to Gumala Mirnuwarni’s success and that 
make it potentially replicable are shared objectives and strategic and practical 
collaboration in implementing those objectives; adequate and ongoing reliable 
funding; consistent and predictable involvement of all the partners, including 
government; with respect to the specifically educational aims of the project, other 
criteria include interested schools and interested parents. Because of the range of 
partners, and their strong support and focus at the local level, the project has been 
spared the policy turbulence and disruptions arising from changing government 
policies and programs at both State and Commonwealth levels.69 This puts it in 
contrast to, for example, the policy changes affecting a community organisation like 
Ngarliyarndu Bindirri. 
Other Roebourne organisations and agencies 
It is not part of this paper to list all the organisations or agencies operating in 
Roebourne, but there are some that demand a mention. A number date from the 
period in the 1970s and early 1980s when Roebourne people were beginning to pick 
up the pieces in the wake of the first mining explosion. The Pilbara Aboriginal 
Church became an important centre of support and community-centred activity and 
remains so. Yaandina Family Centre has evolved from a single nursing service in 
                                                        
69 Entropic feature 5. 
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1975 to overseeing more than ten community service programs. These cover child 
care, aged care, a sobering-up shelter, the Mingga patrol, and youth services. 
Weeriana Hostel has provided residential care for children, initially children coming 
in to school from the wider region, from even earlier. Mawarnkarra Health Service 
offers medical and primary health care in Roebourne and surrounding areas. 
3.3 Where to self-determination? 
In writing about the impact of more sweeping changes in government policy, Levitus 
(2009: 74) comments: 
The most recent phase of Federal Aboriginal policy-making has substantially 
abandoned the self-determination paradigm. Nevertheless the recognition of a 
form of native title in Australian law and a growing trend towards agreement-
making have developed to sustain and expand the niches occupied by local 
indigenous organisations, and the industry’s preparedness to acknowledge 
their standing. 
The Roebourne experience bears out this observation. While far from perfect, the 
persistence of Aboriginal organisations indicates the importance of their role as 
conduits for a negotiated engagement between local Aboriginal people and non-
Aboriginal processes and structures. It also suggests that the organisations act, or 
have the potential to act, as agents of transformation, offering familiar spaces 
within which people relate to each other in ways that are shaped by their traditional 
social and moral frameworks: their traditional culture. In the same process, and 
from that base, they also work to produce, modify, and reproduce the new meanings 
demanded by their incorporation into the modern world (cf Bauman and Tester 
2001: 32); acting as translators inside to members and outside to external agents 
and agencies, becoming meaning makers in the process and accountable at both 
levels, both internal and external. 
Alternatively, organisations can do the opposite and trap their members into rigid 
and intransigent meanings that reject a practical flexibility and constant 
negotiability that is part of traditional Aboriginal social relations and that is 
essential to a productive reframing of the relations between the old and the new. 
In an Indigenous Governance Conference in Jabiru in 2003, people who had been 
involved in the Harvard Project on Native American Economic Development made 
the point this way (Cornell and Begay 2003): 
In some cases, [building cultural legitimacy] may mean Indigenous 
communities have to rethink their ideas of how to govern and invent new ways 
that better meet their needs...What matters is not that things be done in the 
old ways. It is that things be done in ways – old or new – that win the support, 
participation, and trust of the people, and can get things done. Some will be 
old. Some will be new. 
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All this is inevitably a messy business, requiring effective leadership, sound 
governance arrangements, capacity development, and acknowledgement, 
facilitation, and support from external sources, including government. The 
complexities are compounded for Roebourne people by the immense pressures they 
experience in the face of the mad rapidity of current development. These are 
pressures that non-Aboriginal Pilbara residents are experiencing as overwhelming. 
For Aboriginal people, they pose a fundamental dilemma, where the destruction of 
country fractures the connections between land and people and the social relations 
that derive their meaning from those connections.  
This dilemma is not eased by the inexorable assumption that economic development 
is for the greater good, even if only through a trickle down effect.70 In the case of 
Yindjibarndi objections to the granting of particular mining leases to FMG, for 
example, the National Native Title Tribunal found that a lease could be granted, 
subject to conditions. In his assessment of the criterion of ‘economic or other 
significance’, the Tribunal member stated (FMG Pilbara Pty Ltd/Ned Cheedy and 
Others on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People/Western Australia, [2009] NNTTA 91 
(13 August 2009): [84]): 
In their contentions..., the Government and grantee parties contend the grant 
of the proposed lease will assist the local economy through the development of 
local resources and by providing services to the grantee party’s project; the 
State economy through the payment of royalties; and the Nation through the 
earning of foreign capital and contributing to the national tax base. I accept 
the grant of the proposed lease will create considerable positive economic 
effect for the State and the Nation, and that some positive economic effect may 
be experienced by the local economy including local Aboriginal people. 
The history of Roebourne Aboriginal people does little to bear out an automatic 
flow-on effect for them. If anything, the evidence is to the contrary. The benefits 
that have begun to accrue to them are the result of active negotiations and hard-won 
agreements. It is these processes – even where, as with the Burrup and Maitland 
Agreement negotiations, the human cost has been high – that Aboriginal people 
have carved out for themselves some spaces for the exercise of self-determination.  
At the same time, it is governments who bear the responsibility of ensuring that the 
national interest is promoted by policies in which the vital connection between 
economic and social development is sustained (Edmunds 1989: 43). Some recent 
developments in Roebourne raise the possibility of a tentative rapprochement 
between Aboriginal people’s ongoing desire for operating on their own terms, even 
in the intercultural space, and the State’s refocusing on policy implementation 
                                                        
70 The trickle down effect has also been interpreted as that the rich piddle on the poor. 
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through consultation rather than on detached policy reformulation. A corollary of 
that approach is the opportunity for identifying what decisions might be made in the 
Pilbara, in this instance specifically in and for Roebourne, and the ways in which 
accountability for local outcomes could be localised (Desert Knowledge 
remoteFOCUS, Pilbara Dialogue presentation, 4 April 2011); and do this by seeing 
Aboriginal people as integral rather than marginal to the Pilbara story. 
4. Place-based decision-making and local accountability 
The decision by Western Australia’s Aboriginal Affairs Coordinating Committee 
(AACC) to appoint a Chief Operating Officer to provide on-the-ground decision-
making in three priority communities, one of which is Roebourne, suggests that the 
State government is attempting to take on board the lessons from past failures and 
recent research. The Chief Operating Officer was appointed in July 2009. In his 
Annual Report, July 2009 – July 2010, he states the AACC’s intent ‘to use 
Roebourne to develop a model that would change the way government services are 
planned and delivered to Aboriginal people in regional towns’ and sets out the key 
principles for bringing about ‘the greatest change’ (2010: 18, 19): 
 Sitting down together and taking the time to build relationships and earn 
trust. 
 All parties listening and engaging respectfully and genuinely. 
 Joint ownership and joint responsibility for action (not government giving 
and Aboriginal people receiving in a benevolence mode. 
4.1 Roebourne Aboriginal Congress 
Crucial to the process in this model was the establishing of a ‘reference group’ that 
represented the wider Roebourne Aboriginal community, separate to native title 
groups and that would be ‘a recognised Aboriginal group with authority to speak on 
community issues’.71 The principle articulates the desire of government to have a 
single representative body with whom to deal and anticipates the comment made by 
Minister Brendan Grylls at the inaugural Pilbara Futures Forum, held in Port 
Hedland in June 2010, ‘Come to me in a united voice and I will help you’. 
In October 2009,72 a community meeting decided to establish a reference group and 
selected five men and five women. In the following three months, the Department of 
Indigenous Affairs (DIA) and the Aboriginal Affairs Coordinating Committee carried 
                                                        
71 Telephone interview with Chief Operating Officer, Brian Wilkinson, 11 May 2011. 
72 The Annual Report gives the date as 2010 (p. 12), but the subsequent chronology of events 
suggests that this is an error. 
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out intensive capacity building, providing governance training, structure and 
administrative and resource support for the reference group. The Annual Report 
goes on (2010: 12-13): 
It became clear that to achieve real change in the way government services are 
planned and delivered the role of the elected group needed to be partnership, 
ownership and shared responsibility. Thus the group was encouraged to stop 
being just another reference group and become something more substantial. 
The Roebourne Aboriginal Congress was born...[The terms of reference show] 
how far this has moved from that of a typical government reference group to 
that of leadership and self-determination in the overall strategic direction of 
Roebourne. 
The Chief Operating Officer makes clear that one of the key elements for the 
Congress to be sustainable is the support, and possible involvement, of the town’s 
other Aboriginal organisations, particularly that of the NAC and YAC. By July 2010, 
there were some encouraging signs that this would happen, including an agreement 
for the five key Aboriginal corporations to meet with the Congress with the view to 
forming an alliance with and membership of the Congress. The Annual Report saw 
this, if achieved, as ‘one of the most significant achievements. Feedback from 
Aboriginal leaders, government and non-government agencies, and in particular the 
resource industry is that if this alliance is achieved the potential for appropriate 
program delivery and redesign of services is enormous’ (2010: 4, 17). 
In the first year of its existence, the Congress achieved some identifiable results. 
Among these (2010: 24, 25) were the relocation, in cooperation with NAC and the 
Department of Housing, of thirteen elderly Aboriginal people squatting at the Mt 
Welcome station homestead; giving active support to NAC’s NASH residential and 
commercial land development; and assisting in gaining agreement with resource 
companies for significant, coordinated investment aligned to the Roebourne 
Rejuvenation Project, with Woodside agreeing to take the coordination role for 
resource company investment.  
Nevertheless, the Annual Report acknowledged that ‘the Congress model is fragile 
due to the lack of continued on the ground support and financial support’ (2010: 
27). A year later, the Chief Coordinating Officer’s informal view was that Congress 
was ‘fading’.73 DIA continues to provide secretarial support, as it has from the 
beginning, but the process is struggling. There are a number of factors involved. The 
Yindjibarndi dispute with FMG and consequent internal divisions has had a very big 
impact at both community and organisational level. As one of the town’s key 
organisations, YAC has indicated the possibility of its participation but has had little 
                                                        
73 Telephone interview, 24 August 2011. 
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active involvement. Involvement of the other main organisations has been cautious 
and is waning. Fuelling their concerns has been Congress’s lack of due process – 
meetings with no agenda or minutes – and a non-elected community membership. 
With the body having been established to exercise local Aboriginal control, DIA is 
reluctant to impose these requirements, though continues to take meeting notes in 
order to maintain some record.  
At the heart of the problem, however, is that Congress, in its current form, has 
failed to achieve essential support from its theoretical constituents: it has no 
legitimate representative status and therefore no authority. Nor is it building on its 
early achievements and continuing to deliver outcomes for people. It fails the two 
defining elements for achieving cultural legitimacy (Hunt and Smith 2007: xiv-xv; 
paper 1). 
An alternative approach might rescue Congress and is being considered by the Chief 
Operating Officer. It would be based on a membership drawn wholly from the town’s 
organisations rather than including community members. If this were to occur, a 
reconstituted Congress would be drawing on the experience offered by successful 
Indigenous governance institutions, that is, an institutionally networked body based 
on representation that has been legitimised through Aboriginal principles for 
decision-making and relational autonomy (see Introduction paper).74 
4.2 Government engagement 
Although government would prefer to deal through a unified channel for Roebourne, 
it does not offer a single voice in return. As one long-term Roebourne resident 
expressed her view, the trouble with governance in Roebourne is government. The 
multiplicity and lack of coordination of agencies in the town is a decades-long 
problem (see Edmunds 1989, Uniting Church Frontier Services Report 1996). 
Shanks (2009: 24-25), identifying issues that are also of central concern to the 
broader remoteFOCUS project, makes clear that this remains a pivotal issue and for 
that reason is quoted here at length: 
Given the multitude of programs, services and service providers active in 
Roebourne, the need for effective mechanisms to coordinate between agencies 
is fundamental to efficient and effective service provision. From discussions 
with Government and non-government agencies a number of impediments to 
effective coordination at both the regional and localise level are identified. 
Some of these include: 
 A lack of delegation at the regional and district manager level to make 
decisions and to respond to emerging needs and priorities 
                                                        
74 A recommendation to support this process is included in the Introduction paper. 
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 Rigid program and funding guidelines that mitigate against flexible and 
responsive service delivery 
 A lack of discretionary funds with which to respond to local needs 
 Individual agencies under pressure to focus on core business at a cost to 
intersectoral collaboration 
 Community politics encourages inertia, as it is impossible to satisfy all 
sectors 
 Increasing number of interagency and community forums consuming the time 
of senior managers and officers 
 A serious impact on all service delivery with the increasingly high turn-over 
of agency staff resulting in the loss of relativities and understanding of key 
networks and relationships 
 Variable skills and motives of key staff posted to the Pilbara 
 Interpersonal and interagency conflicts 
 A history of Perth and Canberra failing to support the needs and initiatives of 
the Pilbara (Note: Implementation in 2007 of the Pilbara Industry 
Community Council (PICC); the recently announced Pilbara Revitalisation 
Plan through the WA State Budget 2009/2010; and, the action of the States 
AACC to identify Roebourne as a priority has seen a change of focus at the 
highest level in recent times). 
Shanks goes on to summarise these concerns from yet another of the many reports 
that she lists from earlier Roebourne studies and that reiterate the same factors 
(2009: 25): 
In the ‘Miles Brief’ (2006) it stated that ‘a major problem affecting the 
implementation of solutions lies in the fact that generic programs aimed at 
dealing with the issues were deemed unrealistic, for though they are 
prototyped in Canberra, they hold unrealistic expectations of what is really 
required at the community level with regards to funding, hours, distances 
between places and practice. Large amounts of government funding exist in 
Roebourne. The biggest industry in Roebourne is Human Services. The funding 
has led to a collage of services depending on what the current dominant view 
was at the time of funding, or the Government service was made available, and 
then remains. The services take on a political aspect and are then in 
competition with other services for resources, people, and status. This leads to 
conflictual relationships and siloed approaches to work in the community’. 
This is still evident today. 
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It is clear that, in addition to the more proactive approach being taken by 
government in Roebourne and across the Pilbara – indeed across remote Australia 
generally – there is still a long way to go to address its own functionality and 
governance. 
4.3 Royalties for Regions 
The introduction of Royalties for Regions has provided a significant new channel for 
local as well as regional schemes to access funding. In the present Pilbara planning 
hyperactivity, Roebourne has tended to be overshadowed, and potentially swamped, 
by regional and Pilbara city issues, with a focus on Karratha, and even Wickham, for 
further development. Roebourne receives a passing mention in Regional 
Development Australia’s Preliminary Pilbara Regional Plan (August 2010) and is 
included, as mentioned earlier, in the WA Planning Commission’s Pilbara Planning 
and Infrastructure Framework, along with Paraburdoo and Pannawonica, in the 
third tier of ‘towns’ (February 2011: 30). The Framework offers high-blown rhetoric 
but no practical ways of achieving what it unblushingly states to be Roebourne’s 
future role and character as ‘a vibrant town with a strong Aboriginal community 
business and cultural focus’. The one planning initiative that the Framework does 
mention is NASH. NASH is also identified in the Department of Regional 
Development and Lands’ presentation to the May 2010 Pilbara Dialogue (Mann, 
Pilbara Cities).  
The success of NASH in gaining recognition suggests two things: one is that NAC is 
operating successfully and strategically as an Aboriginal organisation in the 
intercultural domain. Another is that sound local projects have the opportunity for 
substantial support, including funding, through Royalties for Regions. The latter is 
confirmed by two grants already approved for NASH through the Regional 
Infrastructure and Headworks Fund: $500,000 in 2009-2010, and $4.5 million in 
2010-2011. In 2010-2011, a further $5 million was allocated for other Roebourne 
housing initiatives through the Department of Housing’s Roebourne Revitalisation 
Plan (Royalties for Regions Progress Report 2009-10; Royalties for Regions 
Snapshot 2010-11). 
There are other networked projects that have arisen from local Aboriginal concerns 
and involve Roebourne Aboriginal people. They tend to be lower profile because 
they are carried out outside the confines of the town, and because they are 
facilitated through a more broadly based regional organisation like Yamatji Marlpa 
Aboriginal Corporation. They offer a potential model for consideration in the 
discussions about a Pilbara Aboriginal regional voice. 
4.4 Pilbara Sea Country Plan 
A regional organisation like Yamatji Marlpa has the capacity to take on board 
Aboriginal concerns, including native title concerns, that extend beyond the 
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interests of any one particular language or native title group. The need for this kind 
of more broadly representative body was recognised very early in the life of Native 
Title Representative Bodies by their first review (ATSIC, The Parker Review 1995: 
37): 
3.69 The Review Committee recommends a large regional level of jurisdiction 
for NTRBs [Native Title Representative Bodies] as being the most cost-
effective; providing a sufficient population mass to generate organisational 
economies of scale; and most successfully facilitating a representative capacity. 
Yamatji Marlpa demonstrates the potential effectiveness of such an approach, 
leaving open the question about the form of association. In this instance, they have 
brought together seven of the native title groups who include coastal areas in their 
countries, in order to provide ‘a united and integrated Indigenous response’ to the 
‘extraordinarily rapid and intense pressure as a result of the resources boom in iron 
ore, gas, and other commodities’ (Pilbara Indigenous Marine Reference Group 2010: 
4). 
The result was the formation in 2009 of the Pilbara Indigenous Marine Reference 
Group as a forum and support group ‘that could assist prescribed bodies corporate 
and claim groups in their decision making’ (2010: 7). The Ngarluma/Yindjibarndi 
native title holders are represented on the body. Initial funding was provided by 
Rangelands NRM (Natural Resource Management) (WA), both the Department of 
Environment and Conservation (DEC) and the Department of Fisheries have offered 
their support, and Yamatji Marlpa has applied to the WA State Natural Resource 
Management office for funding to develop action plans and marine and coastal 
conservation projects (2010: 5, 11). Since its inception, the Reference Group has had 
regular contributions from six of the member groups (2010: 6), indicating the 
willingness of local Aboriginal people to look beyond their immediate concerns to a 
broader set of issues and groups.  
One of the ‘huge challenges’ raised by ‘the unprecedented pace of development in 
the Pilbara’ is posed by the ‘fragile nature’ of the coastal and marine zones, ‘the 
reduced capacity to understand their dynamic ecologies and the differences in legal 
and policy arrangements between land and sea’ (2010: 4). In order to address these 
challenges, the Pilbara Indigenous Marine Reference Group developed a clear set of 
priorities in its first year. Without setting them out here in full, they covered the 
following (2010: 8-9): 
 Develop accredited training, apprenticeships and skill building. 
 Develop employment opportunities – including but not limited to – rangers, 
and environmental/cultural monitors. 
 Coordinate with relevant agencies for improvement of land management 
practices where they may impact coastal or marine issues. 
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 Promote Indigenous participation in fisheries management, including 
explanation, discussion, and negotiation of customary fishing rules. 
It may be that, despite the fragmentation – or atomisation (Sutton 2003) – 
experienced by Roebourne and other Pilbara Aboriginal people in the struggle for 
specific group recognition through native title, a regional networking approach 
dealing with common concerns, like the Pilbara Indigenous Marine Reference 
Group, offers one way of thinking about other regional coalitions of groups in the 
future (a topic that will be taken up in paper 5). 
5. Any still points in a rapidly spinning world? 
It should be clear by now that the dire statistics for Roebourne reported time after 
time over the recent years do indeed represent a set of confronting social problems 
that require urgent attention. But it should also be clear that they do not constitute 
the totality of Roebourne social, cultural, economic, or even daily life. There is much 
else going on; and many of the activities that are starting to create a way forward 
are those that reflect, or accept, local Aboriginal people’s values and concerns. They 
are also activities, like NASH, Juluwarlu, or Ngarluma/Yindjibarndi involvement in 
the Pilbara Indigenous Marine Reference Group, that are being generated and 
developed through local Aboriginal organisations. This is not in isolation from 
engagement with and support from both government and industry, but they connect 
nevertheless with what it is that Roebourne Aboriginal people want. And this has 
remained constant because Pilbara Aboriginal people remain the true locals within 
the whirling configurations of non-Aboriginal residents and fly-in fly-out fly-by-
nighters: or at least fly-by-work shifts. 
That focus on the truly local and on what Roebourne people want, of course, is at 
risk of being lost in the overwhelming pace of broader Pilbara planning and 
development. Nevertheless, the work of the Aboriginal Affairs Coordinating 
Council’s Chief Operating Officer indicates that the principles of partnership and 
mutual accountability remain on the government’s agenda, at least for now. These 
principles are also taken seriously by the major resource companies in terms of their 
social licence to operate in the region. Other companies attempt, with greater or 
lesser success, to take them into account. The dysfunction in Roebourne itself, and 
the fragmentation and limitations on adequate governance capacity in Roebourne 
Aboriginal organisations also pose significant obstacles to the achievement of the 
very goals that they have set themselves. But this only becomes an issue because 
Roebourne offends the illusion that planning will give governments and Pilbara 
agencies control over the economic imperatives that currently dictate what is 
happening. 
New modes of engagement such as the establishment of a Roebourne Aboriginal 
Congress offer a joint way forward out of dysfunction. But it is important to 
remember that, although a possible reconstitution of Congress as a single point of 
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contact with Roebourne Aboriginal people may smooth the processes of negotiated 
engagement for government and industry, it cannot carry the sole burden of 
providing the solution to the problems experienced in Roebourne. It may prove to 
be part of the solution, but only if government delivers a sustained approach 
through consistent policy, responsive programs, on the ground engagement, and 
reliable support and funding. 
The review of what it is that Roebourne Aboriginal people want to achieve has been 
remarkably constant over the development decades. That has provided the thread of 
continuity through all the social and economic problems that are so visible to 
outsiders. It is not goodwill, though that matters, that will make the difference in 
Roebourne, but the effective involvement in practical partnership of local Aboriginal 
people and organisations. The challenge to achieve that is one for Roebourne 
Aboriginal people themselves, but also for industry and for government. And that 
will become a key part of the stories that are still to be told about Roebourne, and 
then about Roebourne as a pivotal point in the broader Pilbara story. 
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13. Harnessing the cyclone - 
Gumala Aboriginal 
Corporation: a case study 
Dr Mary Edmunds 
1. Introduction 
The principal theme linking this series of remoteFOCUS papers is that Aboriginal 
organisations provide a visible ‘point of articulation between external agencies and 
an Aboriginal domain’ (Levitus 2009: 75), or, moving away from the notion of a 
‘separate’ Aboriginal domain, that ‘the field of governance is intercultural [and] 
marked by ongoing forms of socio-cultural difference, similarity, and mutual 
engagement and transformation (B. Smith 2008: 158). The papers propose that it 
has been through active negotiations and hard-won agreements that Pilbara 
Aboriginal people have carved out for themselves some spaces for the exercise of 
self-determination. This paper sets out to test these propositions with respect to one 
organisation, Gumala Aboriginal Corporation (GAC). By the same token, the paper 
also addresses issues in relation to Gumala that test approaches by both government 
and resource companies to the stated goal of ‘closing the gap’ in Indigenous 
disadvantage. 
2. How Pilbara Aboriginal people organise and interact 
with change 
2.1 Background 
Change came to Pilbara Aboriginal people with the arrival of pastoralists in the 
1860s, followed by pearlers. This coincided with the emergence of representative 
government in Western Australia in 1870 and a gradual shift in government native 
policy. Up to this time – before which ‘it can scarcely be said that there were any 
politics in the colony, but only grievances’(Hasluck 1970: 36) – there had been no 
coherent policy. Instead, ‘the first business of authority was to quell disorder, while 
preventing undue violence against natives and, that done, to undertake the work of 
training the natives for civilisation’ (1970: 43).  
Hasluck also notes that, after 1870, ‘in northern conditions, the natives were being 
widely employed’, giving rise to a need to regulate their employment. The result was 
the passing of the Aborigines Protection Act in 1886 and the appointment of an 
Aborigines Protection Board after 1888 (1970: 43, 44). Other ‘protective’ legislation 
followed over the next decades, those with most impact being the Aborigines Act 
1905 and the Native Administration Act 1936. The 1905 Act, among other 
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provisions, empowered the Governor to declare areas prohibited to Aboriginal 
people and to establish Aboriginal reserves. In addition, the Chief Protector of 
Aborigines was made the legal guardian of every Aboriginal and half-caste child 
until that child attained sixteen years. The 1936 Act replaced the word ‘Aborigines’ 
with ‘natives’ and the Chief Protector with a Commissioner of Native Affairs. The 
1936 Act also extended the period for which the Commissioner was to be the legal 
guardian of all natives from sixteen to twenty-one years old. Even after the age of 
twenty-one, no native could marry without prior notice to the Commissioner, who 
could withhold his consent (McCorquodale 1987: 95, 97-98). 
Peter Coppins’ experience is just one example of the impact of the legislation on 
people’s daily lives (Read and Coppin 1999: 39): 
Peter Coppin was just 16 then [1936]. The Act meant that the Commissioner of 
Native Affairs was his legal guardian for another five years. The Commissioner 
could object to any marriage plans, or the Minister could order him out of 
town or prohibited areas. Peter Coppin was not allowed to be in Port Hedland 
after dark. He could not stay there, he could not visit white people living there 
(if he had wanted to) and nor could he enter any bar to drink with the white 
squatters or miners who had also surged north to peg leases in the mineral-
rich Pilbara. Peter Coppin was not allowed to vote, was not a citizen of 
Australia and, now, under the 1936 legislation, was reclassified as a ‘native’. 
Nevertheless, a decade later, Coppin was one of the leaders of the Pilbara Aboriginal 
pastoral strike and actively involved, along with the other Aboriginal strike leaders 
and non-Aboriginal activist, Don McLeod, in the establishment of the Northern 
Development and Mining Company (Nodom) in 1948 (Rowley 1972: 255; McLeod 
1984: 47). Even with McLeod’s involvement – ‘this enterprise was theirs, not mine’ 
(McLeod 1984: 99) – this was ‘the first private company set up by Aboriginal people 
in Western Australia’ (Read and Coppin 1999: 113). Indeed, as Scambary points out, 
‘the strike of 1946 provided a catalyst for increased economic participation of 
Indigenous people in non-pastoral activities’ (2007: 63). One of these non-pastoral 
activities was small-scale mining. Aboriginal people had engaged in alluvial tin 
mining from the time of its discovery near Nullagine in 1892, using the yandy, a 
traditional winnowing dish, to separate out the minerals. By 1906, there were 
approximately 300 people Aboriginal people, many of them women, working on the 
tin fields (2007: 58). Nodom added the mining of wolfram, earning enough through 
their economic activities to buy Yandeyarra and three other stations from the 
mining profits (Rowley 1972: 255). 
Although Nodom subsequently came to financial grief, it had bought a home for 
Aboriginal outpatients at Marble Bar, was working Yandeyarra, and had forced up 
station wages in the Pilbara by the time it went into voluntary liquidation in 1953 
(1972: 254). Operating as a co-operative, the company had also ‘allowed the strikers 
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and, indeed, many other Indigenous people, to survive in the mainstream economy 
in the absence of any state implemented safety net’ (Scambary 2007: 63). A similar 
function was fulfilled for some years by a related organisation, the Pindan Company, 
that was formed in 1955 after the collapse of Nodom (Holcombe 2006: 6) and, in the 
1960s after the split within the group, by the Mugarinya Pastoral Company and the 
Nomads Company. Of these organisations, only Mugarinya and the Nomads remain 
in existence. Mugarinya runs Yandeyarra and Nomads the Strelley and associated 
stations.  
Nevertheless, these early organisations provide examples of what Rowley terms 
‘their own legal-economic carapace’ (1972: 255): 
[By] the late fifties, they had built their own houses at the ‘camps’ and won the 
right to carry arms, drive trucks, and use explosives. They had a company 
independent of the government. They needed only to work for the stations 
when they wished. They were a group which had built their own legal-economic 
carapace and under this were working out the changing standards of a new 
social order. They had the old problems of disorder and drunkenness, failure 
to maintain children, and family disputes, which for so long had been taken to 
paternal protectors. All these they settled in their own ways. They were 
demonstrating that cultural differences are best left as matters for the people 
whose business they are; that within the legal framework of a registered 
company, it is possible to come to terms with the hard facts of the local 
economy. (Emphasis mine.)    
There were other significant characteristics of these early organisations that 
continue to resonate. One was that ‘highly structured lines of authority operated 
over the span of Nodom and Pindan’ (Holcombe 2006: 11); and these lines of 
authority were vested in leaders who gained legitimacy, both with ‘business acumen 
and a solid command of English’ and also with ‘credibility in the arena of 
Indigenous law’ (2006: 8). Another was that the mining camps ‘were established 
within a well-known area defined in contemporary economic and social terms, 
rather than in classical cultural and sociolinguistic terms’ (2006: 9). Related to this 
was that the companies, and the movement on which they were founded, 
demonstrated a regional dimension, with thirteen ‘tribes’ or language groups 
represented in the membership of Pindan: ‘the concept of regionally dispersed and 
layered community governance operated as a means to mesh local authority with 
collective scope’ (ibid.). Finally, and despite operating with a reasonable level of 
success in the intercultural arena, the common interests that held the various 
groups together became weaker over time than a growing diversity. This was based 
in the particularities of smaller groupings but also in growing dissent about 
McLeod’s deeply ideological framework, and led to the split between those, like 
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Peter Coppin, who became the Yandeyarra mob, and those who remained with 
McLeod and the Nomads.75  
None of this was known about, or mattered, to the resource companies who moved 
into the Pilbara after the Federal Government’s lifting of the iron ore export 
embargo in December 1960 (Kerr 1975: 107). Eggleston, a long-term Hamersley iron 
staff member, described it this way (2002: 2): 
Aboriginal people in the region were, to all intensive purposes, ‘invisible’ to 
the developers of large Pilbara mining projects in the sixties. They generally 
lived in coastal communities remote from the projects and had few, if any, 
acknowledged rights. Thirty years of intensive development in the Pilbara has 
largely by-passed them and brought little by way of benefits to them. 
Nor were there any established Aboriginal organisations in the 1960s or 1970s with 
whom the companies might have dealt, even had they been so inclined. The WA 
Aboriginal Heritage Act was passed in 1972, but gave minimal protection for 
Aboriginal land interests. For three decades, until the passing of the Native Title Act 
at the end of 1993, no resource company had ever consulted Aboriginal people about 
any mining development, ‘let alone invited them to negotiate over a project’ (Senior 
1998: 7). Hamersley Iron (now Rio Tinto Iron Ore) in 1996 was the first to do so. 
2.2 The impact of exclusion 
Hamersley Iron was not the only resource company involved in the initial iron ore 
mining boom. The other key companies, mostly in joint ventures, were BHP, now 
BHP Billiton, Goldsworthy Mining Ltd., also now BHP Billiton, and Cliffs-Robe 
River, now part of Rio Tinto Iron Ore. The Woodside-managed North West Shelf oil 
and gas venture was still in the exploration stage in the 1970s; it began building its 
onshore facilities on the Burrup Peninsula in the early 1980s, when the new towns 
of Dampier, Wickham, Karratha, and South Hedland had been established on the 
coast and Newman, Tom Price, Paraburdoo, Pannawonica, Shay Gap, and 
Goldsworthy inland. All but Karratha were closed company towns and local 
Aboriginal people were excluded.   
This exclusion, by both companies and government, ignored the experience of 
mining that had been built up among groups of Aboriginal people. Mt Goldsworthy 
was the first of the iron ore deposits in production (Kerr 1975: 108) and Wikipedia, 
in its Goldsworthy entry, quotes:  
                                                        
75 See remoteFOCUS paper 1, Doing washing in a cyclone, or a storm in a teacup?, section 
4. 
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Ernie Mitchell, Chairman of Directors of an indigenous corporation known as 
the Pindan Group, called for an iron ore export licence to be issued to his 
organisation. Mitchell argued in a pamphlet issued in the early 1960s that:76  
‘The granting of an export licence [for iron ore from Mount Goldsworthy] to 
us, the only successful self-contained Aboriginal group in Australia, would go a 
long way towards silencing the many critics of Australia's policy towards the 
original Australians.  
Furthermore: We do not ask for an export licence on terms different from 
those that would be applied to other persons or groups. We do ask that the 
following facts be considered: 
1. We are lifetime residents of the district. 
2. We have the mining skills, and the workforce necessary to handle the 
project. 
3. We are familiar with the problems that may arise, and have experience of 
solving such problems in recent years. We have been basically responsible 
for producing many thousands of tons of valuable minerals. 
4. We can make arrangements equivalent to those of any other sound 
business concern, and we have a pool of labour, resident in the district, 
and accustomed to working in the climactic and other arduous conditions 
of the Mount Goldsworthy area. 
5. We are aware, as all Australians should be, that our country’s policy in 
New Guinea towards the natives, and in Australia towards us, has been 
vigorously attacked in the councils of the United Nations Organisation ... 
We feel to grant us, the Aboriginal people of the Pindan Group, an iron ore 
export licence, would go a long way towards convincing such critics of our 
Government's sincerity and goodwill towards us, and would be a major 
                                                        
76 Indigenous accumulation and the question of land in the Kimberley region of Western 
Australia: pre 1968-1975 by: Tony Smith, University of Western Sydney, accessed: 27 May 
2010 (Wikipedia reference). This, or a related article, may be Indigenous accumulation in 
the Kimberley during the early years of ‘self-determination’, 1968–1975. Australian 
Economic History Review 
Volume 42, Issue 1, pages 1–33, March 2002. Article first published online: 18 Dec. 2002. 
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contribution to the realisation of our plans to raise our standards to the 
level of our white fellow Australians by enterprise and hard work. We do 
not seek charity.’ 
The Pindan group was not issued with the licence, and the exclusion continued. 
Scambary reports (2007: 96): 
A senior Nyiyaparli woman now resident in the mining town of Tom Price, 
recounted that her now deceased husband, an experienced miner, was arrested 
for entering the town in 1982, a time when Tom Price was a restricted-access 
mining town (AU, 8/21/2003). The purpose of his visit was to seek 
employment with the mining company. 
Yet, by 1982, the major companies had begun to encourage the employment of local 
Aboriginal people, both directly in mine-related work and with small contracts, such 
as the contracts for unskilled work with Ieramugadu in Roebourne. In 1986, Robe 
River’s apprentice of the year was a young Innawonga man, Brendan Cooke 
(Edmunds 1989: 64). But long-term, systematic exclusion and marginalisation had 
resulted in a loss of the experience and skills that had allowed the brief flourishing 
of companies like Nodom and Pindan, with their commitment to ‘enterprise and 
hard work’. For the generations born during and after the initial mining boom of the 
1960s, this history was no more than echoes of ‘old, unhappy far-off things, and 
battles long ago’.77  
By the 1980s also, however, there were new battles to be fought. A definitive one 
that brought to a head many of the tensions between Aboriginal people and the 
resource companies in general, and Hamersley Iron in particular, was Marandoo. 
2.3 Marandoo 
The Marandoo iron ore deposit is located on Eastern Guruma country and in 
Karijini National Park.78 Hamersley Iron had acquired the leases in the early 1980s 
and began active planning for its development towards the end of the decade. There 
was strong opposition from Aboriginal groups, not only Eastern Guruma, but others 
like Bunjima and Innawonga who also have traditional connections. Before the 
passing of the Native Title Act, the only legislative vehicle for the opposition was the 
State’s relatively weak Aboriginal Heritage Act. This Act requires identification of 
sites of cultural importance in order to prevent or minimise disturbance or 
destruction, subject to a final decision by the Minister. Trebeck (2009: 136) 
summarises the issues: 
                                                        
77 William Wordsworth, The Solitary Reaper. 
78 Previously Hamersley National Park. 
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Hamersley asserted that anthropological and archaeological studies conducted 
since 1974 found no significant Indigenous sites, and when taking ownership 
of the Marandoo area in the early 1980s it also acquired clearances obtained by 
the previous owners. Hamersley refused to conduct another survey of 
Indigenous sites at Marandoo. The Western Australian Government eventually 
commissioned a further study that found four sites of cultural significance, two 
of which were located on top of the ore body. 
At one stage, ‘members of the Karijini Aboriginal Corporation, which 
represented the interests of the Banyjima, Yinhawangka and Eastern Guruma people 
of the Hamersley Ranges, mobilised and occupied the construction site’ (Scambary 
2007: 98). 
Despite these concerns, some senior Aboriginal people also saw the potential 
benefits for their communities of the mine going ahead. Eastern Guruma man, Peter 
Stevens, told how he and Bunjima man, Horace Parker, took credit for their role in 
getting approval for the mine to go ahead (Holland-McNair 2006: 68): 
I started to have a direct relationship with Hamersley when they couldn’t get 
that Marandoo going. That land is important to me and my people because my 
Great Grandfather’s buried in the cave after being shot by white people. My 
Grandfather and Uncle and family also been living in that place. 
Hamersley wanted to mine Marandoo but those lawyers and Banyjima people 
had them by the finger and they couldn’t move. We sit back a bit for a while 
and see what’s going on. So me and old Horace Parker (Banyjima Elder), we 
the two straight guys me and old Horace Parker, we straight cause that’s our 
family too, putting the block on Marandoo. We got that Marandoo going, me 
and that old fella, with only the help of Carmen Lawrence’s sister Helen who 
was a lawyer to fight the battle against the Banyjima lawyers. Old Horace 
passed away now. They all passed away now the other old fellas. We pushed 
Marandoo, that’s why they got that Marandoo going.79  
Despite this support, Hamersley’s problems were compounded by the Marandoo 
deposit being in a national park. After a delay of two years, the State Government 
excised the mining lease from the national park in 1991 and passed the Aboriginal 
Heritage (Marandoo) Act 1992, excluding the area from the application of the 
Aboriginal Heritage Act.80 Eggleston comments (2002: 2), ‘This marked a low point 
                                                        
79 Ngimaliny, Peter Stevens, had also passed away by the time this account was published, 
but his family gave permission for his story to be included (Holland-McNair 2006: 66).  
80 In more recent years, Rio Tinto planned to approach the State government to have the 
Aboriginal Heritage (Marandoo) Act repealed. Perhaps surprisingly, the Eastern Guruma 
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in Aboriginal relationships for the Company which, regardless of the rights and 
wrongs of the case, left a legacy of deep distrust and bitterness in the communities’.  
Hamersley Iron’s first attempt to improve relationships in the aftermath of the 
Marandoo dispute was the establishment of their Aboriginal Training and Liason 
unit (ATAL) in 1992. ATAL’s primary role has been to improve training and 
employment opportunities for Pilbara Aboriginal people and the unit, and 
particularly the people like Bob Beeton, Stuart Robertson, and Mark Simpson who 
initially developed the program, are regarded by them with considerable affection.  
The major shift in the company’s approach, however, came with Leon Davis’s 
announcement in 1995 that CRA – as it then was – would work with the Native Title 
Act. In his speech, he also acknowledged that the ‘long drawn out struggle to get the 
official approvals necessary for Marandoo emphasis the need for an...innovative 
approach to the non-engineering aspects of the project’ (1995: 2). Planning for the 
next Pilbara mine at Yandicoogina provided the company with the opportunity to 
put Davis’s words about innovation into practice. 
3. Yandicoogina and the creation of Gumala 
Hamersley Iron’s planning for the development of their Yandicoogina leases in 
1994-95 was CRA’s first project to be undertaken in Western Australia after the 
passing of the Native Title Act at the end of 1993.81 Early consultation was 
undertaken in 1994 about the initial rail alignment, with the result that a route 
suggested by a senior Bunjima elder ‘was eventually adopted in preference to the 
company’s planned alignment’ (Eggleston 2002: 5). This was because of the 
potential heritage problems raised (Senior 1998: 2). At this stage, there were no 
native title claims lodged over the area and consultation took place outside the 
formal native title framework. So too did the company’s decision in 1995 to 
negotiate an agreement, though this was heavily influenced by Leon Davis’s March 
1995 public commitment to changing the way that CRA did business and by active 
support from senior management at Hamersley itself.  
Senior (1998: 2) suggests that, at these early stages, the process was ‘unilateral in 
character involving only Hamersley’. From Hamersley’s perspective, that may well 
have seemed the case. It does not represent the actions being taken by the affected 
groups. Their decisions were hammered out in a series of bush meetings in the first 
half of 1996 (Eggleston 2002: 6). These meetings were funded by Hamersley in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
people indicated some reluctance for this to happen (Bill Hart then Rio Tinto Iron Ore 
General Manager Communities, pers. comm.). 
81 Planning for the development of their Century Zinc project in Queensland was being 
undertaken at around the same time. 
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order to establish who were the right people with whom they should negotiate. 
Senior (1998: 5) suggests that this step to fund meetings outside Hamersley’s 
control was taken with some trepidation, one company executive likening the 
possible outcomes to ‘letting the tiger out of the bag and hanging onto the tail’. 
Whether the metaphor proved to be justified or not, the bush meetings resulted in 
the three groups deciding to join together in a single large native title claim that was 
lodged and registered with the National Native Title Tribunal in June 1996. This was 
the Bunjima Niapaili Innawonga claim (later Innawonga Bunjima Niapaili – IBN – 
claim). The claim was mapped and formulated without the support of the then 
Native Title Representative Body, the Pilbara Aboriginal Land Council (PALC), 
based in Port Hedland.82 Although the PALC was approached for support and 
funding, it declined to give either. This was on the basis of their view that the joint 
claim did not represent the proper traditional cultural boundaries that should have 
been separate for each of the three language groups (correspondence from Gumala 
Chair, Charles Smith, copied to the then Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Senator 
John Herron, 25 September 1998).  
What PALC’s position ignored was that the decision of the three groups was arrived 
at with the consent of senior people in all three groups: senior people, that is, with 
the authority to speak for and make decisions on behalf of their groups in relation to 
traditional matters, especially country. It also ignored the network of relationships, 
traditional and resulting from intermarriage, that connected people across the three 
groups. And, despite its own regional responsibilities, PALC failed to recognise the 
possibility of a more regional initiative that could build on native title as defined 
under the Native Title Act while, at the same time, working together on the basis of 
a common interest. 
Even after the claim was lodged, however, and in the absence of representation from 
the Native Title Representative Body, there remained the question of ‘how the three 
tribal groups should organise themselves and, in particular, whether they would 
choose to negotiate together or independently’ (Senior 1998: 7). The groups’ further 
collective decision was, in many ways, as innovative as Hamersley’s had been in 
choosing to negotiate. They set up a new organisation, Gumala – Bunjima word for 
‘all together’ – to represent, negotiate on behalf of, and bind its members. The 
organisation was incorporated in July 1996, just a month after the registration of 
the joint native title claim, with a committee of eighteen members, six from each of 
the three groups. Its first chair was Charles Smith, a young Bunjima man who had 
been a key player in developing the idea both of the claim and of an organisation 
with responsibility and authority to negotiate and implement an agreement. 
                                                        
82 The PALC’s role as a Native Title Representative Body ceased in 2000. 
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The Yandicoogina Land Use Agreement (the Yandi agreement) was signed eight 
months later, in March 1997. The negotiations had been tough, there were internal 
tensions within Gumala, there had been occasions when all looked lost but, in the 
end, the process worked and the alliance of the three Gumala groups held. Although 
negotiated outside the formal framework of the Native Title Act, the Yandi 
agreement was the first major native title resource agreement to be finalised after 
the passing of that Act, pipping the much more public Century Zinc agreement in 
Queensland by six months.83  
4. Gumala and the Yandi agreement 
The Yandi agreement itself is confidential, so many details are not in the public 
arena. The key provisions and general structure, however, are known and are set out 
on the Gumala web site (www.gumala.com.au). The benefits to be provided for 
Gumala members over the life of the mine include education, training, and 
employment opportunities and initiatives; support for pastoral station operations; 
heritage protection work; in-kind assistance for community development; 
community development; health and well-being programs; and financial benefits. 
Two charitable trusts were established for the distribution of income from the 
agreement: the General Gumala Foundation, that was to last for the life of the 
agreement, and the Foundation for the Elderly and Infirm for the first five years. 
The General Gumala Foundation is now the only trust still operating. No cash 
payments are made directly to individual members. 
4.1 Architecture of the agreement implementation 
The structure established to implement the agreement has three core components: 
Gumala Aboriginal Corporation (GAC), Gumala Investments Pty Ltd (GIPL), and 
Gumala Enterprises Pty Ltd (GEPL). From 2009, GAC’s Board was made up of nine 
                                                        
83 The Century Zinc negotiations were also between CRA and Gulf native title claimants 
though the agreement was finally signed after the mine had been sold to Pasminco.  In this 
instance, CRA chose to carry out the negotiations under the Native Title Act’s Right to 
Negotiate processes.  The Queensland government issued a s29 notice but CRA and 
subsequently Pasminco continued the negotiations well beyond the statutory period 
required by the Native Title Act. Although the proceedings were eventually referred to the 
Native Title Tribunal for arbitration, the parties finally reached agreement through 
mediation. The Gulf Communities Agreement was signed in September 1997. 
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of the Gumala members,84 three elected from each of the language groups – 
Bunjima, Innawonga, and Nyiyaparli – and is the organisational heart of these 
arrangements; but, up until changes in train in 2011 to the agreement structure, 
GAC does not directly control the money paid as part of the agreement.  
This money goes directly to the General Gumala Foundation and GIPL acts as the 
trustee. GIPL is wholly owned, but not controlled, by GAC On the contrary: the 
Trust deed sets out that GIPL has the power to ‘direct, supervise, and control the 
manager’, the manager being GAC. The GIPL Board is made up of six Directors: one 
from each of the language groups and three independent Directors. The independent 
trustees, not the whole Board, appoint the Chair who, in the case of a tied vote, has 
the casting vote; and, if one independent Director resigns, the other two 
independent Directors – again, not the whole Board – can appoint a new one. The 
power in these arrangements, which is ultimately about the money, rests clearly 
with the independent Directors. 
GAC’s role in relation to the distribution of money is to make recommendations to 
GIPL. The recommendations are made after GAC has consulted with the traditional 
owners and developed, researched, and prepared proposals for investments, 
community projects, and other matters falling within the objects of the General 
Foundation. However, it is GIPL, as the trustee, that makes the actual decisions 
about how the money in the General Foundation is to be used. The agreement also 
provided for an Advisory Trustee Company to give independent advice to GIPL on 
significant investments and other such decisions, to make policy recommendations, 
and to exercise general oversight over the Foundation’s operations. The Advisory 
Trustee Company was initially for the first ten years only but has been reconstituted 
and modified. It is to comprise four members, two from Rio Tinto85 and two from 
GAC, with a Rio Tinto member to be Chair and to have a casting vote. Its role is to 
provide high level governance advice, though it has some other responsibilities that 
will be looked at below. Once the decisions are made, GAC then acts as the manager 
of the money, though GIPL retains responsibility for overseeing GAC’s 
implementation.  
In brief and in practice, the money from the agreement goes to the General 
Foundation. GAC makes recommendations to GIPL. GIPL makes decisions about 
investment and distribution. GIPL oversees investments. GAC manages the funds it 
                                                        
84 This is reduced from the original eighteen, with six from each group, following a 2009  
restructure required under the new Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) 
Act 2006 (CATSI Act) (Gumala Aboriginal Corporation Annual Report 2008-09: 7) 
85 No one under the rank of Rio Tinto Iron Ore General Manager can sit on the Advisory 
Trustee company. 
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receives from the Foundation. The funds that go to GAC are used for organisational 
costs and community projects approved by GIPL.  
The agreement also stipulates the breakdown for the money: investments are to be 
not less than 40%; education and training not less than 10%; business development 
not less than 20%; community development not less than 20%; cultural purposes up 
to 5%; and other discretionary purposes up to 5%. 
This multiform governance structure put in place by the agreement is more a 
reflection of Rio Tinto’s prudential requirements than of the relatively simple 
organisation initially crafted by the claimant groups to be the joint negotiating and 
implementing body for the agreement. The Ngarluma Aboriginal Corporation’s trust 
arrangements described in paper 2 exemplify comparable, though less torturous, 
requirements.86  
Rio Tinto’s principles and approach, modified but basically unchanged after more 
than a decade of making large agreements,87 were set out in 2009 in a presentation 
by then Rio Tinto Iron Ore’s John Litchfield:88 
 native title agreements are commercial negotiations; 
 the quantum of benefits is linked to market outcomes, including scale of 
operations, production capacity, and price; 
 the approach to negotiation and the implementation of native title 
agreements includes development of appropriate governance arrangements 
and effective ‘checks and balances’ in relation to benefits, consistent with 
Rio Tinto policy and the Native Title Act. 
The presentation also set out Rio Tinto’s negotiating position on financial benefits 
management structures, that: 
 the entire native title group must benefit; 
 benefits to future generations are catered for; 
                                                        
86 As do the Argyle and Western Cape Communities Co-existence trust arrangements.  
87 In Australia: the Gulf Communities Agreement (Century Zinc) in 1997, the Western Cape 
Communities Co-existence Agreement in 2001, the Argyle Participation Agreement in 2004; 
in Canada, the Diavik Diamond Mine Participation Agreements in 2000. Rio Tinto now also 
administers the Ranger Mining Agreement in the Northern Territory that predates its 
takeover of ERA in 2000. 
88 Rio Tinto Iron Ore’s Pilbara Native Title Negotiations, presentation to the Native Title 
and Cultural Heritage 2009 conference, Marriott Hotel, Brisbane, 27 October. 
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 the native title groups must use a suitable trust structure, and consider tax 
issues and administrative costs; 
 Rio Tinto must have access to audit reports; 
 Rio Tinto and the native title group must agree on the final financial benefits 
management structure. 
Central to Rio Tinto’s concern is sustainability: that money generated from its 
agreements not be dissipated but should benefit Aboriginal people over the long-
term. Their view, rightly, is that good governance arrangements are essential for 
this to happen. Martin argues in support of this principle (2009: 109-10): 
If good organisational governance is a core component of an increased capacity 
by Aboriginal people for strategic engagement with the dominant society, then 
it must draw not only from the values and practices of Aboriginal people, but 
also from those of the general Australian society. While the possibility of 
distinctive values and practices must be accepted as a basic premise in 
institutional design, the essence of developing appropriate Aboriginal 
organisational governance does not lie in supposedly resolving potentially 
conflicting cultural values and practices; rather, it is to be undertaken through 
establishing institutional structures and principles which are robust enough to 
encompass and engage diversity, competition and conflict, and which are 
appropriate to the task at hand. 
4.2 Areas of member dissatisfaction 
Nevertheless, more than ten years on, the Gumala experience suggests that the Rio 
Tinto model is not foolproof. There have certainly been gains for the Gumala 
groups. There has been a growing capital base through investments. It is reported 
that, as at June 2007, GIPL held approximately $20 million (Siopis J,Gumala 
Investments Pty Ltd v Lethbridge, paragraph 2)89, although anecdotal comments 
gave a figure closer to $40 million (Holcombe 2009: 154). The third arm of the 
organisational structure – Gumala Enterprise Pty Ltd (GEPL) – is engaging in 
business activities that will be looked at in more detail below. The membership of 
Gumala has grown from a modest 132 in June 1997 to 1138 in June 2010 (Annual 
Report 2009-2010: 13), and continues to grow to the point that GAC is 
reconsidering the criteria for membership.90  
However, member dissatisfaction with the arrangements focus on two key areas. 
One is the restriction of funding to community projects, with no provision for 
                                                        
89 [2007] FCA 934 (14 June 2007). 
90 Interview with Chief Executive, Steve Mav, 27 May 2011. 
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payments to individuals and therefore a sense among members that they have no 
access to or control over the compensation moneys. The other is the absence of 
opportunity for the beneficiaries of the Foundation to participate in GIPL’s 
decision-making processes, leaving them with no sense of ownership of the 
Foundation. 
Experience of the first restriction led to the same broad claimant groups negotiating 
a different organisational arrangement with BHP Billiton when they signed 
agreements over BHP’s Area C mine (BHP Yandi) in 2000-2001. Similarly to Rio 
Tinto, BHP Billiton requires groups to establish trust or foundation structures for 
the management of financial benefits. The traditional owner negotiations for the 
Area C agreement were led by the same man, Charles Smith, who had been 
instrumental in the Rio Tinto negotiations and had been the first Gumala Chair. 
When not reappointed for a second term, he developed a separate organisation to 
engage with BHP Billiton, citing the negotiation of the Rio Tinto agreement as a 
learning curve (Holcombe 2009: 166). 
The Area C agreements set up the IBN Corporation to act as trustee. Membership of 
the IBN Corporation is also open only to Innawonga, Bunjima, and Nyiyaparli 
people and overlaps with the Gumala membership, although the claimant groups 
were differently constituted by the time of the Area C agreements and certain 
Gumala members are excluded.91 In contrast to Gumala, the IBN Corporation has 
two trusts: a charitable trust, IBN Foundation No. 1 Trust, and a non-charitable 
(taxable) trust, IBN Financial Assistance Trust No. 2. Benefits from the Financial 
Assistance Trust are distributed through four smaller individual group Aboriginal 
Corporations (Scambary 2007: 202). Individuals must be a member of one of these 
small corporations to receive cash payments, with corporation committee members 
deciding on a final distribution of funds. Indications are that, even with the option 
of direct cash payments, the process does not work very effectively in practice 
(2007: 204). 
In submissions to the Federal Government in 2010, both GAC and the IBN 
Corporation identified the restrictive nature of charitable trusts as a matter of 
concern. The GAC submission quoted one of its members, ‘We feel as if we won the 
lottery, but someone else came along and ran away with all the money’ (Gumala 
Aboriginal Corporation 2010: 12). 
The second key area of dissatisfaction, of the relationship between the beneficiaries 
and the Foundation, is one that has grown since the Yandi agreement. It came to a 
head in 2007, when GAC attempted to liquidate GIPL in order to gain control over 
the distribution of Foundation funds.  
                                                        
91 These issues will be dealt with later in the paper. 
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4.3 The challenge of internal and intercultural tensions 
Despite the presence of three Gumala members as GIPL Directors, Gumala members 
in general expressed their frustration that decisions were strongly influenced from 
Perth by the independent Directors who, in their view, were remote from the real 
issues that concerned Aboriginal people in the Pilbara. The dispute was taken to 
court, when GIPL successfully applied for an injunction against GAC’s taking the 
necessary action to achieve their liquidation (Gumala Investments Pty Ltd v 
Lethbridge 2007). A mediated settlement, the Dampier Agreement, was 
subsequently reached in 2007 (Holcombe 2009: 156) and the following year, a 
review of the Foundation – a second review – was undertaken by the Parakeelya 
group from South Australia. Their report included recommendations for changes in 
governance and in the relationship between GAC and GIPL.  
In the same year, 2008, a new Chief Executive, Steve Mav, was appointed. He 
arrived at a moment when the Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations 
(ORIC) decided to conduct the first group examination of entities not yet registered 
under the new CATSI Act. This was in the wake of the 2007 court case, when the 
GIPL Board had raised concerns with ORIC about GAC, as a result of which ORIC 
had imposed conditions on GAC. The status of the Gumala review is illustrated by 
the personal oversight of the ORIC Registrar, Anthony Bevan (Annual Report 2008-
09: 8). Gumala emerged unscathed from this major examination of their books and 
the ORIC conditions were revoked.  
GIPL – registered with ASIC under the Corporations Act rather than under the 
CATSI Act – did not fare so well, with their auditor identifying certain problems. 
This was after a period of detente between GAC and GIPL throughout 2008 and 
became part of a general deterioration in the internal functioning of GIPL and in the 
relations between GIPL and GAC, in which Rio Tinto also become closely involved. 
In 2009, the second five-yearly review of the Yandi Land Use Agreement (YLUA), 
required by the agreement itself, was carried out by the Hon. Fred Chaney and 
former Tasmanian Premier, Paul Lennon. Like the Parakeelya review, their report, 
submitted in November 2009, recommended completion of the restructuring of the 
Gumala Foundation and supported a merger between GAC and GIPL (Annual Report 
2010: 10).  
Despite the clear recommendations from all the reviews for this to happen, and an 
in-principle agreement to the merger by GIPL in December 2009, the 
implementation was never going to be simple. It is difficult to say whether it might 
have been more expeditious, though resistance by some of the GIPL independent 
Directors undoubtedly prolonged the process. It has only been in the latter half of 
2011, nearly two years after the Chaney/Lennon recommendations, that firm 
provisions have finally been put in place to make it happen. The result in essence is 
that GAC will become the trustee of the Foundation as well as the manager. GIPL’s 
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role as trustee will disappear. There will be provision on the GAC Board for 
independent Directors. The reconstituted Advisory Trustee will hold a critical 
performance review of GAC operations every year. If at any stage they have grounds 
to believe that GAC is in material breach, grounds for which they have to give 
reasons, they can appoint someone to review the books. If GAC does not then 
remedy the breach, a special meeting of the beneficiaries can be called to remove 
GAC as the trustee.92  
A meeting of the newly elected GAC Board in September 2011 may mark an end to 
this period of turmoil. Because of the importance of the changes being made, and to 
confirm the endorsement given by the membership at the Annual General Meeting 
and Extraordinary General Meeting held in April 2011, some of Gumala’s most 
senior Elders attended the Board meeting as observers. One of the decisions of the 
Board was to expand the number of Directors from nine to twelve, with the 
appointment of three Elders, one from each of the three language groups (Gumala 
media release 29 September 2011; www.oric.gov.au). Steve Mav was also 
reappointed as Chief Executive, in a decision by the Board to consolidate the 
extensive reforms undertaken in his first term. These reforms were not only 
structural but very much aimed also at improving services to members. 
4.4 Gumala member services 
In pursuing the convolutions of Gumala’s governance arrangements, it is easy to 
lose sight of the purpose of the Yandi agreement, which is to provide benefits to 
members in return for their agreement for mining operations to go ahead. In 2008-
2009, as part of the restructure, GAC set up a Members’ Services Unit to cater better 
for individual circumstances. The programs include (Holcombe 2009: 160): 
sport and recreation, financial support for funerals and headstones, emergency 
assistance, a pensioner program, critically ill patient support, health and 
wellbeing programs, dental and ancilliary health, computers for students, a 
scholarship scheme..., and home loans. 
Gumala has also negotiated an agreement with St John’s Ambulance WA Inc, 
whereby GAC pays the annual subscriptions for 2010-2011 for all the registered 
members, which covers the costs associated in using an Ambulance 
(www.gumala.com.au). While this does not cover Gumala members living outside 
WA, GAC has offered to pay membership cover for St John’s Ambulance in the 
relevant State. 
Further initiatives were developed in 2010. GAC and Murdoch University, with 
additional funding from Rio Tinto, signed an agreement for Murdoch University to 
                                                        
92 Interview with Chief Executive, Steve Mav, 27 May 2011. 
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complete a health and education needs analysis of Gumala members and their 
children. In the 2010-2011 financial year, more than $11 million was being spent on 
member’s programs, over a 1000% increase in three years from the $1 million being 
spent before the restructure. 93 A Christmas cash bonus of $2900 is available for all 
Gumala members aged 50 or over (Gumala News Summer 2010-11, Autumn 2011). 
Spending on education in the 2011-2012 financial year is estimated at about $3 
million. Partnership has been established with the University of Melbourne, with its 
first outcome being the developing of an early childhood centre at the small 
community of Wakuthuni, near Tom Price, together with an early childhood 
education and care program. GAC, the Wakuthuni community, and the University of 
Melbourne, including post-graduate architecture students, worked together 
throughout. The centre was opened in July 2001 (Gumala News, August 2011). A 
further component of the Melbourne University partnership is a housing project, 
with plans for 150 houses in three years. GAC has already bought ten residential lots 
in South Hedland and seven in Tom Price. 
Another service is Gumala radio, which began broadcasting in 2002. It is a fully-
licensed community radio station transmitting to surrounding Aboriginal 
communities. Like other Aboriginal community radio stations, it is a key source of 
entertainment, cultural and language reinforcement, and information for remote 
communities. And it is unusual in the Gumala stable of services in that it reaches 
beyond the Gumala membership to whichever people are in its receiving range. 
It appears that, despite the organisational difficulties, there has been a greater 
orientation over recent years towards delivering benefits to members and ensuring 
that that will remain firmly in place in the future. The governance and 
administrative restructure has been pivotal to achieving this, and has undoubtedly 
increased Gumala’s capacity to engage both with its membership and with the 
broader Australian society (Martin 2009: 109-10). It is arguable, however, that the 
difficulties have been compounded by the tightly structured arrangements for 
control and distribution of funds. Smith (2005: 8) argues that  
regionalised governance cannot be imposed from the top down. Or rather it 
can be, but it will not easily be recognised as having legitimacy or credibility. 
Gumala is not a fully regionalised body, but its membership of combined language 
groups gives it some claim to some characteristics of this status. Rio Tinto’s concern 
has been that the financial benefits from the Yandi, and subsequent, agreements 
should not be squandered and asserts its responsibility to ensure that this does not 
                                                        
93 This amount of funding and grants also relates to an increase in the number of members 
over the same three-year period, from around 750 in 2008 to nearly 1150 in 2010 (2010 
Annual Report). 
198 
 
happen (Litchfield 2009). The Gumala experience, and in particular the recent 
restructuring of the governance arrangements, suggests that the exercise of this 
responsibility itself defeated the benign objectives of the agreement by imposing too 
much control. Such a conclusion is supported by the less stringent, though still 
prudent, structure for the Ngarluma trust (paper 2). It appears that Rio Tinto has 
learnt from its experiences. But so, too, has Gumala. It remains to be seen whether 
it has finally achieved the cultural legitimacy with its members that it has struggled 
to attain. 
4.5 Characteristics of Indigenous governance and representation 
In addition to the findings with respect to cultural legitimacy, the research carried 
out across multiple sites by the Indigenous Community Governance Project suggest 
that there are other sources of tension that derive from Aboriginal values and 
practices themselves (Hunt and Smith 2006: 10): 
In all the community case studies, we found Indigenous extended families of 
polity forming the backbone of governance arrangements and especially 
organisational modes of governance. Not all families are born equal; some are 
demographically and politically more ‘equal’ than other families. Some families 
are larger than others, and some senior family members are more influential 
sources of authority in community life than others. Senior members of 
traditional land-owner groups...have particularly powerful rights and interests 
that permeate all areas of community governance. 
Sometimes informal family coalitions and alliances have become evident in the 
establishment of particular organisations to represent the combined interests 
of families and communities of identity within a settlement or region. In these 
ways, familial descent-group identity has become linked to the concept of 
‘community’, and to community organisational governance and forms of 
political representation. There is thus an extremely influential ‘genealogy of 
governance’ which operates in communities and across regions...All the case 
studies confirm that the familial and genealogical parameters of Indigenous 
community and regional governance are critical to the success of any policy 
implementation and capacity development initiatives around governance. 
Hunt and Smith continue (2006: 10-11): 
Community organisations are enmeshed within the webs of social, ceremonial, 
political and resource relationships that characterise Indigenous societies. 
Organisational governance is intimately linked to, and influenced by, 
Indigenous ‘traditional’ or ‘classical’ systems of governance where groups 
exercise rights, interests and responsibilities that are derived from traditional 
jurisdictions, laws and customs, recognised codes of behaviour, institutions 
and shared values. Every case study has highlighted the fact that Indigenous 
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groups are actively designing contemporary governance arrangements that are 
informed by their diverse cultural institutions and traditional land-ownership 
jurisdictions. 
I have quoted these research findings at some length because they identify some of 
the key dilemmas facing Gumala and the basis of some of the ongoing tensions 
arising from ‘distinctive Aboriginal worldviews, beliefs and practices in which 
connections to country and kin are very significant’ (Martin 2009: 101). These 
tensions manifested themselves quite early, not just within Gumala itself, but also 
within its component groups. The result was the splitting of two of the groups, 
Bunjima and Innawonga. In 1997, only a few months after the signing of the Yandi 
agreement, a group of Innawonga families lodged a separate Gobawarrah 
Minduarrah Yinhawanga (GMY) claim outside the Innawong, Bunjima, Nyiyaparli 
(IBN) claim area. In 1998, much of the GMY claim area was overlapped by a new 
Innawonga claim. In 1998 also, the Martu Idja Bunjima (MIB) – the bottom-end or 
Fortescue Bunjima – lodged a new native title claim that distinguished them from 
the top-end Bunjima. Their claim overlaps the IBN claim. In 1999, in a move 
intended by all three claim groups from the beginning, the Nyiyaparli separated 
their claim area from the IBN claim area and, in 2001, completed negotiations with 
the now IB claimants to resolve any overlaps.  
These new configurations played a role in the negotiations for the BHP Area C 
agreements. Unlike the single Yandi agreement, there are three separate agreements 
for Area C: a 2000 agreement with MIB; a 2001 agreement with IBN; and a third 
agreement with Nyiyaparli claimants in relation to the power-line corridor to the 
mine. The MIB, as a requirement of the agreement, set up their own Martu Idja 
Banjyma charitable trust distinct from the IBN trusts. Moreover, the IBN 
Corporation restricts MIB and GMY members from joining, ‘on the basis that GMY 
and MIB have entered into discrete payments with mining companies, and that they 
had not shared the benefits with the broader Yinhawangka, Banyjima, and 
Nyiyaparli coalition’ (Scambary 2007: 200).94 
This tendency towards atomism has been looked at in earlier papers and is 
described by Sutton (2003: 85): 
A tension between atomism and collectivism appears at more than one point in 
the processes by which Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people seek to 
achieve legal recognition of their title to traditional land and sea areas. Where 
small landed groups belong to larger congeries, and also may overlap 
                                                        
94 The separate GMY agreement was with Robe River over the West Angelas mine. When Rio 
Tinto acquired Robe River as part of its takeover of North in 2000, they also took over 
responsibility for this agreement.  
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considerably in memberships and geographical scope, subgroups may pursue 
their interests rather atomically unless convinced that their interests are better 
served by some form of coalition. 
The tendency was further manifested in 2009, when one of the smaller corporations 
under the IBN Corporation umbrella – the Milyuranpa Banjyma corporation – went 
to the Supreme Court of WA in an attempt to be recognised as a separate group 
within the IBN Foundation. The Court dismissed the application.95 In 2009 also, the 
Native Title Tribunal undertook mediation with the Bunjima and MIB claim groups 
with a view to their combining into a single Bunjima claim. At the date of writing, 
no registered agreement had been reached, and the MIB claim was programmed for 
trial in June 2011 (Martu Idja Banjyma Charitable Trust Annual Report 2009: 9).  
Conversely, there are moves to recombine the Innawonga and GMY claims into a 
single claim, a move to which both groups have agreed. The other significant 
change, already agreed to although not yet implemented, is the separation of the 
Innawonga Bunjima claim into separate Bunjima and Innawonga claims. This 
change does not reflect a process of atomism but an agreed redefining of the claim 
areas to meet the exigencies of the native title determination process. 
What is significant for the Yandi agreement is that, despite all these changes, 
members of all three of the original IBN group remain members of Gumala, 
continue to serve on the Board of Directors, and remain beneficiaries of the Gumala 
trust. The politics of representation are fraught, but the Gumala experience suggests 
that they are to some extent being slowly redefined by the native title and 
particularly by the agreement process. Martin argues the possibility for agreement 
governance to be transformative, with (2009: 100, 108-109): 
possibilities for Aboriginal people to construct their futures through explicitly 
transformative processes involving engagement with the institutions of the 
dominant society. Such processes can enable claimants to negotiate ways to 
have their interests and certain of their rights recognised and aspirations met 
(including for development), without these having to be refracted through the 
distorting lens of traditionalism. That is, in contrast to native title claims, 
agreements are potentially privately resourced and optional projects of 
modernism. 
Gumala may not completely fit this description, nor manage to meet all the 
expectations of its members, but its longevity – in terms of a collective Aboriginal 
organisation – suggests that it does meet some of the criteria and has the potential 
to do so further. Rio Tinto continues its active involvement, some direct, some 
indirect such as training through ATAL. ATAL training pre-dates and is not confined 
                                                        
95 IBN Corporation Pty Ltd v Banjyma Aboriginal Corporation [2009] WASC 279. 
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to implementation of the Yandi agreement, but company employment records 
provided by ATAL indicate that from 1992–2003, 53 Indigenous apprenticeships 
had been commenced, and 113 traineeships had been undertaken with a 90% 
retention rate overall. The same records indicate that graduate employment was 
83%, with 72% employed within Rio Tinto (ATAL 2003, cited in Scambary 2007: 
104). 
This leaves open the question: what role does government play in all this?   
5. Recent government approaches to native title 
agreement-making and benefits 
Neither the State nor Federal Governments is a party to the Yandi agreement. Nor, 
on the basis of the findings of the Taylor and Scambary (2005) study, had either 
government operated effectively for Aboriginal people in the Pilbara, nor indeed for 
Pilbara residents more generally, since resource companies began their large-scale 
operations in the 1960s. Edmunds (1989: 46-47) observes: 
When the Western Australian government signed its agreements with the 
major iron ore companies after 1960...,it accepted in principle a contract in 
which these companies guaranteed a particular level of resource development 
and made social development entirely dependent on and subsidiary to it. In the 
Roebourne region, the government maintained its legitimate role of 
participation in the planning of development infrastructure – the new towns, 
roads and water supply. What it ceded to the companies was the control of that 
development and its social consequences. 
Commenting on the Taylor and Scambary (2005) findings, Altman (2009: 37) 
summarises: 
The authors found that, despite strong demand for Indigenous labour, there 
were significant problems on the supply side owing to poor education, health, 
substance abuse and high interaction with the criminal justice system. Much of 
this was linked to state neglect over the past 40 years. 
The Commonwealth Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs (FAHCSIA), Jenny Macklin, acknowledged the national 
application of this situation in her Mabo anniversary speech to the 2010 Native Title 
Conference (www.jennymacklin.fahcsia.gov.au/speeches/2010/):  
All of you here are only too familiar with what’s been described as ‘the great 
Australian paradox’. Where the traditional owners of resource-rich land are 
the most disadvantaged and poorest people living on it. Where the many 
successful initiatives of Indigenous leaders and organisations co-exist with 
community dysfunction...This paradox has seen generations of children grow 
up in appalling poverty, with frightening levels of overcrowding, high arrest 
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and incarceration rates, disturbing levels of violence, neglect and endemic 
unemployment. 
What we are confronting has been generations in the making. It didn’t happen 
overnight and it won’t be fixed overnight...We are addressing decades of 
under-investment in service, infrastructure and governance by successive 
governments. 
In her speech, the Minister announced a number of measures and proposed 
measures to address this situation. Much of her focus was on ‘the challenges we face 
in maximising the potential of native title as a platform for long-term Indigenous 
economic development, now and for generations to come’. She identified two 
principal areas for reform in order to achieve this: tax and governance. 
5.1 Taxation proposals 
In May 2010, the government had released a consultation paper, ‘Native title, 
Indigenous economic development and tax’. The paper was the result of several 
years of discussion after the Australian Tax Office (ATO) had become aware of the 
level of accumulation in the charitable trusts set up in 2005 as part of the 
implementation of the Argyle Participation Agreement. The position of the ATO was 
that the purposes of charitable trusts are for distribution, not accumulation, a 
position that would run directly counter to the principle of ensuring benefits for 
future generations.  
After preliminary discussion, the Commonwealth Government established a Native 
Title Payments Working Group in 2008 to advise the Government. The Working 
Group submitted its report in early 2009. Its recommendations covered provision of 
information and support for best practice agreement provisions; government 
investment in developing a pool of ‘work-ready’ Indigenous Australians who could 
be employed in the mining and associated industries; favourable tax treatment for 
model trust deeds that have an intergenerational benefit; changes to the current tax 
policy on accumulation in charitable trusts; and tax incentives to companies for 
both financial payments and capacity building. Recommendation 11 sets out that:  
Consideration should be given to the provision of full and immediate tax 
deductibility (on a flow through basis) for expenditure on the establishment of 
community infrastructure, recognising that industry investment is undertaken 
in an absence of government investment and where there is significant market 
failure. Such an approach would recognise that this is essential expenditure, 
akin to capital works and R&D.  
Acceptance by government of such a recommendation would go some way towards 
addressing the – again national – problem of what has been termed ‘substitution 
funding’. There has been a substantial literature on this issue for more than two 
decades, but it is summarised by Altman and Jordan (2008: 3) as:  
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substitutes for essential programs received by most Australians as citizenship 
entitlements...Communities can be forced to rely on payments from mining 
companies to provide basic services and utilities, rather than such payments 
being viewed as private and compensatory and hence to be utilised at the 
discretion of recipients in  areas affected by mining.  
In the Pilbara, the major resource companies all provide infrastructure support – 
grading of roads, water tanks, bores, cyclone cleanup, sometimes electricity – 
especially to Aboriginal communities on homelands or outstations. In the past, the 
pipeline or mine roads were the main or only access to small communities like 
Ngurawaana, some 130 kilometres from Roebourne in the Millstream/Chichester 
National Park.96 The introduction of Royalties for Regions and the provision of 
funding for some approved projects, such as the assessment of options for providing 
potable water to the 5 Mile (Mingullathando) settlement near Roebourne, offers 
some supplementary funding but is unlikely to replace the assistance that Aboriginal 
communities have come to expect from resource companies, and that resource 
companies are in general willing to continue.  
The Commonwealth Government reissued its consultation paper on Native Title, 
Indigenous economic development and tax in October 2010, this time with the 
Department of the Treasury as the lead government department. The paper 
canvasses a number of options, none of which take up recommendation 11, or indeed 
a number of other recommendations, of the Native Title Payments Working Group 
report. Instead, it outlines a number of other possibilities. These include income tax 
exemption for native title agreements; a new kind of entity referred to as an 
Indigenous Community Fund; and a native title withholding tax. The latter (October 
2010: 14):  
would require parties who make payments for the suspension of native title 
rights and interests to withhold an amount of tax (4 per cent was the rate 
proposed) and pass it to the ATO before the payment goes to the native title 
holders. The rest of the payment would then be income tax exempt if on-
distributed to the native title holders or their representative body.  
                                                        
96 The term is applied not only to resource company activities. Altman and Jordan point out 
that ‘from 1990 to 2004 ATSIC-funded organisations were often expected to administer the 
programs of other agencies’. They also identify CDEP organisations as being required ‘to 
provide infrastructure and services in the absence of any other provider...allowing all levels 
of government to renege on their responsibilities to fund infrastructure and services in 
Aboriginal communities’. A classic CDEP service in many remote Aboriginal communities 
has been garbage collection. In light of this situation, another effect of the abolition of 
CDEP wage provision will be the winding back of these services unless there is clear 
government provision, including adequate funding, to take over these activities. 
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In its submission in response to the paper, the IBN Corporation, in addition to its 
comments on the limitations of charitable trusts, put forward a view that reflects a 
view very widely-held among Pilbara Aboriginal people, that is that (2010: 5):   
Whilst protection of capital for future generations is important, freeing the 
current generation of Traditional Owners from poverty and financial 
destitution is more critical and Government needs to work with Traditional 
Owners to liberate funds and assist them in achieving their own economic 
independence and thereby bridging the gap with non-indigenous Australians. 
The submission also agrees that taxation reform of native title payments is long 
overdue, and ranks the three key proposals with income tax exemption as the 
highest and a new tax exempt vehicle such as an Indigenous Community Fund as the 
lowest. 
The Gumala submission likewise supports the option that ‘all native title payments 
should be tax exempt in the hands of traditional owners’ (2010: 7) and emphasises 
the need for changes that encourage and facilitate ‘the transition of traditional 
owners from welfare dependence to economic independence’ (2010: 17). It is silent 
on the subject of the withholding tax, but draws Canadian and United States tax 
regimes for Indigenous people to the government’s attention. 
Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation, the Native Title Representative Body that 
includes the Pilbara, supports the exemption of native title benefits from income 
tax; sees the greater flexibility offered by an Indigenous Community Fund as 
potentially useful; and is likewise silent on the subject of the withholding tax. 
Not surprisingly, BHP Billiton supports neither the proposal for a general tax 
exemption nor a withholding tax regime, though it does support the proposal for a 
new entity such as the Indigenous Community Fund (2010: 1, 3). 
More surprisingly, there is a joint submission from the Minerals Council of 
Australia and the National Native Title Council, suggesting a new level in the 
concept of partnership that is such a consistent theme in discussions and 
recommendations about closing the gap. The joint submission makes clear that ‘the 
overall principle applied by the MCA and NNTC in developing policy in this area [is] 
that payments related to native title should be tax-exempt’ (2010: 13) and does not 
support the withholding tax. The submission goes on to elaborate an alternative 
model to the Indigenous Community Fund; this is the Indigenous Community 
Development Corporation. As the proposal has regional implications, it will be dealt 
with in another paper (paper 5). 
At the time of writing this paper, no further public action has been taken by the 
Commonwealth on possible changes. An issue that is not tackled in either the 
consultation paper, or in the submissions, is the lack of any funding support for 
native title Prescribed Bodies Corporate (PBCs), the bodies set up to hold native 
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title after a determination. PBCs get a passing mention as part of the example 
offered in the Government’s consultation paper (October 2010: 16) and greater 
support for Native Title Representative Bodies to assist native title claimants is 
argued in Representative Body submissions, such as that from Yamatji Marlpa 
Aboriginal Corporation. The practical effect for native title groups is that, once 
native title is recognised, the group is effectively on its own. This is already the 
situation for the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi PBCs. In view of the growing number of 
native title determinations in the Pilbara, possibly including the Gumala members, 
this remains an issue of significance. 
5.2 Governance proposals 
The second area of proposed policy change for native title agreements97 identified by 
the Minister in her Mabo speech is the issue of governance. The Government raised 
some consultation questions in a discussion paper, ‘Leading practice agreements: 
maximising outcomes from native title benefits’, in July 2010. The paper sets out 
the principle on which the Government relies, that is, that ‘native title, particularly 
agreement-making, can play an important role in helping to close the gap between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians’ (2010: 4). Along with a practical 
proposal for Government to develop a ‘leading practice toolkit’ and suggestions 
about streamlining the Indigenous Land Use Agreement processes and clarifying 
good faith negotiations that would require amendments to the Native Title Act, the 
paper’s main proposal is the establishment of a new statutory function to receive, 
review, and register native title agreements. The function could be carried out by a 
new body, or possibly by an existing body such as the Office of Indigenous 
Corporations (ORIC). 
This proposal is a pale reflection of the recommendation made, on the basis of 
extensive research, by the Indigenous Community Governance Project  for the 
establishment of an Australian Indigenous Governance Institute (Hunt and Smith 
2007: xvi). The emphasis in this recommendation is a basic shift in approach from 
review and compliance to capacity building and support. An Australian Indigenous 
Governance Institute would fill the current gap in effective support for Indigenous 
governance structures and in sustained governance advice; training; oversee legal 
requirements; and disseminate best practice. This would be a broader role than 
ORIC’s and address governance issues in the establishment, rather than subsequent 
compliance, of corporations.  
Reconciliation Australia, which was a partner in the Indigenous Community 
Governance Project, points out to the Commonwealth Government that a fledgling 
                                                        
97 It is worth noting comprehensive government use of the rhetoric of ‘reform’ when what is 
actually meant is ‘change’. The use of ‘reform’ often masks what is simply policy turbulence.  
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Australian Indigenous Governance Institute has been established and is in a 
developmental phase. They recommend that government investigates the possibility 
of supporting the new body as a Centre of Excellence in practice and research for 
Indigenous governance. The submission also points out that Reconciliation 
Australia, in partnership with BHP Billiton, has already developed an Indigenous 
Governance Toolkit as an online training resource for Indigenous organisations 
(2010: 5-6). This would seem to preclude the proposed usefulness of government 
duplicating such a resource. 
The Government’s discussion paper fails to acknowledge the enormous pressure that 
has been placed on Indigenous organisations, not just in the Pilbara, but 
everywhere, by the dizzying changes in policy in the last six years with their 
insatiable demands for ever-changing implementation and compliance.  
For Indigenous communities and their organisations, the state does not exist 
‘up there’, at a disembodied remove from them. The sovereign governing power 
of the state is plain for Indigenous people to see on a daily basis. They 
experience it in the form of visiting public servants, the ever-changing rules of 
service delivery and funding, the deluge of information gathering by 
governments, and the burdensome routine of meetings and consultations 
(Smith 2008: 80). 
The paper also holds some potential stings: ones that are contrary to any serious 
input from Indigenous groups. One is that Government mandate the adoption of 
particular governance measures and leading practice principles by bodies that 
receive native title payments. Another relates to the consultation matters raised in 
the tax paper, that ‘any new tax treatment implemented in response to consultations 
on the Treasury Paper [be] conditional on entities that receive native title payments 
adopting the governance measures and leading practice principles’ (2010: 7). 
Eligibility of organisations for treatment under any new tax measures would be 
assessed as part of the flagged ‘review function’. Without in any way minimising the 
importance of good governance in Indigenous organisations, these possible 
measures seem more punitive than facilitating, and designed to undermine rather 
than support the capacity of Indigenous groups to manage their affairs 
appropriately. They are a return to the coercive rather than collaborative approach 
by government and are more likely to undermine rather than assist the development 
of good Aboriginal governance.98 
                                                        
98 Some perspective on how the government is approaching these proposals is perhaps to be 
found if they are seen in the broader perspective of disputes arising over the operation of 
trusts. In 2011, for example, three children of Australia’s richest person, Gina Rienhart, 
have gone to the NSW Supreme Court to have their mother removed as head of the family 
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5.3 Policy turbulence 
There is one further observation, perhaps a footnote, pertinent to the 
Commonwealth Government’s development of native title agreements policy. In 
2008, the Council of Australian Government’s (COAG’s) Native Title Ministers 
established a Joint Working Group on Indigenous Land Settlements. The aim of the 
Joint Working Group was to ‘develop innovative policy options for progressing 
broader and regional land settlements’ (Joint Working Group on Indigenous Land 
Settlements Terms of Reference 2009-2010). The Government’s ‘Leading practice 
agreements’ discussion paper refers to a workshop convened in April 2010 by the 
Joint Working Group and stated that the discussion paper ‘constitutes the 
Government’s initial response to the JWILS 2009-10 terms of reference and its 
response to the report of the Native Title Payments Working Group’ (2010: 5). 
In February 2011, COAG issued a communiqué announcing a ‘comprehensive reform 
plan for a new system of Ministerial Councils’ (13 February 2011: 4). The changes 
were to take place from 30 June 2011. In the new COAG Council System, the 
Ministerial Council for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs disappears. In 
its place, there is a COAG Working Group on ‘Indigenous reform’, one of three 
Working Groups. It appears that the Joint Working Group on Indigenous Land 
Settlements has survived for the moment, but it remains unclear what its role is or 
will be, or what might happen to the recommendations arising from its April 2010 
workshop. Its future direction, and the possibility of a revision of its terms of 
reference, are under consideration.99  
6. Gumala’s ongoing role 
In the midst of government policy consultations, changes, turbulence, of vertiginous 
levels of resource development, and of its own often volatile internal and member 
group interactions, Gumala keeps on keeping on. Its recent restructure has been 
extensive in an attempt to improve its own governance and to meet some of the 
structural problems, such as the relationship between GAC and GIPL, that have 
threatened to obstruct or derail the implementation of the Yandi agreement. 
The restructure has also been an attempt to resolve problems that arose over time 
with the third body established by the Yandi agreement, Gumala Enterprises Pty Ltd 
(GEPL). GEPL was set up to be the business arm of Gumala and is wholly owned by 
GAC. It receives some funding from the Foundation but is separately managed with 
a Board made up of seven members: three independent members, one Director from 
                                                                                                                                                                            
trust (The Australian 8-9 October, 2011). An application by Mrs Rinehart for a suppression 
order for the case to be heard in camara was rejected by the court. 
99 Note from Attorney-General’s Strategic Policy section, 25 May 2011. 
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each of the Gumala three native title groups and GAC’s chief executive. This was not 
always the case. Early tension emerged between GEPL and GIPL with the refusal of 
GIPL to release funds for the recruitment of a general manager (Scambary 2007: 
200).  
As part of the broader restructure, a new GEPL Board of Directors was put in place 
in 2008-2009 and GAC’s chief executive was appointed as GEPL’s Managing 
Director, (GAC Annual Report 2008-2009: 9), providing a more integrated 
relationship between the two bodies (Holcombe 2009: 160).   
GEPL has developed three divisions. The first of these, established in 1997, was 
Gumala Contracting, which is wholly owned and managed by GEPL. This was set up 
as a joint venture earthworks contracting business with Hamersley Iron (Scambary 
2007: 199) but now operates independently, though often as a contractor to Rio 
Tinto Iron Ore. In early 2009, the company was a finalist in the Rio Tinto Supplier 
Recognition Awards (www.gumala.com.au).  
GEPL’s second division ESS Gumala, is a joint venture with Compass Group 
Australia that provides catering, cleaning, management and other mine site 
hospitality services to mining companies around the Pilbara. ESS Gumala manages, 
to take just one example, the old Hamersley Iron workers’ accommodation, now 
Rocklea Palms motel, in Paraburdoo. The company has a 40% interest in the joint 
venture, which is now recognised as the third largest catering company in the state 
(http://geplcomau.melbourneitwebsites.com). The joint venture agreement was 
renewed in 2009 after twelve years of operation. 
The third, and newest, GEPL division is Gumala Tourism. At present, this is 
confined to the Karijini Eco Retreat, but that’s a grand confinement. Previously the 
Savannah Campground in Karijini National Park, GEPL worked with the former 
Department of Conservation and Land Management (CALM) to develop it into the 
Eco Retreat. This opened in 2007. In 2010, Brendon Grylls, Minister for Regional 
Development, announced a $1 million grant through the Royalties for Regions 
program, as part of the Pilbara Revitalisation Plan phase 2. It is planned to build an 
education and cultural amphitheatre and related facilities, a project dear to the 
heart of the traditional owners. 
Building on its experience and making use of its three divisions, GEPL is well placed 
to exploit business opportunities offered by the current resource development. If the 
Pilbara Cities program goes ahead, with Tom Price as a ‘major town’ and 
Paraburdoo as a ‘town’ there will be a construction bonanza.  
A continuing challenge is the level of Aboriginal employment across all of GEPL’s 
projects. In 2009, for example, there was only one Aboriginal employee at the 
Karijini Eco Lodge. Many of the others were backpackers: Irish, French, German. 
The situation is changing. In 2011, five Gumala members – the ‘Karijini girls’ – were 
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working as staff at the new Visitor’s Centre to welcome visitors and provide 
information. One of them, Margie Hughes, has been working in the Park for over 
fourteen years and had already won three Department of Environment and 
Conservation awards (Gumala News, August 2011). 
Through GEPL’s contracts, Gumala investments, and the possibilities opening up 
through Karijini Eco Retreat and tourism more generally, Gumala is beginning to 
diversify its sources of income. This is likely to be a major feature in allowing it to 
move away from reliance on a single source of income through the Yandi agreement, 
therefore providing sustainability in continuing its services to members and the 
possibility of greater durability as a result. The organisation is also starting to work 
more actively with other Aboriginal organisations, though it has tended to focus 
more on its own issues than in developing such networked links. However, it is 
currently working with Ashburton Aboriginal Corporation on training programs and 
is listed as a Registered Training Organisation. The Chair of Ashburton Aboriginal 
Corporation, Doreen James, is also one of the Elders appointed to the Gumala Board 
in the expansion of the number of Directors from nine to twelve in September 2011, 
suggesting a reinforcing of that link. 
It would appear, therefore, that, despite the problems that Gumala has faced since 
its establishment, including the pressure towards fission from its own members, the 
organisation has managed to meet the two connected criteria that the Indigenous 
Community Governance Project identified as essential for cultural legitimacy (Hunt 
and Smith 2007; paper 1). 
At the same time, the Indigenous Community Governance Project makes clear that 
(2007: xv):  
legitimacy is not static. Project research indicates that it is imperative that 
reforms to governance should arise out of strengthening Indigenous capacity 
to develop legitimacy, and be controlled by Indigenous people themselves. 
The current amendments to the Yandi agreement and to its governance structures 
have moved Gumala towards greater control by its members in the context of those 
members now having engaged in related participatory and governance processes for 
nearly fifteen years. Their experience has had its pitfalls, both internally and 
externally, but it appears that the organisational structures are now sufficiently 
robust to be able to deal adequately with decision-making and conflict, containing it 
within the appropriate internal space while the organisation continues to get on 
with business. 
7. Conclusions 
Gumala is clearly a very different organisation from the early Pilbara Aboriginal 
companies like Northern Development and Mining (Nodom), Pindan, and Nomads. 
Nor is it quite the ‘carapace’ conceived by Rowley. But its history does show some of 
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the same characteristics, ‘working out the changing standards of a new social order’; 
and that, ‘within the legal framework of a registered company, it is possible to come 
to terms with the hard facts of the local economy’ (1972: 255). In that sense, Gumala 
does appear to match the criterion of an Aboriginal organisation as a ‘point of 
articulation’ between both traditional and contemporary Aboriginal values and 
practices on the one hand and the demands of the broader society on the other. The 
space that it provides for self-determination, through the Yandi agreement process 
and subsequently, may be limited, but its creation was effected by the three native 
title groups themselves and proved a successful vehicle for the conduct of the 
negotiations. 
This raises the question about how success is measured, especially through the 
agreement implementation process. One measure is the external one of meeting 
corporation and accountability criteria. More important in terms of sustainability is 
whether the organisation retains cultural legitimacy. To date Gumala, sometimes 
shakily, has done so. In terms of the current resource ramp up, it is in a position to 
take advantage of opportunities but remains, as an organisation, to some extent 
buffered from the worst impacts because its existence is tied to the fortunes of a 
particular mining project. This is not true of its constituent members whose 
country, like that of the Nyiyaparli in particular, is subject to major mine planning. 
It may be that the real test of Gumala’s organisational strength, whether as carapace 
or intercultural domain, is yet to come. 
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14. Connections, continuities, 
and change - Martu and their 
country. 
Dr Mary Edmunds 
I was born at Kunawarritji [Well 33]. My father was born at Kinyu [Jarntu, 
well 35]...Kinyu belongs to many people: from the west, from the east, from 
the north and from the south. These people come from all over...This Country 
is for a lot of people. 
Roley Williams, in Yintakaja Lampajuya [these are our waterholes], 1988, 
pp180-184.100 
1. Introduction 
In 2007, artists from six of the nine Western Desert art centres came together on 
the first bush trip of what became the Canning Stock Route project, Yiwarra Kuju 
(one road). More than seventy people camped at Kilykily (Well 36) in Martu 
country. On different visits over the next three years, people told stories, painted, 
filmed, took photographs, recorded; and through these activities – another form of 
caring for country – revisited and reaffirmed the family and cultural networks that 
link the more than fifteen language groups that live across the region (National 
Museum of Australia 2010: 15): 
The term Ngurra kuju walyja, which translates literally as ‘Country one 
family’, describes not only the extraordinary degree to which people are related 
across the Canning Stock Route country, but also the pivotal relationship 
between people and the Country itself. Although specific families ‘belong to’, 
and maintain rights of ownership over, particular areas of Country, these areas 
are themselves related and interlinked through a matrix of Dreaming tracks or 
songlines, which trace the creation journeys of ancestral beings. 
These connections are not confined to the desert but run east and south, and further 
west to the coast. The Seven Sisters’ (Pleiades) journey, for example – Minyipuru 
Jukurrpa for Martu people – begins near Roebourne and many of the sites on their 
travels are now wells on the Canning Stock Route (2010: 53). Some Roebourne 
artists, for example Bunjima woman Janine Samson, also have the right to paint this 
story. The Yiwarra Kuju project was complemented by a sister project: the Rock Art 
                                                        
100 Quoted in National Museum of Australia 2010 Yiwarra Kuju, The Canning Stock Route, 
p81. 
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and Jukurrpa Australian Research Council linkage project (www.csr.anu.edu.au/), 
carried out over four years from 2007  
Both Canning Stock Route projects enlivened other connections: across generations, 
across new and different media and forms of representation, and between the 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal participants and their respective roles in relation to 
each other as the kind of partnership relation constantly emphasised by Aboriginal 
people. The project also traced ‘the movements, both human and artistic, that define 
the changing social landscape of the Western Desert in the twentieth century’ (2010: 
197). 
 The history of the Martu themselves is part of the Western Desert’s ‘changing social 
landscape in the twentieth century’.  For many of their old people, first contact with 
non-Aboriginal people (kartiya) has occurred within their lifetimes (Davenport, 
Johnson, and Yuwali 2010). The history of the Martu, then, illustrates vividly and 
immediately the consequences of contact, the impact of shifting government 
policies, and the various ways in which Martu people have acted and responded. 
2. Background 
2.1 The emergence of Martu 
The name ‘Martu’, or Martujarra, is itself a result of those changes. The term has 
developed as a post-contact collective to include a number of diverse but related 
desert language groups (www.wdlac.com.au).101 It is language based and means ‘one 
of us’ or ‘person’. The largest of these language groups are Manyjilyjarra and 
Kartujarra, but ‘Martu’ also includes some ten other language groups or linguistic 
units (Tonkinson 1974: 43; 1989: 107). Martu Wangka is the language that has 
developed from a combination of these languages.  
When the Western Desert language group communities moved in to Jigalong in 
the mid 20th century, members of the Kartujarra and Manyjilyjarra language 
groups lived side by side with other groups and Martu Wangka developed. The 
Martu Wangka language combines elements of Manyjilyjarra and Kartujarra 
with some Putijarra, Warnman and Nyiyaparli (www.wangkamaya.org.au).  
At the same time, the languages already had enough in common to be classified as 
dialects. ‘The existence of...many dialects does not detract from the unity of the 
group’ (Federal Court of Australia 2002: para. 9). 
                                                        
101 Anthropologist Robert Tonkinson, who has worked with Martu people since 1963, coined 
the collective term ‘Mardudjara’ (Martujarra) for ‘the people who lived in a wide area 
surrounding Lake Disappointment’ (Tonkinson 1989: 99-100).  
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Correlated with the physiographic and climatic commonalities of the Western 
Desert are its uniformities as a cultural bloc. Its Aboriginal inhabitants speak a 
common language with dialectical variations and share a similar basic social 
organization, relationship to the natural environment, religion, mythology, and 
artistic expression...The linguistic unit was a larger and more readily defined 
social unit, named for the dialect spoken by its members and composed of 
several contiguous local groups interrelated by marriage. Normally, such a unit 
occupied a specific area, with known but not precisely defined borders 
(Tonkinson 1974: 16, 17-18). 
The desert environment and the variability of rainfall and access to water and food 
resources reinforced the cultural permeability of boundaries between groups and 
the high levels of mobility both within and, importantly, across known and 
acknowledged territorial units. Contact between groups was essential both for 
physical survival and for the maintenance of defined but interconnected religious 
and cultural responsibilities. 
This same desert environment and variability of rainfall also served to delay contact 
between the Martu and European settlers. The latter were slow to tackle what they 
judged to be a harsh and hostile landscape. Even exploration was undertaken only at 
the end of the nineteenth century, with both the Calvert expedition, two of whose 
members died (Gallagher 1989: 143), and Frank Hann venturing into the region in 
1896. Hann left a legacy of European naming. In the east Pilbara, his journey 
brought him to Karlamilyi, a unique area in the Western Desert, 
being a major watercourse that contains reliable water sources, some of which 
can be safely classed as permanent. This attribute, plus the abundance of 
wildlife attracted to the watercourse and its environs, must have made it 
appear like a veritable oasis to the dwellers of the desert proper, so it is little 
wonder that the River region was well known to groups from over a wide area – 
both for its mythological origins, as a creation of the major creative beings, the 
Two Men (Wati Kujarra), and its significance as a food and water resource, 
especially in bad times (Tonkinson 1989: 108-09). 
Hann called it the Rudall River, after surveyor William Frederick Rudall. He also 
came across Kumpupirntily, a vast dry salt lake that, for Aboriginal people, is ‘one of 
the most dangerous areas in the Western Desert, [as] home to cannibal beings 
known as Ngayurnangalku’ (National Museum of Australia 2010: 61). Hann was 
looking for a fresh water lake. He expressed his feelings at what he found instead by 
naming the salt lake ‘Lake Disappointment’.  
In the early years of the twentieth century, small outposts – pastoral stations, 
mining settlements, railheads, and missions – were founded along the desert 
periphery and attracted small numbers of Martu and other Aboriginal groups, 
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mainly as temporary visitors although some as immigrants (Tonkinson 1974: 23). 
The first  
substantial encounter in the desert was brought by the conjunction of the 
economic aspirations of East Kimberley cattle producers and the political 
expediency of a government in Perth vulnerable to pressure from producers in 
the North-West and consumers of beef in the south (Gallagher 1989: 142). 
This was the expedition led by Alfred Canning in 1906-07 that established the 
Canning Stock Route.  
The establishment of Jigalong on the western edge of the Gibson Desert was another 
direct effect of policy. Jigalong was set up as a small depot for the maintenance of 
the rabbit proof fence when this was completed, also in 1907. It was also a camel-
breeding centre until the 1030s. The depot attracted some local Aboriginal people, 
but it was in the 1930s that desert people began to live there (Tonkinson 1974: 29-
30);102 in the  twenty years after World War II that many finally settled (Gallagher 
1989: 153); and not until 1964 that the last groups were brought in from the desert. 
One was a group of eight – one man, two women, two young men, and three children 
who were met at Well 31 (Gallagher 1989: 155). The other was a group of twenty 
Martu women and children, encountered near the Percival Lakes by two patrol 
officers. Welfare patrols had been sent out to ensure that no Aboriginal people 
would be in the area that would be affected by the British Blue Streak rocket’s first 
flight test in 1964 (Davenport et.al 2010; Contact 2010; 
www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/films/1951to1964/filmpage_rocket.htm).  
The Blue Streak rocket program began in Australia – at Emu Field and Maralinga in 
South Australia, and the Monte Bello islands off the Pilbara coast – in the 1950s. It 
was enthusiastically embraced by the Federal government, or at least by the then 
Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, who made ‘the secret and swift decision to allow 
Britain to test its nuclear weapons in Australia...without consulting his cabinet 
colleagues’. After the first atomic bomb test on land at Emu Field in 1953, he 
declared in response to a parliamentary question: ‘It has been stated most 
authoritatively that no conceivable injury to life, limb, or property could emerge 
from the test’ (Milliken 1986: 57-58). For desert Aboriginal people, including the 
Martu, isolation in this instance was not a protection.  
2.2 Martu responses to contact 
Nevertheless, the movement of Martu into settlements and towns was not all push. 
There were also pull factors as people made exploratory forays into the possibilities 
                                                        
102 In the years before his 1906 stock route expedition, Canning had also been involved in 
surveying the rabbit-proof fence (National Museum of Australia 2010: 33). 
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offered by these curious newcomers to their country.103 In the ‘Martu Mediation 
Report’ prepared by Tonkinson for the Martu native title claim, he writes that Martu 
people ‘rapidly acquired a strong desire for tea, flour, strong tobacco and sugar; as 
several Martu have described it, “We were captured by flour and sugar” ’ (cited in 
Shanks 2011: 74).  
Many of the stories about contact show how ready Aborigines were to 
incorporate the evidence of another world into their own. This is particularly 
true in the case of food...In the early [nineteen] sixties when Len Beadell, the 
great desert track maker, gave people apples and oranges they naturally tried 
to cook them first. Baked apple was deemed a success, but the orange did not 
cook well at all (Gallagher 1989: 153, reporting an account from Martu man, 
Mack Gardiner). 
Another account related to the unusual composition of the group, made up of only 
women and children, that walked in from the desert in 1964 (Gallagher 1989: 155). 
Some years before, the men had come in to Jigalong to check it out for themselves. 
They found it so appealing that they stayed, and never returned to their families.104 
Despite these changes, and ‘the gradual migration of Western Desert People from 
the desert heartland to the fringes as a consequence of the spread of European 
settlement,...there was no serious cultural break with their traditional roots’ 
(Federal Court 2002: para. 8). Central to these ‘traditional roots’ is the Martu 
understanding of place, one that they share with other desert Aboriginal people. 
Carty (2010: 30-31) describes this in relation to the Canning Stock Route: 
For Aboriginal people, the creation of the stock route, the sinking of the wells, 
the coming of the drovers did not happen in time, as we commonly think of it, 
but in place. Events do not just happen in the desert; they happen here or 
there, in the places – Ngurra, or Country – that people paint...In this place-
based view of the world, stories from the Jukurrpa, from family, from colonial 
history and from personal experience, are all layered in the sites where they 
happened. Country is a kind of memory. 
The personal contact experience for some Martu, as for other Pilbara Aboriginal 
groups, involved life on stations; for Martu, on desert fringe stations like Talawana 
and Balfour Downs that had been established by the early 1900s. The stations ‘are 
                                                        
103 This kind of initial engagement was not exclusive to the Martu. A number of recent 
novelists have re-imagined early contact in different parts of the continent. Kim Scott has 
done this for the south of Western Australia in the novel that won the 2011 Miles Franklin 
Literary Award, That Deadman Dance. 
104 Pers. comm. at Jigalong to Edmunds in 1997.  
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close to a major waterhole route from the desert to Jigalong and have served as 
staging places for Aborigines moving westward’ (Tonkinson 1974: 32). In addition, 
they supported small groups of Aboriginal workers. 
Some of the Martu station workers took part in the Pilbara Aboriginal pastoral 
strike in 1946 (see paper 3). Some of those with legitimate rights to speak for the 
Karlamilyi (Rudall) area, remained with the Nomads after ‘The Split’ within the 
strikers’ group in the 1960s (see paper 1) and spent the next decade moving between 
Jigalong and Strelley Station. In 1981, a further separation took place, with some of 
the Strelley Warnman and Manyjilyjarra people returning to country and setting up 
what is now the Punmu community. In 1983, Punmu formally broke ties with the 
Strelley organisation (Lawrence 1989: 7-8).  
The disputes that emerged over time within the strikers’ group were not a single 
conflict but arose from a range of different views and priorities. Some were part of 
internal group tensions. Others were exacerbated by government actions and 
evanescent policies that promised but failed to deliver greater recognition of 
traditional ownership of country. 
2.3 Impacts of government actions and policies before New Public 
Management 
A central focus of the present remoteFOCUS project is on the consequences of the 
introduction of New Public Management changes, but some of its key characteristics 
were evident in Aboriginal affairs long before the 1980s. Among these were the 
institutional asymmetry associated with governance deficits and mis-alignments; 
policy turbulence; and the imbalance between the local and the general. Martu, like 
Aboriginal people elsewhere, but also other people in remote Australia, had little say 
in the decisions that affected them (remoteFOCUS presentation to Karratha 
Business Forum, 25th February, 2011). 
For Martu people, the decisions that most affected them related to country. 
In a little publicised move, the Karlamilyi (Rudall River) National Park was 
gazetted in May of 1977. Significantly, no consultation on this decision was 
ever undertaken with Aboriginal people who maintain traditional ties to the 
country in question. It was not until the Seaman inquiry on Land Rights in 
1984-85 that the traditional owners of the Karlamilyi (Rudall River) region 
even learned that a vast area of the Western Desert was no longer Vacant 
Crown Land (Lawrence 1989: 7).    
The longer term consequences of this gazettal for formal recognition of Martu 
traditional ownership of the area only became clear at the time of the Martu native 
title determination in 2002 (see below). 
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Also without consultation with Martu, the State Minister announced an Exclusion 
Zone over an area of the park in 1987, declaring an indefinite ban on mineral 
exploration (Lawrence 1989: 4, 32). Unlike the vesting of the national park, the 
basis for the Exclusion Zone was 
delightfully simple. The Minsters for Mines, CALM [Conservation and Land 
Management], and Aboriginal Affairs made an administrative decision in 
October 1987 that no exploration or mining would be permitted within the EZ, 
unless or until otherwise determined by the Government (Cotton 1989: 44).  
In between these two events, as a result of an election promise, the new Labor State 
government had established an Inquiry on Aboriginal Land Rights in March 1983, to 
be carried out by Paul Seaman. He began his work in September. For two years, 
Aboriginal people and their representatives, as well as Seaman and his staff, worked 
assiduously to achieve land rights for Aboriginal people in Western Australia. The 
efforts came to nothing. The proposed legislation was defeated in the State’s upper 
house, the Legislative Assembly, in April 1985. But by that time, the politics of both 
State and Federal Labor governments had led to the collapse of support for land 
rights, whether in Western Australia or nationally. Martu, like other Aboriginal 
groups all over the State, had engaged with the Inquiry in good faith. ‘The cruel 
irony...was that it raised expectations that were to be utterly destroyed in twelve 
months time’ (Lawrence 198: 9). 
2.4 Migration and residence 
Despite the vagaries of government, Martu presence on country was well re-
established by the mid-1980s. The communities where a significant number of 
Martu Wangka speakers live are Jigalong, Parnngurr (Cotton Creek), Punmu, and 
Kunawarritji (Well 33). Others have settled in Newman and Nullagine. Martu people 
have also moved to other towns and communities in the Pilbara, including Port 
Hedland, Warralong, and Strelley (www.wangkamaya.org.au).  
Jigalong is on Aboriginal Trust Land and was legally incorporated as an Aboriginal 
community in 1973. It is in Nyiyaparli territory but children born there inherit their 
affiliation from their Martu parents (Tonkinson 1974: 43) and Martu have 
responsibility as its caretakers. The Jigalong population is currently around 300-
400 people in the dry season and 450 in the wet season, although the latter number 
can fluctuate markedly during Law business time. It remains a closed community 
and a permit for entry is required.  
Punmu, with a population of approximately 120, is within the Karlamilyi National 
Park, and Parnngurr, with around 100 people, on the edge. Kunawarritji, also with 
around 100 people, is on the Canning Stock Route.  
The Newman area is in the Nyiyaparli native title claim but, as with Jigalong, the 
Nyiyaparli people recognise Martu as its custodians (Shanks 2011: 13). Parnpajinya, 
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outside the main town of Newman and on the opposite side of the highway, is one of 
four Pilbara Town-Based Reserves. It has twelve dwellings and approximately 60 
residents (Department of Indigenous Affairs 2011: 6). Parnpajinya also dates from 
the early 1980s, ‘when Martu people settled on an area of land which had long been 
a significant Martu site’ (2011: 11; 74-75). 
With some security of tenure for Aboriginal interests [Parnpajinya is 
Aboriginal Land Trust reserve], an effort was made to provide basic 
infrastructure and services by some of the key stakeholders; Aboriginal Affairs 
Planning Authority (AAPA), BHP Iron Ore, Homeswest – Aboriginal Housing 
Board, the East Pilbara Shire and other government agencies to a lesser extent. 
It would appear from earlier documentation that there was never any intention 
that the site become permanent and this is reflected in the very basic 
accommodation and communal ablution facilities that were constructed during 
the 1990s. These ranged from ELA (canvas) shelters, single room mud-brick 
houses, tin shacks, pit toilets, a large work shed and later, a larger rammed 
earth home was constructed at the northern end of the site. A Community 
Coordinator and Aboriginal Liaison Officer were funded by AAPA to help in the 
coordination of Government agency services to the community. Despite these 
efforts the residents continued to reside in squalid conditions and face many 
social problems, many of which were, and still remain, alcohol related. 
Newman itself currently has a population of approximately 7000 people of whom 
around 700 are estimated to be Aboriginal (2011: 11, 12). The town is also a centre 
for visiting Aboriginal people from remote communities. A DIA survey of visitors in 
2009 found that 41% of visitors were from Jigalong, while others were mainly from 
the remaining Western Desert communities. 69% of people said they came to town 
regularly, with 100% staying 1-4 weeks. 77% stayed with family or friends, 16% 
camped, and only 7% paid for accommodation. Of the reasons for being in town, 
100% stated shopping and socialising, with 75% of the socialising responses 
including wanting to drink. Further DIA information from 2010 showed that ‘the 
visitors were mainly men in the 20-40 age group who were very candid in their 
responses of coming to town to drink and return to their community to “dry out”, 
then return for another session of binge drinking’ (2011: 7). 
The attraction of Newman and other Pilbara towns as providing access to alcohol 
arises from the situation that the Martu remote communities are dry communities. 
Restrictions were introduced into Jigalong in 2009 and have been extended until 
April 2014. Kunawarritji is also dry, but is to have a special tourist condition 
because of its location on the increasingly popular Canning Stock Route 
(www.wa.gov.au, Minister for Sport and Recreation; Racing and Gaming media 
release, 13 May 2011). Even Parnpajinya ‘requested and received assistance through 
the DIA and police to institute community by-laws outlawing the supply and 
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consumption of alcohol’ in 2006 (Shanks 2011: 35). The voluntary initiation by 
communities of these restrictions is evidence of Martu people acting, or at least 
attempting to act, to take control over the conditions of contemporary life, in this 
instance, conditions associated with modernity. Their recent history demonstrates 
even more clearly the concern for continuing control over their responsibilities for 
their traditional country. 
3. Martu action and response 
3.1 Native title 
While the Commonwealth Parliament was debating the Native Title Act 1993, the 
Western Australian Parliament passed the Land (Titles and Traditional Usage) Act 
which commenced on 2 December 1993. The majority of the provisions of the 
Commonwealth legislation did not commence until 1 January 1994 (Norberry 1995: 
1-2). 
The Western Australian Act purported to extinguish any native title in Western 
Australia and replace it with more limited statutory rights to traditional usage 
of land. The Act purported to validate past grants of title. It also provided for 
limited rights to compensation for extinguishment of those statutory rights 
and for the effects of validation. 
The Martu were one of two Western Australian Aboriginal groups to challenge 
the State legislation (Teddy Biljabu & Ors v. The State of Western 
Australia).105 The challenge was successful. Among other things, the High 
Court found that 
the Western Australian Act discriminated against the plaintiffs in relation to 
their rights to land [and] was inconsistent with the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975...in that it provided inferior security of title to native title holders in 
comparison with that enjoyed by other holders of land title in Australia...The 
Court found that native title had not been extinguished in Western Australia 
(1995: 2).  
Following the win in the High Court, the Martu lodged their native title application 
in 1996. Then Justice French referred to this moment when he made the Martu 
native title determination at Parnngurr in September 2002 (Federal Court of 
Australia 2002: para. 7): 
                                                        
105 The State of Western Australia v. The Commonwealth, The Wororra Peoples and Anor v. 
The State Of Western Australia, Teddy Biljabu and Ors v. The State Of Western Australia 
(1995) 183 CLR 373 (16 March 1995).  
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Thirty of the Martu people travelled by road from the Western Desert and 
Eastern Pilbara in June 1996 to deliver their application to the main registry of 
the National Native Title Tribunal in Perth. They also presented the Tribunal 
with sand from their country, on the understanding that it was to be returned 
when a determination of their native title was made. As the report asserts: 
‘This symbolic gesture was demonstration of the claimants’ strongly-held belief 
in their ownership of their traditional territories’. After making the 
determination I propose to make today...,I will invite Mr Graeme Neate, the 
President of the National Native Title Tribunal, to return the sand to the Martu 
People in a Piti or traditional wooden dish. 
The determination, and the mediation process that preceded it, marked a number of 
significant developments over the intervening six years. One was the resolution, 
after forty years, of the rift that had followed the Pilbara Aboriginal workers’ 
pastoral strike (discussed in papers 1 and 3) and that had led to the Nomads group 
lodging a claim that overlapped the Martu application. The Nomads overlapping 
claim, however, was only one of eight initial overlapping claims. Seven of these were 
resolved through the Native Title Tribunal mediation process, with all those 
involved finally represented on the single successful Martu claim. The eighth, a 
partial overlap with the Ngurrara claim to the north, was acknowledged in the 
determination as a shared area between the two groups (2002: para. 11).  
The unexpected blow for Martu people was that the determination excluded the 
Rudall River National Park: ‘our soul [that] is needed for our people’.106 This was a 
result of the High Court’s judgement in Western Australia v Ward,107 handed down 
only the month before the Martu determination. The Court had found that the 
vesting of certain reserves, including some national parks, may have extinguished 
native title. At the time of the determination, it was unclear whether this was the 
situation in relation to Karlamilyi or not. Hence its exclusion from the 
determination.108 The claim over Karlamilyi remains in mediation with the National 
Native Title Tribunal (Federal Court file no. WAD6110/98; www.nntt.gov.au). 
                                                        
106 Teddy Biljabu at Parnngurr on the day of the determination, quoted in The Weekend 
Australian, September 28-29, 2002. 
107 [2002] HCA 28. The case is also referred to as the Miruwung Gajerrong case. 
108 In January 2010, the Federal Attorney-General released draft legislation setting out a 
proposed amendment to the Native Title Act. This arose from proposals made in 2008 by 
Robert French, by then Chief Justice of the High Court. The proposed s47C would allow the 
native title applicants and the relevant government party to agree to disregard the historical 
extinguishment of native title in areas of land set aside for the purpose of preserving the 
natural environment, in certain circumstances (www.ag.gov.au). Not surprisingly, all three 
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3.2 Martu organisations 
With the determination of Martu native title, there are now three organisations 
through which Martu people operate. One has been established to meet the 
requirements of the Native Title Act but, within those constraints, Martu themselves 
have determined the governance and representation structure for all three. Each of 
the organisations has its own Board and governance arrangements, but the 
organisations exercise an active engagement with each other in a linked network 
representing Martu interests.  
3.2.1 Western Desert Lands Aboriginal Corporation (WDLAC) is the Registered 
Native Title Body Corporate holding native title in trust for the Martu native title 
holders. On behalf of the Martu People, WDLAC holds the native title rights and 
interests, including the right to exclusive use, occupation and possession, which 
includes the right to control access, of 136,000 square kilometres of land within the 
Central Western Desert region. It has offices in Parnngurr (Cotton Creek) and Perth 
(www.wdlac.com.au) and is responsible for managing all activities affecting Martu 
native title.  
Membership of WDLAC is made up of those Martu and Ngurrara native title holders 
identified in the Martu native title determination.109 The organisation’s decision-
making process was developed over a five-year period, beginning in 1998. From the 
early meetings, the countries, or area sub-groups of Martu land, were documented 
as the basis for decision-making within a corporate structure. The proposed body 
involved five area groups with a governing committee made up of two men and two 
women from each of the sub-groups. In 2002 and 2003, further meetings including 
Ngurrara as well as Martu people agreed that there should be six area sub-groups, 
with the shared area being split into two sub-groups (Federal Court of Australia 
2003: paras 4-6, 9). The same representation on the governing committee was to be 
continued, together with three community members. In 2009-10, this number of 
directors was reduced as a result of changes required by the introduction of the new 
Commonwealth Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 
                                                                                                                                                                            
organisations working with or for the Martu native title holders forwarded submissions in 
support of the proposed amendment, with specific reference to Karlamilyi (Rudall River) 
National Park. The submission from the Western Australian Office of Native Title opposed 
the amendment. No further action has been taken to date by the Federal Attorney-General. 
109 Rule Book of the Western Desert Lands Aboriginal Corporation (Jamukurnu-Yapalikunu) 
Registered native Title Body Corporate (www.oric.gov.au). A separate Ngurrara 
determination, covering country in the Great Sandy Desert north of the shared area 
included in the Martu determination, was reached in November 2010 (Kogolo v State of 
Western Australia [2007] FCA 1703). 
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(the CATSI Act). The present representation is one man and one woman for each of 
the six country-based groups, still with three community members in addition (Rule 
Book 2010: 28). 
As well as being responsible for the management of Martu native title, WDLAC is 
also authorised to enter into agreements for and on behalf of the Martu people 
(Western Desert Lands Aboriginal Corporation 2010: 6). Although the level of 
exploration and mining is far less than that affecting the central and west Pilbara, 
these activities, together with increasing levels of tourism, have been significant in 
Martu country and will be looked at in more detail in the next section. 
3.2.2 Kanyirninpa Jukurrpa (KJ) is the Martu History and Archive Project. An 
independent organisation since 2009, KJ began as an arm of WDLAC but as a 
discrete body within the larger organisation, translating the legal recognition of 
Martu ownership of country into practical programs focused on country. Its 
organisational structure reflects this focus, with twelve Martu directors drawn from 
across the communities where people now live – two from each of the main 
settlements and two from the diaspora – with three non-Martu advisory directors to 
assist with finance, administration, and other corporation matters. These 
developments were the result of Martu decisions. 
KJ’s work includes Ranger and Caring for our Country Programs, return to country 
trips, camel and other feral animal management plans, Martu Media, mapping, and 
training. There are three Ranger teams and seven Ranger programs as part of the 
land management program. Between March and May 2011, the program had fifteen 
to twenty young men on country every week.110 Some parts of the program operate 
with local CDEP teams (KJ Newsletter Sept./Oct. 2010), as CDEP continues to 
operate in the remote communities.  
Central to this work of the organisation is active engagement with outside bodies 
like the WA Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC), the Department 
of Agriculture and Food (Newsletter March/April 2010), and CSIRO, with whom KJ 
has been working on a Martu Atlas. The Atlas will include tracks, waterholes, and 
where animals are found on country and how many (Sept./Oct. 2010:8). At the 
invitation of Rangelands WA, the Jigalong Rangers assisted the development of a 
new Ngurrawaana Rangers team to work on country around Roebourne (Newsletter 
March/April 2010:3). All these activities come under the KJ umbrella of protection 
and promotion of Martu cultural and heritage resources, and the development of an 
economic base for Martu in their communities, based on their culture, knowledge, 
and skills (Western Desert Lands Aboriginal Corporation 2008: 15).  
                                                        
110 Discussion with Peter Johnson from KJ, 23 May 2011. 
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They run alongside the history and archival responsibilities, which have also 
covered a range of projects. KJ was closely involved in the Canning Stock Route 
project. Among other Martu people who participated, emerging film maker Curtis 
Taylor from Martu Media was the youngest member of the project team (National 
Museum of Australia 2010: 220), and occasionally strayed into the Rock Art 
adventures. The book, Cleared out (2010) that was the basis of the documentary 
Contact, was written with Yuwali by two of the KJ people, Sue Davenport and Peter 
Johnson and KJ assisted in the organisation necessary for filming.  
As with the environmental and land projects, historical and archival work is 
undertaken in collaboration with outside organisations. Importantly, partnerships 
have been developed with a range of national institutions: KJ has a partnership 
agreement with the National Library of Australia and similar agreements with the 
National Film and Sound Archive (NFSA) and the Australian Institute of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS). The partnership includes provision of 
both materials and funding. In March 2007, a group of Martu elders visited these 
institutions in Canberra, a trip organised by the National Library, the NFSA, 
AIATSIS, and the National Museum and arranged through KJ (AIATSIS Institute 
News, August 07). As part of the trip, the NFSA ceremonially handed them digitised 
copies of archival sound and moving image recordings (Australian Film Commission 
media release, 13 March 2007). KJ also undertakes cross-cultural awareness 
programs to companies, their employees and contractors. 
3.2.3 The Martu Trust is the most recent of the organisations. Rather than having it 
imposed from outside, WDLAC itself recognised the need for a trust to manage and 
use the financial benefits beginning to flow to Martu people as a result of a number 
of negotiations taking place. The largest of these payments came when Rio Tinto 
sold the Kintyre uranium deposit in 2007 (see below). Information sessions and 
workshops were held at many different places over the next two years. The 
consultation strategy was developed with the assistance of KJ. WDLAC 
commissioned RPM, the Kununurra-based company that had worked with the 
Kimberley traditional owners to set up the Gelganyem and Kilkiyi Trusts to manage 
the money paid, also by Rio Tinto, from the Argyle agreement some years before. As 
part of the development of the Martu Trust, a group visited Kununurra to talk to the 
people involved in the Gelganyem and Kilkiyi Trusts (Western Desert Lands 
Aboriginal Corporation 2008: 13-14).  
The design adopted by the Martu Trust is based on this model and contains four 
distinct areas: a future fund, a community organisation fund, a business enterprise 
fund, and a direct ownership fund (WDLAC Newsletter, May 2009).111 In 2009-2010 
                                                        
111 The same or a similar model is generally used in trusts set up as a result of negotiations 
between native title groups and Rio Tinto (see papers 2 and 3). 
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and in 2010-2011, the Trust agreed to fund projects in aged care, arts and crafts, 
business, community, education, health, funerals, law and culture, and issues of 
hardship. The Trust also agreed to provide $100,000 to a Mums and Bubs Centre in 
Punmu; the project was mainly funded by World Vision and BHP but needed the 
extra funding for completion. Other joint funding for the Trust was with the 
Indigenous Coordinating Centre (ICC) and the Jigalong police for a school holiday 
program for Jigalong young people (WDLAC Martu Trust Newsletter July 2010). 
As described earlier, the three organisations have distinct organisational 
structures112 and operations, but they meet monthly to exchange information and 
ideas, and to work towards clear agreement on each brief and identify where there 
are shared interests.113 The cross-over in many areas is in dealing with resource 
company interests. These are omni-present as elsewhere throughout the Pilbara, but 
less dominant in terms of their impact on Martu country and people. 
4. Resource company engagement 
In their third and final report to the Minister for Indigenous Affairs, the Indigenous 
Implementation Board emphasised that ‘economic participation will be a key means 
by which Aboriginal people are able to generate income that can be used for 
personal, community and cultural development’ (2011: 18). For Martu, as for other 
Pilbara Aboriginal people, an important, though not exclusive, channel has been 
through their more recent engagement with resource companies, especially since the 
recognition of native title. 
4.1 BHP Billiton  
The first big resource company with whom Martu had experience was BHP, who 
started their first iron ore mining operations in the Pilbara at Mt Whaleback in 
1968. The town of Newman, some 165 kilometres west of Jigalong, was built as the 
company town to service the mine. The earliest contacts with Martu and Nyiyaparli 
people were not promising: 
At one stage a few Jigalong men were employed there as labourers, but by 1970 
the mining company was making quiet efforts to rid itself of both Aboriginal 
employees and the small group of local Aborigines who were living on the edge 
of the town. Local police were telling Aborigines that they were not welcome in 
Newman (Tonkinson 1974: 149-50). 
                                                        
112 WDLAC is incorporated under the CATSI Act; KJ and the Trust under the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). 
113 Meeting with WDLAC and KJ, Perth, 25 May 2011. 
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Newman remained a closed town until 1982 (West Pilbara Planning Commission 
2011: 22). The removal of restrictions coincided with the Martu move back onto 
country, to Punmu, Kunawarritji (Well 33), and Cotton Creek (Parnngurr). It was 
also around this time that Martu settled on the Newman Parnpajinya town-based 
reserve. Changes by then in BHP’s attitude meant that the company was among the 
bodies who contributed towards Parnpajinya basic infrastructure (Shanks 2020: 75).  
Such changes increased rapidly with the development of more Pilbara mines and the 
advent of native title, and also work with Indigenous groups outside Australia, such 
as the EKATI diamond mine in Canada’s North-West Territories, where the 
company entered into a socio-economic agreement in 1996. Four years earlier, in 
1992, the company established an Aboriginal Affairs department with offices in 
Newman and Port Hedland. It has entered into native title agreements with a 
number of Pilbara groups. With no mine on Martu country, it has nevertheless 
entered into a ‘process of participatory development with the Martu people of the 
Western Desert’ (www.bhpb.com): 
The participatory development approach is structured within a number of 
existing partnerships between BHP Billiton Iron Ore and government and non-
government organisations. This approach requires that the Company develop 
relationships with regional Martu organisations, which will ultimately 
strengthen institutional arrangements with government and industry at a 
regional level towards improved outcomes for Martu people.  
Not all has gone smoothly, from the point of view of either BHP Billiton or Martu. 
But there have been important milestones. BHP Billiton was one of the principal 
partners for the Canning Stock Route Project and was a co-funder, together with the 
Martu Trust and with World Vision, of the Punmu Mums and Bubs Centre. The 
latter is part of a $5 million dollar partnership entered into in 2009 with World 
Vision aimed at helping health and pre-school learning activities in the East Pilbara 
(www.bhpbilliton.com.au).  
In 2001, the Newman Partnership for Success – the Newman Aboriginal Education 
Partnership – was initiated. This program is part of the Graham (Polly) Farmer 
Foundation’s ‘Follow the dream/Partnerships for success’ (see Introduction paper 
and paper 2) and is a partnership between The Graham (Polly) Farmer Foundation, 
the Western Australian Department of Education and Training, the Australian 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, BHP Billiton Iron 
Ore and local Community Members.  
Prior to the project commencing, BHP Billiton commissioned a detailed 
consultation process with the local Indigenous community to determine what 
their desired outcomes were for the education of their children and what 
strategies could be put in place in achieve them. The study recommended that 
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The Graham (Polly) Farmer Foundation "Partnership for Success" project 
would provide an appropriate model to meet community objectives.  
The Partnership operates from facilities supplied by BHP Billiton Iron Ore, 
which include study, tutoring, internet and kitchen facilities. There are 27 
students. Since its inception in 2004 the Partnership has graduated 11 
students, 2 of whom have gained Tertiary Entrance, 7 of whom have gained 
traineeships/apprenticeships or entry to TAFE and 2 to direct employment. 
(www.pff.com.au/partnerships/newman.php) 
There are now four enrichment centres across Port Hedland and Newman to support 
local Indigenous students (Australian Indigenous Education Foundation/BHP 
Partnerhship launch, 30 August 2011). A new partnership building on this 
experience was formed in 2011 between BHP Billiton Iron Ore and Mission 
Australia, through which a dedicated team from Mission Australia will mentor 
identified students from Newman and Port Hedland, ‘in order to track their 
progress against their aspirations and connect them to further opportunities and 
programs currently on offer both in the Pilbara and Perth’ 
(www.pilbaraecho.com.au).  
4.2 Rio Tinto 
Rio Tinto’s presence in this area of the Pilbara is later. In the early 1980s, CRA 
Exploration raised concerns for Martu people by carrying out activities in and 
around Karlamilyi, with drilling at the sensitive area of Parnngurr rock hole. It was 
in response to these activities that a group of primarily Warnman and Manyjilyjarra 
speakers returned to the rockhole and set up camp, establishing the basis of what 
has become the Parnngurr community (Lawrence 1989: 10).  
An uneasy interaction between CRAE and Martu people continued over the next few 
years. These persisted over the period of the Seaman Inquiry into Aboriginal Land 
Rights which, although ultimately unsuccessful, influenced some events for Martu 
people. One of these was a meeting at Well 33 in April,1984, between Commissioner 
Seaman and Aboriginal representatives from a wide array of Aboriginal 
communities on the desert’s periphery. ‘Two days before the meeting with the 
Commissioner, the assembled group formally incorporated as the Western Desert 
Land Council’ (1989: 8). This became the Western Desert Puntukurnuparna 
Aboriginal Corporation (WDPAC), which operated for some twenty years as a land 
council and later as the Native Title Representative Body.114  
                                                        
114 WDPAC no  longer carries out these functions. It has been replaced by Central Desert 
Native Title Services as the Native Title Representative Body for Martu and other desert 
people. And, as we have seen, Western Desert Lands Aboriginal Corporation (WDLAC) – a 
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The following year, various government agencies – the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs, the Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority, and the Public Works Authority – 
began discussions with WDPAC about providing living area leases to the 
communities at Punmu and Parnngurr. Towards the end of the same year, 1985, the 
Land Council received word that CRAE had identified a significant uranium deposit 
at Kintyre (1989: 11-12; 16). The deposit is very close to the park, but lies just 
outside its northern boundary. 
Because of both Federal and State government uranium policies, Kintyre has not yet 
been developed. However, in 2005, Rio Tinto115 initiated negotiations with Martu 
with a view to reaching an agreement about a benefits package in return for support 
for the mine to go ahead. By mid-2007, a detailed draft agreement was on the table. 
As with other Rio Tinto agreements, it included both financial and non-financial 
benefits. A year later, however, Rio was in the process of selling Kintyre. 
Negotiations about gaining Martu support for the sale ‘got off to a bumpy start’ but 
were ultimately successful (WA Today, July 10, 2008). Canadian company Cameco 
bought the project in 2008 in a 70% joint venture with Mitsubishi. It was the money 
paid to Martu by Rio Tinto as part of the sale agreement that generated the move to 
establish the Martu Trust (WDLAC Newsletter May 2009). 
Negotiations between WDLAC and Cameco are continuing, with the establishment 
of a Kintyre Consultative Committee who meet on a regular basis to discuss the 
project and the prospect of moving towards negotiations about a comprehensive 
mining agreement. Cameco has made a commitment to hiring and training local 
Martu people to work in the exploration camp. Their web site indicates that this 
resulted in close to twenty new jobs for Martu during the drilling program 
(www.cameco.com/australia/kintyre), although there have been some incidents of 
concern where WDLAC has reported the company to the Department of Indigenous 
Affairs for perceived breaches of the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 (Western Desert 
Lands Aboriginal Corporation 2010: 9).  
The future of the project, however, is finally dependent on a change in government 
uranium mining policy. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
completely separate organisation – is the Prescribed Body Corporate holding Martu native 
title in trust. 
115 The Rio Tinto subsidiary involved was Canning Resources. Initial discussions were 
carried out through Central Desert Native Title Services, the Representative Body, until 
WDLAC took over the negotiations in 2007 (Western Desert Lands Aboriginal Corporation 
2008: 8). 
231 
 
4.3 Other 
In addition to iron ore and uranium, gold has also brought major mining activity to 
the Pilbara. For Martu, this relates to Telfer, a former mining town and mine on 
their traditional country but excluded from the native title determination. Telfer 
was originally built by Newmont Mining in 1976 to service the mine, where 
operations began in 1977 as a joint venture between Newmont and BHP. In 1990, 
Newmont Australia and BHP Gold merged to form Newcrest Mining, making 
Newcrest the owner and operator of Telfer. In 1996, the company made the decision 
to wind back the town as a residential site to a base for a fly-in fly-out (FIFO) 
workforce. In 2000, mine operations were suspended but resumed in 2005, with a 
Community Relations Agreement having been reached with Martu 
(www.newcrest.com.au/history), and WDLAC is now in negotiations with Newcrest 
about a comprehensive mining agreement (Western Desert Lands Aboriginal 
Corporation 2010: 9). 
Petroleum exploration on Martu country is also intensifying, requiring constant 
vigilance from WDLAC. However, in the midst of the Pilbara mining bonanza, the 
Martu decision to reject one mining proposal was supported by the National Native 
Title Tribunal. This was a proposal by Holocene, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Reward Minerals, to mine potash at Lake Disappointment. This was in the part of 
the native title determination where the Martu people hold exclusive native title 
rights but remains nevertheless subject to the future act regime under the Native 
Title Act. Yiwarra Kuju sets out the deep significance for Martu people of 
Kumpupirntily (Lake Disappointment) (National Museum of Australia 2010: 61ff): 
The power of the Jukurrpa, and of the ancestral beings whose actions shaped 
the world, remains present in the land...Along the Canning Stock Route, this 
influence is felt most powerfully at Kumpupirntily (Lake 
Disappointment)...One of the most dangerous areas in the Western Desert, the 
lake is home to cannibal beings known as Ngayurnangalku (the word means 
‘will eat me’). The Ngayurnangalku live under the surface of the lake, in their 
own world, with its own sky and a sun that never sets...Martu people will not 
set foot on the lake’s salt-encrusted surface for fear of those who live beneath. 
According to Yunkarra Billy Atkins, even passing by can be dangerous.    
Despite this, Martu did not immediately reject the initial proposal by Reward 
Minerals; meetings between the two parties took place over 2006 and a Term Sheet 
agreement was signed (www.rewardminerals.com). However, when discussions 
stalled, the company approached the State government to activate the provisions of 
the Native Title Act to allow the grant of a mining lease. In the inquiry that went 
before the Native Title Tribunal, both Holocene and the government sought a 
determination that the mining lease could be granted, though they differed on the 
conditions that might be applied. WDLAC sought a decision that the grant not be 
made. This is only one of three cases in which the native title party has maintained 
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this position in an inquiry before the Tribunal (National Native Title Tribunal 2009: 
3). 
In May, 2009, the Tribunal found that the act must not be done. 
The National Native Title Tribunal determined that the lease must not be 
granted essentially because the interests, proposals, opinions and wishes of the 
native title party in relation to the management, use and control of the area 
concerned should be given greater weight than the potential economic benefit 
or public interest in the mining project proceeding. This is the first 
determination made by the Tribunal to that effect (2009: 2, emphasis mine). 
Holocene asked the Commonwealth Attorney-General to overrule the Tribunal’s 
determination, an avenue of appeal provided for under the Native Title Act. The 
Attorney-General did not overrule the decision. 
Understandably, the Martu and others saw this as an historic moment. It is possible 
to speculate that, had the proposal concerned iron ore, or even gold or petroleum, 
the outcome might have been different and arguments about the national interest 
might have prevailed. Nevertheless, the case demonstrates both the active role being 
undertaken by Martu people in protecting their cultural heritage and also the extent 
to which the recognition of native title allows them, along with other Indigenous 
Australians, to assert their rights against outside interests, including government. 
The uniqueness to date of the decision suggests that this outcome is neither the 
norm nor a precedent, particularly in the resource hot-house of the Pilbara; but it 
has been an important victory for Martu people in terms of their own priorities and 
concerns, and ‘given hope to traditional owners Australia wide that they can have a 
voice’ (Western Desert Lands Aboriginal Corporation 2009: 7). In the context of the 
present remoteFOCUS discussions, perhaps the more important point is that the 
Martu voice, always there for those prepared to listen has been heard. 
4.4 Martu Land Access Agreement 
In response to the increasing ubiquity of exploration activities on Martu country, 
WDLAC has created a comprehensive land access agreement template, the ‘Land 
Access and Mineral Exploration Agreement’, and a similar standard agreement for 
petroleum exploration. Most, but not all exploration companies have been willing to 
sign such an agreement, but WDLAC has worked closely with key personnel in DEC 
or the Department of Minerals and Petroleum and, as a result, has successfully 
prevented some areas from being released for exploration because of their high 
significance to Martu people (2010: 8,9). 
5. Martu within the broader Pilbara development context 
For Martu, then, as for other Aboriginal people throughout the Pilbara, interaction 
with resource companies is a constant, if somewhat less engulfing, factor. At the 
233 
 
same time, discussions between the Martu and resource companies to a large extent 
take place without the involvement of government, though clearly within the 
framework of government policy and regulation, and with necessary, and generally 
constructive, interaction with relevant government agencies such as the Department 
of Environment (DEC) and the Department of Minerals and Petroleum.  
The immediate issue for remoteFOCUS then is: to what extent is the present 
government refocus on the Pilbara, with energetic planning for and substantial 
resources into the region, likely to make a difference for Martu people? And what 
are the elements of planning and resources that may have an impact? The 
announcement of the Pilbara Revitalisation Plan in May 2009 committed the State 
government to provide $300 million from the Royalties for Regions fund ‘to 
modernise and transform Pilbara communities over the next four years’ (Minister 
for Regional Development, Ministerial media statement, 11 May 2009). One of the 
community development schemes identified in the announcement was ‘Newman 
tomorrow’. 
5.1 The Newman Revitalisation Plan 
The Pilbara Planning and Infrastructure Framework lists Newman as a ‘sub-
regional centre’ (Western Australian Planning Commission 2011: 5). This is just 
below the proposed Pilbara cities of Karratha and Port Hedland, and above the 
‘major towns’ of Tom Price, Onslow, and Wickham. The Framework makes the point 
that Newman is now BHP Billiton’s ‘mining hub’ for its central and east Pilbara 
operations, though neglects to mention that it now also falls within the Rio Tinto 
footprint since they began operations at the Hope Downs 1 mine, 75 kilometres 
north-west of Newman, in 2006; Hope Downs 4, still to come on stream, is 35 
kilometres also north-west of the town. The Framework also notes that the town 
services the needs of the Aboriginal settlements located throughout the East Pilbara. 
The estimate of the current population is around 6000,116 with another 2000 fly-in 
fly-out (FIFO) workers. This is planned to expand to 15,000 by 2035 (2011: 22). 
 The Newman Revitalisation Plan (2010) points out that 
it is widely recognised around the world that some places require government 
interventions, without which they are unlikely to reach their potential. The 
more important these places are, the more urgent the need will be to identify 
exactly what is required to be most effective. The traditional interventions and 
delivery of soft and hard infrastructure by the State Government is conceived 
and delivered by a wide range of State agencies and Government Trading 
Enterprises, each with a different focus, timing and lacking coherence. The call 
                                                        
116 The discrepancy between this and an earlier one of 7000 indicates the fluidity of the 
Newman population. 
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for urgent action in Pilbara towns recognises that a new governance approach 
is needed (2010: 13). 
The Plan also recognises that, while there is a comparatively low number of 
Aboriginal residents in the town, ‘there are a number of surrounding communities 
with high Aboriginal populations that access the services provided in Newman 
(2010: 26). It acknowledges that one of the shortcomings of the present situation is 
a ‘lack of positive engagement of the Aboriginal community in the town centre’ and 
goes on to mention, 
the current influx of people from outlying ‘dry communities’ coming to the 
Newman town centre to access alcohol at the bottle shop, which results in 
inappropriate behaviour, street drinking and other negative social issues in the 
middle of the town centre (2010: 28). 
This is a problem that is now the object of close attention by the Department of 
Indigenous Affairs (DIA).  
In its 2011 Report, the Indigenous Implementation Board commented: 
The Board has been gratified by the extent to which the reform of DIA has 
occurred. From a time where there was serious consideration being given to 
disbanding DIA there has been a significant transformation of the credibility of 
DIA as an agency capable of assisting Aboriginal people to achieve their due as 
citizens of Western Australia. DIA is now a respected Government presence at 
regional and state level and most importantly is earning the respect of 
Aboriginal people across the State. (2011: 47). 
This observation is supported by an energetic presence of DIA in the Pilbara. One of 
its recent activities has been to address the issue of alcohol and the impact of 
remote visitors in Newman. Its Newman Report 2011 (Shanks 2011) identifies a 
series of core issues and sets out a number specific strategies and initiatives to deal 
with them. This was done in close collaboration with Martu and other Aboriginal 
people, although the Report points out that ‘Aboriginal people interviewed and who 
have met with DIA for this Report, said “no more talking by government or 
consulting Aboriginal people”. The issues are already known, we must all move 
together towards developing and supporting identified local strategies’ (2011: 5).117 
In a related initiative, DIA is now working with Pilbara Cities on a transformation 
project for four of the Pilbara town-based reserves. This includes Newman’s 
                                                        
117 A similar comment was reported in the DIA Roebourne Report a couple of years earlier 
(Shanks 2008). It underlies and emphasises the distinction between ‘consultation’ – 
government officers or others going in to talk  to people but taking little or no action 
subsequently – and what Indigenous people see as true partnership.  
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Parnpajinya Aboriginal community.118 This project is fundamentally different from 
previous approaches to managing Aboriginal reserves and communities. Earlier 
thinking had settled for attempting to improve infrastructure with, for example, 
community layout plans. One for Parnpajinya had been prepared in 2002 and 
endorsed by the WA Planning Commission in 2006. It represents an example of the 
‘business as usual’ approach rejected in the Newman Revitalisation Plan, proposing 
to add just one new house to the existing twelve, and a ‘visitors camp’  
(www.planning.wa.gov.au/dop_pub_pdf/parnpajinya_clp1_living_area_2002.pdf). 
Such approaches tended to reflect an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ attitude and did 
little to address social problems.  
As the Town-based Reserves Transformation and Re-development business plan 
points out, ‘All Aboriginal town-based reserves are a legacy of 19th and 20th century 
Western Australian government policies that first sort to protect and later segregate 
Aboriginal Western Australians’ (DIA 2011: 4). The document goes on to point out: 
[Town-based Reserves] in the Pilbara (as across the State) are a discrete 
pocket of disadvantage within otherwise prosperous regional towns. This 
disadvantage will be further highlighted as a result of significant investment 
into the Pilbara through the Pilbara Cities Initiative if investment and change 
is not directed towards the TBRs. 
Aboriginal people living in Pilbara TBRs do so in appalling dysfunctional 
environments with poor living conditions and with less access to services than 
non-Aboriginal people. TBR residents are impacted by overcrowding, high 
unemployment rates, and social problems on a daily basis... 
With the current Pilbara Cities vision proposing major transformation of the 
Pilbara centres and towns of Karratha, Hedland, Newman, and Onslow, there 
exists a fantastic opportunity to ensure that Pilbara Aboriginal population 
living in town-based reserves within these major centres and neighbouring 
towns are not left out of the wider Pilbara vision (2011: 4, 5). 
The plan is a radical re-think towards normalisation and a staged transition into the 
towns themselves. The reserves would remain Aboriginal Lands Trust property, and 
perhaps become a cultural hub, but not residential. These decisions are to be made 
                                                        
118 The other three are Bindi Bindi in Onslow, Tjalka Boorda in South Hedland, and 
Irrungadji in Nullagine. The transformation project will be applied in different ways in each 
place, depending on the specific local circumstances. It should be noted that the town-based 
reserves transformation project is not related to any move to close down remote 
communities and bring people into ‘growth’ towns. It is premised on the actual situation of 
Aboriginal people already living in or near towns and the conditions that currently go with 
this. 
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working with each local Aboriginal group. In the case of Newman, BHP is also keen 
to support.119 
At the same time, local Aboriginal people are themselves exploring ways of 
representing their place in this process. Curtis Taylor, the young film maker 
involved in the Canning Stock Route project, situates the dramatic climax of his 
short film Mamu around London Bridge, one of the Parnpajinya sites where 
drinkers hang out. Drawing on both traditional belief systems and contemporary 
realities to show the fundamental importance of maintaining links to both, he 
explains, ‘We want people to look at us the way we see ourselves’.120 
A project such as the Town-based Reserves Transformation and Redevelopment 
indicates the possibilities that arise when government energies and expertise align 
rather than operating in silos. In this case, the Royalties for Regions allowed for the 
emergence of the Pilbara Cities initiative, with resources, both human and financial, 
to go with it. The WA Planning Commission developed the Pilbara Planning and 
Infrastructure Framework to provide precisely a framework for the work of Pilbara 
Cities. As discussed in paper 1, neither in the Framework, nor in Pilbara Cities’ 
discussions, is there much inclusion of Aboriginal people or communities. The 
Framework dedicates one page to ‘Aboriginal communities’ (2011: 33) and the 
emphasis for Pilbara Cities is on bringing more outsiders to the region: who, as 
Chris Adams, Pilbara Cities General Manager commented, will die there as well as 
live there, that is, complete a life cycle there: ‘At present, no one dies there. One 
success factor would be that the cemeteries are full’.121  
Enter a restructured and reinvigorated DIA, whose direct responsibility is to 
Aboriginal people, and who have recognised the opportunities potentially available 
to Aboriginal people through the changes in government policy and resourcing. 
What they are in the process of achieving is active and effective co-operation – not 
co-ordination – across a range of government agencies and programs, and beginning 
to access some the resources, especially from the Royalties for Regions, necessary to 
maintain this. Funding is still to be allocated for stage 1 of the Town-based Reserves 
Transformation and Redevelopment Project, but other projects directly relevant to 
                                                        
119 Interviews with Helen Shanks, DIA Director Operations – Central (Pilbara/Goldfields), 
24 May 2011 and 20 July 2011. 
120 AIATSIS National Indigenous Studies Conference. Young and old: connecting 
generations’. Canberra: September 2011. 
121 ABC Radio National, Saturday Extra, 6 August 2011; and see Introduction paper. The 
comment obviously refers only to non-Aboriginal people; Pilbara Aboriginal people, like 
Indigenous people elsewhere in Australia, die at a rate much higher than non-Indigenous 
Australians, and Pilbara Aboriginal cemeteries are all too full. 
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Martu people have already been approved. One is for preparation of design and 
costs for suitable building/infrastructure for medical services for the Puntukurnu 
Aboriginal Medical Service in Jigalong (June 2010). KJ has assistance to purchase 
three houses in Newman to accommodate senior management for the Martu 
Knowledge Program (rdl.wa.gov.au/royalties/r4rpilbara/Pages/default.aspx, 4 Aug. 
2011). DIA, in working with Pilbara Cities and with WDLAC, is also developing a 
Martu community housing model, both for Jigalong and for other Martu places of 
residence such as Nullagine.122 
5.2 Local government 
There is still a long way to go. In its Report on the Inquiry into Local Government 
Service Delivery to Indigenous Communities (2008), the Local Government 
Advisory Board noted: 
Local governments have a responsibility under the Local Government Act 1995 
to provide for the good government of people within their district. While local 
governments provide good government to the majority of their residents, they 
generally have not provided regular or wide-ranging services to Indigenous 
communities, particularly those in remote communities (2008: 46-47). 
The Report goes on to elaborate that  
Local governments have long cited the land tenure status of Indigenous 
communities as a reason why they have not established effective relationships 
with Indigenous communities or provided services to them. The majority of 
Indigenous communities are located on Crown Reserve land that for the most 
part is vested with the Aboriginal Lands Trust (ALT). This is generally classed 
as private land. A significant number of reserves [including Jigalong] have also 
been proclaimed under the Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act and 
these require entry permits. 
The private nature of communities and the undedicated status of access roads 
are also recognised as major impediments to local government service delivery 
in Indigenous communities. Local governments have generally adopted the 
view that they are not responsible for providing services or facilities to 
Indigenous communities which are not accessible to the general public (2008: 
36-37). 
For local government, too, the issue of rates and the exclusion of these communities 
from the requirement to pay them is also an obstacle to the provision of services to 
remote communities. From 1990 up until its abolition in 2005, ATSIC provided 
Indigenous communities with funding for the delivery of core essential and local 
                                                        
122 Interviews with Helen Shanks, 24 May and 20 July 2011. 
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government services through the Community Housing and Infrastructure Program 
and CDEP (2008: 45). In 2006, the State and Commonwealth Governments signed 
their Bilateral Agreement on Indigenous Affairs, as well as an Agreement for the 
provision of housing, infrastructure, and essential services for Indigenous people 
in Western Australia: November 2005-June 2008 (2008: 21, 46). Parnngurr and 
Punmu were both included in the State’s implementation document, Western 
Australia’s Operational Plan for Indigenous Housing, Infrastructure, and Essential 
Services July 2006-2007 (Department of Housing and Works 2006). To date, local 
government involvement remains largely at the level of endorsement of community 
layout plans. 
At the same time, WDLAC and KJ are engaging with both DIA and the East Pilbara 
Shire: WDLAC about housing in Jigalong,123 both WDLAC and KJ about roads. A 
road between Punmu and Parnngurr proposed by the Department of Environment 
and Conservation (DEC), for example, had not been agreed to by WDLAC ‘because 
DEC hadn’t talked to Martu enough about it’ (KJ Newsletter March/April 2010: 10). 
The discussions that took place in 2009 and 2010 covered matters such as whether 
the road would belong to the Shire or to Martu. ‘If it was a Martu road, only Martu 
could use it...But if there was an accident, no-one would be covered by insurance. 
Martu would also have to pay to look after it. If it was a Shire road, the Shire (or 
DEC) would have to pay to maintain it’. Martu decided that it should be a public 
road and DEC was to talk to the Shire about helping to pay for it. Newcrest 
organised training for Martu to help build the road. A key concern for Martu was 
that tourists should not have access to sacred places. 
These are the immediate, place-based concerns for Martu, and they now have 
recognised native title ownership of country and representative organisations 
through which to negotiate them. Although they are experiencing effects from the 
current Pilbara resource boom, its impact is moderated for them because of their 
still relative remoteness, at least apart from towns like Newman. Many of their 
interactions are through departments like DIA and DEC, which have a significant 
focus on their concerns and an immediate and ongoing presence on the ground. 
These factors offer Martu people an increasingly responsive channel through which 
their voice is being heard. They are also developing a robust basis and framework 
for partnership with resource companies, government, and non-government 
organisations and institutions. Projects such as Yiwarra Kuju – the Canning Stock 
Route and Rock Art projects – are a vivid demonstration of the richness available 
when all these participants come together to allow Martu, and related Western 
Desert people, to express the centrality of place, and how it infuses and underpins 
the relationships and conditions even of contemporary everyday life. The moves 
                                                        
123 Ibid. 
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towards an increasingly effective set of partnerships indicate the possibilities that 
arise when this place-based understanding of the world, and its expression through 
effective and networked Aboriginal organisations, is taken seriously by 
governments. 
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15. Imagining a region: 
prototypes and possibilities 
for Pilbara Aboriginal people 
Dr Mary Edmunds 
1. Introduction 
On 26 September 2007, Marnda Mia, a new central and west Pilbara Aboriginal 
regional organisation officially opened its office in Roebourne. Its logo carried the 
statement, ‘In unity, there is strength’.  The news release published to mark the 
occasion stated: 
Marnda Mia is an independent company which aims to build coordinated, 
institutionalised capacity for local indigenous families and groups and provide 
a strong local voice. It will provide a consistent regional response to education, 
employment, training, property and business development and enterprise 
support... 
The “Principles” that have guided the establishment of the independent 
organisation/company Marnda Mia CNC Pty Ltd are that: 
 Marnda Mia CNC Pty Ltd should be an independent voice, owned and 
controlled by Traditional Owners; 
 Members are all equal amongst themselves; 
 Marnda Mia CNC Pty Ltd should be a mainstream company, not subject to 
Indigenous legislation; 
 Marnda Mia CNC Pty Ltd should be an organisation/company that [native 
title] claimant groups could choose to belong to; and 
 The strong should help the weaker, for the benefit of all realising their vision 
for the future (Marnda Mia and Rio Tinto Iron Ore 2007). 
The company had evolved from negotiations between Rio Tinto Iron Ore and a 
number of the Pilbara native title groups who, in 2003, had come together in an 
informal cooperative working group to form a Central Negotiating Committee 
(CNC). This was incorporated as Marnda Mia CNC Pty Ltd in early 2007 ‘to develop 
a regional approach to issues which affect all the Traditional Owners of the Pilbara. 
Its role is to work collectively to address disadvantage faced by Aboriginal people in 
the region’ (Marnda Mia nd.). 
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Four years later, its offices stand vacant and locked. The notice facing the highway 
as it goes through Roebourne forlornly asserts, ‘Serving the Aboriginal People of the 
Pilbara’. The web site, largely unattended for several years, has finally been 
removed.124 The realisation of another fine, if flawed, vision of a united Pilbara 
Aboriginal voice has proved elusive.  
In some ways, Marnda Mia’s problems were specific to mistakes made in the process 
of its own development (see below). In others, it demonstrates the challenges that 
need to be met if there is to be a representative Pilbara Aboriginal voice. Similar, 
but not less fundamental, issues confront the proposed Roebourne Aboriginal 
Congress (paper 2) and must be addressed in the development of any new forms of 
governance for the Pilbara as a whole if Aboriginal people are to increase their 
effectiveness beyond individual, family, or group concerns in engaging with the 
present fragmented hyper-development in the region.  
One of the governance dysfunction features (number 2) identified in the 
remoteFOCUS project is that of governance and mis-alignments: that is,  
that Indigenous populations do not tend to have equivalent structures of 
political representation nor structures of internal organisation that correspond 
with government structures. This makes it difficult for governments to ‘see’ 
them, and governments will therefore try to create proxies that co-respond to 
them, and enable them to ‘see’ into (and thus manage relationships with) 
Indigenous populations. This misalignment or ‘institutional asymmetry’ means 
political/administrative structures are ‘imported’, instituted by executive 
means, and only partly bed-in locally. The structures become a consuming 
point of political contestation, not the object they are intended to achieve. 
Second, it follows that Indigenous populations...will be seen as having 
difficulty in sustaining collective action decisions (reaching them, and 
sustaining them over time). For both reasons, from a government and 
Indigenous point of view, you get a lot of voice without articulation of power 
(Walker 2011: 7). 
If remote Australia has been the ‘forgotten back yard’ of each State and Territory as 
Walker suggests (2011: 1), then Aboriginal people might be characterised as the 
forgotten back yard of the Pilbara, at least until recent years (cf Taylor and 
Scambary 2005), and at least in terms of effective engagement with both 
government and industry. To date, the common law and statutory rights arising 
from native title have provided the strongest basis for individual groups to benefit 
from the region’s resource development. At the same time, the assertion of native 
title rights has also led to a reassertion of group identity defined by and limited to 
                                                        
124 The Marnda Mia Board agreed to go into liquidation in April 2012. 
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native title and, often, to a fracturing of other social, residential, or cultural bases of 
commonality.  
In important ways, therefore, as earlier papers have discussed, there is a tension for 
Aboriginal people between a need to privilege the local and a demand to 
operationalise the regional; the situation described by Sutton (2003:85; paper 3) as 
the tension  – ‘for reasons that are ancient in origin’ – between atomism and 
collectivism. A further dimension is the ways in which Indigenous extended families 
of polity form ‘the backbone of governance arrangements and especially 
organisational modes of governance’ (Hunt and Smith 2006: 10; paper 3). This itself 
can cause the marginalisation of other, less influential families or individuals. 
The question then is: how might these opposing pressures be reconciled? 
2. Background 
It is arguable that Australia had achieved a legitimate model of Aboriginal regional 
and national governance but that this proved to be incompatible with the 
centralising and whole-of-government agenda adopted by the Federal Government 
in the late 1990s (Sullivan 2011: 34). The model was the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) with its thirty-five Regional Councils. It was 
abolished by the Federal Government in 2005.  
It is not the purpose of this paper to revisit the ATSIC saga. However, some of the 
related issues are instructive for the present remoteFOCUS discussion, particularly 
as the abolition of ATSIC and its impact on Pilbara Aboriginal people is a prime 
example of policy turbulence and policy nonsense, where ‘the half-life of policy in 
remote Australia looks like it does in a fragile state environment’ (Walker 2011: 7-
8). 
In December 2002, the then Federal Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
and Indigenous Affairs, Philip Ruddock, commissioned an external review of ATSIC. 
This was the first comprehensive review undertaken. In April 2003, a month before 
the review panel was due to produce a public discussion paper, the Minister 
announced a series of changes, including the establishment of a new agency, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS) (Pratt 2003: 1-2). It was 
disbanded just over a year later, on 1 July 2004. 
The ATSIC review’s Report – significantly titled In the hands of the regions – was 
presented to the Minister in November 2003. It recommended structural change, 
but not abolition. Central to its recommended restructure was ‘a package of reforms 
which gives greater control of ATSIC to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
at a regional level’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2003: 5). ATSIC itself was, at this 
point, giving serious consideration to the possibility of Regional Councils being 
reconstituted as Regional Authorities (ATSIC 2000). The ATSIC report referenced 
the Torres Strait Regional Authority and identified that ‘there was more support 
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from discrete and remote communities for the establishment of regional authorities 
than from those in settled urban and rural centres where communities have often 
been dispersed’, and that ‘following the regional example of the Torres Strait 
Regional Authority, it was easier to form a regional authority over a discrete 
geographic region where Indigenous peoples formed a majority’ (2000: 16, 16-17). 
The 2003 ATSIC review Report makes clear its view that ‘a regional orientation will 
strengthen the voice and efficacy of regional councils and establish the necessary 
framework for integrated service and program delivery’ (ibid.), a view writ large in 
the title of the Report, ‘In the hands of the regions – a new ATSIC’. Instead, the 
government not only ignored the recommendations about regionalisation but 
transferred Indigenous programs from ATSIC/ATSIS to existing mainstream 
Australian Government departments and agencies. Previous ATSIC consideration of 
the establishment of regional authorities disappeared. 
The response of one Aboriginal region – in the East Kimberley, not the Pilbara, but 
reflecting widespread views – was expressed as follows: 
The Wunan Regional Council, on behalf of the Aboriginal people of the East 
Kimberley, would like to express its concern and disappointment about the 
abrupt and ill-considered decision of the government to abolish ATSIC. While 
there may be some legitimate concerns about the operation of ATSIC, the 
precipitate action that led to the mainstreaming of ATSIC programs and 
administrative staff without proper consultation or satisfactory arrangements 
being put in place, has created considerable confusion and anxiety amongst the 
Aboriginal community...The Wunan Regional Council feels very strongly that 
Aboriginal people should have the opportunity to participate actively in the 
decisions that affect their future. Just as passive welfare has been recognised 
as a problem, so too will passive policy processes lead to worse outcomes for 
Indigenous people (Wunan Regional Council [2005]). 
As a nod to the regions, the government established Indigenous Coordination 
Centres (ICCs) to ‘replace ATSIC offices nationally’ (Senate Select Committee 2005: 
85) and to be a demonstration of the new ‘whole of government’ policy: 
The ICC managers will have staff from multiple federal and state/territory 
agencies; their role will be to engage with stakeholders and coordinate dealings 
between all agencies and their clients on a whole of government basis. 
However, the ICCs are not intended to be direct service delivery shopfronts. 
ICCs will coordinate the design and delivery of services with local Indigenous 
communities (2005: 85-86). 
In 2006, the ICCs became part of the amalgamated Department of Families, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FACSIA; now, in yet another change, 
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA)). The 
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ICC for the Pilbara is based in South Hedland. But whereas ATSIC had one region – 
Ngarda Ngarli Yarndu – that serviced the central and west Pilbara and another that 
included the East Pilbara in a much broader Western Desert region – the Hedland 
ICC covers the whole of the Pilbara region, including the East Pilbara.  
 3. The idea of a region: what and why?  
As the ATSIC regional boundaries and earlier discussion of the Martu (paper 4) 
suggest, the question of the Pilbara as a single region for Aboriginal people is not 
self-evident. Nor, in light of displacement and movement, are the meanings of ‘local’ 
and ‘community’ which, in the present social and economic context, are related but 
not the same. For Aboriginal people, ‘local’ refers to two principal domains that 
underpin and define social connectedness: traditional country, which is larger than 
native title but now includes that; and place of residence, the town or settlement 
often referred to as ‘community’, that is sometimes, but very often not, on 
traditional country. For Aboriginal people, then, attachment to ‘place’ is layered; so 
that ‘place-based’ concerns and decisions encapsulate this multiplicity. ‘Community’ 
is one dimension, and places where people grew up may be another, as Aboriginal 
historian, Frances Peters-Little, makes clear (2000: 3-4): 
The concept of community invokes notions of an idealised unity of purpose and 
action among social groups who are perceived to share a common culture. To 
some extent, ‘community’ and ‘culture’ are treated as synonymous, rather than 
as principles operating at different levels of social realities. Indigenous culture 
is therefore seen to define Indigenous community. This, of course, is not so... 
[I also] examine the role government policy played in the development of 
Aboriginal ‘communities’ and their contemporary social organisation, 
geographical boundaries and cultural identities. While Aboriginal people did 
not passively accommodate new and imposed, introduced and artificial 
colonial boundaries, it is clear that missions, reserves and pastoral stations 
have become Aboriginal communities which are now an integral part of 
Aboriginal people’s heritage and are fundamental to Aboriginality. 
For Aboriginal people, then, a region is a network, connecting people across place 
(locality) and community. And it was always thus, through songlines, ancestral 
dreaming tracks, marriage exchange, and ceremony, with clear ownership of defined 
territories but, particularly in the desert, permeability of boundaries. Demarcation 
of boundaries became clearer towards the coastal areas, but economic and 
ceremonial exchange extended inland for those groups as well. Today, those 
traditional links are reinforced especially during the time of Law business, with 
Martu and Nyiyaparli joining with central and coastal groups. The idea of the 
Pilbara as a single region is therefore not alien to its Aboriginal people, though the 
fit is not so neatly defined. Martu people, as we have seen for example (paper 4), 
form part of a distinctive desert cultural bloc with a north-south axis and strong 
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links to the east, into the Northern Territory, rather than to the west. A current DIA 
process working towards the establishment of a framework for governance reform in 
the Pilbara notes that ‘there is recognition of Martu as a distinct group’ (Shanks 
2011: 10). 
The history of colonisation in Western Australia also demonstrates that the 
emergence of a region entitled ‘Pilbara’ came relatively late. One historian suggests 
that the title was first used only for a goldfield proclaimed in 1888 and named after 
the Pilbarra Creek, a tributary of the Yule River, where the gold was discovered (de 
la Rue 1979: 87).125 For a long time, the land was part of a larger region known as 
the North West. As late as 1955, the ‘North West’ remained as a general term to 
refer to land north of the 26th parallel (Kerr 1975: 3). 
Indeed, since colonisation, the definition of ‘regions’ in Australia more generally has 
been diverse and based on ecological, mineral, economic, political, or a range of 
other interests. One map from the 1920s, for example, looks at regions from the 
point of view of a single mineral resource and possible habitation. From this 
perspective, the current region of the Pilbara fares rather badly. 
                                                        
125 Linguists Sharp and Thieberger (1992) suggest that the name ‘Pilbara’ derives from 
Nyamal and Banyjima, bilybara meaning 'dry'. 
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Whatever the history, however, the region is now established by State and 
administrative boundaries. Though further sub-divided into the four shires, the 
notion of the Pilbara has become more than an administrative, statistical, or even 
economic division and has begun to resonate – albeit often accompanied by big 
dollar signs – in the national, as well as regional, imagination. 
There is evidence, too, that Pilbara Aboriginal people acknowledge the need for a 
regional governance body (Shanks 2011: 10; Indigenous Implementation Board, 
Indigenous Pilbara Dialogue 2010; Edmunds paper 1). Whatever the artificialities 
from an Aboriginal perspective of the definition of the Pilbara as a region, there is a 
general acceptance, including from Aboriginal people themselves, that this is the 
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level at which Aboriginal people are required to engage if they are to shift the 
‘institutional asymmetry’ that exists between themselves and government, not only 
at the State and Commonwealth levels but also at the level of local and regional 
government. Some of the current developments and possibilities are dealt with 
below. 
4. Prototypes and principles  
4.1 Aboriginal aggregated bodies 
In her paper, ‘Jurisdictional devolution’, Smith proposes a ‘geography of devolution’ 
as an organising perspective or frame of reference for the effective implementation 
of Indigenous decision-making.126 This would be ‘in the form of a flexible 
aggregation model – regionally dispersed, layered community governance – which 
has both community and regional elements’ (2002: vi). As part of this frame of 
reference, she discusses both the ‘federalist principle’ – of unification with 
autonomy or, in terms closer to Aboriginal understandings, of autonomy and 
relatedness (2002: 6-7, 9) – and the process of aggregation: ‘a process of assembling 
or “scaling up” by the collection of particulars into a mass or sum, which it is then 
possible to consider as a whole or collectively’ (2002: 25).  
In a later paper, she outlines Indigenous principles of regionalism: relational 
autonomy, or the twin trajectories of narrow localism and broader relatedness; and 
subsidiarity, with federal systems of Indigenous governance being ‘decentred’ and 
accommodating ‘inter-dependent layers’ (2005: 6; Introduction paper).  
I would argue that a number of the bodies or loose associations developed over time 
by Pilbara Aboriginal people and described in earlier papers manifest some of the 
defining characteristics of aggregation: the Northern Development and Mining 
Company, Pindan, and Nomads (paper 3); Ieramugadu and the Pilbara Indigenous 
Marine Reference Group (paper 2). Some of these were, or are, more successful than 
others. Formally incorporated bodies, such as Gumala, the IBN Corporation (paper 
3) or the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi Foundation (paper 2) can also be seen as 
aggregations rather than federations. The jury is still out on the Roebourne 
Aboriginal Congress but its failure to connect with the Roebourne people it is meant 
to represent suggests that its history may be a short one (paper 2). 
The attempt to establish the Congress as a representative voice for Roebourne as a 
town suffers from some of the limitations that led to the collapse of Marnda Mia as a 
potential regional organisation. The lessons to be drawn from the latter are 
                                                        
126 Smith’s specific focus is Indigenous self-determination, including the question: Who 
constitutes the ‘self’ in self-determination? (2002: vi). Her analysis and model are equally 
relevant for the present discussion.  
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instructive in a discussion about developing a Pilbara-wide Aboriginal ‘governance 
hub’. For that reason, it is worth looking at the Marnda Mia story in more detail. 
4.2 Marnda Mia 
Marnda Mia failed principally because it became Marnda Mia. In the process, it was 
pushed too rapidly from a loose aggregation of native title groups supported by the 
Pilbara Native Title Service (PNTS, the Native Title Representative Body), to an 
incorporated entity at odds with the PNTS and with most of its previous 
membership base. The latter disconnection was the most damaging for its 
representative status and its longevity. Instead of operating as a unified voice, it 
became an element of contention and ultimately seriously divisive. Although still a 
registered company,127 it has effectively disappeared from Pilbara affairs in all but 
name. 
The genesis of Marnda Mia was the Central Negotiating Committee (CNC). This had 
emerged from the then seven native title working groups negotiating agreements 
with Rio Tinto Iron Ore in 2005 and 2006. The groups agreed to join together in the 
negotiations in order to deal collectively with the company and achieved what they 
saw as a successful outcome. Although the immediate agreements were with each of 
the native title groups individually, PNTS and the CNC also pushed for further 
negotiations that would lead to a regional agreement. By the end of 2007, 
discussions about a regional agreement were firmly on the table. These were to 
cover a range of non-financial benefits such as education and training, employment, 
and business development and contracting. They also involved further developing a 
regional representative voice to government (Rijavec 2010: 236ff). All seven groups 
and PNTS were in support of these continuing negotiations. There was also a 
request to Rio Tinto from some of the individual groups to establish an independent 
company based on the CNC for this purpose (Parker et al. 2008).  
At that point, the process unravelled. The incorporation went ahead with the 
assistance of consultants contracted by Rio Tinto, but did so without maintaining 
ongoing consultation with the affected groups and without taking the proposed 
constitution back to each of the groups for authorisation before it was finalised. 
Over the same period, PNTS and its parent organisation, Yamatji Marlpa, withdrew 
their support for the new body. Over the following two years, negotiations continued 
with individual native title groups and some involvement of Marnda Mia in the 
discussions about establishing regional standards and a regional framework. At that 
stage, however, Marnda Mia was supported by only a remnant of the initial native 
title groups.  
                                                        
127 ASIC Free Company Name Search, downloaded 5/9/2011. 
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With financial support from Rio Tinto, the organisation purchased the old Victoria 
Hotel and the offices on the highway. The hotel was unlicenced, was to be used for 
accommodation only, and was renamed ‘Ieramugadu Inn’. Both hotel and offices 
now stand empty; the grand rhetoric is in tatters. Other commercial proposals 
included establishing an airline, another proposal that did not eventuate.128 In 2011, 
Rio Tinto continues to underwrite the Victoria Hotel investment while Marnda Mia 
struggles to get out of debt. Rio Tinto also funds the legal advice Marnda Mia is 
receiving from the same consultant who drew up their constitution and assisted in 
their ill-fated incorporation.129  
In 2010, Rio Tinto Iron Ore signed final agreements with four native title groups, all 
represented by PNTS.130 Each of the four groups opted to participate in a regional 
agreement that will include a Regional Aboriginal Corporation. This is not a new 
body and will be a company controlled by all the native title groups who sign the 
Regional Agreement. For the first five years, only native title groups who have final 
agreements with Rio Tinto Iron Ore can be members; after five years, other groups 
can apply to join (Yamatji Marlpa 2010).131 
Had it not been for key mistakes made in the formation of Marnda Mia, the 
organisation might well have been in a position to become the Regional Aboriginal 
Corporation and an active and effective representative for at least a number of 
Pilbara Aboriginal groups. People wanted what the CNC had come together to 
achieve. But central to those mistakes was the disconnection from most of its 
constituent groups. A critical aspect of this was the failure to ensure essential 
authorisation from and accountability back to the groups. When this occurred, it 
lost its claim to cultural legitimacy (paper 1). Instead of from the groups, the 
principal support for the organisation came almost exclusively from its external 
sponsor, an eventuality being risked by the Roebourne Aboriginal Congress.  
                                                        
128 The then CEO’s enthusiasm for an airline may have arisen from a previous role as Town 
Clerk for Ngukurr, in South-east Arnhem Land, and his experience with Ngukurr Air. 
129 Interview with Rio Tinto Iron Ore management, Perth, 23 and 24 May 2011. 
130 The Australian, Paul Cleary front page story, June 3, 2011; Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal 
Corporation Newsletter, Issue 14, June 2011. A fifth agreement with the Ngarluma 
Aboriginal Corporation was also finalised (paper 2), but NAC is not represented by Yamatji 
Marlpa. Interestingly, the pressure from Rio Tinto for these agreements to be signed meant 
that the groups involved did sign them before the end of 2010. Rio Tinto itself did not then 
finalise its own signing for another three to four months. 
131 The terms of the agreement are cited with the permission of the Yamatji Marlpa CEO. 
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For Marnda Mia, this situation was compounded by the exclusion of Yamatji Marlpa 
which, as the Native Title Representative Body that had originally auspiced the 
CNC, also has the organisational and on-the-ground experience in maintaining 
communication with and input from each of the groups. With the loss of that 
connection to all the groups, Marnda Mia effectively rejected the principles for 
cultural legitimacy essential to its survival. The new Regional Aboriginal 
Corporation and its Implementation Committee will be able to draw on Yamatji 
Marlpa’s experience both in achieving and monitoring the regional standards and in 
advocating for better services from government. With Rio Tinto as well as limited 
native title group membership, however, it is not the desired regional Aboriginal 
voice. For that, it is necessary to look elsewhere. 
5. Possibilities 
There is as yet no organisation or body in the Pilbara undertaking a regional 
governance role. There are, however, a number of successfully aggregated 
community-based organisations, including native title prescribed bodies 
corporate,that operate across the region or parts of the region or across more than 
one language group. These offer the prospect of a network of grass-roots bodies 
that, as one possible model, might be linked in some form of regional authority 
where 
the transfer of responsibilities coincides with the transfer of power and 
capacity to legitimate, representative institutions. Devolution can give a 
practical form to corporate or geographic autonomy...It involves the creation 
of relatively autonomous realms of authority, responsibility and entitlement, 
together with accountability to local constituents (Smith 2002: 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
Smith outlines one model of how this might work, taking welfare funding as an 
example (2002: 21): 
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One of the advantages of this model – although for a full governance model, the 
arrows would go both ways – is that  
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it responds to the culturally-based preference for both local autonomy and 
wider forms of collective interdependence...A particular advantage of the 
model is that it distributes different forms and degrees of accountability across 
layers, thereby spreading the workload entailed in devolution, and enables 
‘two-way’ accountability to be reinforced (i.e. internal or vertical 
accountability to Indigenous constitutents at different structural levels, and 
external or horizontal accountability across to public and private sector 
institutions and levels of government) (2002: 26). 
The principles on which Smith’s model is based are congruent with those proposed 
by the Kimberley Wunan Regional Council in its submission to the Senate Select 
Committee after the abolition of ATSIC (2005: 7): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 
 
Smith’s model refers to Central Australia, the Wunan Regional Council’s to the 
Kimberley. Nevertheless, the principles underlying each are the same and apply 
equally to the Pilbara, with a networked approach and the principle of subsidiarity 
central to both regions.  
At the same time, the implementation of those principles must be adapted to the 
particular local circumstances, as the 2011 Report of the Indigenous 
Implementation Board makes clear in its recommendations for regional governance 
(2011: 31ff). At the same time, the Report stresses: 
The Pilbara region itself and Pilbara Aboriginal people are under immense 
pressure from the expansion of the resources sector...Land access agreements 
and heritage agreements and related activities such as surveys and 
negotiations have occupied many of the Pilbara’s key leaders and elders and 
the majority of other leaders are employed by industry, government or in 
Aboriginal organisations and businesses which themselves are extremely busy 
dealing with the impacts of growth or its opportunities. 
The relatively limited amount of determined Pilbara region native title and the 
negotiation pressures on claimants and representative bodies means that the 
Pilbara is several years behind the Kimberley in reaching the level of stability 
to be considering aggregated Aboriginal representative structures (2011: 37). 
The Report goes on to state that ‘it is therefore considered premature to seek to 
define a regional governance model at this time for the Pilbara’ (2011: 38).  
Despite this qualified assessment, DIA is working with Pilbara Aboriginal people 
and groups to develop Pilbara governance reform, as the Indigenous 
Implementation Board’s report sets out (2011: 38-39). This is in response to the 
resolution passed by Aboriginal people in attendance at the first Pilbara Futures 
Forum in 2010 (about 200), to support in principle a ‘one voice/s’ 
representative/regional body (DIA 2010a: 4). In this instance, the support for a 
representative/regional body was specifically to progress the governance reform 
project, but it echoed the unanimous resolution made a year earlier at the 
Indigenous Implementation Board’s Pilbara Dialogue ‘that a Pilbara Indigenous one 
stop shop (the governance hub referred to earlier in the workshop) be created to 
speak to all levels of government’ (2009: 11; and cf paper 1). The preliminary steps 
being undertaken towards this include Pilbara ‘Tribal Nations get-togethers’,132 
moves towards the reinstatement of a Pilbara Council of Elders (previously 
convened by DIA), and DIA working with native title representative bodies to look 
                                                        
132 The terminology of ‘Tribal Nations’ is itself subject to further consultation and discussion 
(meeting of remoteFOCUS team with Aboriginal community members, Port Hedland 
hospital, 21 July 2011). 
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at best practice (2010b). To date, ‘get-togethers’ have taken place in Roebourne, 
Onslow, and South Hedland (DIA memo 23 August 2011). 
The process has met with some difficulties, including the ubiquitous challenges of 
providing information to community members, but also the submerging of this 
project within the multiple demands of other DIA responsibilities, and the relatively 
marginal status of DIA within the State departmental hierarchy. These problems 
have delayed, but not derailed, the project. Not all of them arose from what the 
Futures Forum acknowledged as the current Pilbara Aboriginal political and native 
title environment. It was also recognised that ‘DIA and government people involved, 
while fully committed, will not always have the supports and backing etc. from other 
government colleagues at various levels and this may place them in a...risk 
situation’ (2010a: 6). 
Nevertheless, there are functioning Aboriginal organisations that already offer the 
promise, as yet incipient, of an aggregated Aboriginal representative structure. The 
organisations mentioned here are examples only, not a comprehensive list; but they 
demonstrate some of the ways in which the principles of local autonomy, wider 
forms of collective interdependence, subsidiarity, two-way accountability, and 
cultural legitimacy are being successfully practised. 
6. Some Pilbara examples  
6.1 Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation 
The native title representative bodies and, where there has been a native title 
determination, their prescribed bodies corporate, are structured to provide 
representation from their various component groups. Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal 
Corporation (YMAC), for example, has a separate Pilbara Regional Committee 
representing Pilbara native title claim groups.133 The native title claim groups, in 
turn, each have a working group made up of elected representatives who have 
authority to speak on matters relating to country, and who nominate a 
representative to the Pilbara Regional Committee. Although YMAC covers the 
Murchison and Gascoyne (Yamatji) regions as well as the Pilbara, this structure is 
now fairly standard for native title representative bodies. Among many other 
activities, YMAC assisted in the formation in 2009 of the Pilbara Indigenous Marine 
Reference Group that has brought together six of the coastal native title groups to 
work with relevant government agencies for the protection of coastal and marine 
                                                        
133 A restructure of YMAC in 2008-2009 subsumed the Pilbara Native Title Service (PNTS) 
into the broader organisation, although the practical impact of this, apart from the loss of a 
separate name, appears to be minimal and the regional offices and staff remain. 
257 
 
zones that are being, or are in imminent danger of being, damaged by development 
(see paper 2). 
Importantly for moves towards developing a representative regional body, YMAC 
and the DIA are now working collaboratively on the Pilbara leadership and 
governance project. YMAC is leading work on the structure model under native title 
and DIA on that for the community. YMAC will continue to be involved as the 
project develops (DIA memo 23 August 2011). 
6.2 Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi Foundation Ltd 
On a smaller scale, the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi Foundation Ltd (NYFL), set up 
as part of the 1998 agreement process with Woodside and the North West Shelf 
venture partners (cf paper 2), has a Board elected from the Ngarluma and 
Yindjibarndi native title holders, as well as a Woodside appointee and independents. 
It has entered into a number of successful commercial joint ventures, including a 
2011 one with contracting company NRW and the Eastern Gurruma business arm. 
Unlike the Roebourne Aboriginal Congress, which has foundered on the 
Yindjibarndi internal split over the dispute with FMG, the NYFL Board, including 
the Yindjibarndi Directors, signed off in July 2011 on a joint venture contract with 
FMG’s Solomon project. It is reported that the Board’s meeting was ‘lively rather 
than heated’.134 The contract is for eighteen months drilling and blasting. The 
beneficiaries are to be not just Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi but other local 
Aboriginal people. 
With other commercial ventures, NYFL’s income has diversified in five years from 
around 90% from Woodside in 2006 to less than 30% in 2011. The organisation 
started with around two to three hundred members and now has more than fifteen 
hundred, a development that, like the big increase in Gumala member numbers 
(paper 3) suggests that NYFL is providing outcomes that people want.  
6.3 Ashburton Aboriginal Corporation 
A locally based organisation that now operates on a Pilbara-wide canvas is the 
Ashburton Aboriginal Corporation (AAC).135 This was formed in 2000 ‘to provide 
direct relief from poverty, sickness, suffering, destitution, misfortune and 
homelessness to all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people of the Ashburton 
Shire area of Western Australia’. The Board is made up of ten Aboriginal Directors, 
drawn from across the Shire, and two independents. The Shire itself stretches from 
Onslow on the coast across to the border of the East Pilbara Shire. It includes the 
                                                        
134 Interview with NYFL CEO, Evan Maloney, 22 July 2011. 
135 The information in this section is based on an interview with AAC CEO, Janet Brown, 
Tom Price, 27 May 2011, and the AAC Annual Report 2009-2010. 
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towns of Onslow, Tom Price, Paraburdoo, and Pannawonica and some eight 
Aboriginal communities. 
When AAC was first set up, it was a local CDEP provider. In 2005, it had 109 CDEP 
participants and four staff. In 2007, one hundred people were moved through to 
employment. In the same year, as part of the changes to the CDEP (see Marsh 2011: 
2ff), the government approached the Board to take on the Western Desert region. 
And the same year also, the AAC Board undertook its first major strategic planning 
exercise, positioning the Corporation for the post-CDEP situation and the need to 
develop programs that would move the organisation from dependence on CDEP. In 
the interim, other Pilbara CDEP service providers like Ngarliyarndu Bindirri 
Aboriginal Corporation in Roebourne and Pilbara Meta Maya Regional Aboriginal 
Corporation in Hedland lost this role. As from 1 July 2010, AAC is the only provider 
of CDEP services in the Pilbara, to three central region towns and communities, four 
coastal region communities, and all four Western Desert communities. Its CEO, 
Janet Brown, is a member of FaHCSIA’s CDEP Consultative Group. 
AAC also has funding from the Indigenous Employment Program (IEP). In July 
2009, AAC was awarded an Indigenous Job Services Australia contract. In 2010, it 
was asked by Job Futures to take over their Pilbara services contract from Marnda 
Mia. It now has a 55% job market share across the Pilbara. In addition to direct 
employment services, AAC established Pilbara Training Services, which has a 
Memorandum of Understanding with Pilbara TAFE and is now a Registered 
Training Organisation. In 2006, the organisation embarked on a biodiesel 
production program, collecting used cooking oil from towns such as Port Hedland, 
Newman, Karratha, and Roebourne and mining camps like BHP’s Area C and Rio 
Tinto’s Hope Downs and West Angelas. By 2010, the amount collected was around 
5000 litres per week. The oil is processed in the ASHOIL plant opposite the AAS 
office in Tom Price and in 2009, ASHOIL Pty Ltd was formed as an AAC subsidiary. 
Royalties for Regions funded $145,000 towards the project and AAC has entered 
into a supply agreement with Rio Tinto to supply between 5000 and 7000 litres per 
week of bio fuel for their drilling and blasting operations. There is also a biodiesel 
manufacturing unit at Punmu and the organisation is able to supplement its own 
extensive vehicle fuel needs. 
The concern to provide an alternative to diesel fuel has generated another AAC 
initiative. In 2009, AAC submitted an expression of interest to the Department of 
Regional Development and Lands about Pilbara water opportunities arising from 
increasing mine dewatering as technology allows resource companies to mine below 
the water table. Although considerable amounts of this water are pumped back into 
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the mine as part of the dust mitigation process, there is still a surplus.136 The AAC 
proposal involves using this surplus water to grow high yield, fast-growing crops for 
biodiesel. One of these is the moringa tree from India, which is also a traditional 
food plant. The other, slower-growing tree, is the pongam, also from India. The AAC 
is undertaking seven ‘field to fuel’ trials, some of which are in the Western Desert 
communities. The aim is to move to fuel sustainable communities if the trials are 
successful. Again, Royalties for Regions was an important contributor, with 
$150,000 funding towards the planting project. 
By 2010, the organisation had fifty staff, with offices in Tom Price, Hedland, 
Roebourne, Newman, Onslow, and Karratha. Full-time CDEP staff are based in 
Marble Bar, Parnngurr, Jigalong, Onslow, and Punmu and part-time staff in 
Kunnawaritji, Onslow, Nullagine, Yandeyarra, and Tom Price. Warralong, one of the 
Strelley group of stations, has a local supervisor and gets visited regularly. 
According to the AAC CEO, Janet Brown, staff on the ground in the remote 
communities – ‘grunt on the ground’ – is the most important element for the 
success of the organisation’s programs. Without that, there would be nothing. 
The achievements of AAC in the past six years are nothing short of astonishing. 
Crucially, the organisation demonstrates the two connected elements that Hunt and 
Smith identify as necessary for governance arrangements to gain cultural 
legitimacy: ‘proper’ representative structures and decision-making processes, and 
practical outcomes for its members ((2007: xiv-xv; and papers 1 and 3). 
In the case of the AAC, it is perhaps the second of these elements – the delivery of 
outcomes – that feeds into and reinforces the first; while a committed, active, and 
regionally representative Board works collaboratively with a competent CEO and 
senior staff to give priority to projects that reflect the aspirations and concerns of 
Aboriginal people. 
The AAC does not profess to offer a model of an aggregated organisation that might 
form the basis of a regional body, but it does operate within a working network of 
partnerships with other organisations, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, and 
with government. It works with KJ on Martu programs and Gumala on training. 
Roebourne’s Ngarliyarndu Bindirri is partnering with AAC in its own biofuel pilot 
project. This is being run at the Roebourne Regional Prison’s Decca training facility 
on the Harding Dam road as part of the horticultural program, with moringa trees 
planted as another trial. The program is also given support from Rio Tinto and 
government. The AAC has a Memorandum of Understanding with the Shire of 
                                                        
136 The issues arising from dewatering have caused concern both to some Aboriginal groups 
and environmentally, but these are not matters for the present discussion. 
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Ashburton and the Shire’s CEO, Jeffrey Breen, is one of the two independent 
Directors on the AAS Board.  
The AAC is a signatory to a Regional Partnership Agreement (RPA) on Indigenous 
employment in Ashburton/Roebourne but, despite the parties including other 
Aboriginal organisations, industry, local government, and the State and Federal 
governments, this has not proved very effective, perhaps because, despite its local 
and regional orientation, no one party has direct responsibility – although the 
Ashburton Shire has reached around 20% of Indigenous employment for its own 
workforce – or perhaps because other programs are achieving more for employment 
than is available through an RPA.137  
Certainly, the AAC has demonstrated that it is not fazed even by what is clearly the 
policy turbulence around the CDEP program. Instead, they have responded by 
developing a timely strategic plan based firmly on Pilbara Aboriginal people’s 
aspirations and capabilities. And because, as the AAC CEO puts it, the response to 
policy turbulence has been ‘to tailor-make solutions from our own areas. It’s up to 
us.’ The AAC offers an enticing model for the effectiveness of place-based decision-
making, and how locally-based Aboriginal organisations can become the basis for a 
network of regionally-oriented governance. 
6.4 Trusted outsiders 
The Introduction paper sets out the relevance of this factor. In the discussion about 
Pilbara Aboriginal organisations – though it has more general applicability – it is 
that all entities of government, business, and regular organisations are served by a 
cadre of professional administrators to advise and implement the decisions of a 
governing body. Aboriginal organisations need to be served in the same way. That is, 
not all actors in an Aboriginal organisation need to be Aboriginal and, as these 
papers make clear, are not. The key issue is that the essential decision-making is 
carried out by the relevant Aboriginal people. In the effective Pilbara Aboriginal 
organisations discussed in this series of papers, this is emphatically the case.  
7. A proposed Indigenous Community Development 
Corporation 
As discussed in paper 3, one of the submissions in response to the Treasury 
Consultation paper – Native Title, Indigenous Economic Development and Tax – 
and the joint Attorney-General and Minister for FaHCSIA’s discussion paper – 
                                                        
137 This is not the case with Groote Eylandt where the communities themselves, through the 
Anindilyakwa Land Council, seized the opportunity offered by the RPA to negotiate major 
changes and concessions with both BHP and the NT and Commonwealth governments 
(Westbury 2010:11). 
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Leading practice agreements: maximising outcomes from native title benefits – 
came jointly from the Minerals Council of Australia and the National Native Title 
Council. The submission proposed ‘a more effective approach’: an Indigenous 
Community Development Corporation. It should be noted that, although the 
attention of the Tax Office was originally drawn by the East Kimberley Argyle 
agreement to the use of charitable trusts as the mechanism for native title benefits, 
its interest was acutely honed by the level of financial benefits associated with 
Pilbara native title agreements with resource companies.  
The proposal is not designed specifically to operate at a regional level but implies 
the possibility, with beneficiaries to include both traditional owners and ‘Indigenous 
peoples in a community who do not have stator entitlements applicable to the 
relevant area’ (2010: 18). The basis of the joint proposal appears to be akin to the 
model of the Aboriginal Benefits Trust (now the Aboriginal Benefits Account) in the 
Northern Territory, together with an assumed willingness by native title 
beneficiaries to contribute at least part of the financial benefits they have so 
recently achieved as part of an agreement or agreements. The implied expectation is 
that, in a region such as the Pilbara, the native title groups would agree to a joint 
organisation funded directly by their benefits but over which they would have only 
limited control. Based on the experience of the Rio Tinto Marnda Mia experiment, 
among other examples, there is no prospect of this being acceptable to Pilbara 
groups, at least for now. The trusts being currently established to manage the 
financial benefits all provide for inter-generational benefits: to the detriment, many 
native title group members would argue, of exit from poverty of the present 
generation.  
The question is whether a present reluctance of native title agreements beneficiaries 
to contribute to a body such as a Pilbara Indigenous Community Development 
Corporation should be an impediment to the establishment of a Pilbara Aboriginal 
regional body. Based on the previous discussion, the answer is most likely to be ‘no’.  
The formation of partnerships based on shared Aboriginal concerns, or needs 
(Sullivan 2011), like the Pilbara Indigenous Marine Reference Group, which has had 
regular contributions from the time of its formation from six of the member groups 
(Pilbara Indigenous Marine Reference Group 2010: 6), indicates the willingness of 
local Aboriginal people to look beyond their immediate concerns to a broader set of 
issues and groups (see paper 2). The crucial issue is that these are voluntary, not 
mandated, contributions; and they express Aboriginal concerns or needs, not those 
of government or external interests. One of the challenges for the establishment of a 
Pilbara regional body, including the possibility of broader benefits from native title 
agreements, will be to ensure that the regional body is truly representative of 
Pilbara Aboriginal people’s concerns and has sufficient cultural legitimacy to be 
effective. And its funding base needs to derive, at least in part, from the successful 
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economic activities being undertaken by community-oriented as well as native title 
organisations. 
8. Possible place of a representative Pilbara Aboriginal 
regional governance body 
Key questions for the Pilbara remoteFOCUS project are: on the basis of the evidence 
provided in these case studies, what are the strategic and positive ways for 
Aboriginal people to pursue their aspirations through engagement/involvement in 
broader governance reforms in the Pilbara and the associated investments occurring 
in the region? Specifically, what are the ways for Aboriginal people to draw the 
greatest benefit from developments in the Pilbara and the establishment of the 
Pilbara Cities agenda? How might it be possible to change the situation of Pilbara 
Aboriginal people from the marginalisation and poverty created by earlier mining 
booms (Taylor and Scambary 2005) to one where they participate in the current 
prosperity? And what barriers would they face, including overcoming the identified 
problems of education and health? 
The message from Aboriginal people, repeated so consistently as to be almost trite, 
is partnership: people wish to act, not be acted on. And there are two main channels 
through which they express this: affirmation of place, and engagement through 
organisations. Both have been covered in earlier papers. Here, the challenge is to 
align them with current overall Pilbara planning and development, particularly with 
government investment in Pilbara Cities. 
In a paper, ‘Pilbara cities: from projects to places’, Newman et al. (2010: 1) discuss 
the ‘two, four and ten’ of creating cities in the Pilbara: the two challenges to 
this transition – remoteness and resilience; the four themes for enabling the 
transition of project towns to good cities – economics, infrastructure, planning 
and ‘placemaking’, and governance; and the ten practical solutions to allow 
this transition to occur for the towns of the Pilbara.  
The whole of their analysis is relevant to the remoteFOCUS Pilbara project, and 
several aspects particularly to the question of Aboriginal engagement and 
governance. Of their four themes, ‘economics’ includes development and diversity; 
‘infrastructure’ refers to both social and physical infrastructure; and ‘governance’ 
stresses that this is needed at regional, state, and federal level ‘to ensure that 
confidence in developing cities with a long-term future is clearly enunciated and 
acted upon’. On that basis, they recommend the establishment of some new regional 
governance structures (2010: 4). 
8.1 Economic development and diversity 
The question of economic development is obviously not at issue: as a recent Kudelka 
cartoon had the exchange between disembarking Chinese businessmen: ‘It’s great to 
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finally visit the quarry’. ‘The locals prefer it to be called Australia.’138 The issue of 
diversity for the Pilbara is much more challenging and is one of the areas of concern 
for planning. The case studies make clear that diversity is a priority for Aboriginal 
people. Modest as they may be compared with the juggernaut of resource 
development, many of the successful enterprises being undertaken across the 
Pilbara focus on caring for country, environment, sustainability, and community 
viability. They are about the Pilbara as a place for the future, not just for the 
present. 
From this point of view, the emphasis on employment for Aboriginal people needs 
also to diversify. Employment is essential, and both the resource companies and 
government have made serious commitments to promote employment, with a 
number of Aboriginal people taking up positions in the various mining companies. 
Often, however, this is not the kind of employment that people want, or have the 
capacity, to undertake. The issue remains a crucial one, but some of the successful 
programs being run by Aboriginal organisations – including the use of CDEP while 
it lasts – provide indications of how productive employment might develop outside 
and beyond the resource industry. 
8.2 Social infrastructure and ‘placemaking’  
Pilbara Aboriginal people already have what the Pilbara Cities initiative is 
attempting to achieve: a sense of belonging based on relationships and the 
permanence of home. They embody the goal for long-term residence articulated by 
the Pilbara Cities’ CEO, Chris Evans, in that they live and die in the Pilbara.139  
In terms of other aspects of social infrastructure, particularly health and education, 
these were identified by Taylor and Scambary as the two major impediments to 
Aboriginal people’s engaging in serious employment (2005: 148-149; paper 1). The 
issue of education in particular is one that is being tackled by a combination of 
private and public sector partnerships: the Polly Farmer Foundation, for example, 
or the BHP Billiton and World Vision program for Martu people. And partnership, 
not control, is central to the success of these programs. The BHP Billiton 
partnership with the Australian Indigenous Education Foundation builds on the 
outcomes achieved earlier by the Polly Farmer Partnerships for success programs in 
order to expand its achievements (Australian Indigenous Education 
Foundation/BHP Billiton Partnership launch, 30 August 2011). 
Other programs are also having modest success against a background of non-
attendance or early drop-out by Indigenous kids: where ‘nobody wants to stick in 
                                                        
138 The Australian August 22, 2011. 
139 ABC Radio National, Saturday Extra, 6 August 2011 (Introduction paper and paper 4). 
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school. It’s a big problem, shame... It’s not doing much for Indigenous kids...’ 
‘There’s nothing here, nothing to help Indigenous kids to get into school-based 
traineeships. So I lost interest in school and left.’140 Another small-scale response to 
this situation is a South Hedland program for young mothers, to get them out of the 
house to earn some money, not just receive ‘baby money’ but to work, to take one 
example, as life guards. For another young woman, the key is provision of 
opportunity: ‘I was given the opportunity to study medicine at Newcastle University 
[where] there is an Aboriginal health unit, with a lot of us studying together...and 
community members instilling hope’. She has now graduated as a doctor and 
returned to work in Hedland. 
A more comprehensive approach is being undertaken by the Department of 
Employment, Education and Workplace Relations together with the WA State 
Department of Education as part of the Closing the Gap strategies. In May 2011, a 
practitioners’ forum was held to workshop the expansion of intensive literacy and 
numeracy programs for Indigenous students (www.deewr.gov.au). But there is no 
doubt that, if the education levels of Pilbara Aboriginal people do not improve 
radically, the dream of partnership and even diversity will become a chimera as they 
get yet again left behind by the urgencies of digging up – and digging out – the 
quarry. 
Newman et al. make the point clearly: 
Employing local people in the many jobs that are being created in the Pilbara 
will enable money to be retained in the region...Pilbara Cities will only thrive 
when they offer equal opportunities for Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
residents...There have been long-term shortages of skilled labour in the Pilbara 
so training facilities...need to be planned and built ahead of the demand 
instead of constantly being behind, as has happened over recent decades 
(2010: 5-6).  
8.3 New regional governance structures  
Although not going so far as suggesting a discrete body such as a Pilbara Regional 
Authority, Newman et al. do identify the need for a Pilbara Regional Plan with full 
statutory powers, citing the example of the East Perth Redevelopment Authority 
(2010: 8-10). Since their paper was published, the WA Planning Commission has 
produced the Pilbara Planning and Infrastructure Framework (2011). There is yet 
to be a body established with statutory powers. One of the remoteFOCUS reform 
principles is the establishment of a Commission for Outback/Remote Australia. If a 
                                                        
140 Meeting of remoteFOCUS team with Aboriginal community members, Port Hedland 
hospital, 21 July 2011 
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Pilbara-specific Commission were to be legislated along these lines, it must include 
a place for Aboriginal engagement. The question then is, how should this happen? 
Which brings us back to the central demand for partnership: there has been nothing 
in any of the consultations carried out recently to suggest that Aboriginal people 
support their direct inclusion in such a body. This is clear from the reports by the 
Indigenous Implementation Board, by the DIA Futures Forum, from Pilbara 
Dialogues, and from the more informal exchanges undertaken by remoteFOCUS. 
What Pilbara Aboriginal people want is equal partnership with government and with 
industry.141 This can be best achieved by the establishment of a representative 
Pilbara Aboriginal Regional Governance Body, building on the various levels and 
kinds engagement already being carried out at more limited levels and providing the 
opportunity to ensure that Aboriginal interests, concerns, and priorities are taken 
seriously and comprehensively. To be fully effective, it should have the same 
statutory support as any new Pilbara body such as a Pilbara Regional Authority. 
This recommendation takes into account the Indigenous Implementation Board’s 
comment that defining a regional governance model for the Pilbara at this time 
would be considered premature (2011: 38). It is not the purpose of remoteFOCUS to 
‘define’ the model, but to provide evidence of what works and what does not and, on 
that basis, to set out the possibilities. The case studies support the timeframe 
suggested by the Indigenous Implementation Board for ‘building governance 
capacity and investing in future leadership skills’, with a view to possibly 
implementing a new regional governance structure after the majority of land-access 
agreements are concluded, the date for the latter being suggested as 2012. 
The DIA and YMAC Pilbara Leadership and Governance Project is already moving 
towards developing a regional governance model, a process that will also take time, 
and needs to do so, though without unnecessary prolongation, if it is to get it right; 
an essential dimension of getting it right being that such a body has cultural 
legitimacy. The case studies demonstrate that this is not easy; but also that it is not 
impossible, and that the principles on which it would need to be based are already 
clearly identified, including through this series of remoteFOCUS papers. 
The need to take time, however, and the distractions caused by the demands of 
other departmental priorities and diversion of resources, throws up the problem of 
consistency of purpose, not just locally but specifically by government. If this is to 
work, there is no room for policy turbulence or, on the ground, for people 
turbulence. Another of the remoteFOCUS principles is to ensure the continuity and 
                                                        
141 The same very strong message was given by national Indigenous leaders in a Governance 
Workshop organised by the Attorney-General’s Social Inclusion Division in Canberra in 
April 2010. 
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effectiveness of public servants servicing remote Australia. The Newman Report 
notes the following: 
There is a perception that government service delivery is ineffective, and that 
government acts only when required, putting out ‘spot fires’ while ignoring the 
building of capacity of any given community, including mainstream in the 
Pilbara. This perception is born out of the ‘temporary’ public service 
arrangement in the Pilbara where a 2-3 year stint can be undertaken in an 
environment of ‘not wanting to rock the boat’, where officers at the regional 
level who are highly committed often become ‘burnt out’, are unable to make 
decisions at the ground level and/or have difficulties getting the real message 
heard at a higher or political level; and where all good intentions that are 
achieved or put in place are often erased by the following officer (Shanks 2011: 
10).  
Current DIA officers working on the Leadership and Governance project are highly 
committed and prepared to rock the boat. The success of the project demands that 
they be given the strongest support at both departmental, inter-departmental, and 
government level.  
8.4 Responsibility of government 
The principal responsibility for achieving an effective Pilbara governance that 
provides real partnership with Pilbara Aboriginal people lies squarely with 
government. Many (though not all) of the resource companies have shown practical 
willingness to contribute to Pilbara community development, including Aboriginal 
community and individual development. To a large extent, they, rather than 
government, have provided the environment and support for partnerships to 
develop. To take just one example, the Woodside Conservation Agreement has led to 
the participation of Big hArt in Roebourne and the development of the Yijala Yala 
community partnership (paper 2). In many instances, resource companies have 
replaced government funding and support; the experience from Roebourne Regional 
Prison’s education program is that the budget from the Department of Corrective 
Services has been cut annually and that the viability of the program, including the 
Decca Training Facility programs, are only possible because of the support of Rio 
Tinto.142 This should not be the case. 
With the establishment of the Royalties for Regions programs and Pilbara Cities, the 
State Government has shown a willingness to reclaim its responsibilities. The DIA 
Leadership and Governance project is being undertaken in collaboration with 
Pilbara Cities and a number of the recent successful projects undertaken by 
Aboriginal organisations have had funding from Royalties for Regions. These are 
                                                        
142 Interview, Roebourne Regional Prison, 19 July 2011. 
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just two of the many areas of necessary engagement by government, whose 
departments tend to remain, on the whole, metropolitan-centred. One of the 
recommendations by Newman et al. in their ‘10 mechanisms for transition’ is for a 
WA Government Department of the Pilbara to be located in Karratha (2010: 9). This 
would certainly help to maintain government attention on the social, not just 
economic, dimension of the Pilbara. As Westbury quotes: ‘Regional 
Australians...will be looking for governance arrangements that maximise decision-
making and accountability in the local area – where they are comfortable – not back 
in Canberra [or Perth] where we are comfortable’ (2010: 16). But, with the pace of 
development, and government unwillingness to moderate it, this is unlikely to be 
sufficient. 
Nevertheless, government has a key role to play in supporting the development of a 
viable Aboriginal regional governance body to work in partnership with any new 
Pilbara governance body, without moving to control it. When that goal is achieved, 
it may well be that Pilbara Aboriginal stories, so central to Aboriginal culture and 
identity, and to their rightful place within Australia, become integral to a national 
story that includes remote Australia.  
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Executive Summary 
This Pilbara report is a companion report to the remoteFOCUS report titled ‘Fixing 
the Hole in Australia’s Heartland: How Government needs to work in remote 
Australia’.  It is specific to the Pilbara region in Western Australia, however, it draws 
on the national conversation, analysis and findings of the remoteFOCUS project. 
(see box following this executive summary for a brief summary of the national 
project findings.   
In short the remoteFOCUS report confirms the initial diagnosis outlined in the 
remoteFOCUS Prospectus ‘remoteFOCUS:  Revitalising Remote Australia’ that 
remote Australia is in dire trouble, and that the way governments engage with, 
administer and govern remote Australia is at the heart of the problem.  The plethora 
of programs, plans and interventions, the disconnection and uncoordination 
between the tiers of government and the dissatisfaction and disengagement of 
remote citizens, attest to this reality. 
The Pilbara on first glance appears to be at the other end of the remote Australia 
spectrum being unique in its environment and economic features and the scale and 
nature of the challenges and change it faces. Yet it shares much in common with all 
of remote Australia when it comes to matters of governance 
The remoteFOCUS report clearly shows that there is a uniformity of diagnosis from 
the community, government and academe that change is needed and despite well 
intentioned attempts to respond to this concern, efforts have continually fallen 
short.  The public service has responded by working harder and endeavouring to 
respond in a more coordinated  way.  And while the focus of considerable effort 
across remote Australia has been to address Aboriginal disadvantage, the diagnosis 
is not unique to them, and affects all residents of remote Australia.    This is an issue 
of about how governments work – not something caused by the people of remote 
Australia.  Systemic change is needed. 
The remoteFOCUS report outlines a new approach to governing remote Australia 
based on establishing structures with a capacity to mediate and develop partnerships 
between the various tiers of government and community and Aboriginal governance 
structures.  It establishes principles for effective long-term governance and outlines 
them in a practical framework for governance reforms so that the tough problems 
that bedevil remote regions can begin to be addressed effectively.  It asserts that 
centralised executive responses will not address the underlying governance 
dysfunctions that drive government failure to meet the needs and aspirations of 
remote Australians. 
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The Pilbara on first glance can appear to be unrelated to this diagnosis being unique 
in its environment and economic features and the scale and nature of the challenges 
and change it faces. Yet it shares much in common with all of remote Australia when 
it comes to matters of governance. 
This remoteFOCUS Pilbara report sets out a brief overview of the changes taking 
place across the Pilbara and the work of government and the community in 
addressing the consequences of that change.   
In the Pilbara a valuable start has been made by the WA Government.  Royalties for 
Regions is a unilateral (that is, state) policy which addresses the traditional failure 
to provide financial resources to regions sufficient to meet their legitimate needs 
and aspirations.  Pilbara Cities is again a decision by the state to establish 
unilaterally a unifying vision going beyond ad hoc responses to particular issues.  
The next step is to build loyalty to the region - to ensure each level of government 
and the different Pilbara communities are on the same page - but this cannot be 
done unilaterally.  It needs the political leadership of all levels of government and 
the various elements of community in the Pilbara to agree to the need for the sort of 
approach set out above. Of particular concern is the incorporation of Aboriginal 
interests into this process through their established representative structures. 
The report investigates in some detail the issues surrounding Aboriginal 
opportunities for partnership and their need to engage and be engaged by the 
changes that are taking place and outlines the challenges involved in developing a 
governance model that works for all residents of the Pilbara. 
Planning processes cannot be regarded as legitimately ‘settled’ without achieving 
satisfactory inclusion of Aboriginal perspectives and interests. 
The principles and framework for effective long term governance in remote Australia, as 
developed and set out in the remoteFOCUS report, are explored in a preliminary way by 
working through the six primary steps to establish the context; design parameters; 
principles, scope and mandate; functions; form; and accountabilities required to establish 
a governance design for the Pilbara. 
The report finds there needs to be a regional governance authority, though many details 
about its precise role and functioning require more work than has been possible within 
the scope of this study. These details will be critical to the effectiveness of any agency – 
and the design needs to be consonant with the views of a complex array of stakeholders.  
The test of whether new arrangements will improve governance in the Pilbara is that 
a newly created body has the authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy that allow 
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it to respond to the nature and pace of change in the Pilbara and the contest of 
positions in response to change. 
Such a body would need, by its composition and legal structure, to be above the 
contest and endure over time and be mandated to: 
 Establish a shared vision between government and community for the Pilbara 
region, 
 Negotiate compacts that provide clear mandate of responsibilities and a 
common platform for accountability at all levels of governance across the 
Pilbara, 
 Foster place-centred solutions and regional innovations, and 
 Ensure resourcing for functional capacity. 
It may be possible to achieve this outcome through an adjustment of some existing 
structures, however, we argue that the mandate and function proposed for such a 
governance body suggest a fresh start should be made. 
One approach would be high level political support to establish a Pilbara trial where 
the principles and approach outlined in the report are applied, with the specific aim 
of developing an on-going process of learning, consensus and regional capacity 
building - a starting point with a defined scale and scope. This will build momentum 
for change as required and potentially provide “proof by good example” of the 
efficacy of such change.  
The voices of community legitimise concerns for politicians to respond to. In their 
own way community concerns provide the mandate for political leadership. 
Continuing community articulation of why their concerns persist and how the 
current system of governance appears unable to resolve these concerns is a 
fundamental condition precedent to establishing a mood and appetite for positive 
reform in the Pilbara. 
It is now not a case of not knowing what to do, rather a case of having the collective 
will to do it. Only political and civic leadership will drive the necessary reforms. 
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‘Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland: How 
Government needs to work in remote 
Australia’.  
The report titled ‘Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland: How government needs 
to work in remote Australia” advances five propositions, responding to two primary 
questions:  
(a) What is going wrong in remote Australia?  
1. Remote Australia is confronted by common issues and these issues are 
globally familiar though extraordinarily diverse and complex local 
challenges. They are common to regions where people reside remotely from 
centres of economic and political power but are facing rapid social and 
economic change.  
2. While it is important to recognise the limited influence that public policy 
can have on some aspects of these issues, present governance arrangements 
which have developed incrementally over 20 years or more are not well 
attuned to the current circumstances and emerging trends in remote 
Australia.  
3. In the absence of a nationally accepted narrative that embraces micro-
economic reform and establishes the national interest in remote Australia 
and a settlement pattern that supports that national interest, little is going 
to change, as initiatives will tend to be ad hoc rather than systemic.  
(b) How can it be fixed?   
4. There are many potential ways of remedying these structural governance 
problems, but the more promising prospects involve greater degrees - and 
varying patterns - of community engagement and decentralised governance. 
While this will inevitably take time, it is imperative that a start – a 
substantive start - be made. The general framework within which particular 
designs can be developed requires wide ranging regional engagement to 
resolve the specific application of these principles in particular locations. 
Application and details of the approach will differ from place to place and 
from time to time. 
5. While there is some spasmodic attention on remote Australia (particularly 
on “crises” such as Aboriginal disadvantage, or as the social and personal 
fall-out of fly-in-fly-out workplace practices), normal politics and public 
administration are unlikely to achieve the structural reforms needed to 
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address these issues, and others. Special purpose initiatives will be required, 
and these will need cross-party political commitment and support from 
business, professional and community organisations.  
 We conclude that: 
 Governance arrangements are a threshold cause of policy failure, and 
 Policy for remote Australia needs to be separately conceived and framed, and 
“custom-built” to meet its specific circumstances and needs.  
 The challenge in designing new approaches to governing and administering 
remote Australia is that a paradigm shift in policy is required - one that 
addresses and changes structurally embedded habits, practices, and 
approaches - and this cannot come from within the present governance 
framework. 
The sense of disconnect and discontent with governance recorded in our extensive 
consultations across remote Australia is captured in the five things people have told 
us they want but don’t get:  
1. A say in decisions which affect them.  
2. Equitable and sustainable financial flows.  
3. Better services and a locally responsive public service.  
4. Local control and accountability where possible.  
5. Inclusion in a greater Australian narrative.  
Accordingly, structural response to these concerns is required for successful 
governance. 
The key outcome of the developing of new governance principles should be the 
creation of locally appropriate institutions that have sufficient authority, legitimacy 
and effectiveness to fulfil their functions. The current three-tiered system of 
government fails to do this adequately in remote Australia. In large parts of remote 
Australia Aboriginal organisations including Land Councils and Native Title Bodies 
provide effectively a fourth tier of governance adding to the complexity of 
arrangements. 
The nature and pace of economic, social and technological change in remote 
Australia and the deep and consistent concerns expressed in our consultations with 
the people of remote Australia - and acknowledged in many government reports - 
necessitates creation of governance responses that meet the following principles:  
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 A structure or institution with the authority and legitimacy to create and 
sustain a vision for a region is needed.  
 For solutions to dysfunctional governance problems in remote Australia to be 
lasting, they should incorporate ‘negotiated compacts’ which adequately 
mandate institutions to mediate contests and reach durable agreements.  
 Solutions are also likely to invoke place centred responses and regional 
innovations.  
 ‘Resourcing must follow function’. This principle is less contentious, but 
is typically acknowledged only in the breach in Australian public policy.  
Accordingly, it is proposed that with intense regional engagement, a governance 
reform process should be established, in six primary steps summarised by the 
following terms: context; design parameters; principles, scope and mandate; 
functions; form; and accountabilities. 
 Only political leadership, such as that which produced an initiative and policy 
shift like Royalties for Regions in WA or mandated the NTER, but – 
importantly - aimed at systemic change to the way governments make 
decisions, operate and are accountable, will take us beyond a ‘we-must-try-
harder’ mantra without regard to the efficacy of the system itself. This cannot 
be driven from within the bureaucracy, which is constituted within the status 
quo and bound by its rules. Political leadership needs to come to the 
conclusion that there is a system problem not a policy problem. 
 Reform will be problematic unless the incorporation of Aboriginal 
perspectives is a non-negotiable condition precedent. 
 Another significant opportunity would be for the Productivity Commission to 
investigate the capacity for such a governance reform to act as a micro-
economic stimulant for remote Australia.  
 The voices of community legitimise concerns for politicians to respond to. In 
their own way community concerns provide the mandate for political 
leadership. Continuing community articulation of these concerns is a 
fundamental condition precedent to establishing a mood and appetite for 
positive reform. 
It is now not a case of not knowing what to do, rather a case of having the collective 
will to do it.  The market will not define the national interest in remote Australia and 
its peoples. Only political and civic leadership will drive the necessary reforms. 
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It is easy politics to hide behind concepts of representational democracy and market 
economics and waive the needs of remote Australia in favour of the weight of public 
opinion and numbers in the serviced suburbs. For it is here where the majority of 
political leaders derive their authority and maintain their relevance.  This type of 
neglectful inequality is corrosive for the nation and rots Australia from within. 
The economic cost of deferring action or denial of reform is nationally significant.  
Investment now with a view to avoiding vastly higher costs both in terms of 
addressing disadvantage and relocation is prudent judgement in the national 
interest. There are aspects of our national interest and identity that we lose by 
making the wrong decisions over and over again or by neglecting to make a decision 
at all. 
We know what this might cost but we don’t yet know what this is worth as a nation. 
What is the cost of this hole in Australia’s heartland? 
Is the current condition of governance in remote Australia good, fair and just?  Is it 
right? 
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The remoteFOCUS Pilbara Project 
The purpose of the remoteFOCUS Pilbara project is to position the Pilbara as a 
leader in the reform of government governance, administration and engagement 
with the aim of significantly advancing regional development through a more 
strategic, systemic and sustainable process. Growing loyalty for regions. 
It was commissioned by the Pilbara Development Commission to initiate an urgent 
dialogue between the Pilbara communities, relevant government agencies and 
industry stakeholders to develop reforms that could improve the way governments 
interact with the region.  
The remoteFOCUS Pilbara Project was established on the widely held assumption 
that comprehensive reform of governance was urgently required in order to improve 
economic outcomes, infrastructure and service delivery.   
The need for special measures such as the Pilbara Plan and Royalties for Regions 
were taken as proof that ordinary systems of government were in need of reform in 
the Pilbara. 
The project aims to develop reasonable alternatives and reform proposals that will 
enable the PDC to continue its efforts to provide well informed, coordinated advice 
to State government on Pilbara futures. 
A number of initiatives have been made in the region since 2008 to co-ordinate 
various government, non-government, industry and Aboriginal stakeholders. The 
political environment has also changed somewhat.  The Australian Government is 
pursuing the localisation of decision making through RDA’s and in WA the advent of 
Royalties for Regions has provided opportunities to respond to regional issues with 
real money albeit within existing structures.  However, it remains that the 
underpinning government legal and financial arrangements are such that co-
ordination is too often impeded by competing or conflicting governance and 
administrative arrangements.   
RemoteFOCUS was tasked to contribute to the PDC’s Pilbara Dialogue to enable well 
informed, co-ordinated advice to State Government and other stakeholders on 
Pilbara futures. Broad ranging questions discussed included: 
Where does the Pilbara story come from? 
 Is the vision broader than being a region that produces wealth for the nation 
and the state? 
 Who is responsible for creating and telling the story?  
 281 
 Who are the community of interest? 
 Should we view the Pilbara as a colony of the SW and SE of the country run 
primarily for the benefit of stakeholders elsewhere? 
Is a new localism/regionalism realistic? 
 Given the global, national and state significance of the Pilbara, what decisions 
can we expect to be made in the Pilbara? 
 Are there ways that accountability for local outcomes can be localised? 
How inclusive is the planning of the Pilbara? 
 How do Aboriginal people tell their story of the Pilbara? 
 How can they be included in the vision, services, accountabilities and cash 
flows of the region?  
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The Pilbara 
Situated in the north west of Western Australia, the Pilbara is a mineral rich region 
of spectacular scenery thought to be around 2.8 billion years old. Often described as 
the engine room of the nation because of its immense reserves of natural resources, 
the Pilbara is also blessed with stunning natural beauty boasting striking landscapes 
and a rich and diverse cultural heritage. 
 
The Pilbara covers a total area of 507,896 square kilometres extending from the 
Indian Ocean to the Northern Territory border (including offshore islands). The 
region comprises four local government authorities - the Shires of Ashburton, East 
Pilbara, Roebourne and the Town of Port Hedland and the established ports of 
Dampier, Cape Lambert, Onslow, and Port Hedland.  Two further ports, at Anketell 
Point and Cape Preston, are under construction. The ports are some of the most 
significant national gateways to the global economy. 
 
The recent 2011 census reports 59,894 people live in the Pilbara1 comprising 36,882 
males and 23,012 females. The median age is just 32 years and the population is 
made up of just under 10,000 families. In addition, this resident population is 
subject to the unique pressures generated by an extremely large Fly-In Fly-Out 
(FIFO) workforce. Already, in just two Local Government Areas (LGA’s) (Ashburton 
and East Pilbara) the annual FIFO population is estimated at 29,000. Based on 
building licence approvals, there are presently 55,000 FIFO beds in the region as a 
whole and this will grow by at least another 33,000 in the next two to three years2.  
At the same time a study by an Edith Cowan University School of Management 
research team estimates a 25 per cent annual turnover rate for the 50,000 fly-in, 
fly-out (FIFO) workers in Western Australia3. 
Meantime, the LGA’s argue that their rate bases do not allow the generation of funds 
necessary to deal with community pressures because of early commercial 
agreements between the State government and the major resource companies which 
preclude local government from effectively rating many of the major resource 
developments.4 For their part, the resource companies argue that the introduction of 
the Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) made it uneconomical to locate workers at or near 
their operations. 
The region can be separated into three distinct geographical formations, a vast 
coastal plain, breathtaking inland ranges and an arid desert region extending into 
Australia's dry centre. The Pilbara is a semi arid region characterised by high 
temperatures, low and variable rainfall and high evaporation. Temperature ranges 
are generally greater in inland districts away from the moderating effects of onshore 
winds common to the coastal districts. 
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Some of the Pilbara's most popular natural attractions are the Karijini and  
Millstream/Chichester National Parks with its spectacular gorges and waterfalls, 
Marble Bar and Cossack with their historical features, and the Dampier Archipelago 
for those interested in aquatic pursuits such as fishing, diving and other boating 
activities. 
The region is also well known for its heritage assets and especially for Aboriginal 
rock art, of which there are spectacular examples throughout the Pilbara.  
The Pilbara is of great economic significance to the nation with an economy 
dominated by the extraction, processing and export of minerals and hydrocarbons. 
The region has significant geostrategic importance to WA and national interests.  It 
produces approximately5: 
 95% of Australia’s iron ore 
 70% Australia’s natural gas 
 85% of Australia’s crude oil and condensate  
The Pilbara Development Commission estimates the Gross Regional Product (GRP) 
of the Pilbara at 14 billion in 20116. The mining sector accounts for 74.6 per cent of 
economic activity in the Pilbara7. The 2011 production value of Pilbara minerals and 
petroleum exports was AU$86.2b. This figure has increased massively since 
1999/2000 when exports were AU$4.1b. The Pilbara also services the offshore 
Carnarvon Basin, Australia’s largest known oil and gas reserve (21% WA total 
mineral's and petroleum value) in 2010. 
The Pilbara accounts for 59% of WA’s mineral and petroleum production value8.  
Projects under construction are led by the $43 billion Gorgon LNG project and iron 
ore developments in the Pilbara and the Mid West.  Major iron ore projects include 
Hancock Prospecting’s Roy Hill mine ($6.7 billion), Sino Iron Project ($6.2 billion), 
BHP Billiton’s Rapid Growth Project 5 ($4.9 billion), Rio Tinto’s Pilbara expansion 
($3.4 billion), Gindalbie Metals Karara Magnetite Project ($2.6 billion) and 
Fortescue Metals Group Solomon Hub Stage 1 Project ($2.5 billion).  
Outputs of other sectors in the Pilbara regional economy are led by sectors with 
strong links to mining.  Mining and construction employ 49 per cent of all people 
employed in the Pilbara9 
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Commodity Values -Pilbara Region $86.2b  
Production Value of Minerals and Petroleum by Commodities – 2011   
PILBARA REGION 
Iron Ore $60.29b 
Gold and Silver $1.006b 
Copper $643m 
Manganese and Salt $585m 
Other  $130m 
TOTAL $62.66 Billion 
PILBARA OFFSHORE  
Crude Oil and Condensate $12.004b 
Liquefied Natural Gas $9.344b 
Natural Gas $1.400b 
LPG Butane and Propane $745m 
TOTAL $23.49 Billion 
Source :WA Department of Mines and Petroleum 2011 WA Mineral and 
Petroleum Statistics Digest, June 2012. 
Commodity Value – by Shire  
PILBARA REGION 
East Pilbara 40,131b 
Ashburton 21,654b 
Roebourne and Karratha 135m 
Port Hedland and Marble Bar 743m 
TOTAL $62,66b 
Offshore Petroleum $23,49b 
Source :WA Department of Mines and Petroleum 2011 WA Mineral and 
Petroleum Statistics Digest, June 2012. 
Expansion in the resources, agricultural, tourism and fisheries sectors, along with 
complementary developments in the provision of services, are planned to transform 
the region from a ‘residential quarry’ to a desirable and resilient population centre.10 
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In an effort to expand the resident population and diversify the economic base, the 
West Australian Government has developed the Pilbara Cities vision.  Government 
and industry have committed significant financial and political outlays largely 
through the state government Royalties for Regions program and the many resource 
developments mentioned above. 
For the Pilbara Cities vision to be realised solutions to current and forecast 
challenges must be negotiated.  To support the region’s continued economic 
prosperity, a population policy that provides incentives to settle in the Pilbara is 
urgently required. The complex issues of Indigenous affairs and Native Title require 
continued focus and dialogue.  Finally, current deficiencies in critical infrastructure, 
water and governance structures must be resolved11. 
A key question for the people of the Pilbara is whether the current governance 
arrangements are capable and fit for purpose in resolving the challenges and 
contests that arise from the compounding growth that both Pilbara Cities and the 
resource extraction industries will bring to the region. 
Population, Development and Investment 
The Pilbara is Australia’s most important economic zone providing the most 
significant national gateways to the global economy. This region occupies 20% of 
the WA land area and produces more than 59% of the state minerals and petroleum 
revenue with the value of exports exceeding $86.2 billion in 2011. 78% of royalties 
and taxes in WA are derived from these activities. The Pilbara is now home for just 
on 59,894 residents12 or just on 2.1% of the WA population. Of this total around 6 
000 or 16.9 % are Indigenous Australians (10.5 per cent of the WA Aboriginal 
population). 
In the 2006 census, the resident population of the Pilbara was around 41,000. The 
Indigenous population – that also includes some Torres Strait Islanders – was 5,632 
or 13.7%. Estimates of the total resident population for 2008 indicated a rise in the 
two years after the 2006 census of around 5,000 to nearly 46,000 and another 
5,000 for 2010 to 51,000. Hence population increased by 15% over the seven years 
to 2008 an annualised growth rate of just over 2%.  
In the recent 2011 census the Pilbara was the second fastest-growing Statistical 
District (SD) in the state, increasing by 2.7% (or 1,300 people) in 2010-11. 
Roebourne (S) was the LGA with the largest growth in this SD, increasing by 640 
people (3.3%), while Ashburton (S) was the fastest-growing with an increase of 
3.7%.13 
The Pilbara Industry’s Community Council (PICC) 2010 employment and population 
projections estimate that the resident population will increase from 51,000 in 2010 
to 62,500 in 2020, although with FIFO this would rise to a total of 66,530 in 2010 
and to 96,200 in 2020.14  The PICC report also forecasts FIFO to increase 83% 
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between 2010 and 2015 and a further 23% by 2020.  Pilbara Regional Planning 
Committee (PRPC) estimates that FIFO and construction work could inflate resident 
population estimates by 20-40% in peak times. These figures sit on top of resident 
workforce growth of 28% between 2010 and 2015 with a further 16,000 extra 
workers in Karratha alone. The Pilbara Cities vision calls for the population to 
expand to over 120,000 by 2035.   
This will require a sustained average population growth rate of more 
than 4% per annum for 25 years. 
Current planned projects suggest an additional 34,000 workers in 2012 in the 
region, declining to an additional 21,000 in 2015 (above 2009). This increase 
implies a doubling of the workforce over the short term to a total of 67,000 in 2012 
and settling back to 54,000 in 2015. An intense period of construction drives the 
peaked profile, with a construction workforce of 27,000 required in 2012, reducing 
to an additional 15,000 above 2009 construction workforce by 2015.  
The operations workforce in the region will steadily increase over the period, with 
the region likely to require an additional 19,000 operations workers by 2015. 
These changes will have substantial impacts on the relative proportion of the 
Indigenous population. If these projections are realised – and the PICC figures for 
2010 indicate that they may well be – then the proportion of Aboriginal to non-
Aboriginal people may well decrease. This is despite the fact that the Indigenous 
population itself has grown steadily over the past couple of decades and continues to 
do so15(Taylor and Scambary 2005: 13); and that, in 2006, the Pilbara Aboriginal 
population represented the third highest proportion of Aboriginal people in Western 
Australia16 (Western Australian Government, Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
2011). In addition, the spread of Aboriginal people is varied, with towns like 
Roebourne, Marble Bar, South Hedland, Onslow with much higher Aboriginal 
populations than in, for example, Karratha or Dampier; and other areas such as 
parts of the East Pilbara where the proportion of Aboriginal people is much higher 
than the regional average. As Taylor and Scambary observe (2005: 13): 
The simple point is that, over vast tracts of the Pilbara region, the 16 per cent global 
Indigenous share statistic17 can be misleading as large parts of the country away 
from the demographic influence of urban centres and mine sites remain essentially 
Indigenous domains where Indigenous people and their institutions predominate. 
A large variation occurs even within towns. In South Hedland, for example, the 
2006 census figures show a spread of Aboriginal residents across the town from 
eight to nine per cent in some areas to twenty-eight to thirty-three per cent in 
others. (These papers are accessible in chapters 10-15 of the remoteFOCUS 
Compendium). 
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Government and Industry have done some excellent work documenting the scale of 
the changes proposed for the Pilbara and the following snapshot provides a sense of 
the governance challenge that lies ahead. 
Pilbara Cities 
Over the next two decades the Pilbara residential population is expected to grow 
significantly, exceeding 140,000 by 2035.  This growth will be largely driven by the 
State government’s Pilbara Cities initiative, which aims to secure the long term 
sustainability of the Pilbara through the development of a robust and diverse 
regional economy.  It is planned under Pilbara Cities that Karratha and Port 
Hedland will be developed into cities with populations of 50,000, supported by 
Newman as a sub regional centre with a population of 15,000. 
This vision was timely and projected a positive future for the Pilbara which at the 
same time could redress a number of issues that had developed as a result of the 
rapid change in the regional profile. 
Despite the wealth generated in the Pilbara, in common with the resource industry 
worldwide, the challenge is to achieve significant economic flow-on effect in the 
immediate region. That is, despite increased activity the region is still peripheral or 
marginal to the main economic impact of the resources developments. 
A snapshot of the Pilbara in 200618 set out the scale of the challenges to be tackled: 
Resource Challenges 
 The mines are effectively mining the social capital of the region as well as the 
mineral resources 
 Non resource industries accounted for much less than 1% of GRP. 
 Expansion in resources sector but no evidence of corresponding expansion in 
other sectors 
 The resource sector accounts for most of the employment. 
 Staff fly directly from the east coast to Karratha and Hedland 
 The productivity cost of labour turnover (around 40%) is in the order of 175% 
of annual salary for the 6months after resignation. 
Local Business Challenges 
 Decline in Small Medium Enterprises (SME’s) in 2001 compared with 1995 by 
more than 20 %.  
 Most of the payments to suppliers of goods and services are made outside the 
region; Significant online shopping taking place. 
 Overall cost of living is 49% higher than in Perth. 
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Demographic Challenges 
 The average age of Pilbara residents is 31 though 26% of the Pilbara 
population is under 14 years of age. 
 Number of families in Pilbara decreased by 4.2% 1996-2006 despite an 
overall population increase. 
 The ratio of males to females is 140:100.  
 The non-indigenous population is skewed to the 25 – 45 year age bracket;  
 The majority are not long-term residents and are grouped in the larger towns 
of Port Hedland and Karratha. Yet some people have lived in the Pilbara more 
than 30 years. 
Aboriginal Challenges 
 Indigenous people currently account for 17.5% of the resident Pilbara 
population. Over 5700 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people live in 
the Pilbara 
 More than one-third of Indigenous residents are under 15 years of age. 
 A relatively smaller number live in Indigenous communities and on pastoral 
stations. 
 50% of working age Indigenous people in the Pilbara were not in the 
workforce. (2001 Census) 
 Approximately 60% of arrests in the Pilbara in 2003 were of Indigenous 
people. 
 Aboriginal people do not figure prominently in the many planning reports. 
Housing Challenges 
 High housing costs and difficulties in attracting and retaining employees are 
two key impediments for small business. 
 Savings generated are mainly invested outside the region (including 
residential housing) 
 A house in Hedland costs up to $1m to build, houses are rented for $2000 per 
week. In Port Hedland and Newman median house prices have risen over 
800% since 2001 and rents are approaching $1500-$2500 per week. 
 Unmet housing demand currently 3878 projected to rise to 8614 in 2015. 
 Will need additional 40,900 dwellings by 2035 to meet population growth 
from Pilbara Cities. 
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Citizenship Challenges 
 Average participation rate for registered voters across the Pilbara is 21.1%. 
In summary the region had a lack of economic and industry diversity with,  
 an over-reliance on the resources and energy industry;  
 a lack of long-term population growth;  
 high costs of infrastructure and services;  
 a lack of clarity over towns service provision; and  
 an Indigenous community that is effectively marginalised from the 
mainstream economy. 
The main reasons people left the region was:  
 cost of living,  
 lack of educational opportunities for children and  
 lack of community facilities. 
In response to this emerging regional profile and the significant growth of resource 
investments, and to counter the negative impacts on the social front, the Pilbara 
Cities initiative was announced by the Premier and the Minister for Regional 
Development in November 2009. This is the central component of a broader plan to 
normalise living conditions and cost of living, to enrich the quality of life, and to 
diversify economic opportunities: to use some of the vast wealth produced in the 
region for the social benefit of the people who live there and to make newcomers 
want to stay. The objective is to have two cities, Karratha (Karratha and Dampier) 
and Port Hedland (Port Hedland and South Hedland), each with a population of 
50,000. Newman would become a sub-regional centre; Tom Price, Onslow, and 
Wickham ‘major towns’; Paraburdoo, Roebourne, and Pannawonica ‘towns’; Point 
Samson, Marble Bar, Nullagine, Cossack, and Shellborough ‘villages’. 19. Aboriginal 
‘communities’ – unnamed – sit outside this particular planning hierarchy, in a 
discreetly acknowledged too hard – ‘challenging’ – basket  
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The present governance structure 
This report explores issues surrounding the design of governance arrangements for 
the Pilbara. Because of its singular circumstances, this region presents a unique 
challenge. No other spatial zone in Australia will experience such commercial 
investment and development. No other region is of remotely equivalent significance 
for the entire Australian (much less Western Australian) economy. No other region 
will experience such a conjunction of social pressures: including a disproportionate 
fly-in-fly out work force; extremely ambitious local developmental plans; and an 
Aboriginal population that remains marginalised and largely disconnected from the 
surrounding bonanza. 
In response, both state and national government have embraced regional strategies. 
Initiatives under the auspices of the Western Australian government include 
Royalties for Regions, the Pilbara Cities vision, Pilbara Development Commission. 
Following the 2011 review of Regional Development Commissions, the government 
has decided to retain the Regional Development Commissions but to strengthen 
their links to the Department of Regional Development and Lands in Perth and to 
assess needs for extra capabilities.20 At the national level an office (Regional 
Development Australia – Pilbara) has been established at Karratha and an Advisory 
Council constituted. These initiatives demonstrate the concern of governments for 
prosperity and global linkage to march in step with local community development 
and settlement, not the opposite.  
This remoteFOCUS report suggests that present governance arrangements will 
ultimately need to be augmented. There are few developmental projects in 
Australian history that match (in scale and significance) what is now unfolding in 
the Pilbara – the Snowy Mountain scheme is perhaps an analogue although this was 
largely an engineering project whereas the Pilbara involves social and economic 
considerations of unusual complexity. Despite the essential role of place based 
capabilities, these are now under-developed and incapable of addressing 
contextualised needs.21 Moreover, commitments to engagement, consultation and 
buy-in require much greater capacities for linkage and choice at the regional level. 
This is in a context in which many extra-regional interests and considerations also 
need to be accommodated.  
There has been significant activity in developing forward plans for the Pilbara over 
the life of this remoteFOCUS project and already the Pilbara Plan has been 
superceded by two generations of plans although each version carries some element 
of earlier planning. 
Many attempts have been made to coordinate and sustain efforts—by state and local 
governments, the mining sector—to diversify the economy, enrich the quality of life 
and reduce the cost of living. But the rate of change and the underpinning 
government legal and financial arrangements are such that competing or conflicting 
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governance and administrative arrangements too often impede co-ordination, let 
alone cooperation. 
How do you establish sound governance in such a complex and changing 
environment? 
How do you plan new cities and operate a business in a region like the Pilbara when 
the reality is that there are probably thousands of people not in this region who are 
making decisions every day that have a direct impact on this region? 
All levels of government—commonwealth, state, and local—as well as industry 
bodies, are taking an active role in planning for the Pilbara and the management of 
current, proposed, and expansion projects. This has resulted in frenetic activity 
levels of some complexity. In addition to normal departmental responsibilities for 
their various portfolios –the State government has largely, as a result of the 
Royalties for Regions program introduced in 2008, established or redefined a 
number of specialist bodies to oversee Pilbara matters.   
From its inception in 2008 till December 2011 Royalties for regions had expended 
$361,610 m in the Pilbara 
Local Government  
Local government plays a significant role in community governance, while the local 
government sector recognises that the State Government is responsible for strategic 
issues of State interest and for providing a coordinated approach to issues affecting 
all Western Australians. Four local government bodies provide a range of local 
government functions across the Pilbara. 
The Shire of Ashburton, at nearly half the size of Victoria (105 647 square km), 
boasts some of the world's largest open cut mines, largest pastoral leases and cattle 
stations and a thriving fishing industry all set against a beautiful and ancient arid 
tropical landscape. 
The region's 7,000 residents are employed in a variety of industries including oil, 
gas, mining, cattle, fishing and tourism. The supporting infrastructure also provides 
employment and career opportunities.  
The Shire has four towns Tom Price, Paraburdoo, Onslow and Pannawonica. 
The Shire of East Pilbara has an area of approximately 380,000 square 
kilometers and is the third largest municipality in the world. The main townships 
are Newman, Marble Bar and Nullagine.  The town of Newman is home to about half 
of the shire’s population and is seen as a modern mining town with suburban-style 
homes, which provide a stark contrast to its surroundings of red and desert 
landscapes. Newman has some of Australia’s most beautiful country with 
spectacular flora and fauna. The 2011 census identified a resident population for the 
Shire of 8100. Amongst the natural beauty of the Shire is one of the world’s biggest 
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open cut mines being BHP Billiton’s Mt Whaleback Mine. It was discovered in 1957 
by veteran prospector Stan Hilditch and was named “Whaleback” because the hill 
resembled the shape of the humpback whale. There are many Aboriginal 
communities in the East Pilbara such as Jigalong, Punmu, Parngurr, Irrungadji, 
Pipunya and Goodabinya. 
Port Hedland is a town of 15,046 people where life is relaxed and being situated 
along the ocean provides a variety of aquatic leisure activities and a home for whales 
and nesting flatback turtles. Port Hedland is an anglers’ paradise with a variety of 
fish such as whiting, mullet, bream and kingfish.  Port Hedland lies on an inlet 
fringed with mangroves and a number of hand shaped tidal creeks which come off 
its shallow natural harbor. 
Port Hedland was originally known by the indigenous Kariyarra and Nyamal people 
as Marrapikurrinya which means “place of good water”. The BHP Iron Ore Mill at 
Nelson Point is the industrial centre which focuses on the extraction, processing and 
export of iron ore. The port handles the largest tonnage of any port around 
Australia. Here the iron ore is unloaded, screened, crushed, stockpiled and 
exported.  
Of the 59,894 people that call the Pilbara home about 19,800 local residents live in 
the Shire of Roebourne located 1,557 kilometres north of Perth on the spectacular 
Pilbara coast.  The Shire of Roebourne consists of five major towns including 
Karratha, Dampier, Roebourne, Wickham, Point Samson and the historic settlement 
of Cossack. 
Karratha, its thriving regional centre. 42 kilometres north east of Karratha is 
Roebourne a community with a strong and proud Aboriginal culture. 
The Shire of Roebourne is the western gateway to the Millstream-Chichester 
National Park and the spectacular Dampier Archipelago is just off the coast.  Some 
of the most popular and easily accessible beaches in and around the Central Pilbara 
Coast are Hearson's Cove, the Dampier Foreshore, Point Samson, Honeymoon Cove 
and Cossack.  There are also numerous beaches on the Dampier Archipelago and the 
Montebello Islands.  
Each Shire has developed a number of strategic plans over recent years in an 
attempt to fulfil their statutory responsibilities and maintain pace with the changes 
that are occurring in their regions.  Most recently these are: 
 Town of Hedland – has developed ‘Hedland Futures Today’ 
 Shire of Roebourne – has developed ‘Karratha 2020’ which is about to be 
superseded by ‘Karratha City of the North’ 
 Shire of Ashburton  - currently only have a strategic plan to 2012 but are 
about to release a new plan early next year. 
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 East Pilbara Shire – has a plan titled ‘Newman Tomorrow’. 
It is arguable that none of the four Shires has a current rate base that would enable 
them to deliver a full range of services expected by ratepayers nor could they sustain 
the recurrent operational costs of the significant infrastructure investments 
currently being made without ongoing subsidy. 
The Pilbara Regional Council is a statutory body established under the Western 
Australian Local Government Act 1995. It was formed in 2000 and is made up of 
representatives from the four Pilbara shires: Ashburton, East Pilbara, Roebourne, 
and the Town of Port Hedland. It was established to take a regional approach to 
service delivery and to act as a collective voice to government and industry. In 2010, 
it received funding for three projects to be carried out in the following twelve 
months: improvement of local government services to Aboriginal communities 
($180,000); the preparation of a Regional Business Plan to investigate shared 
service delivery between the four local governments ($170,000); and the promotion 
of larger strategic infrastructure development and asset preservation and renewal 
($2,275,067 from the Country Local Government Fund). 22 
The Pilbara Regional Council governance model recognises that each member 
council brings specific expertise to the table, and that there is already a spirit of 
collaboration in the Pilbara. The governance model is neither top down nor bottom 
up; rather it acknowledges the mutual interdependence of all for the benefit of the 
region.  For a considerable time the PRC was not particularly active. 
The Pilbara Regional Council seeks to deliver a voice and attract a financial return 
commensurate with the Region's contribution to the Australian economy.23 
State Government Bodies 
The Pilbara Development Commission is one of nine Regional Development 
Commissions established under the Regional Commissions Act 1993 and supported 
by the Department of Regional Development and Lands. The role of the 
Commissions is to facilitate and coordinate the development of the region in which 
each one is based24. The 2010 Review of RDC’s commented that ‘if regional 
governance in Western Australia were to be measured against jurisdictions 
elsewhere in Australia, then the RDC model, with its local staff, CEO and board, 
would stand out against all other systems, which are broadly centralist in nature’ 25. 
The PDC mission is to empower Pilbara communities to direct their own future as 
diversified and sustainable centres that are attractive to visit, live, work and invest 
in. 
PDC seeks to shape the future of the Pilbara such that: 
 It is a vibrant and sustainable place to live, work, visit and invest. 
 Investment is leveraged many times over 
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 We can attract and retain a strong workforce 
 There is prosperity and benefit for everyone 
The PDC office in Karratha is now co-located with Pilbara Cities and Landcorp at 
the Karratha Business Centre. 
The Commission undertakes and engages with stakeholders in increasing the 
knowledge of the region in order to provide policy and decision makers with quality 
information. Recent and current studies undertaken include a study into the 
situation of Aged Care in the Pilbara, Demand/Needs analysis for short stay 
accommodation, requirements for small business support and feasibility of 
establishing business incubators. PDC is currently undertaking a demand/needs 
analysis of short term accommodation and feasibility studies for business 
incubators in Karratha, Onslow and Tom Price. 
The Pilbara Dialogue is a high level forum facilitated by PDC for information 
exchange about development in the Pilbara, agency updates and presentation of 
guest speakers. Also the e-Pilbara website is an initiative of the PDC to facilitate the 
ability of local business and industry to share opportunity. It has also set up 
REMPLAN, an economic modeling program made available to interested parties to 
model the potential economic impacts of projects in the region. It has the 
capabilities to identify opportunities for economic development, provide 
quantifiable regional data for studies and grant applications. 
The WA Regional Development Council consists of the chairpersons of the nine 
Regional Development Commissions, two local government representatives, and the 
Director General of the Department of Regional Development and Lands. It is the 
peak advisory body to the Western Australian Government on regional development 
issues. 
In 2010 the WA government commissioned a review of regional development 
arrangements to undertake a comprehensive examination of regional development 
and the Regional Development Commissions.  
This review chaired by the Hon Wendy Duncan MLC reported in November 2010. 
Cabinet noted the report on 13 December 2010 and on 11 July 2011 endorsed the 
Government response.  
The Regional Development Council (Council) jointly working with and supported by 
the Department of Regional Development and Lands (RDL) will be responsible for 
Legislative changes including: 
 the roles and responsibilities of the Regional Development Commissions 
(RDC) and the Council being updated through amended legislation to create a 
new operating model. Such updating will reflect for the Council the direction 
set by the review committee through recommendations 7 and for RDCs 
recommendation 8. 
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 gaining agreement from the Western Australian Planning Commission 
(WAPC) on the development of Regional Investment Blueprints to avoid any 
potential for confusion and role conflict with the development of regional 
planning frameworks and strategies. The WAPC has asked for a clear 
distinction between roles and functions, recognising the emphasis in the 
review recommendations on regional economic and community development, 
and industry attraction responsibilities. In developing such preeminent 
blueprints Regional Development Commissions will have mandated authority 
to bring together stakeholders. 
From 1 July 2011 the Council will be provided with additional dedicated and 
ongoing support, to be located in RDL, as it will have a key role in setting strategic 
directions, policy prioritisation and strategies common to all RDCs for regional 
economic and community development responsibilities, including industry 
attraction. To further strengthen the Council an Executive Chair will also be 
appointed on a contract for services arrangement from 1 September 2011, providing 
full-time leadership.26  
Recommendation 9.6 
Government proposed for recommendation 9.6 that the Department of 
Regional Development and Lands (RDL) and the Department of Indigenous 
Affairs (DIA) identify solutions to enhance Aboriginal partnership and 
governance, to realise human capital for the state, and develop a policy 
position for the Minister and the Minister for Indigenous Affairs, and 
Cabinet; 
The Aboriginal Affairs Coordinating Committee will progress 
recommendation 9.6. 
Recommendation 10 
Establish a Ministerially endorsed and mandated working party to 
strengthen the integration and alignment of statutory land use planning, 
regional development, and local government service delivery within existing 
legislative planning frameworks for the Pilbara region. (This accords with 
Economic Audit Committee recommendations 6 and 10.) 
Government directed that RDL lead in implementing Recommendation 10 as 
Government will establish a Ministerially endorsed and mandated working 
party to strengthen the integration and alignment of statutory land use 
planning, regional development, and local government service delivery within 
existing legislative planning frameworks for the Pilbara region. There is great 
potential in having the Commonwealth, through the Regional Development 
Australia organisations, join this partnership. If successful, the model could 
be applied to other regions. 
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This transition is currently taking place. 
The Pilbara Cities Office. 
In November 2009 Premier Colin Barnett announced the Pilbara Cities Vision and 
May 2010 the State Budget allocated resources for the establishment of a Pilbara 
Cities office. 
The Western Australian State Government established the Pilbara Cities Office in 
August 2010 to oversee implementation of the Pilbara Cities Vision and initiate a 
new governance structure function in the region. It was envisaged the Pilbara Cities 
Office would evolve over time and it was most important that this would be overlaid 
with Federal and Local Government functions and organisation: 
The Pilbara Cities Office is active in promoting the Pilbara Cities vision and the 
projects supporting its realisation 
The Key Focus areas to achieve the Pilbara Cities Vision are: 
 Infrastructure Coordination 
 Land Availability and Development 
 Community Projects and Engagement 
 Economic Diversification 
Key challenges arise from the massive growth in recent years and as a direct 
consequence: 
 Housing is less affordable due to unmet demand 
 Infrastructure upgrades/expansion are not keeping pace with growth 
 Small business numbers have declined partly due to rising costs 
 Education and Health services are below expectations 
 Community services facilities are aging and inadequate 
 Sense of community is in decline, adversely impacted by workforce Fly-in-
Fly-Out rosters and 12 hour shifts. 
The WA Planning Commission is a statutory authority with state-wide 
responsibilities for urban, rural, and regional land use planning and land 
development matters. The WAPC maintains a number of committees, including the 
Statutory Planning Committee which covers a wider remit than physical planning 
activity and the Pilbara Regional Planning Committee. The Statutory Planning 
Committee is the WAPC’s regulatory decision-making body. Its functions include 
approval of the subdivision of land, approval of leases and licences, approval of 
strata schemes, advice to the Minister on local government planning schemes and 
scheme amendments. 
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The Pilbara Regional Planning Committee is one of six regional planning 
committees set up to advise the WAPC on planning for the region, or part of the 
region and makes recommendations on the extent and content of region planning 
schemes.  The Commission is supported by the Department of Planning 
(Department of Planning web site). 
The Pilbara Regional Planning Committee 2011 draft Pilbara planning and 
infrastructure framework was released in February 2011 and endorsed by the 
WAPC in September 2011 as the latest, and only one but perhaps the most 
ambitious, of a number of regional plans that have emerged in recent years. Many of 
the latter focus on funding for selected local or regional projects.  The Pilbara 
Planning Framework seeks to ensure that development and change in the Pilbara is 
achieved in a way that improves people’s lives and enhances the character and 
environment of the region. It addresses the scale and distribution of future 
population growth and housing development as well as identifying strategies for 
dealing with economic growth, environmental issues, transport, infrastructure, 
water resources, tourism and emerging impacts of climate change.  
The WAPC has published a range of plans and policies relevant to planning for the 
Pilbara, including: 
 Shire of East Pilbara Local Planning Strategy 
 Onslow Regional Hotspots Land Supply Update (2008) 
 Pilbara Planning and Infrastructure Framework 
 Port Hedland Area Planning Study (2004) 
 Port Hedland Regional Hotspots Land Supply Update (2011) 
 Karratha Regional Hotspots Land Supply (2010) 
 Karratha Area Development Strategy (2007) 
 Newman Regional Hotspots Land Supply Update (2008) 
There are local planning schemes operative in the Pilbara: 
 Shire of Ashburton Town Planning Scheme No 7 
 Shire of East Pilbara Town Planning Scheme No 4 District Zoning Scheme 
 Town of Port Hedland Town Planning Scheme No 5 
 Shire of Roebourne Town Planning Scheme No 8 
In 2009, the Pilbara Development Commission published its Strategic Plan 2010-
2053. Also in 2009, the State Government announced the Pilbara Cities blueprint; 
the Pilbara Regional Council finalised its Plan for the future 2010-2014; and the 
Minister for Regional Development, Brendan Grylls, set out the Royalties for 
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Regions Pilbara Revitalisation Plan (Ministerial media statement 11/5/09). The 
Pilbara Revitalisation Plan was established as a four year program to support the 
development of the region with an initial allocation of $300m, which has grown to 
$456.8m with additional monies allocated in the 2010/11 State Budget. 
Phase two of the plan is being led by the Pilbara Development Commission and the 
Department of Regional Development and Lands. A strategic directions group 
established as a sub committee of the Commission’s Board, determines the strategic 
priority areas for the region and recommends projects for funding to the Pilbara 
Revitalisation Plan Steering Committee and the Minister for regional Development. 
Industry Bodies 
The Pilbara Industry’s Community Council (PICC) is a unique concept set up in 
2006 with member companies BHP Billiton Iron Ore, Chevron Australia, North 
West shelf venture, Rio Tinto Iron Ore, Woodside. Fortescue Metals Groups (FMG) 
is also a member. Although PICC has become less active as other programs have 
been put in place, its key commitments were twofold: to increase Indigenous 
participation in employment in the Pilbara and the sustainability of Pilbara towns. 
PICC saw collaboration with government as vital to ensure that both sectors work 
together 27. 
PICC has undertaken a number of innovative projects over the past several years 
including the development of the Pilbara Health Initiative, a review of education in 
the Pilbara, and forecasting for employment and population projections in the 
region. 
When first established PICC provided a forum for members to co-ordinate existing 
and proposed industry, community and Government sponsored programmes 
designed to address their two core objectives to:  
 Identify the key drivers of the Pilbara economy and provide a forum for 
collaboration and co-ordination between industry, community and 
Government to maximise opportunities for positive change in the region.  
 Consult with Local, State and Commonwealth agencies concerning programs, 
plans and financial arrangements relating to PICC’s objectives, and  
 Increase key stakeholder and community awareness of industry and 
government initiatives through effective and timely communication. 
In 2008 and 2010, the Pilbara Industry’s Community Council commissioned 
reports, Planning for resources growth in the Pilbara, focusing on employment and 
population projections to 202028 (Heuris Partners 2008; Waller 2010). 
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National Bodies 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) National Partnership 
Agreement on Remote Service Delivery came into effect in January 2009 as 
part of the Closing the Gap commitments. None of the priority locations in Western 
Australia is in the Pilbara. The 2009 Report by the Coordinator General for Remote 
Indigenous Services therefore deals only with the priority locations, which are all in 
the Kimberley. Despite the economic activity in the Pilbara the range of planning 
activity in the Pilbara is largely silent on how it links with the Remote Service 
Delivery objectives. 
Regional Development Australia (RDA) was established in 2008 to bring together all 
levels of government to support the growth and development of regional Australia 
(Regional Development Australia web site). It is supported by the Department of 
Regional Australia, Regional Development and Local Government and is made up of 
a network of 55 non-profit, community-based locally managed committees serving 
rural, regional, remote and urban communities across Australia. The RDA’s are 
derived from the previous Area Consultative Committees (ACCs). 
Regional Development Australia Pilbara Committee (RDA Pilbara) was previously 
the Pilbara Area Consultative Committee. In 2008, the Pilbara Area Consultative 
Committee – now RDA Pilbara – produced The Pilbara Plan, identifying 43 
‘essential projects’ in conjunction with the Pilbara Development Commission and 
the Pilbara Regional Council.  This formed the basis of RDA Pilbara’s August 2010 
Preliminary Pilbara Regional Plan. 
RDA Pilbara works in partnership with all levels of government, industry and the 
non-government sector, to help build and strengthen communities in the Pilbara 
region through leadership, collaboration and the provision of responsive and 
innovative services. 
Their most recent strategic plan claims a clear mandate to deliver tangible and 
ongoing value to the Pilbara region in 5 key result areas. 
 Leadership, Inclusive Planning And Decision Making 
 Strong Communities 
 Environment Sustainability 
 Resilient Economies 
 Getting Better At What We Do 
Given the RDA Pilbara budget is a mere $353,000 per annum it is difficult for it to 
be a serious partner in the activities that are taking place in the Pilbara and its 
contribution is overshadowed by the PDC. 
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The Office of Northern Australia was also established in 2008 to provide policy 
advice to the Australian Government on sustainable development issues in, or 
affecting, northern Australia. One of its immediate priorities was the establishment 
of the Northern Australia Ministerial Forum, which held its inaugural meeting in 
December 2010. One of its five key themes is Indigenous employment and skills 
shortages (Northern Australia Ministerial Forum joint communiqué, 13 December 
2010). 
Pilbara Governance in a Nutshell 
The focus on diversifying the economy has now introduced a number of newer 
economic development regions that are not geographically aligned with the local 
government areas. 
This is a cyclone of activity with global, national, state, local government, 
community, aboriginal and industry interests represented, overlapping and 
duplicated though not all necessarily aligned or understood. Fifteen committees, 
commissions and Boards with overlapping mandates and some with limited 
authority or resources, all in a region with a resident population of 46,000 people. 
It is clear that the Pilbara is served by range of State, Commonwealth, community, 
Aboriginal and industry bodies. What is less clear is the extent to which the 
proliferation of bodies, policies, plans, amounts to a coherent and effective 
approach to regional issues. Neither is it clear whether it has created the policy 
turbulence of multiple lines of authority, ever changing policy and funding 
guidelines and the churning of different levels of territorial authority we refer to 
among the governance dysfunctions identified in the remoteFOCUS report. 
Discussions with local councils and other interests suggests the collaborative 
arrangement amongst regional councils is not working as well as it could.  The 
prime reason suggested is that, in the absence of a comprehensive development 
vision based around the local political economy, it is difficult to frame propositions 
about gains from collaboration. This is compounded by individual arrangements 
between particular councils and resource companies. 
This evidence points to a need for systemic structural reform rather than executive 
management solutions and streamlining reforms that merely seek to tidy up current 
arrangements. 
Aboriginal: Communities, partnership, 
interest and perspectives. 
In early discussions with the Pilbara Development Commission and the four local 
government bodies providing services across the Pilbara, it was made clear they all 
felt there were difficulties in taking account of the interests and engagement of 
Aboriginal people of the region.  
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In the recent flurry of planning for the region, including the WA Planning 
Commission’s Pilbara Planning and Infrastructure Framework (2011) and the 
establishment of Pilbara Cities, the focus has been on attracting more long-term 
residents from outside and working towards building a more sustainable 
community. This may be an alternative “vision splendid” but, in its elaboration, 
Pilbara Aboriginal people—a key group of long-term residents—have been all but 
invisible. 
How the multiple and, as the papers show, important Pilbara Aboriginal 
organisations meshed with the existing planned or proposed Pilbara governance or 
administrative structures is not established.  
In view of these deficits and, with support from the PDC, the remoteFOCUS project 
commissioned Dr Mary Edmunds to prepare a series of papers: 
 to compile a socio-political overview of Aboriginal people in the Pilbara and 
report on the dynamics of engagement between Aboriginal people and the 
institutions of the Pilbara including State and Commonwealth, local 
government, industry and other Aboriginal organisations; 
 to undertake specific targeted studies in the Pilbara that will inform the 
remoteFOCUS project on ways of Aboriginal people being able to draw the 
greatest benefit from developments in the Pilbara and the establishment of 
the Pilbara Cities agenda; and 
 to distil from the overview and case studies evidence-based learnings and 
recommendations as a basis for strategic and positive ways for Aboriginal 
people to pursue their aspirations through engagement/involvement in 
governance reforms in the Pilbara and the associated investments occurring 
in that region. 
There are six papers that address these objectives. These papers individually and 
collectively, vividly illustrate the resultant effects of the governance dysfunctions of 
current governance structures and practices affecting remote Australia and 
identified as part of the broader remoteFOCUS project. (These papers are accessible 
in chapters 10-15 of the remoteFOCUS Compendium). 
They point to another critical and unresolved tension for governments: that is, how 
to achieve greater clarity of national purpose and realisation of appropriate living 
conditions and opportunities for Aboriginal citizens while at the same time 
accepting the right of Aboriginal people to cultural distinctiveness and identity.  
In addressing this tension the authors hold to the premise that the future of 
Aboriginal Australia is inextricably bound up with the future of the descendants of 
the nation’s settlers and immigrants. 
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We rely on the concept of consolidation (a dynamic, interactive, intercultural, two 
way partnership between equals) as a key component of our forward direction as 
distinct from concepts of integration or assimilation. 
The notion of consolidation emerges strongly from the Pilbara studies as 
‘partnership’.  
The Nature of Rapid Economic and Social Change in 
Remote Places 
Despite new initiatives of government and the private sector, the evidence points to 
the vulnerability of Aboriginal governance structures trying to deal with the growing 
demands of resources boom, land negotiations, and very significant streams of new 
revenue from agreements with resource companies. 
Our wider remoteFOCUS findings would suggest that the nature and rapid pace of 
change will inevitably always have people and groups in tension with ongoing 
contests. 
The pressure to reach agreements can be a cause of divisiveness within and between 
groups in itself. Research has demonstrated the damaging impact of stress on 
Aboriginal health. The good intentions of resource company personnel are not a 
panacea for good health. 
 
In this context the findings of the Indigenous Implementation Board are pertinent 
when they suggested that it was ‘considered premature to seek to define a regional 
governance model at this time for the Pilbara’29. Their view was based not on 
incapacity but on an assessment of the high levels of pressure affecting Pilbara 
Aboriginal groups.  
Aboriginal Concept of the Pilbara as a Region 
The question of the Pilbara as a single region for Aboriginal people is not self-
evident. 
Given past displacement and movement, the meanings of ‘local’ and ‘community’, in 
the present social and economic context, are related but not the same.  
For Aboriginal people, ‘local’ refers to two principal domains that underpin and 
define social connectedness: traditional country, which is larger than native title but 
now includes that; and place of residence, the town or settlement often referred to 
as ‘community’, that is sometimes, but very often not, on traditional country.  
For Aboriginal people, then, attachment to ‘place’ is layered; so that ‘place-based’ 
concerns and decisions encapsulate this multiplicity.  
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For Aboriginal people a region is a network, connecting people across place 
(locality) and community. And it was always thus, through songlines, ancestral 
dreaming tracks, marriage exchange, and ceremony, with clear ownership of defined 
territories but, particularly in the desert, permeability of boundaries. Demarcation 
of boundaries became clearer towards the coastal areas, but economic and 
ceremonial exchange extended inland for those groups as well.  
The idea of the Pilbara as a single region is therefore not alien to its Aboriginal 
people, though the fit is not so neatly defined.  
Whatever the artificialities from an Aboriginal perspective of the definition of the 
Pilbara as a region, there is a general acceptance, including from Aboriginal people 
themselves, that this is the level at which Aboriginal people are required to engage if 
they are to shift the ‘institutional asymmetry’ that exists between themselves and 
government, not only at the State and Commonwealth levels but also at the level of 
local and regional government.  
Two themes offer the basis of a way forward for achieving greater Aboriginal 
participation and inclusion in the governance of the Pilbara. They are:  
 Aboriginal principles of regionalism.  
 The critical place of Aboriginal organisations as providing ‘the institutional 
framework of Aboriginal civil society and, at the same time, the principal 
means of Aboriginal civic engagement with the wider world’30. 
Aboriginal principles of regionalism 
‘Relational Autonomy’ 
Within Aboriginal social and political domains there is a preference, on the one 
hand, for autonomy, that is marked by a tendency towards localism and high value 
accorded to local control at the level of small, kin-based congeries of people 
attached to particular geographic locales. 
But this momentum towards atomism, fission and small-scaled autonomy is 
systemically balanced, on the other hand, by an equally compelling strain towards 
relatedness.  
This ability to scale up or down according to need, capacity, availability of 
resources, seasonal variation is an important characteristic of Aboriginal 
organisation. 
The tension in Aboriginal groups between atomism and collectivism that has been 
described as ‘relational autonomy’31 underlies classical forms of Aboriginal 
regionalism.  
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Subsidiarity  
Instead of assuming that governance must be centred, bounded and unitary, the 
Aboriginal principle of subsidiarity, when meshed with the principle of relational 
autonomy, poses the possibility that federal systems of Indigenous governance can 
be decentred and accommodate inter-dependent layers. 
An important characteristic of traditional subsidiarity is its negotiated division and 
allocation of roles, rights and responsibilities across different groups and classes of 
people. 
The Indigenous Community Governance Project32 case studies highlighted a ‘two-
way’ trajectory for Indigenous governance: namely, a desire for residential 
decentralisation and localism on the one hand, alongside political centralisation and 
service regionalism on the other.  
Sullivan33 argues the concept of subsidiarity to include culture as well as 
governance...It seeks to allocate to central authorities decisions that transcend local 
particularities, yet at the same time guarantees to regions the right to set policies 
that reflect regional priorities.  
The Pilbara studies make clear that achieving this is not straightforward but it is 
possible. (These papers are accessible in chapters 10-15 of the remoteFOCUS 
Compendium). 
The studies provide examples of regional movements evolving regional structures, 
with ‘the creation of connected autonomy where there are tiers of authority, 
responsibility and entitlement, together with tiers of accountability – down to local 
constituents, and up to higher organisational levels’ 
Aboriginal organisations as the institutional framework of 
Aboriginal civil society 
The development of Indigenous sector organisations since the early 1970s has been 
instrumental in providing Aboriginal cultures with a contemporary institutional 
framework for building wider networks and taking control of their own 
modernisation. These are drivers of positive social change, the foundation of 
Aboriginal modernisation, and the principal means of Aboriginal civic engagement 
with the wider world.  
Aboriginal people, particularly in regional and remote areas, do not achieve their 
understanding of civic engagement with the wider society from schools or through 
the media, but through engagement with their local organisations.  
Aboriginal organisations provide a visible ‘point of articulation between external 
agencies and an Aboriginal domain’34. 
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It has been through active negotiations and hard-won agreements that Pilbara 
Aboriginal people have carved out for themselves some spaces for the exercise of 
self-determination.  
The Pilbara Development Commission’s 2007 Directory of Pilbara Indigenous 
communities and organisations lists nine regional Aboriginal organisations and 32 
local organisations across the four shires.  
There is a future scenario whereby in order to achieve Aboriginal employment 
outcomes from a limited population base Aboriginal people introduced to the region 
from elsewhere will dilute local voices or confuse the messaging leading to the 
potential for future conflicts between Indigenous outsiders thus causing deeper 
division.  Aboriginal identity may be a growing issue in the region.   
Proportionally the number of Aboriginal people to total population will also 
decrease as a result of the estimated in-migration of populations to fulfil the Pilbara 
Cities vision, further weakening local Aboriginal voice. And there will be growing 
divisions between the richer and poorer groups as a result of the resource carve up 
and the uneven outcomes of the native title process. 
The Pilbara has many examples of effective Aboriginal organisations that 
demonstrate cultural legitimacy even in the face of the governance dysfunctions of 
government and the distracting pace of development. Others have failed to achieve 
such cultural legitimacy and have withered as a result.  
Role of Families 
There is a danger in family-centric societies that immediate family interests inhibit 
the ability to work together to solve common social problems or to act for the 
common good. One of the reasons for this is the absence of community building 
institutions or, in terms of the present discussion, of any kind of civil society.  
The development of good governance models in Aboriginal organisations must, in 
the immediate term at least, accommodate the principle that ‘the familial and 
genealogical parameters of Indigenous community and regional governance are 
critical to the success of any policy implementation and capacity development 
initiatives around governance’35.  
Consequently, Aboriginal organisations do not constitute just another corporation 
readily amenable to the usual corporate governance norms.  
Cultural legitimacy within a region 
Aboriginal organisations have proven capable, legitimate, and accountable 
institutions that can manage the evolving nature of social contestation, which is an 
inherent part of any changing society. However sometimes this process requires a 
network of organisations rather than any single one.  
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The role of ‘trusted outsiders’ 
The most successful Aboriginal organisations operate with a combination of local 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal employees, working to and with an effective 
Aboriginal board. In these instances, the key elements for the non-Aboriginal staff 
are trust – we are back to the relational model – and competence.  
There is another category of trusted outsider which has proved effective in other 
situations, that of independent community mentors or brokers – often the funded 
broker – to enable effective community-government interactions.  
The place of Pilbara Aboriginal people in decision-making 
for the region 
The Pilbara studies make clear that the current government intervention in planning 
for the future of the Pilbara has failed to include Pilbara Aboriginal people in any 
comprehensive way.  
In current Pilbara planning Aboriginal people figure as a separate and subordinate 
rather than integral consideration in the broader regional vision for the future - as 
contributors to rather than participants in the region, with much of that 
contribution designated as playing a role in the protection of cultural heritage.  
This is a fundamental disconnect from the way that Aboriginal people see 
themselves and their place in the region, and the equality that they seek in 
partnership with both industry and government. 
The Indigenous Implementation Board’s experience is that with each new 
conversation the need for unity has been increasingly affirmed by participants and 
that plans to develop workable regional processes are becoming the main 
determination of conversation outcomes.  
There remains little evidence – despite best intentioned efforts - that government, 
whether Commonwealth or State, is delivering a more coordinated and sustained 
approach to engagement with Aboriginal people or to service delivery. If anything, 
the bewildering array of programs has increased, while longer-term programs like 
CDEP – pooled unemployment benefits supplemented with amounts for capital and 
administration - have been extensively revised or withdrawn altogether. This has 
been despite the fact that individuals and organisations had come to rely on CDEP 
for essential funding and income. Nevertheless, organisations have shown 
remarkable resilience in dealing with these changes. 
There is positive and important engagement through the Royalties for Regions and 
collaboration between the Department of Indigenous Affairs and Pilbara Cities; but 
the principal focus is not on integrating or consolidating Aboriginal residents with a 
broader population. Rather, it is on encouraging long-term migration to the Pilbara 
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of outsiders, who will not just live but die there, with a key performance indicator 
for the success of sustainability being ‘when the cemeteries are full’36. 
What the Pilbara studies also make clear is that, despite this marginalisation from 
the broader planning, there is vigorous and sustained Aboriginal activity happening 
across the region, mainly through organisations, and that Aboriginal people want to 
be included as equal partners in making decisions about the future of their country, 
at both local and regional levels.  
What is required from government is the development of an enabling, collaborative 
environment that, in working towards the establishment of regional Pilbara 
Aboriginal voices, provides appropriate support but also ensures the creation of 
structured and effective pathways between this voice – in whatever form it takes – 
and the established Pilbara bodies: the shires, the Pilbara Development 
Commission, Pilbara Cities, and any other regional organisations. 
Conclusions 
The Department of Indigenous Affairs (DIA) and Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal 
Corporation, the Native Title Representative Body, are working together to develop 
a longer term and sustainable model for partnership.  However, given the multiple 
responsibilities of DIA and Yamatji Marlpa, their current resourcing will not be 
sufficient to achieve a satisfactory outcome in time for Aboriginal inclusion in 
current processes of planning by Pilbara Cities, the Pilbara Development 
Commission, or the Shires.  
Planning processes cannot be regarded as legitimately ‘settled’ without achieving 
satisfactory inclusion of Aboriginal perspectives and interests. 
A more urgent process is needed in order to take account of the rapid pace of 
resource development, its impact on Aboriginal people in the region, and the 
absence in the WA Planning Commission’s 2011 Pilbara Planning and 
Infrastructure Framework of any detail at all about where Aboriginal people fit 
within the overall Pilbara Cities agenda, whether as Aboriginal communities or in 
the planning for the hierarchy of ‘cities’, ‘major towns’, ‘towns’, or villages. The 
planning documents are all silent on issues of regional connectivity, a concept 
highlighted in international development literature. 
There is an urgent need, therefore, for additional dedicated resources and people to 
undertake this task.  
There is as yet no organisation or body in the Pilbara undertaking a regional 
governance role. There are, however, a number of successfully aggregated 
community-based organisations, including native title prescribed bodies corporate 
that operate across the region or parts of the region or across more than one 
language group.  
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These offer the prospect of a network of grass-roots bodies that, as one possible 
model, might be linked in some form of regional governance that responds to the 
culturally-based preference for both local autonomy and wider forms of collective 
interdependence. 
A particular advantage of the model is that it distributes different forms and degrees 
of accountability across layers, thereby spreading the workload entailed in 
devolution, and enables ‘two-way’ accountability to be reinforced (i.e. internal or 
vertical accountability to Indigenous constituents at different structural levels, and 
external or horizontal accountability across to public and private sector institutions 
and levels of government). 
This is in line with the concept of place-centred governance proposed in the report 
‘Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland: How government needs to work in 
remote Australia.” 
A challenge to both government and Aboriginal people is to explore whether the 
creation of one voice is more important than establishing how the diversity of voices 
fit together.  The wider remoteFOCUS analysis concludes that in peripheral places 
subject to rapid economic change the nature of the process and the contest that is 
ongoing between stakeholders mitigates against single voice arrangements. It might 
be useful to explore a connected autonomy model as an alternative to the unified 
model that could be advanced as an option. 
 ‘New governance institutions must be initiated by Aboriginal people themselves on 
the basis of their informed consent’ – the collaboration model – and ‘external 
coercion and the imposition of governance institutions have little traction in 
changing behaviour or building commitment and responsibility’37  
The message from Aboriginal people, repeated so consistently as to be almost trite, 
is partnership: people wish to act, not be acted on. And there are two main channels 
through which they express this: affirmation of place, and engagement through 
organisations. Here, the challenge is to align them with current overall Pilbara 
planning and development, particularly with government investment in Pilbara 
Cities. 
Pilbara Aboriginal people already have what the Pilbara Cities initiative is 
attempting to achieve: a sense of belonging based on relationships and the 
permanence of home.  
What Pilbara Aboriginal people want is equal partnership with government and with 
industry.143  
                                                        
143 The same very strong message was given by national Indigenous leaders in a Governance 
Workshop organised by the Attorney-General’s Social Inclusion Division in Canberra in 
April 2010. 
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Next Steps: Towards Governance Reform in 
the Pilbara 
The resources boom currently unfolding in Australia is potentially the most 
significant in our history. Because of the time lines projected for export it is 
technically a growth development rather than a boom. No other resource based 
growth phase – from the gold rushes of the 1850s on – has promised such a large or 
sustained contribution to the national economy. This development will touch all 
Australians, economically, socially and ultimately politically. Employment, 
migration and residential patterns will also be deeply affected as will the 
distribution of wealth between states and regions. Amazingly, there is no one 
comprehensive authoritative document that synthesises the available data or that 
explores these possibilities.  
Some caveats are also in order. Many hold that the international finance system is 
chronically prone to bubbles and that present resource price inflation may represent 
in large part its latest version. If this proved to be the case, there could be a sudden 
and uncomfortable end to Australia’s purple patch. 
These qualifications aside, the long-term outlook must be judged to be positive – as 
confirmed in the foreshadowed investments. 
The national interest in sustainable communities and in informed Aboriginal 
choices is overwhelming. To facilitate these outcomes this report envisages the 
development of a place centred authority with powers that exceed substantially that 
of the existing regional actors. The existing diverse array of agencies and authorities 
need to be consolidated and/or placed in relationship to such a unitary structure. 
The latter of course would need appropriate resources and standing. Moreover other 
financial arrangements, including importantly personal and corporate taxation 
incentives, need to be consistent with community development ambitions. The 
major resource companies have, through their sponsorship of local amenities, 
displayed considerable enlightened self-interest. But corporate benevolence is no 
substitute for democratic control and appropriate taxation structures.  
An authority with comprehensive responsibilities for matching national purposes 
and local aspirations and for leading and coordinating governance and 
administration seems essential if shared stakes in the development of this 
extraordinary region are to be realised.  
The next section of this report describes in a preliminary way how the principles 
and framework discussed in the remoteFOCUS report might be applied in 
developing governance options for the Pilbara. The following provisional example 
works through the six primary steps to establish the context; design parameters; 
principles, scope and mandate; functions; form; and accountabilities required to 
establish a governance design for the Pilbara. 
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We stress that the following proposal represents a tentative response. While we are 
totally committed to the finding that there needs to be a regional governance authority, 
many details about its precise role and functioning require more work than has been 
possible within the scope of this study. These details will be critical to the effectiveness of 
any agency – and the design needs to be consonant with the views of a complex array of 
stakeholders. That said, the following indicates the factors that we believe are essential 
and some suggestions about how these factors might be met.  
We have drawn on understandings gained from the many reports written about the 
Pilbara and the numerous Pilbara Dialogues and community consultations to 
demonstrate the logic that flows from the remoteFOCUS analysis. Clearly this option is 
subject to the caveat that further refinement would require a clear mandate and 
significantly more consultation with a wide range of stakeholders.  
It is important to note that the framework and the principles that underpin it should be 
the focus of further discussion rather than the specific items used in this example. 
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The Pilbara: An Option for Governance 
Reform 
Context 
What are the issues in the region? This covers the key social, economic, 
demographic, governance or other features which underwrite the need 
for focused regional action and which need to inform the governance 
design. 
The Pilbara has been historically and now almost entirely driven by economic 
imperatives rather than government imperatives and currently it is fair to say that 
government is in catch-up mode. 
There is overwhelming community concern that rapid resource development, and in 
particular FIFO/DIDO workplace practices, has changed the nature of these 
communities and changed local community outcomes some of which are 
unsatisfactory. 
In recognition of the pace of change, the longevity of the resources boom and the 
impact of that growth the WA Government, with some Commonwealth support has 
made significant commitments to community development including a revitalised 
vision for the Pilbara and intervention in the market. It has proclaimed two twin 
cities in the Pilbara together with other towns further inland. This vision is the first 
clear statement of a desired settlement pattern in the north by government since 
Premier Charles Court many years ago. 
 The WA government has completed a planning framework and has locked in 
budget and a limited amount of legal commitment through the Land 
Administration Act and Land Development Act. 
 The good intentions of the government are further evidenced by the 
investment in the Royalties for Regions funding in the Pilbara and is now 
evident in a range of infrastructure and social programs in the Pilbara. Most 
parties, however, would agree that the pace of change and the depth of 
demand for services and housing, particularly, mean there is a significant 
degree of catch-up required. This process is expected to finish in 2035. We 
infer that in order to achieve this outcome, institutional structures of a 
similar commitment and longevity will need to be in place to accompany this 
vision. 
 Local authority has been developed, albeit on a limited scale, through the 
appointment of a general manager to Pilbara Cities, the development of the 
WA Planning Framework and the work of the Pilbara Development 
Commission. 
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 The Commonwealth government relies on RDA Pilbara to plan and engage on 
a regional basis, while Infrastructure Australia examines opportunities to 
contribute to major strategic infrastructure projects. 
Consistent advice from people living in the region and working in regional 
institutions is that outside of the negotiations between resource companies, native-
title holding groups and the WA Government on land issues there has been a failure 
to bring Aboriginal people into meaningful partnerships that will ensure they 
receive the full benefit of the Pilbara vision and opportunity. This is potentially a 
serious and chronic problem for all the parties. Changes cannot just be dictated by 
government. How the people of the Pilbara resolve the coexisting realities of 
Aboriginal people with entrenched legal and communal rights (and income streams 
and land holdings) and specific identities determined by culture and contract, and 
the desire of these same groups of people wishing to derive normal citizenship 
benefits as individuals from services provided by government will be an ongoing 
challenge. Whether the people of the Pilbara have a governance structure that 
enables them to meet this challenge is also an open question. (These issues are 
discussed in much more detail in chapters 10-15 of the remoteFOCUS 
Compendium). 
 Aboriginal people have a significant role to play if the vision is to be 
achieved. They hold substantial native title rights to land across the Pilbara, 
and they will lock in substantial income in the form of communal royalty 
equivalents from these rights. 
 Our earlier analysis has shown that in areas where there is a contest for 
resources, the agreement and negotiating process actually reinforces 
individual and communal identities and rivalries. In a context of continuing 
economic change, there will be conflicts between and within Aboriginal 
groups and between Aboriginal groups, resource companies and government 
which will need to be resolved in a permanent and relatively workable way.  
 There are examples of workable structures in which Aboriginal people have 
worked their way through analogous issues. This is exemplified in the 
formation of the Pilbara Indigenous Marine Reference Group in the Pilbara.38  
The RPA development on Groote Eylandt39 is a more systematic and long 
term example of a workable outcome. In both cases, people and governments 
have been united through finding common objectives and purpose, defined 
responsibilities, defined resource commitments for all parties and defined 
timelines for action. 
 Agreements that involve directed compensation or royalty equivalent 
payments to restricted outcomes can ultimately be detrimental to the quality 
of governance arrangements which will be necessary to sustain a Pilbara 
Cities vision. Agreements that restrict or reduce capacity to decide what to do 
potentially limit the growth of good governance among Aboriginal people. 
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Local government is under-resourced for the challenges that it faces. Its capacity to 
generate revenue through property taxes is limited. This is because the resource 
companies engage through a state agreement process currently leaving local shires 
unable to rate the land resource companies develop for their operations. In this 
context, local shires must seek support from individual resource companies by 
‘grace and favour’, not by right.  
Current institutional structures are not effective or legitimate in either containing 
or resolving a productive contest on the geographic scale of the Pilbara because no 
single existing authority is mandated to act in the best interests of the Pilbara as a 
whole. 
Design Parameters 
Which agencies currently are/or are not responsible? Based on the 
present governance arrangements and other specific features set forth in 
the context, these express the key conditions which need to be met if a 
regional governance design is to be effective. 
Given the various stakeholders who need to be engaged and the likely form that key 
pressures will take, any governance response in the Pilbara will need the capacity to: 
 Establish a shared vision between governments and communities, 
 Negotiate compacts that provide clear mandate of responsibilities and a 
common platform for accountability at all levels of governance, 
 Foster place-centred solutions and regional innovations, and 
 Ensure resourcing for functional capacity. 
Principles, Scope and Mandate  
What is agreed as the benchmarks for success? These describe the broad 
outcomes for the region that need to be realized through the governance 
design. 
The governance body should endure over time and beyond political cycles. It should 
have a specific charter which empowers it to pursue: 
 Social and economic benefits for the people of the Pilbara in balance with 
both the national and wider state-based interest, 
 Social inclusion and equity across the Pilbara where Aboriginal people are 
integral not an add-on, 
 Coordinated multi sector responses to economic and social change, 
 Mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability both ‘upwards’ and 
‘downwards’, 
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 Coordinated multi-level responses to the contest of interests within and 
between government, business and Aboriginal interests, 
 Environmentally and socially sustainable strategies for the Pilbara, and 
 Practice subsidiarity to the optimum obtainable degree. 
Functions 
Function refers to the specific role(s) that need to be assigned to realise 
these outcomes. 
There are six main functions that should be undertaken by such a body. 
 Maintaining and promoting the Pilbara narrative, 
 Brokering and settling agreements (peace-making where agreement is not 
possible), 
 Clarifying the mandates of all levels of government and communities, 
 Clarifying outcomes and service standards appropriate to place and scale, 
 Matters on notice—anticipating, researching, monitoring, planning and 
developing strategy, and 
 Conducting reviews and reporting, ongoing governance review and action 
learning. 
An important unresolved issue concerns the role of this putative organisation in 
managing funding (or pooled funding) in relation to ongoing operations. Our view 
would be that operational delivery and funding disputes will undermine the 
legitimacy of the body to achieve its five main functions. The functions undertaken 
by this body should not be in competition with other institutions with specific 
service delivery requirements. 
Through its strategic, synthesising and coordinating role, it would however have an 
authority that would enable it to shape the nature of the funding recommendations 
and the delivery of those services by external agencies in the interests of the Pilbara. 
Form 
This covers the specific governance design, the shape, jurisdiction, 
powers, responsibilities and resources available to an institution. 
The two key aspects of the form of this body relate to how it is constituted legally 
and who owns it. The overriding condition that must be met is that the people 
(board members/trustees/directors) who govern the body are ‘above the contest’. 
It would be up to the various stakeholders to determine whether this could best be 
achieved through a legislated commission or authority or through a company 
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established under the Corporations Act as a company wholly owned by the members 
along the lines of the RAPAD example, or through some other legal mechanism. 
The term of people appointed to the ‘board’ of the new body should be for a longer 
period than the normal political cycle and the characteristics of the board members 
should align closely with the functions and mandate of the body. 
The number of people appointed to the body should be smaller rather than being 
fully representative of a range of Pilbara interest, possibly 5-7 people. 
In addition to the people who reside in the Pilbara, the natural interest groups who 
might comprise the membership are the federal, state, and local government 
structures that already exist. We have also argued that the Aboriginal interest in the 
region is deserving of its own recognition and will require appropriate negotiated 
processes to achieve full participation. 
If these groups formed the natural constituency of interest in a new governance 
body to achieve an above-the-contest outcome, it is essential that the people 
appointed to run the body who are not representative of their direct interests but 
charged to serve the interests of the Pilbara plus other wider interests. 
The governance of the body would be driven by a charter or set of rules that 
constrained the board or trustees to act only in the best interests of the Pilbara and 
its peoples. We acknowledge that at times this would leave this body in conflict with 
one or a number of its members and their accountabilities, however, resolving 
contests would be a principal role of the new body. 
The body would be serviced by a secretariat and access to a network that would 
facilitate tasking and engagement of other actors in the region. 
Budget and resources to fund the governance body could well be found within 
existing arrangements, noting, again, that resourcing must follow function and a 
level of funding certainty will be essential for success. 
In order to be legitimate the body needs to be located in the Pilbara although in 
the early years it will no doubt be necessary to have a node in Perth (this has 
significant human and financial resource implications). 
Authorities and Accountabilities 
This covers the specific authority that is assigned to the coordinating 
organisation. For example, does it have political standing or is it a 
composite of other authorities, albeit one with independent standing, 
mission and roles.  
Both ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’ accountability arrangements need to be defined. 
‘Upwards’ accountabilities will be to various federal and state political and 
administrative authorities and agencies; ‘downwards’ accountabilities will be 
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between the existing and/or putative regional structures and relevant local 
government, community and other representative bodies and organisations and to 
local people. 
With the overriding charter to act in the best interests of the Pilbara, the body will 
be required to influence Commonwealth agencies having interests and programs in 
the region, state agencies operating in the region and local and regional shires and 
regional authorities including Aboriginal organisations responsible for local 
outcomes. 
In addition to the four shire institutions, the Pilbara Regional Council, Pilbara 
Development Commission, Office of Pilbara Cities, RDA Pilbara, share an interest 
and would require a relationship with the new body. 
A critical issue is that a new governance body would require mandated authority to 
act and an ability to achieve the outcomes in the best interests of the Pilbara. 
Accountability, ideally, might be through a reporting mechanism such as a joint 
(federal-state) parliamentary committee or through an auditor-general model. This 
would ensure that the body was accountable to the public in general but only when 
judged against its Charter or mandate. 
To be effective this body must be capable of influencing the direction of expenditure 
and performance outcomes across each level of government and at local government 
level. It must also be capable of negotiating with the private sector to obtain an 
optimal alignment of interests. Unless the body can hold those responsible for 
expenditure of such funds accountable through some mechanism then it will not be 
able to achieve the mandate it has been set. 
The Pilbara Challenge 
The test of whether new arrangements will improve governance in the Pilbara is that 
any newly created body has the authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy that 
allow it to respond to the nature and pace of change in the Pilbara and the contest of 
positions in response to change. 
Political leadership at all levels will have to mandate change based on: 
1. Acceptance that the standard concerns set out in the report are based on 
reality and that more of the same will produce more of the same and 
therefore a changed approach to how government operates is needed. 
2. Acceptance that  
 if the three levels of government and the communities (Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal alike) are working at cross purposes success is impossible because 
goals are different,  
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 if members of the communities disagree with or do not support what 
governments are trying to do wicked problems (health education 
employment) will not be solved 
 in remote Australia government is the main provider of an economy (as 
against having some industries and particularly mining which do not of 
themselves ensure an economy as against having an industry), and  
 different rules may need to be established for application in the Pilbara, 
recognising the market distortion and other unique operational realities  
 Acceptance that there is a need to have; 
 shared goals (vision) based on a shared understanding of context and shared 
or agreed outcomes  
 clarity of mandates, ie an acknowledgement of roles and responsibilities of  
each level of government and key community elements including Aboriginal 
communities. 
 funding and capability which matches mandates 
 ability to adjust mandates and settle disputes over time as no arrangements  
will be perfect and circumstances will change. 
 an ability to look after all the above across the political cycle and according to 
agreed principles. 
 a body or agency authorised by the different levels of government and the 
community  to keep the ring on all of the above otherwise left to themselves 
the different levels of government will revert to the  norm and act in their 
separate interests and in the interest of regions beyond the Pilbara.  
 appointments to lead such a body or agency that are authoritative by nature 
of those appointed rather than representative. Such appointments should 
extend beyond the political cycle and be accountable to the stakeholders 
against the criteria laid down by them. 
 Acceptance that to work through these issues in the Pilbara requires a 
resourced, skilled and independent process to be put in train, and an 
action/learning/innovation framework to be established.  
In the Pilbara a valuable start has been made by the WA Government.  Royalties for 
Regions is a unilateral (that is, State) policy which addresses the traditional failure 
to provide financial resources to regions sufficient to meet their legitimate needs 
and aspirations.  Pilbara Cities is again a decision by the State to establish 
unilaterally a unifying vision going beyond ad hoc responses to particular issues.   
The next step is to build loyalty to the region - to ensure state and local 
governments and the different Pilbara communities are on the same page - but this 
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cannot be done unilaterally.  It needs the political leadership of each level of 
government and the various elements of community in the Pilbara to agree to the 
need for the sort of approach set out above. Of particular concern is the 
incorporation of Aboriginal interests into this process through their established 
representative structures. 
Such a body would need, by its composition and legal structure, to be above the contest 
and endure over time. 
It may be possible to achieve this outcome through an adjustment of some existing 
structures, however, we would argue that the mandate and function proposed for such a 
governance body suggest a fresh start should be made. 
An appropriate discussion of possible new governance arrangements which are 
sufficiently open to new evidence and new concepts, are serial and sufficiently sustained, 
and are not immediately politicised is, to say the least, very difficult in the present 
government policy system. 
The integration of legitimate national, state and local interests through structural reform 
is unlikely to emerge from the public sector or conventional legislative processes. In fact, 
we argue, such efforts are negated by present governance arrangements. 
The reality is that without a mandate for change from senior office holders in the 
Western Australia and potentially the Commonwealth, such reform will be difficult to 
achieve. Also, a reasonable level of cross party support in the early stages of development 
will be necessary to ensure the durability of the body. 
Only political leadership, such as that which produced an initiative and 
policy shift like Royalties for Regions in WA aimed at systemic change to 
the way government makes decisions, operates and is accountable, will 
take us beyond a ‘we-must-try-harder’ mantra without regard to the 
efficacy of the system itself. This cannot be driven from within the 
bureaucracy, which is constituted within the status quo and bound by its 
rules. Political leadership needs to come to the conclusion that there is a 
system problem not a policy problem. 
Reform of this nature and scope will not be easy, nor will it be uniform. In some 
situations people will have to use existing legislation and organisational resources 
to initiate a start to reform.  
Reform will be problematic unless the incorporation of Aboriginal perspectives is a 
non-negotiable condition precedent. Inadequate and inconsistent resourcing of 
Aboriginal organisations and government agencies tasked with engaging in 
partnership with Aboriginal people will hinder attempts to improve governance 
design in the Pilbara.  A prerequisite would be resourcing both government and 
Aboriginal organisations and communities of Aboriginal people were resourced to 
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enable them to pursue partnership and greater understanding of the benefits and 
requirements of governance reform. 
One approach would be high-level political support to establish a Pilbara trial where 
the principles and approach outlined in the report are applied, with the specific aim 
of developing an on-going process of learning, consensus and regional capacity 
building - a starting point with a defined scale and scope. This will build momentum 
for change as required and potentially provide “proof by good example” of the 
efficacy of such change.  
Irrespective of the starting point, the remoteFOCUS report establishes a number of 
clear criteria, including vision, authority, legitimacy and effectiveness against which 
reforms at any level can be evaluated. 
 Is there a capacity to have a guiding vision or narrative that gives direction 
and explains the actions of all levels of government, that is, a shared vision? 
 Is there a capacity to settle mandates? 
 Is there a capacity to match mandates with funding and resources? 
 Is there local accountability within the various administrative structures? 
 Is there a capacity to review and adapt mandates as experience accumulates 
and learnings develop? 
 Is there a body that is above the contest, authorised by the players to be 
responsible to oversee all of the above? 
At the level of community the concerns expressed in this report need to be 
articulated in localised contexts across the Pilbara.  The voices of community 
legitimise concerns for politicians to respond to. In their own way community 
concerns provide the mandate for political leadership. 
Continuing community articulation of why their concerns persist and how the 
current system of governance appears unable to resolve these concerns is a 
fundamental condition precedent to establishing a mood and appetite for positive 
reform. 
It is now not a case of not knowing what to do, rather a case of having the collective 
will to do it. Only political and civic leadership will drive the necessary reforms. 
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17. Central Australia - Context 
for Governance Reform 
In Central Australia there is a clear need for a unifying vision that goes beyond 
service provision and law and order and reliance on the boom and bust cycles of 
commodities. A vision focused at least in part on development of capacity and 
economic livelihoods, regional connectivity and innovation.  Again with three levels 
of government, representative community organisations, a business community and 
a web of representative Aboriginal organisations the task is formidable. 
What is required is an intense regional engagement around the key social, economic, 
demographic, governance or other features which underwrite the need for focused 
regional action and which need to inform the governance design. The process needs to 
confirm: 
 the issues in the region 
 what needs to happen at each level of government and of communities 
themselves 
 what are agreed objectives, what are we wanting to achieve 
 who is responsible for what tasks including keeping everyone on track over 
time 
 are the resources and capabilities matched to task 
 what structure will have the authority and legitimacy to maintain this 
approach over time 
An appropriate discussion of possible new governance arrangements needs to be 
open to new evidence and new concepts. It needs to be sustained and not 
immediately politicised.  
The following is one possible context statement for Central Australia that might 
begin that conversation.  
Whilst it has a high degree of relevance, it is provided here not because it is the only 
context statement that could be generated but to highlight the need for a productive 
engagement across the whole community over a longer period of time to generate a 
more common understanding of both the context and the key conditions which need 
to be met if a regional governance design is to be effective.  The very fact that the 
reader may disagree with this preliminary context statement highlights the 
importance of people developing together a reasonably shared understanding of the 
context before they proceed to the next steps required to build up the most suitable 
governance structures for their region. 
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The remoteFOCUS project was note resourced to conduct the full engagement 
necessary to provide a more definitive context statement or to progress to laying out 
design parameters required of better governance arrangements, or the principles, 
scope and mandate of any new structures, or its functions, form, or its authorities 
and accountabilities.  However the following is provided as a preliminary overview, 
after which some next steps are suggested. 
1 Context 
Central Australia is a product of its history, its geography and its peoples.  
 It covers 64% of the NT and contains 24% of the population. 
 As a region, Central Australia has an estimated regional population of 48,000 
people including 28,000 in Alice Springs, 3,500 in Tennant Creek and 8,137 
in the Barkly Shire, 4,887 in the Central Desert Shire and 7,322 in the 
MacDonnell Shire. 
 Its broad-based and relatively fragile economy has always been subject to 
fluctuations of the seasons and decision-making taken in places well removed 
from Central Australia.  
 A social profile of the region reflects a political landscape that has effectively 
driven Aboriginal people away from major urban centres through:  
 The post-war assimilation investments in government communities, and  
 The Aboriginal desire to be close to Country, and  
 The response to the granting of land rights and native title. 
 This settlement pattern reflects a response to the longstanding and still 
current intercultural tension of: 
 Pastoralists needing land and waterholes,  
 Tourists needing services and first-class accommodation,  
 A government class seeking to create public order and moderate the contest 
of values and land uses, and  
 Aboriginal people asserting their desire to sustain strong linkages to land and 
culture, and enjoying citizen’s rights. 
These core elements of settlement in Central Australia are now undergoing 
significant adjustment. Unlike the Pilbara, where the drive is from the expansion in 
the resources sector, the drive is from largely Commonwealth and Territory-led 
reforms of Aboriginal policy and significant financial investment in those reforms 
accompanied by a hope that the resources sector will also land in the Centre or that 
tourism will return if the dollar drops. Given the political profile of Central 
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Australia, the normal processes of democratic government are unlikely to resolve 
the underlying structural divisions exacerbated by these reforms. The region is in a 
state of economic transition. 
Alice Springs is the major centre for the regional economy. The town has the range 
of infrastructure and services expected in a regional centre and its local economic 
base—government services (Aboriginal administration, health and defence related 
services), tourism, retail, transport and some manufacturing and pastoral and an 
expanding mining sector.  
 It is the service hub for the communities of Central Australia plus the eastern 
part of Western Australia and the top of South Australia.  
 It supplies services not available in any other town within a 1500km radius 
and is headquarters for two of the three shires in the region. 
 Tennant Creek’s population has decreased by 9% from 1996 to 2008 with an 
Aboriginal population in the Barkly Shire of 50% and 24% of the Aboriginal 
population below the age of 20 years with only 6% of the non-Aboriginal 
population under 20 years.  
Projections have 5,000 Aboriginal people in the Barkly Shire and about 2,000 non-
Aboriginal people. These demographic projections sit uncomfortably with the fact 
there are currently 171 businesses in Tennant Creek, 71% of businesses are locally 
owned but only 14% are owned by Aboriginal people or organisations. It would 
appear there needs to be a significant uptake of business by Aboriginal people if the 
local economy and local services are to be sustained. 
Mining produces the biggest share of Gross Regional Product (GRP) in Central 
Australia including in the Barkly Shire but doesn’t employ many people. The other 
larger government, health and community services sectors employ more people 
locally but they only represent about 9% of businesses. By far the largest number of 
businesses are in the property and retail area though these contribute little to GRP. 
Twenty-four per cent of the Barkly regional population receive either Centrelink or 
Job Services network benefits. 
Despite having an unemployment rate of just 2.5%, Alice Springs has a two-track 
economy where the unemployment rate for Aboriginal people sits at 14.2%.  
Recent investment of the NT and Commonwealth governments in Aboriginal 
communities and town camps in Alice Springs and Tennant Creek Transition Plans 
have delivered a significant economic stimulus into the region. 
The economic base of the region is currently precariously positioned and dependent 
on future government investment. The significant mining opportunities traditionally 
contribute to the boom and bust nature of the centre whereas tourism and the 
provision of services to Aboriginal people have made a more consistent contribution 
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to the region’s growth. Failure to understand this would be a significant impediment 
to current policy reform. The recent rise in the Australian dollar has impacted on 
tourism and this fact in concert with changed policy settings in Aboriginal affairs 
have created increased uncertainty in Central Australia. 
 Rolf Gerritsen, a Central Australian economist, estimates that if Aboriginal 
people were suddenly extracted from Central Australia the Alice Springs 
economy would shrink by 40% and there would be widespread out-migration 
of non-Aboriginal people. 
 This is an indication of interdependency of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
populations, and the degree of dependence of Aboriginal people, the Central 
Australian communities and NT Government on national funding. 
 The dilemma for all governments is that the pressure for Aboriginal people to 
move to find employment and services either has them converging on the hub 
or migrating further south to large coastal cities.  
 If a consequence of these initiatives is to depopulate the remote regions of 
Australia matters of national strategic interest need to be weighed carefully 
and governments need to have large programs to house, educate, and employ 
people in the immigration towns with little immediate capacity to fit easily 
into urban living. 
Whilst the population estimates for Alice Springs have shown a recent increase they 
mask a decline in the non aboriginal population (by 6% 2001-06) and an increase of 
in migration of Aboriginal people responding to restrictions in outlying 
communities and seeking opportunities and services available in Alice Springs. 
 One of the challenges for Alice Springs is to build and sustain a workforce in 
a community which has a high turnover and recent decline in population. 
 A significant adjustment would occur if government or defence retreated 
from the region. The Commonwealth has already shown it is disengaging with 
direct contact in Aboriginal communities. 
Surviving off these longer-term investments are something like 1,800 businesses.  
 79% are micro or small businesses. 
 83% of these businesses are reliant on other external government investment 
and the transient population (transaction costs of mobility) for their survival. 
 These are largely property and business services, construction, retail and 
transport and storage. The value of the most numerous businesses is not 
reflective of the business contribution to GRP. 
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 The region is heavily dependent on government investment and public funds 
transfers with 35% of the region’s population drawing Centrelink or Job 
Services network benefits. 
The failure or inability of current governance arrangements to resolve the 
differences in values, ideas and land uses that have been at the heart of the 
intercultural space in Central Australia still challenge the region today.  
 The dominance of Aboriginal issues has left the region without the capacity to 
tackle some of the future challenges. Nor has it allowed the region to develop 
the types of institutions that will enable contested views to be resolved over 
time. 
 Another contest that remains unresolved is the relationship between the 
different levels of government and the shuffling of mandates and the lack of 
clarity around longer term directions for the region.  
 The difficulties and underfunding of new shire arrangements and the 
separation of the largely Aboriginal interests into the shires as differentiated 
from the Municipality of Alice Springs is a further example of the failure to 
fully engage and respect the region as a total system rather than two systems 
requiring two systems of governance. 
 At all levels of government there appears to be no one person or department 
responsible for taking an overview or a holistic view of the impact of change 
on the region: a view that examines the impact on business, environment and 
aboriginal and non Aboriginal people who have invested in the region. 
Local political realities in Central Australia are such that it is the large number of 
small business people (who often do not necessarily share either the values of 
Aboriginal people or of the pastoralists and land managers who are involved in the 
contest over land use), who are the group who influence political response and who 
generally support the policing or strategic intervention approach to stabilise the 
community in the short run rather than the more time and relationship intensive 
activities that engage Aboriginal people and build community institutions that can 
deal with and govern the contest of views. 
 In this contest, government has increasingly assumed an executive role and 
adopted a managerial response but invariably that is a controlling role and it 
has distanced the community from the setting of policy.  
 Executive government has used its power to take charge of delivery of service 
in order to improve human development indicators. It is now able to 
influence consumption, spending and security of individuals. 
 A trade-off in this whole-of-government and strategic intervention approach 
is that the community has been largely disempowered and the way 
government has gone about procuring services in support of this approach 
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leaves little room for local suppliers to be innovative. Without that local 
innovation the adequacy of the measures in a sustainable sense are 
questionable. 
There are also significant spill over effects in the region. 
 Local institutions have become overloaded or where they have contested the 
executive approach been underfunded and disappeared.  
 There has been an expectation created that the Shires will assume greater 
responsibility for the small communities abandoned by the Commonwealth 
and the NT Government as they consolidate their growth towns and hub and 
spoke models of service delivery.  
 The interventions have seen an increase in seeing development of the region 
in security terms both in terms of active law and order cries within Alice 
Springs and the policing of pornography and alcohol in outlying 
communities. 
In summary, it could be argued that the executive policy reforms increased rather 
than decreased marginalisation and typecast Aboriginal peoples’ responses to the 
changed policy environment. 
The managerial responses have mixed legitimacy among the people they are directed 
at and this has provided for contested and turbulent responses among some 
Aboriginal people and among the non Aboriginal population of central Australia 
with a consequent loss of hard won social capital. For more remote people it has 
created a feeling of despair and torpor.40   
The current Federal Government has renewed interest in regional Australia and has 
developed a large mix of specific programs. The challenge for governance reform is 
how to ensure these investments work in the best interests of the region. 
Government has demonstrated its good intentions through a long-term commitment 
to targets to ‘Close the Gaps’ in a specific number of areas. This commitment has 
financial commitment, a commitment to be strategic and coordinated not only 
within the Commonwealth agencies but also between the Commonwealth and the 
Territory. 
Executive control of housing, welfare and security services and social security 
payments complemented by the placement of government business managers in 
communities and adjusting the role of the Regional Indigenous Coordination 
Centres all point to a strong commitment by government. 
However, returns from this endeavour appear patchy and, whilst improvements are 
noted, they are often ephemeral or are outpaced by even more significant 
improvement in the same indicator among non-Aboriginal populations. In that 
sense, gap closing may be a problematic measure. 
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There is a growing agreement within government that training of staff in community 
development techniques would be desirable and greater community engagement and 
meaningful consultation and negotiation would also assist in achieving government 
and community objectives however, there is currently no program to support this. 
This position is further developed in the remoteFOCUS submission to the Senate 
Committee Stronger Futures Inquiry – submission 373.41   
What is clear from the remoteFOCUS work is that despite a uniformity of analysis of 
what needs to be done and recognition at the highest levels that current outcomes 
are problematic, the system of government appears unable to make the necessary 
systemic adjustments. On our analysis many areas of current systems and practices 
need to be addressed systemically. 
 It is clear that innovative economic policy rather than a singular focus on 
improved subsidies, welfare and services must be at the heart of policy on 
Central Australia. 
 Economic policy requires more from government than setting macro-
economic conditions—it needs to become an active partner in 
business/livelihood with community and private sector and it needs to be 
prepared to be innovative – more of the same regional development will not 
work. 
 Agglomeration, regional integration, and regional connectivity are keys to an 
innovative response in Central Australia. 
 Government could stimulate capacity in Central Australia though micro-
economic reform including adoption of more innovative regional and 
procurement policies. 
 The current arrangements comprising three tiers of government and a series 
of ad hoc regional arrangements overshadowed by localised law and order 
concerns, appear to be incapable of resolving both the priorities and the 
contests that need to take place around these arrangements. 
 The structure and configuration of institutions across central Australia are, 
therefore, largely not fit for purpose. 
 Failure to innovate is most marked in the public sector. 
 For Central Australia, the national debate over rights and responsibilities of 
Aboriginal people and the general question of citizen rights and equity for all 
Australians has created service expectations that cannot be fiscally sustained 
in this region. 
There are a number of inherent contradictions within the current policy mix 
impacting on Central Australia.  
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1. There is a lack of clarity of national purpose as to whether Aboriginal people 
can pursue cultural difference and whether as a result the nation is prepared 
to respect Aboriginal difference and allow a future for remote settlements 
that that difference reflects. At a more nuanced level what cultural difference 
is Australia prepared to accept, support and fund. 
2. As a consequence we currently have an unworkable settlement strategy in 
Central Australia where the hub and spoke service model of the growth towns 
strategy and the abandonment of homelands by the Commonwealth set a 
default policy of population movement to large regional centres without 
regard to economic issues and being indifferent to the consequences for a 
range of other employment and human service outcomes that result from 
such mass mobility. 
3. Central Australia has an inadequate economic base to support the 
infrastructure requirements and the recurrent effects of such a de facto de-
population strategy. Fiscal federalism allows the Territory government to 
apply revenue assessed by the Grants Commission against needs of remote 
communities to be allocated independently of those community needs. 
4. The governance arrangements in Central Australia with elements of 
Commonwealth disengagement and a distant and largely over-stretched 
Territory government and grossly underfunded local governments means 
there is no effective or legitimate means to address concerns unless the 
Commonwealth invests significantly in regional renewal and alternative 
governance outcomes. This disengagement means that many of the elements 
of civic life normally present in a community are not evident in remote 
communities. 
5. Targets for change have been elusive and, in hindsight, judged chronically 
inadequate and opportunistic, chasing new projects or hoping for mining to 
arrive or commodity prices to increase. The employment targets required will 
require more than reliance on markets if government is to sustain any 
improvement in human development indicators. 
The response to these five concerns has been a managerial response that in ways 
unintended simply reproduces the problems. 
Next Steps: Towards Governance Reform in Central 
Australia 
What might then be the basis for a discussion around a new governance 
reform in Central Australia and what mechanisms might be used to 
facilitate that discussion? 
One approach would be the establishment of a regional innovation trial where the 
principles and approach outlined in the report are applied, with the specific aim of 
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developing an on-going process of learning, consensus and regional capacity 
building - a starting point with a defined scale and scope. This will build momentum 
for change as required and potentially provide “proof by good example” of the 
efficacy of such change.  
The mix of economic and social issues evident in this context for Central 
Australia suggest a more systemic and holistic response is required to 
establish a platform for shared accountability and future development of 
the region. Regional connectedness and learning are part of the 
innovation process as proximity is a trigger for innovation. 
The remoteFOCUS report suggests that place centred approaches and 
regional innovation strategies provide an effective mechanism for 
engaging the community and confirming the views of the multiple 
stakeholders required to create a shared vision. We are of the view that 
in order to be systemic this vision has to encompass the whole of Central 
Australia rather than a mere focus on Alice Springs. 
Innovation in its broadest sense involves creating new ideas, and diffusing them 
into economies, driving changes which improve welfare and create economic 
growth.  It is also increasingly dependent on interpersonal relationships as ideas 
develop within networks seeking solutions to particular problems. Where innovation 
takes place these relationships shape informal cultures and formal institutions to 
create more conducive environments for particular kinds of innovation.  There is 
also a territorial dimension to innovation because innovation relationships depend 
on proximity for interaction and geographical proximity can allow actors to interact 
more easily.42 
Irrespective of the starting point, the remoteFOCUS report establishes a number of 
clear criteria, including vision, authority, legitimacy and effectiveness against which 
reforms at any level can be evaluated. 
 Is there a capacity to have a guiding vision or narrative that gives direction 
and explains the actions of all levels of government, that is, a shared vision? 
 Is there a capacity to settle mandates? 
 Is there a capacity to match mandates with funding and resources? 
 Is there local accountability within the various administrative structures? 
 Is there a capacity to review and adapt mandates as experience accumulates 
and learnings develop? 
 Is there a body that is above the contest, authorised by the players to be 
responsible to oversee all of the above? 
The current three-tiered system of government fails to do this adequately 
in Central Australia. Land Councils and Native Title Bodies provide 
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effectively a fourth tier of governance adding to the complexity of 
arrangements. 
The test of whether new arrangements are possible in Central Australia is that the 
process of developing an innovation strategy is able to determine what type of regional 
governance arrangement will have the authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy to 
respond to the nature and pace of change in Central Australia and deliver on a regional 
innovation strategy. 
Working through these issues requires a resourced, skilled and independent process 
to be put in train, and an action/learning/innovation framework to be established. 
It will also require a commitment from each level of government and leading 
Aboriginal organisations and the Land Council and Native Title Bodies. 
We know that more of the same will produce more of the same and therefore a 
changed approach to how government operates is needed. We accept that:  
 if the three levels of government and the community(ies) are working at cross 
purposes success is impossible because goals are different,  
 if members of the communities disagree with or do not support what 
governments are trying to do wicked problems (health education 
employment) will not be solved 
 in Central Australia government is the main provider of an economy (as 
against having some industries and particularly mining which do not of 
themselves ensure an economy as against having an industry), and  
 in the short term the pressure of change may require unique operational 
realities  
As we noted in the Pilbara option, it is now not a case of not knowing what to do, 
rather a case of having the collective will to do it. Only political and civic leadership 
will drive the necessary reforms. 
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Endnotes 
                                                        
40 Beadman, Bob. (2004) ‘Do Indigenous Youth have a Dream?’ The Menzies 
Research Centre, Barton, ACT. P15.  
41www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=cl
ac_ctte/strong_future_nt_11/submissions.htm.  
42  Benneworth, P. and A Dassen (2011), “Strengthening Global-Local Connectivity in 
Regional Innovation Strategies: Implications for regional innovation Policy”, OECD 
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